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Chapter 1: Introduction: the politics of floods and fear 
 
 
 
‗… the analysis of the political strategies surrounding the construction of insecurity is necessary to 
understanding some of the most influential social and political processes of our time. This is why 
more research on the politics of insecurity is needed‘ (Béland, 2005: 20). 
 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
1.1.1 WHY FLOOD POLITICS? 
 
Flood politics are not like normal politics - they are about survival, they are security issues. 
Security is being ‗without a care‘ (s(in)e cura)  -  in German Sicherheit is safety, security and certainty 
in one (Bauman, 1998). Floods deeply challenge Sicherheit in each of its three meanings. Similar to 
other complex emergencies like earthquakes or wars, extreme floods reduce people to vulnerable 
existence, surviving in a situation where normal rules and laws no longer obtain. The way 
hydrological risks to be dealt with are of decisive influence on how secure people feel. 
The present study will look at the political aspect of flood protection, which shapes the 
decisions on dealing with risk. Floods not only frighten people in society, they incite fear of social 
chaos and societal ungovernability in authorities, who are expected to provide security within 
their territory. The public outcry after flood events can seriously challenge a governmental body‘s 
legitimacy, which may be blamed for unsatisfactory warning or ineffective flood protection. 
But the role of protector, taking responsibility, can also bring extra legitimacy. If a flood 
happens, someone gets blamed, but if it is contained, someone takes the credit. In drought- or 
flood-prone states, river projects can play a key role in legitimising hegemonic rule of water 
agencies. Water is a political good that can enhance (or reduce) a political actor‘s legitimacy base 
(Donahue and Johnston, 1997). 
Despite advanced techniques of risk assessment and management that give the appearance of 
controlling the future, bids for security (its supply and demand) cannot be based on ‗objective 
facts‘. Risk is about what might happen and therefore about fear and anxiety. The analysis treats 
risk and security as constructs, as frames that give meaning to a bewildering reality. I propose this 
sense-making may have a political instrumentality to it: it legitimises certain agendas over others. 
Even if the frames ultimately prove unsuccessful they may reap the desired effect of landing the 
issue high on the political agenda. The present study seeks to bring a coherent theorisation and 
conceptualisation of the political construction of security and risk in water management, 
responding to Béland‘s (2005) observation that ‗(t)he construction of threats and insecurity 
through framing processes is a major aspect of the politics of insecurity‘ (Béland, 2005). 
The study focuses on infrastructural projects designed to prevent traumatic flood events 
happening. Engineers increasingly devise participatory processes promoting stakeholder 
involvement. For this study I researched five schemes (and one that never made it), several of 
which were prize-winning designs involving a degree of public participation - and still, each 
provoked a level of controversy (politicisation) unforeseen by its initiators. 
The study sketches the genesis, conflicts and outcome of six river plans: the Toshka project in 
Egypt, the Ilısu hydropower dam in Turkey, the FAP-20 compartmentalisation pilot project in 
Bangladesh, river widening and deepening on the Maas and controlled flood storage in the Ooij 
polder in the Netherlands, and the Maidenhead, Eton and Windsor Flood Alleviation Scheme in 
Britain. 
When I started studying these cases at the turn of the Millennium, I could not have predicted 
that all the cases studied were going to end up heavily dented: 
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-   Most of the consortium walks out and the project is shelved for five years (Turkey) 
-  Phase One is completed, but many wonder if the next phases will ever be carried through 
(Egypt) 
-   The project is completed but never sees its follow-up (Bangladesh) 
-   The project is reduced and much of its ´green´ content cut (Netherlands, Maas) 
-   The infrastructure for controlled flooding never even gets built (Netherlands, Ooij) 
-   The infrastructure is completed, but crumbles at its first test (Britain) 
 
Flood projects bring contest over the risk, over who should be protected by whom at what 
sacrifice. These issues are so fundamental they warrant intense political debate and action. It is 
therefore prudent to anticipate that such projects will always be politicised, although this rarely 
really means the end of the project. 
The analysis shows that such politicisation is always to the apparent surprise of project 
initiators. They may be dismayed to learn that not even a well-organised trust-building 
participation process, ‗joint‘ or ‗open planning‘, will exempt river planners from such a political 
process.  
I propose that a crucial factor explaining this is that flood projects not only promote some 
people‘s security, they often significantly reduce the security of others. A river regulation plan 
that regulates floods and promises economic development for the area is not necessarily 
appreciated, given recurring social and environmental protests against dams, embankments, 
spillways and detention basins as unrequited interference in local affairs. The projects appear to 
have disregarded essential values of project-affected stakeholders, inciting anxiety, anger and 
conflict. 
In the present study, we shall encounter spaces where some stakeholders blame government 
for failing to stop the flood or even starting it, some dread the invasion of their space and 
freedoms, making them feel fenced in, ‗enclosed‘, and still others who feel deprived of 
protection, bereft of basic political rights, either in the name of security or efficiency. All of these 
however can ‗speak security‘ to try and turn the tables. 
In Security. A New framework for Analysis, Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde claim that 
saying ‗security‘ legitimises extraordinary measures that are otherwise impossible to achieve 
(Buzan et al., 1998). The speech act of ‗securitisation‘ is a powerful move for closure, foreclosing 
political debate and choice for the sake of swift emergency action. While states are mandated to 
declare threats, so can others (Litfin, 1997). Still, not everyone advocates ‗securitising‘ 
environmental issues (Krause and Williams, 1997). If river schemes can make one more rather 
than less vulnerable, it is tempting to distrust the political process and argue against state 
involvement in flood security. I will argue, though, that one should not throw the baby called 
Security out with the bathwater. We need a well-coordinated and accountable collective security 
apparatus to counter collective insecurity (see also Béland, 2005). While Béland rightly reminds us 
that state protection also has an oppressive side, it is not so clear flood victims are better off if 
condemned to the alternative – self-help. 
 
 
1.1.2 THEORETICAL RELEVANCE 
 
The key theoretical aim for this thesis is to develop an analytical framework for understanding 
discursive risk and security strategies. Risk studies and security studies traditionally study 
phenomena of danger at different geographical levels: the local and international level, 
respectively. Recently the two disciplines seem to be drawing towards each other as local risks 
take on international or global dimensions (global warming, environmental refugees) whereas 
security studies increasingly recognise the sub-state and non-military dimensions of conflict - and 
INTRODUCTION 
 
3 
  
indeed, are developing an understanding of security which goes beyond (violent) conflict. In both 
disciplines, the legitimacy of social arrangements for dealing with security and risk, and in some 
cases even of the political system as a whole, are now debated, resulting in the identification of 
risk as the new danger for states (Giddens, 1999) and a plethora of new understandings of 
‗security‘. The so-called Copenhagen School of peace research has given a fresh impetus to 
security studies that also places environmental politics in a different light. Regrettably, the focus 
of the research and debate on the Copenhagen approach is very much concentrated on Europe, 
specifically on issues of identity, integration and migration issues (Wilkinson, 2007). The 
approach however merits wider application, both in terms of geography and subject matter. Not 
only has ‗securitisation‘ become a household word in International Relations and peace studies, it 
echoes in other disciplines such as cultural and media studies and human geography. The 
approach has become more current in international hydro political analyses (Turton, 2001, 
Jägerskog, 2003, Phillips et al., 2006), but these studies applied security concepts to situations of 
scarcity rather than excess, i.e. floods. The present approach sheds light on the framing and 
legitimisation and delegitimisation of proposed ‗solutions‘ to disaster challenges. A comparative 
approach highlights similarities and differences in context. 
Given the proximity of wars and emergencies in their potential for social disruption it is 
surprising that the securitization approach has not made similar inroads in disaster studies 
literature. The constructivist approach underlying securitisation theory permits a dispassionate 
account and analysis of the politics of emergency.  
The present study applies the approach to natural hazards and river development as potential 
sources of securitisation, given the existential threat, urgency and exceptional measures taken to 
contain rivers. Drawing on three current international narratives of ‗water wars‘ and peace (in 
1.4), I will identify three similar narratives of (de)securitising floods. It tests this idea on the basis 
of an analysis of six recent infrastructural river interventions in five countries – two in Western 
Europe, one in South Asia and two in the Middle East. The latter two regions have often been 
singled out as flashpoints for international water conflict. 
 
 
1.1.3 CENTRAL RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
On the basis of security literature, the present research starts from the proposition that ´saying 
security´ would successfully legitimise river management projects, close the debate, and boost the 
role of the securitising agent in the river management regime. This leads me to the following 
central research question: 
 
What role do 'security' frames play in (de)legitimising flood management projects, and how does this affect the 
political and river management regime context?  
 
Answering this question involves the following tasks:  
1. developing a conceptual framework that brings together security studies and flood 
management studies from a constructivist perspective. 
2.  identifying and analysing arguments and frames for and against flood security projects, the 
alternatives advanced and the extent to which these were considered. 
3.  identifying the different discourses and security speech acts of ‗security‘ and ‗risk‘ employed 
to influence key decisions on those projects (closing or opening security frames) and whether 
they legitimise these alternatives. 
4. charting flood governance regimes impinging on decision-making on water regulation 
projects and hegemonic actors and frames governing them. 
5.  analysing the role of flood events and river projects in challenging this regime. 
6. analysing whether the findings for the above questions are similar in different national 
governance settings. 
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To help answer these questions, I develop a conceptual framework around concepts of regime, 
crisis, framing, closure and hegemony, applied to six case studies in five different countries. 
 
 
1.1.4 ORGANISATION OF THE BOOK 
 
The remainder of this chapter is devoted to conceptual development and case selection. 
The next Section will first look at the importance of security to the state and the challenges of the 
changing ‗security governance regime‘ (1.2), in its administrative and technological sense. It 
introduces the idea of closure and notes the role of crisis events like floods or even a flood project 
in ‗opening up‘ the regime overnight.  
As a crisis can be ‗constructed‘, the focus turns to the role of discourse and (strategic) framing 
of risk and security issues (1.3). The Section goes into contest over frames, the formation of 
discourse coalitions and hegemonic strategies, and closes with a definition of politics of flood 
insecurity. Section 1.4 makes methodological observations on a constructivist ‗positioning‘ 
approach and pointers of identifying successful and unsuccessful securitising moves. The final 
section (1.4.4) explains the case study selection process. and goes into more detail about the 
research methods employed. 
 
The remaining chapters will analyse the six case studies, starting with the two Middle East (‗dry 
basin‘) studies discussed in Chapter 2 and 3, Egypt and Turkey. The politics of the Toshka river 
diversion scheme and the Ilısu hydroelectric dam are discussed at the domestic and international 
levels. Chapter 4 compares the two cases in the context of the three security narratives and finds 
this leads to three very different assessments of the politics of the projects.  
Chapter 5 until 8 discuss four ‗wet basin‘ studies: Bangladesh, the Netherlands (Ooij polder 
and Maaswerken) and England. Flood Action Plan 20, the disputed project discussed in Chapter 
5, compartmentalized an existing polder in Central Bangladesh, seeking to a safer environment 
for food production and to democratize decision-making on when to drain monsoon water. The 
Maaswerken, Chapter 6, deepened and widened the river Maas in the south of the Netherlands to 
provide a safer but also more natural river environment. While the Maas is a natural border with 
Belgium, the Ooij polder, on the Rhine, connects the Netherlands with Germany. The polder was 
slated for controlled emergency flood storage in case of extreme events but as Chapter 7 
discusses, the polder dwellers refused to be sacrificed. The final case study zooms in on the river 
Thames where a flood relief channel to protect Maidenhead, Eton and Windsor caused a 
commotion. 
Chapter 9 brings all cases together and develops three flood narratives analogous to the 
security narratives in Chapter 4. Chapter 10 concludes by linking back the findings from the river 
management studies to security theory. 
 
 
1.2 THE FLOOD REGULATION REGIME: CONTROL OVER RIVERS AND 
PEOPLE 
 
Flood managers may be the only people who pray for a really good periodic disaster. The Dutch 
paraphrase ‗Give us our daily bread and a flood every ten years‘ will sound familiar to civil 
engineers in Britain, Bangladesh and in many other settings, even Egypt where one might prefer 
the flood to appear every single year. 
Flood experts however do not normally make the rules, and they do not always have their way. 
The way environmental hazards like floods are managed are a reflection of how society is 
organised, the governance arrangement or regime - the division of labour and responsibility 
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between public and non-public actors to provide stability of expectations, and thus durably 
legitimizing certain solution alternatives over others. 
Security politics has important consequences for the decision arena: who can take decisions, 
who has responsibility, what options for redress are there? As a regime provides stability of 
expectations, it durably legitimises certain solution alternatives over others (Bijker, 1995). The 
ensuing resource distribution can become ´closed´ and ´fossilised´, until a new frame or crisis 
event opens the regime up again. 
Disasters are moments when nature escapes human control; it is hard to imagine effective 
disaster management policies without the aim of control (Hilhorst, 2003: 6). Engineers are 
trained to look at the world as a control system, in which they manipulate parameters and they 
solve problems (e.g. see Geldof, 1994)  so that the system will not be overwhelmed. Yet the only 
really effective way to impress on people that action is urgently needed is the arrival of a high 
water event. While the flood stays away, it is hard to convince decision-makers to agree to 
interventions to manage the river. Other concerns always seem more important than containing 
the river, which costs large amounts of money and interferes with people‘s everyday lives. When 
the flood calls, it is a rare and limited window to ‗do something‘, to intervene and avert the threat 
or seize a development opportunity. The window is brief, so best to make good use of it. 
Given the state‘s identity as security provider, the ´marketing´ of security by playing on 
insecurities to generate or foreground ´demand for security´ is part and parcel of politics. The 
present Section will therefore first discuss the role of the state, then changes in the governance 
arrangement thereafter and then the role of a crisis.  
 
 
1.2.1 SECURITY GOVERNANCE 
 
Historically, states have not always enjoyed supremacy, and have often needed to legitimise 
themselves through warfare (Tilly, 1985). Currently, citizens have no choice but be protected by 
the state, unless they stage a coup d´Etat. The Westphalian state system, instated in 1648 to put an 
end to several long European wars, vests the legitimate use of the means of violence and the 
power to declare a state of exception solely in the sovereign state. This power to instate or shore 
up the rule of law States can make, but also break the law for the sake of order in the face of 
perceived chaos constitutes the very essence of sovereignty. According the German political 
philosopher Carl Schmitt (Schmitt, 1922) this decision is even the very essence of the political: it 
determines the distinction between friends and enemies, reconstituting actors as political actors 
(those with rights) and outcasts (those without rights) who find themselves reduced to what the 
Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben (1998) has called ‘bare life‘. The normal order is dependent 
on this power. While European states have rarely experienced states of emergency of late, it is far 
more frequent on other continents. Bangladesh, for example, declared a state of emergency in 
2006 to deal with political chaos.  
The urgency of a threat or crisis justifies bypassing normal political debate, budget 
considerations and public accountability and transparency, as well as and civil rights like privacy 
and a voice in decisions affecting them. Under an authoritarian regime, political contest, 
consultation and co-operation with stakeholders would be an anomaly. This may suit some states 
well as states cannot always be sure of their monopoly on sovereignty.  
´Weak states´ may feel threatened and in competition at the domestic level with regional 
strongmen, separatist forces or religious movements that do not recognise their authority. As 
Agamben (1998) has warned, a state which has security as its sole source of legitimacy is a fragile 
organism: it can always be provoked by terrorism to become terrorist itself. The state can act 
destructively to save the population from destruction. An insecure state, beleaguered from all 
sides, may seek certainties by pursuing dangerous routines and fall into a pattern of regression 
(Mitzen, 2005) and repression. Chapters 2 and 3 will investigate to which extent Egypt and 
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Turkey are such ‗security states‘, while the other cases assess if, and how, flood defence plays a 
role in the legitimacy of the other states, especially their water departments. 
A state of emergency or state of war is not cast in stone; a state can change its ‗mind‘, its self-
image as a consequence. A currently influential school of Constructivism in International 
Relations (Wendt, 1999, Checkel, 1999) claims that states have identities and security needs, 
especially a need for stability of expectations. If these needs can be met otherwise, there is no 
need to work in security mode. Threats may become less threatening over time, conflictive 
relations may become friendly. Re-framing an issue as ‗non-security‘ opens the political arena up: 
it can promote the role of non-state actors and bring in governance alternatives and other, non-
military foci for protection. When there is no clear enemy or crisis to deal with, the united 
societal front against the challenge dissipates into factions (Roe, 2004). The liberal (Lockeian) 
project found in European democracies is a contest between a plurality of contenders. 
Discussions of contemporary security studies have involved both ‗wideners‘ and ‗deepeners‘ 
(Hough 2004):  
 
- ‗deepeners‘: ‗deepening‘ security referents to include sub-state categories, that is, communities or 
individuals rather than states become the focus for protection.  
- ‗wideners‘: ‗widening‘ security categories beyond the military domain: economic, environmental, 
societal, political security may be deemed survival issues. The 'new security agenda' is focused on 
societal emergencies and vulnerabilities (Sundelius quoted in Ekengren, 2004) 
 
A governance focus finds that there is not only a ‗widening and deepening‗ of security 
‗referents‘, but also of ‗security suppliers‘. ‗Security governance‘ is a newly emerging, and 
therefore  still underdeveloped concept to analyse new social arrangements for security provision 
(Krahmann, 2003). Modern states faced with demanding citizens and lobbies, and with knotty 
policy issues that reflect the increasing complexity, diversity and dynamics in today‘s societies 
(Kooiman, 2000). They find it hard to meet the presumed or expressed demand for security 
alone. To fill the gap between demand and supply, non-state actors present themselves and may 
be enlisted or co-opted to help out in providing security. The police, prisons, protection and 
intelligence services are currently being (part-)privatised in several countries while the war in Iraq 
is fought enlisting private companies. Private and NGO actors are likewise of growing 
importance in humanitarian relief after disasters. This may improve the governability of danger 
and risk, but also present problems of transparency and accountability, control, coordination, and 
efficiency (Krahmann, 2003). 
A currently popular narrative claims that the world is becoming increasingly ‗flat‘ (Friedman 
2005): power distances get smaller, unilateral control is relaxed. The (contestable)1 ´government 
to governance´ narrative paints a picture of a past where public services were rendered in a 
vertical manner, and now are increasingly horizontalised: less hierarchy, more lateral co-
ordination. 
However, the vertical aspect may be as important to the analysis. A twin trend towards 
decentralization and internationalisation of policy suggests a concomitant vertical differentiation 
of governing powers at work. Thus, the European Union‘s subsidiary principle stipulates that 
policy should be made and implemented at the lowest relevant level, placing more decision power 
in the hands of local authorities and participating citizen organisations. Meanwhile the overlay of 
international actors. notably the European Union (the European Framework Directive of 2000 
and the High Water Directive of 2006) set standards that impinge on member states‘ national 
policies while donors and consultants may overrule the (de)securitising moves of statesmen. The 
European Union is also seeking to make transnational civil defence arrangements (Ekengren, 
2004). 
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TABLE 1.1 Horizontalisation and verticalisation of governance 
NGO= Non-Governmental Organisation, CBO= Community-based Organisation.  
                        Sector 
Level  
Private Public Civil society 
 
International 
 
 
International business 
 
International 
 
International NGOs 
 
 
National  
 
 
National business 
 
 
State 
 
 
National NGOs 
 
Local  
 
 
Local business 
 
Local authority 
 
CBOs 
 
 
While relations between ‗partners in governance‘ are unlikely to be egalitarian, their roles may 
be fluid. The governance domain begins to look like an open ‗network‘ (Goverde et al., 2000) that 
is in flux but has a degree of close coupling between actors. Karen Bakker et al. (2006) perceive 
this movement more like a shift in emphasis, from the vertical levels of governance to the 
functional mechanisms of government. There is no ‗either/or‘ but ‗and-and‘: both state and non-
state actors take roles: they co-ordinate with each other in top-down hierarchy, but also 
horizontal ‗heterarchy‘ and ‗free interaction‘ in society (Kooiman, 2000). While such authors 
appear to project their hopes for a better world onto governance, others are sceptical. 
Bustamante and Palacios (2005) for example are concerned that the concept depoliticises 
essentially political issues of distributive justice and rights. In the present study, an analytical 
rather than normative approach to governance will be attempted (Hood and Baldwin, 2001).  
The new, dynamic arrangements for security at different geographical levels have given rise to 
a blending of the literature on governance in Public Administration and regimes in International 
Relations. As a result there are various ways of conceptualising the mechanisms of risk and 
responsibility to provide order and stability of expectations in an issue-area, such as 
environmental policy arrangements (Arts and Tatenhove, 2000) and risk regulation regimes (cf. 
Hood, Rothstein and Baldwin, 2001). For the purposes of this study, the ‗regime‘ for dealing with 
an issue-area such as river management will combine and integrate three foci of ´patterned 
behaviour´ (Puchala and Hopkins, 1983) noted in regime theory: a regime will be said to consist 
of the actor coalition involved, the rules and roles they take on with respect to each other, and their 
knowledge and action capacities (after Hasenclever et al., 1997) (see Ch. 4, annex for background 
and application). While regimes describe co-operation in interstate relations, the literature on 
governance looks at multiple levels of organization. They tend to focus on the horizontal and 
vertical moves away from the state as pictured in Table 1.1 above. 
While painting a more intricate picture of how security issues are dealt with, such a picture 
underexposes two important groups: the expert community and local, disaster-affected 
stakeholders. Buzan et al. (1998: 72) note that the way academic agenda structures the political 
agenda is ‗exceptional‘. Given the long and prominent history of experts in (infra)structural river 
management, the role of science and technology in the way flood hazards are dealt with merits 
special attention. Our focus on projects moreover means a focus on the project‘s interface with the 
stakeholders in the local domain.  
Following Hilhorst (2003), I shall therefore focus on the interactions within three specific 
social domains that share practices with respect to hazard management:  
-   governance sector (decision-makers, funders, bureaucrats)  
-   security experts (scientists and managers) 
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-  local actors at risk from floods – or as the case may be, from flood projects. Actors within 
these domains are supposed to be co-ordinated and co-operative, but Hilhorst notes this is an 
exception rather than a rule. 
Having discussed the governance sector at some length, I will now turn to the domain of 
experts and technology. The local domain will be discussed in Section 1.2.3. 
 
 
1.2.2 SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY  
 
A central concept in the study is (en)closure´, taken here in both its technical, political and 
discursive sense. If you close off a river and enclose its stream by technological means, you capture 
a resource that others see as a common pool resource. Political closure disenfranchises actors from 
having ¨voice´ in decision-making. Weber (1947) highlighted the concept of social closure which 
creates in- and out-groups, selective or all-inclusive participation. Closure has a distribution effect 
on who gets ´voice´, responsibilities, resources, constraints, and which actors, factors, alternatives 
are excluded. Discursive (rhetorical) closure, finally, excludes debate and alternatives and puts the 
audience in a position from which everything is ‗obvious‘ (Chandler, 2007:127). It was noted that 
a core frame, technology or axiom, once selected, tends to reinforce itself and becomes almost 
unassailable. Narratives under-girding these frames may become ‗canonised‘ in institutions and 
‗normalised‘ in everyday institutional practices (Miller, 2000). We will return to discursive closure 
in Section 1.3. 
The water projects under review can all be seen as technological innovations, intervening in a 
social reality but also shaped by that reality (Pinch and Bijker, 1987). Science and Technology 
studies show that technology is never politically neutral - dikes and dams are ‗thick with politics‘ 
(Bijker, 2007). Thus new ‗paradigms‘, new ways of dealing with a technological challenge, are not 
merely the result of progressive insight, but of contest. Pinch and Bijker (1987) show that a great 
number of actors are involved in the development of a knowledge claim or technology, which 
shows up conflicting interests and power relations. Bruno Latour, a protagonist of Science and 
Technology Studies conceives of innovation as the continuation of politics by other means 
(Latour, 1987). As it arrives on the scene, a new knowledge claim or technology has different 
meanings for different groups (interpretative flexibility). The type of solution needs to be facilitated 
and legitimised, which means it will not only be judged on its technical merits. Therefore there is 
likely to be debate, or even conflict, over this claim. The debate can be cut short either through 
rhetorical closure (explicitly or implicitly declared closed) or the problem being redefined (defined 
away). Once selected, a core technology or axiom, tends to reinforce itself and becomes almost 
unassailable. A ‗paradigm‘, an exemplar of how things should be done, emerges. This creates a 
stable environment. Socio-technical regimes are networks of rules and assumptions in which an 
established technique gets its stability (Geels, 2004). Rival technologies will remain underfunded 
and underexplored. Developments within this dominant paradigm tends to be incremental in 
nature rather than radical (shock wise) until further optimisation is no longer possible and a 
‗shock‘ or challenge opens the ‘frame‘ up. This phenomenon is known as closure (Pinch and 
Bijker, 1987). 
The type of technological regime has environmental as well as institutional and social 
consequences. Mumford (in Miller, 1986) argues that large, closely coupled technologies are more 
compatible with top-down bureaucratic (centralized) management, while dispersed technologies 
are more democratic, as they can be controlled locally. In the water sector, we can juxtapose high 
dams with groundwater pumps and flood walls and flood-proofing of individual neighbourhoods 
and arrive at the same conclusion. 
Particular technologies thus serve some groups better than others. Physical infrastructure 
creates what Callon (1986) has termed ‗obligatory passage points‘ or nodes. The illuminating 
concept of ‘pipelines of power‘ (after Turton, 1999)2 captures that infrastructural layout has 
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distributive consequences: who controls who gets resources first, who gets them later, and who 
never gets them. Egypt, but also India, Israel and indeed the Netherlands built their interlinked 
water grid so that they can move water around from any location to another, to bring it where it 
is needed or to drain it where it is in excess, or – in the Dutch case – as a water defence line to 
stop enemy invasions. In times of crisis, governments decide who gets priority treatment – who 
continues to receive water in times of drought, or which areas will be saved in times of flood. 
We can visualise a continuum denoting whether the chosen technology constraints and 
controls the river (e.g. a flood wall) or frees up the river (a dike relocation to widen the channel)3 
which relate with the regime‘s treatment of the river as a danger or an opportunity, as enemy or 
friend (Fig.1.1a). 
 
A state that takes the lead in controlling and developing all water resources on the territory to 
guarantee the security of supply, is said, after Mark Reisner‘s (1993: 112-114) phrase, to be on an 
‗hydraulic mission‘. This is a highly ‗closed‘, Etatist form of river governance - open-ended in its 
ambitions and interventionism, but one-dimensional in its state-society relations, as it mobilises 
people and resources in a top-down, command-and-control fashion to realise its development 
schemes for irrigation and hydropower production (Wittfogel, 1957). A state can bring water to 
people through infrastructure, or people to water through resettlement. Either way, the control 
of water is thus closely related with the control of people.  
But while under the hydraulic mission, the sky appears to be the limit, many 20th-century 
developments ran up against ‗closing basins‘. This is said to have triggered a different, ‗reflexive‘ 
form of management, more aware of the limits of environmental carrying capacity for water 
development and the need to diversify. It opened up the regime to more economically rational 
water management, environmental conservation, and stakeholder participation with stakeholders 
(Meissner and Turton, 2003). In terms of my focus on closure, this brought an ‗open‘ form of 
water governance; limited in its ambitions for control, intervention and expansion, open-ended in 
the range of alternatives. Water is no longer a resource, but is recognised for other values too, 
and alternative uses. A continuum is pictured in Fig.1.1b. 
 
FIG. 1.1    Stream and social intervention continua 
  
Fig. 1.1a:    STREAM INTERVENTION CONTINUUM:  
Closed --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Open 
Taming the river           Living with the river 
 
 
Fig. 1.1b    SOCIAL INTERVENTION (GOVERNANCE) CONTINUUM:  
Closed --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Open 
Top-down governance       Network governance 
 
So far, we have discussed the role of scarcity management in river control. In flood management, 
dealing with temporary excess, the state likewise has more ‗open‘ and ‗closed‘ control strategies 
that keep the river away from people or people away from the water. By influencing people‘s 
risky behaviour, security policy is hoped to reduce risk to life and assets. While drought is a 
creeping catastrophe, floods are sudden and immediate, with a capacity to overwhelm the social 
system in one fell swoop. The potential for such crisis events to change and open up the scene 
has been subject to much speculation.  
 
 
1.2.3 LOCAL DOMAIN 
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Faced with a disaster, it is the local domain that bears the brunt of immediate coping and relief 
efforts (Kirschenbaum, 2004). A ‗from government to governance‘ approach backgrounds that 
before governments became involved in security management, people developed and 
institutionalised local responses to hazard on the basis of their local knowledge of the area, to 
survive in the most adverse environments (van Dijk and de Bruijn, 1995). When central states 
initiate disaster management approaches, these are set in a particular technological frame that 
may be at odds with local responses, peculiarities, perceptions of insecurity. However, of late 
project initiators have sought to make their projects more participatory and interactive, so that 
local people may have a voice in decision-making that affects their lives. The present study does 
not so much concentrate on charting these coping mechanisms but rather on the interaction 
between the central and local levels when a project is planned and implemented. 
 
 
1.2.4 CALLING A CRISIS 
 
The decision-making regime, it was noted above, may fossilise and in so doing prevent 
innovation. But political actors may seize on a crisis to enter, leave, or improve their position, 
while others use the same event to reinforce theirs or stifle alternatives.  
A disaster is a crisis of control. A crisis, in turn, is  
 
'an event, concentrated in time and space, which threatens a society or relatively self-sufficient 
subdivision of society with major unwanted consequences as a result of the collapse of precautions 
which had hitherto been culturally accepted or adequate' (Turner, 1976). 
 
Crises expose and question the taken-for-granted arrangements in society (the regime, the 
governance set-up), and provide windows for changing them. They reveal and call into question 
social arrangements that in normal situations remain unnoticed or undisputed. ‗Abnormal times‘ 
can bring to consciousness alternative conceptions of the world (Antonio Gramsci quoted in 
Lukes, 2005a). If system legitimacy itself remains intact, the legitimacy of specific actors may be 
at stake.  
The public outcry after flood events challenges the legitimacy of a governmental body or the 
technological frame, which may be blamed for unsatisfactory warning or malperformance of the 
flood protection system. Others within and outside the ruling regime may present themselves as 
alternative security suppliers. This (de)legitimisation drive is often fanned by non-participant 
intermediaries such as the press, who amplify risks (Pidgeon et al., 2003) and as a rule paint 
conflicts in shrill colours (Vultee, 2007).  
 
The present research looks at floods as focusing events that may break the status quo. 
According to Punctuated-Equilibrium Theory (PET), a crisis disturbs the equilibrium and opens 
windows of opportunity for another coalition pushing for radical, self-reinforcing change 
(positive feedback), ´punctuating the equilibrium´ (Baumgartner and Jones, 1991). A new 
problem definition can de-stabilise the status quo in the decision-making regime such that actor 
coalitions are realigned and new actors find their way into the process (Baumgartner and Jones, 
1991). Both in flood policy and in regimes this has certain inevitability: if you repress risk and 
tension, the crisis will only be bigger when it happens – you have only displaced the risk from 
‗high incidence, low consequence‘ to ‗low incidence, high consequence‘ (Bak, 1996 calls this 
‗organised criticality‘). 
Radical change after a crisis clearly cannot be taken for granted. Pelling and Dill (2006) note 
that disaster enables political leaders to regain or even enhance their legitimacy and repress 
spontaneous social action. A flood, or the fear of one, can then be expected to open a 
considerable window of opportunity in which governments can get away with draconic 
emergency measures and schemes without political fall-out.  
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Declaring and responding to an environmental crisis such as a drought or flood can thus 
unfold either to maintain or change the status quo. But while declaring a crisis brings advantages 
and resources, it also carries special responsibilities, so that not declaring a crisis where others 
would declare one can be preferable to a political actor. Some high-water events and hurricanes 
are called crises, some are not, as illustrated by Hurricane Katrina. The hurricane did was not 
awarded national disaster status, which led to a much-criticised delay in crisis response.   
After all, short of an acute threat - a loaded gun pointed at one‘s head, a tsunami wiping out a 
town - many ‗dangers‘ and ‗crises‘ are ambiguous. A crisis is only a crisis when a situation is 
declared and accepted to be one. Given this unpredictability, I decided to see what happened in 
actual high-water events. 
 
Meijerink (2005) and Johnson et al. (2005) analysed floods as windows of opportunity for a 
new river management philosophy.4 (Liberal) regime theory also teaches that a ‘catalytic shock‘ 
can turn the decision-making regime upside down (Young, 1994)5. But they did not look at the 
potential of flood projects for overturning the regime. Lowry (2006) sees both disasters and river 
regulation schemes as ‗focusing events‘ that can herald major change. This widens our scope to 
the regime change potential of conflict. A flood scheme can also call into question the local social 
arrangement of rules, roles and knowledge in managing the resource, i.e. the regime, and changes 
people‟s (perceived) security positions. As a result the project itself is a 'risk' (both in the sense of a threat 
and an opportunity) to stakeholders in flood management. 
Political ecologists have noted that a crisis can be constructed and declared for a particular goal. 
The flexibility of the ‗crisis‘ label allows declaring some issues security issues and ignoring others. 
Political ecologists show that calling an environmental crisis and/or securitising biodiversity 
(wildlife conservation) decisively changes power relationships between socio-economic groups 
(Lees, 2001)6. A ‗crisis‘, a successful representation of urgency, works like a tin-opener or 
window-smasher to break the closure, with important political and institutional consequences. 
 
The next section will explore the concept of construction and framing in more detail, along 
with the associated body of knowledge on how people create stories and narratives to make sense 
of the world. It will especially zoom in on one particular frame possessing particular ‗political 
magic‘: the security frame. This brings us to a short exposition of the constructivist approach of 
the Copenhagen School exemplified by Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde‘s 
framework. 
 
 
1.3 MOVES FOR CLOSURE: STRATEGIC FRAMES, NARRATIVES AND 
SECURITY  SPEECH ACTS 
 
‗What man desires is not knowledge but certainty‘ - Bertrand Russell 
  
"There are not only struggles over security among nations, but also struggles over security among 
notions. Winning the right to define security provides not just access to resources but also the 
authority to articulate new definitions and discourses of security, as well" (Lipschutz, 1995). 
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1.3.1 WHY FRAMES? 
 
Cultural anthropologists teach us that we do not perceive the world 'as it is' - rather, we devise 
stories about the world that make sense of the messy reality we are presented with. People tend 
to dread uncertainty and ambiguity: the fundamental uncertainty over the future procures an 
existential feeling of not being in control (Lupton, 1999). (for the difference between uncertainty 
and risk. see Box 1.1 below).  
Risk is about fear of loss, but without meaning, we ourselves are lost. We construct a coherent 
world-view that lends logic, a meaning to our existence. Given the amount of uncertainty, people 
create cause-and-effect stories to ‗fill in the blanks‘. Frames mobilise the values against which 
‗risks‘ and policy ‗problems‘ are judged to exist, and point at a way out. These stories have 
important social effects, since the way the problem is framed delineates the range of alternatives 
considered and the division of responsibilities in the governance regime.  
In their interaction with the world, people create representations that become legitimate 
(Berger & Luckmann, 1991 [1966]: 110ff) and try to convince others that it is the proper view. A 
frame is a persuasive device used to ‗fix meanings, organize experience, alert others that their 
interests and possibly their identities are at stake, and propose solutions to ongoing problems‘ 
(Barnett, 1999: 25). Frames are incorporated categories of perception. ‗Norm entrepreneurs‘ 
promote new ideas such that they resonate with the intended audience (Nadelmann, 1990: 482). 
This skill is known in organisational management studies as the ‗management of meaning‘ 
(Smircich and Morgan, 1982, Czarniawska-Joerges, 1988). 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
BOX 1.1. Risk and uncertainty are commonly defined as follows (after Knight, 1921): 
 
1. If you know for sure what is going to happen, that is certainty. 
2. If you do not know for sure what will happen, but you know the odds, that is risk. 
3. If you do not even know the odds, that is uncertainty. 
 
 
1.3.2 SECURITY FRAMES 
 
The work of Buzan, Waever, and De Wilde (1998) suggests that security and risk frames are a 
special frame category. By putting the issue into the domain of the absolute and non-negotiable, 
such frames can move a decision-making process to a degree of closure that other types of 
frames cannot achieve because they are about life and death issues. It sacrifices choice for the 
sake of necessity. 
Security, for Buzan et al. (1998), is a speech act (Austin, 1962), that is a way of using language 
that changes the world by uttering it. While everything we say has the potential of influencing the 
world around us, some categories have a far more powerful ‘social magic‘ than others. Like 
making a promise, naming a ship and declaring a couple married, calling something a security 
issue in the right context, given the right stage, to the right audience makes it so. The ‗social 
magic‘ of speech acts is that they create and legitimise facts on the ground, calling something a 
security issue can make it so. Saying ´security‘ forecloses choice and contradiction: it becomes an 
absolute that overrides everything else where others might like to dispute aspects of the proposed 
projects.   
Security successfully presents an as absolute and inviolable, reducing the range of alternatives and 
of actors (and their say) involved in decisions to a minimum. It splits the world into black and white: 
if you are not for it, you are against it; if you are not part of the solution, you are part of the 
problem. A security speech act does not tolerate half measures - it calls for the ‗neutralization, 
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elimination or constraint of that person, group, object or condition which engenders fear‘ 
(Dillon, 1995).  
This type of closure depoliticises the issue; it does not, however, kill politics. Rhetorical closure 
does not necessarily mean that the issue has been ‗solved‘ or even accepted (as Pinch and Bijker, 
1987 seem to claim). It is also possible that someone succeeded in ‗putting a lid on it‘ through 
skilful use of discourse. The united front of discursive closure therefore may obscure power 
inequalities and the exclusion of alternatives proposed by less powerful actors. Security absolutes 
may get things done and clear up ambiguity, they can also create antagonism. Where there are 
winners, there are also losers, where there is inclusion there is exclusion. ‗Risk-talk implicitly 
empowers some people as experts and excludes others as inarticulate, irrelevant or incompetent' 
(Jasanoff, 1999: 96). 
Dangers to security issues are usually far from ‗clear and present‘, they need to be framed as 
such  One issue will become elevated to security status (‗securitised‘), while another remains 
unaddressed. Douglas and Wildavsky have argued that out of the many threats we are faced with, 
we select only those that protect the (political) community (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1983). An 
instrumentalist (strategic) perspective however does not rule out the possibility that actors project 
threats for their own political gain. The power to ´close´ the frame not only ends quarrelling but 
also gives access to the resources of security (for oneself or one‘s constituency)  legal, financial, 
informational, institutional. This makes it attractive to seek to shape the closure. But the speech 
does not have to be successful: people do not always spring to attention when a little boy cries 
‗wolf‘. Buzan et al. (1998) call the successful performance of this speech act securitisation. 
A securitising move does not become a successful securitisation7 without the consent, however 
grudging, from others. This points at the rather underappreciated roles of audience and social context 
in successful securitization (Balzacq, 2005). It takes a receptive audience to turn word into action, 
to become hegemonic in an arena of competing discourse coalitions. 
 
 
1.3.3 FINDING AN AUDIENCE: HEGEMONIC COALITION BUILDING     
 
Security framing takes place within a ‗field of power struggles in which securitizing actors align 
on a security issue to swing the audience‘s support toward a policy or course of action‘ (Balzacq 
2005: 173). The fragmented political infrastructure in liberal democracies can contribute to the need 
to spread a ‗sense of crisis‘ to get anything done (Béland, 2005). This can ‗distort‘ the message 
significantly. Moreover, different messages may be intended for different audiences. 
Public speech acts are always uttered with an audience in mind. Burton and Carlen (1979) show 
how official discourse is an ‗exercise in legitimation‘, incorporating ‗discrepant‘ discourse and 
achieving ‗discursive coherence‘. An emergency, a crisis, a threat to survival, is most likely to 
generate general consensus (Buzan et al., 1998). Providing and taking responsibility for security can 
procure the provider legitimacy, which increases an actor‘s power (Donahue and Johnson, 1998). 
Legitimacy is 'the extent to which social or political norms are accepted, especially those applying 
to the exercise of power or domination of some individuals or groups of individuals by others' 
(Rush, 1992: 53). All hierarchical power relations must be legitimated at every level of social life 
from the smallest scale to the level of multinational regimes (Beetham, 1991)8. Even Machiavelli 
recommended that the Prince who seizes power by force cultivate belief that his actions are just 
and legitimate (Tansey, 1999). It is easier to govern society when authority is accepted than when 
it is imposed: the costs of imposing one's dominance to obtain compliance are higher than those of 
cementing a platform on which everyone can agree. As Rush (1992: 21) suggests, fear, an 
unwillingness to accept the consequences of non-acceptance, apathy or cynicism (the opportunity 
costs of acceptance) can lead to de facto acceptance. He contrasts this with de jure authority: 
acceptance of the exercise of power as right or justified by those to whom it is administered 
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(Rush, 1992: 52). Compliance with a securitisation may thus be impelled by a hegemonic 
securitisation - not complying means endangering the hegemonic relationship (Stahl, 2007).  
A widely accepted taxonomy of authority acceptance is David Held's (1984) continuum of 
social-political compliance  (Fig. 1.2): 
 
Low acceptance (compliance) 
Coercion 
Tradition 
Apathy 
Pragmatic acquiescence 
Conditional agreement 
Normative agreement 
Ideal-normative agreement 
High acceptance (compliance) 
 
FIG. 1.2 A ladder of compliance, after Held (1984). 
 
 
How does a discourse gain acceptance as authoritative? Different speakers/authors can take an 
infinite number of positions with regard to the concept. But unless they already dominate the 
scene, they will need to strike a discursive alliance to promote one‘s agenda. Discourse coalitions 
form around what Barthes has called ‗empty signifiers‘ (q. in Chandler 2007), that is, words that 
do not refer to something very specific, so that they can be filled in different ways by different 
people. This reduces the number of positions in the arena (shades of grey) to a manageable 
number.  
Forging a discourse coalition or discourse alliance is likely to involve pandering to other actors‘ 
agendas that are not too much at odds with your agenda. To enable this, you need to construct a 
political formula to combine threats into a totality that captures these agenda elements, but in which 
your agenda, and your leadership is seen as the common good. A hegemon - from the Greek 
hegemoon, guide - is the (durably) predominant actor or actor coalition, not in terms of material 
and coercive power – although that certainly helps - but in terms of authority who can command 
compliance with his or her rule. 
The neo-Gramscian school of International Political Economy, which analyses hegemony, 
took the stage around the same time the aforementioned linguistic turn in management literature 
became influential. The discipline (re)discovered the work by the Italian revolutionary thinker 
Antonio Gramsci on hegemony. Gramsci was inspired by the conservative Mosca who, not 
unlike today‘s managerial literature, analysed the strategic construction of political formulas to 
build and cement hegemonic leadership coalitions enabling a minority to stay in control. By 
contrast Gramsci, imprisoned by the regime of Benito Mussolini, theorised hegemony with a 
view to subverting it (Cox, 1981). A concept of control is a settlement (a deal) that stabilizes or 
balances socio-economic forces. Gramsci noted that hegemonic ideas underlying this deal are 
reproduced not only by states but by societal institutions such as the church, schools and trade 
unions, who had accepted the agenda of the ruling coalition as the general interest. The resulting 
sense of solidarity (normative agreement) facilitates compliance and forestalls the threat of 
political resistance. Gramsci pointed at Fordism, named after the car maker who offered his 
workers five dollars a day so that they could save up for a Ford car, as an increasingly 
internationally successful socioeconomic ‗deal‘ in his day, a hegemonic concept of control. As we 
shall see (Ch. 4) river management was a cornerstone of the ‗New Deal‘ (welfare state), as the 
Tennessee Valley Authority which integrated flood control and water development project. 
This influential approach reminds us that the ideational level is never very remote from 
practices and material capabilities: the call for arms uttered by an army general is likely to have 
more influence than that of a schoolboy. The context of (material) power relations may influence 
the results of a frame contest (Marullo, Pagnucco, and Smith, 1996: 3). Yet neither can a 
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hegemon durably command the compliance of others in the political arena by relying on the use 
of force only (hard power), they have to employ a discursive strategy (‗soft power‘) to attract and 
persuade. Hegemonic rule is thus a judicious combination of coercion and consent. Nevertheless, 
neither the legitimacy of a security frame nor that of a security provider has to be accepted. The 
below will go into the different forms of rejecting a security frame - these will be especially 
interesting for the present study where those rejections themselves use the language of security. 
 
 
1.3.4 CONTESTED SECURITY 
 
Margaret Thatcher became famous for her favourite categorical claim: ‗There is no alternative‘, 
whose acronym is ´TINA´. Her visionary compatriot and contemporary, the cyberneticist 
Stafford Beer (in van Gigch, 1987)9 has argued, there is always an alternative, even if it is 
politically more opportune to disallow it. Frames always compete with counter-frames to provide 
singular interpretations of problems and appropriate solutions. New social groups (discursive 
alliances) will inevitably form and bring other (environmental, economic, cultural) security values 
to bear. In any engagement and negotiation process, actors bring new frames into play all the 
time, foregrounding certain aspects and backgrounding others. It does not mean that security 
issues have disappeared, but rather that the interpretation of the threat and its solution become 
more flexible and negotiable. This ‗interpretative flexibility‘ enables the reframing of conflictive 
situations as non-conflictive and vice-versa. In a securitised situation this flexibility means they 
are subject to desecuritisation processes; if the context was never securitised to begin with, it 
means unsuccessful securitisation (that is: successful non-securitisation). The move is disarmed, 
life goes on like before. 
While the securitiser may find it strategically opportune to frame an issue as a security issue, 
this audience may thus find it strategically opportune to accept or reject the speech act  
Unintended (possibly uninvited) ´audiences´ may join the fray to contest and reframe the security 
claim. In analysing the contest over flood management projects, I have looked into the ‗counter-
frames‘ offered in the public arena, and have left the possibility open that stakeholders could 
‗counter-securitise‘, and as a consequence, politicise, an issue just as well as project initiators.  
Constructivists tend to present reframing as a process of ‗social learning‘ - the process of 
arriving at complementary mindsets (or ‗reasons for action‘) in a network of interdependent 
stakeholders (Leeuwis, 2004). While the term conjures the image of a studious group seeking to 
understand the world, a reframing process is equally likely to involve conflict and struggle where 
power differences make themselves felt (Proost and Leeuwis, 2006). The research indeed zooms 
in on multiple instances of conflict over river management projects, where securitising moves 
were strongly contested. 
Conflict is ‗a social situation in which a minimum of two actors (parties) strive to acquire at the 
same moment in time an available set of scarce resources‖ (Wallensteen, 2002). It reflects and 
reproduces ‗incompatible subject positions‘, that is, of a diametrical opposition between Us and 
Them, Self and Other(s), with clearly defined boundaries between them. Such ‗pre-productions‘ 
tend to escalate, so that conflict over one issue becomes antagonism over everything else. While 
the conflict may be over only one aspect, the parties involved find themselves daggers drawn 
over all possible issues: everything else collapses into two categories: black and white, friend and 
foe. One actor who feels impeded by the presence of an ‗other‘ will start to project all fears and 
undesirables on this Other. This ‗logic of equivalence‘ (Laclau and Mouffe, 1993)10 stands in clear 
contrasted with a ‗logic of difference‘ accepts more shades of grey. Communication breaks down, 
antagonists speak about each other but rarely with each other. In such a conflict situation, it is 
not one but two coalitions that need to convince their audience that their non-negotiables should 
be honoured. 
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1.3.5 COMPETING WATER (META-)NARRATIVES  
 
Security moves and stories are set in larger (global) narratives, which lend a 'deep structure' and, 
hence, coherence to ambiguous, uncertain situations. Narratives allow storytellers to be certain 
about what is essentially uncertain. Like the speech act, the story frames particular solutions in 
terms of influencing or neutralising action - curbing opportunities for resistance and alternative 
conceptions (closing the frame) or pushing for particular measures to check, debate and correct 
security measures (opening the frame). 
 
War or peace? 
National or basin borders are far from impermeable to ideas. Chapter 4 will analyse the 
political relation between floods and security in the context of three competing global discourses, 
each of which has something to say about the relation between people and the river, as well as 
between people with the state and between states. In this context I take issue with the view that 
there is a basically uncontested set of prevailing (hegemonic) ideas in ‗the water discourse‘ (Du 
Plessis, 2000), Furlong (2006). While several concepts are currently almost unassailable (Wester 
and Warner, 2002), what constitutes hegemonic water discourse in the ‗International Water 
Relations‘ community appears to be more in flux than the water discourse authors claim (Warner 
and Zeitoun, under review). There appears to be a change of ‗grand narratives‘ giving meaning to 
experienced reality11. 
For the selection of these narratives I will rely on the very similar accounts by Trottier (2003), 
Stucki (2005) and Brouma (2003), seeking to explain contest for discursive hegemony in the 
1990s and 2000s. The three analytical understandings do not emerge in a void; they are the 
outcome of social interplay. 
In which co-existing water narratives can take root - pessimists may postulate a Malthusian 
'water in crisis' narrative where optimists see a cornucopian 'fix' which promises an easy way out 
of the problems. This is especially relevant at a time when water appeared to take centre stage on 
global agendas. 
The end of the 1980s saw a sense of crisis and confusion in both the security and water sector. 
The can-do mentality, the feeling that every problem can be fixed, that long prevailed in the water 
world eroded after a succession of setbacks. The Water Decade had brought water to many, but 
many more were still without water. 1989-2001 was a period of relative ´anarchy´ with no clearly 
hegemonic arrangement. 
Global ´anarchy´ brought, in broad strokes, three types of response, two contenders for 
discursive hegemony. The first narrative is that of ‗water wars‟, a Malthusian tale that considers 
water as a high-politics (security) issue. Robert Kaplan predicted a ‗coming‘ anarchy and 
ungovernability while many popular books appeared predicting ‗resource wars‘ (Starr & Stoll 
1990, Bulloch and Darwish 1994, de Villiers, 1999). I will argue that (physical, political, 
discursive) ‗closure‘ and its close cousin, ‗enclosure‘ are at the heart of this narrative at the level 
of the project and at the level of the national and basin governance context. In the 21st century, 
climate change put the fear of ‗water wars‘ back on the political map. 
On the other hand, an increasingly influential ‗water peace‘ camp made itself heard, which saw 
the post-Cold War period as an opportunity for reform towards environmentally sound, 
participatory, integrated, co-operative basin water management. Water pricing, virtual water and 
shared benefits are catchwords of this worldview. The state was no longer seen as the natural 
water manager, and security and development not necessarily its domain. The Turning of the 
Screw narrative proposed by Turton and Ohlsson (1999) will be presented as an exponent of this 
view. 
At the same time, a ´counterculture´ against liberalisation and privatisation as well as large 
dams (Narmada, Arun) became increasingly vocal and at times successful. Taken to its extreme, it 
can be summarised as ‗plus ça change, plus c‟est la même chose‘. This is the hydro-hegemony thesis: 
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hegemony is expressed in ever more subtle forms of control over water - and over society. But 
hegemony as we saw is always contestable, and a global movement against the hegemony of what 
its opponents see as water capture has made itself felt in the past two decades. This presents a 
completely different take on ‗water wars‘ (Shiva, 2001), not between countries, but between the 
global and the local 
The question ‗what happens next after the Cold War?‘ thus produced a trifurcation between 
schools of thought on scarcity and (en-)closure.  
It turns out that these discourses give different meanings to what the ‗politics of flood security‘ 
constitute, what ‗co-operation regimes‘ mean and how flood management may be labelled as  
 
-   a security imperative (the water wars narrative),  
-   an engine for cooperation and sustainable development (the water peace narrative)  
-   an instrument of control and locus for contest (the water hegemony narrative). 
 
Natural or social? 
The phrase ‗complex emergency‘ captures war and disaster, which both invite the state of 
exception. Given that the two are close cousins, I looked for narratives in the discipline of 
disaster studies as foci for flood security that would be compatible to the above three narratives. 
Candidates are the ´structural´, ´behavioural´ and ´vulnerability´ approach (Hilhorst, 2003, 
Johnson et al., 2005).   
The structural paradigm is the result of modern science, which saw the flood as a force of 
nature to be tamed with physical infrastructure. Rulers and their bureaucracies sought to 
eliminate uncertainty by calling on science and expertise, to avoid relying on the fickleness of 
nature and of human passions. River regulation in flood-prone or drought-prone areas easily 
becomes a matter of central government concern. The first centralised states developed from the 
perceived need to regulate rivers for collective development. Water bureaucracies (‗hydrocracies‘), 
often related with the military sector (US Corps of Engineers in the US, DSI in Turkey) would 
take care of civil defence against flood threats as part of homeland security. The downside of 
machine bureaucracies however is that they are rarely well-equipped to deal with crises; they tend 
to handle crises the same way as normal situations (Crozier, 1964). 
Dissatisfied with the performance of flood defences, an American liberal school of human 
geographers (G. White, 1954, Burton, Kates and White, 1993) focused on human behaviour and 
choice. Institutional regulation (zoning) and incentives (subsidies) influences the preferences 
within the range of alternatives individuals have at their disposal, to make up for people‘s 
´bounded rationality' (see also Johnson et al., 2005). Collective insurance and national reinsurance 
complements the set of instruments. 
A vulnerability approach, finally, critiqued this approach in the 1980s, arguing that 
disadvantaged groups in society do not have a choice, but end up in the most hazard-prone 
locations because of their position in the political economy (Hewitt, 1983, Blaikie et al., 1994). As 
they identify with local actors and initiatives rather than the state, I see strong parallels with the 
(anti-)hegemony perspective on ´water wars´. 
 
 
1.3.5 BEYOND TALK: PRACTICES OF SECURITY AND CONFLICT 
 
So far, the discussion in this section has focussed on words, as used in speech acts, frames, 
stories, narratives. It has been noted with some frequency, however, that focusing on speech acts 
only privileges the verbal over the non-verbal. This not only ignores the power of images (M. 
Williams 2003), but also backgrounds the practical institutionalization of security and external 
conditions (Léonard, 2004, Floyd, 2007). Bigo (2002) has noted that to understand securitisation, 
we should not just look at the success of speech acts but at the practices of security professionals, 
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their everyday practices in the security field at the micro level, not only at the macro-level studies 
of political discourses12. While politicians and other public speakers speak (or picture) security, 
security experts more quietly handle the technologies of security. Securitization discourses are 
embedded in technology, which not only comprises instruments to implement policy decisions, 
but also ‗shape the options available to decision-makers‘ (Léonard, 2004)  
The present study focuses on such practices by way of projects: proposed technological 
interventions. A channel, an embankment, is planned in a cycle of situation analysis, project 
identification, selection of options, implementation and evaluation. At each of these stages, 
decisions are made and alternatives and actors in- or excluded. Unlike Bigo (2002), however, I 
maintain it is not only the recognised security professionals, but also their opponents who shape 
the discourse and practice of security with securitisations and counter-securitisation. Project-
affected stakeholders can voice approval or stage vocal protest, but also more quietly display 
‗compliance‘ or ‗deviance‘. Depending on the protection frame‘s felicity with the intended 
audience, a major infrastructural flood management project helps or hinders the legitimacy of its 
initiators and objectors and the constellation (decision-making regime) in which they operate. 
I reasoned that the best way of eliciting security practices is by focusing on actual river 
management schemes. To promote development and guarantee protection, a river scheme almost 
inevitably involves ´taking (someone‘s) space´ (River) regulation projects are ‗sites of struggle over 
the definitions of uses and the boundaries of the zones which have material effects on the use 
and perception of space' (Bierschenk, 1988). This is notably where a flood project meets the 
domain of local stakeholders. Spatial planning is about ´making space´ using concepts that reflect 
an actor‘s ambitions with that space (Hagens, 2007) a ‗hub‘, a ‗park‘ or even a ‗new civilisation‘, 
but also ‗ancestral commons‘ (Bierschenk, 1988). In so doing, the planner meets others who have 
other plans for the space at issue, or resist what they see as the invasion of their space and 
territorial control. Projects are thus essentially contested (Bierschenk, 1988) and it is this contest 
that can reveal the practice of security interventions. 
Public officers, but also non-state actors can use the crisis and danger vocabulary to make their 
claim to power or legitimacy and delegitimise others. Project-affected actors, or those speaking 
for them, may claim the intervention makes them more insecure rather than more secure. This 
can lead to negotiation and accommodation or negation, but also to an escalating crisis. The 
present analysis tests Lowry‘s interpretation of a Focusing Event as an opportunity for actors to 
promote or even impose previously impossible agendas. 
 
 
1.3.6 IN SEARCH OF POLITICS 
 
What, then, is the politics of flood security? Having defined ‗flood‘, ‗(in)security‘, the present 
study treats the security arena as a special kind of ‗politics‘. There are a great many 
conceptualisations of politics, ranging from party politics to all human relations. For the purposes 
of the present study, I will bring together some of those strands. 
Many might subscribe to Wishnick‘s (2005) cynical interpretation of politics: an actor‘s 
manipulation of a problem for political ends. This however is not a usual interpretation in 
political science, A preliminary view of politics, steeped in the Greek tradition, is what delineates 
the public from the private sphere. The political is what promotes the public common good 
(what constitutes ‗the good life‘) in the polis. This normative content is reflected in the definition 
of politics as the ‗authoritative allocation of values‘ (Easton, 1953). Politics is the contest over the 
distribution of scarce resources (Haywood, 1998) - or ‗the shaping, distribution and exercise of 
power‘ (Laswell and Kaplan, 1950: 75). It is the answer to Harold Laswell‘s (1936) question: 
‗Who gets what, where, when, why and how‘, summarised as cui bono (in whose interest)? 
Dye, Zeigler, and Lichter (1992) rephrase Lasswell´s question as: ―who says what; in which 
channel, to whom, and with what effect?‘ Politics is communication - politics takes shape through 
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discourse, visuals and dramaturgy (staging) (Hajer, 1995, 2001). Hajer (1995: 59) defines politics 
as the struggle for discursive hegemony in which actors struggle to secure support for their 
definition of reality. 
While for Buzan et al. (1998: 23-24), politicised means ‗subject to public policy and debate‘. I 
will follow Guzzini‘s (2005) wider understanding of politicisation as ´making political´, the 
imagination of alternatives which open the frame, and Mouffe (2005) in being alive to the 
polarising effects that, she claims, are only proper to actual political interaction. The politics of 
flood insecurity, then, is the contest (foreclosure and opening) over alternatives (which I will take 
to mean frames, actors and options) for flood management, and their distributive effects between 
stakeholders. 
 
The present study takes up Buzan et al.‘s (1998: 25) rejoinder to concentrate on discourse and the 
political constellation when studying the effect of a security argument, if without much guidance on 
how this might be done. Above, I have explained how I conceptualise the central analytical 
elements of the two - frames, narratives, governance and regimes. The final section of the chapter 
will explain in more detail how I conceived the methodology.   
 
 
1.4 METHODOLOGICAL NOTES 
 
1.4.1 CONSTRUCTIVISM AND POSITIONING  
 
Following Buzan et al. (1998), I shall take a constructivist approach to risk and security. In 
constructivism there is no objective truth, only interpretation. Constructivists (Berger & 
Luckmann, 1991 [1966]) see the world not as something static, something that ‗is‘, but something 
that ‗becomes‘. Change is normal, we should be on the alert if something remains the same for 
very long. 
Because we cannot explain and validate constructions, we can only try to understand and 
interpret what may have been on an actor‘s mind (Smith and Hollis, 1990). Discourse analysis, 
such as securitization analysis, helps us ‗disclose‘ what was consciously or subconsciously closed. 
By naming a threat, it makes explicit what was hidden, and in so doing the speaker gives us a 
piece of his or her mind (Miniotaite, 2000). Buzan et al. (1998) reminds us not to look specifically 
for the word ‗security‘, but rather for ‗arguments that take the rhetorical and logical form defined 
[by them] as security‘ (Buzan et al. 1998: 177). This is their recipe for securitisation: 
―follow the security form, the grammar of security, and construct a plot that includes 
existential threat, points of no return, and a possible way out - the general grammar of security as 
such plus the particular dialects of the different sectors, such as talk identity in the societal sector, 
recognition and sovereignty in the political sector, sustainability in the environmental sector, and 
so on. (..). (I)t is implicitly assumed that if we talk of this (...), we are by definition in the area of 
urgency: by saying 'defence' (or in Holland, 'dikes'), one has implicitly said security and priority‖ 
(Buzan et al., 1998: 27). 
 
How does one operationalise this rather broad portrait (signalement) of social and linguistic 
felicity conditions for securitisation in the water sector and critically engage with it? As a first 
clue, Buzan et al. (1998) explicitly relate security to survival issues. ‗Survival‘ is the point of no 
return, everything else will be irrelevant. Gromes and Bonacker interpret this as follows: 
‗Phrases (...) close to ‗to be or not to be‘ are death, end, annihilation, extinction (...) Loss of 
self-determination is inflicted by notions as loss of freedom, (..), oppression (...) and proper 
names that refer to well-known examples‘ (Gromes and Bonacker, 2007). 
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In addition, I proposed above to relate securitisation to closure, the disallowance of 
contending alternatives, actors, issues that is, the delegitimisation of choice. To me (Warner, 
2004), ‗There Is No Alternative‘ (TINA) sums up the exemplar of a securitisation: it shuts out 
alternatives, breaks normally binding rules of engagement, such as exchange, debate and 
openness, that might bring in other colours. 
Since no one in the security studies to my knowledge appears to have done this so far, I 
developed the below diagram (Fig. 1.3) which provides a provisional heuristic of the 
characteristics of the (ideal-typical) practice of securitised and desecuritised decision-making, 
compiled on the basis of the principles laid out in the literature, especially Buzan et al. (1998) and 
P. Roe (2004): 
 
 
 Logic of Securitisation (‘ war’, 
‘emergency’)  
Logic of Non-securitised 
Policymaking (‘peace’, ‘routine’) 
Applicability 
 
For extraordinary, urgent events For ongoing concerns 
Governance Vertical (Top-down management, 
patronage in protection) 
 
Network (co-management, negotiation 
among autonomous actors) 
Degree of power sharing Bypassing democracy and 
stakeholder participation  
 
Stakeholder participation and influence 
Role of market Bypassing market mechanism and 
cost-benefit analysis 
 
Market for security goods and services  
Mode of securing compliance Compliance through force and 
rules 
 
Compliance through persuasion and 
marketing of security 
Transparency Secrecy, information distribution 
on need-to know basis, 
unaccountability 
Openness, free exchange of 
information, public accountability 
FIG.1.3 Logics of securitised and non-securitised policy making, author´s interpretation of Buzan et al. (1998) 
and Roe (2004: 283). 
 
 
 
Constructivist political science maintains that political actors (individuals, groups, or states, as 
in International Relations) not only and not always play power games, they also puzzle, which 
may change actors‘ interest definition, therefore their compliance with a particular policy issue 
(Checkel, 1999) and as a result, their positioning. A constructivist approach means that actors can 
learn and change their perspective in interaction with others, such that it changes their role, their 
position with respect to those others. We can expect the definition and identity of ‗who‘ in 
Laswell‘s question (who gets what..) as well as in van Eeten‘s (1997) ‗stories‘ to be in flux rather 
than a static entity. Political actors develop identities in their interaction and interrelation with 
each other, so that they themselves can be ‗changed by the distributional games in which they 
participate‘ (I. Neumann, 1999). The same actors can act as friends or enemies, as Englishmen or 
Europeans. Since, according to Buzan et al. (1998) the security speech act is an ‗act‘ with special 
force, the present study zooms in on the consequences of this particular positioning. The enemy 
can be the flood, but also the flood manager, whose actions (or non-action) may be seen to bring 
insecurity rather than security. Speech acts are embedded in what Jasanoff (1999) has called 
‗songlines‘ and others storylines. Uttering a specific element from that storyline (say, Buzan et al‘s 
examples of Dutch dikes), a whole story-line is effectively re-invoked that lends credence to some 
(security) actors and delegitimises others (cf. Hajer, 1995: 62, 67). 
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But security language is not cast in stone. Slocum and van Langenhove‘s (2003) suggestions for 
a positional methodology may be helpful here. Whether social interactions are conflictive or 
peaceful depends upon how people attribute meanings to their interactions and situation. 
Discourse is a fishnet-like structure of knots (objects) connected by threads (relations) (Lindahl 
and Sundset, 2003). An actor in the fishnet has a ´subject position´ from which (s)he sees and 
categorises the world, the rest of the net and positions others. Slocum and Langenhove‘s 
Positioning Triangle consists of Actors, Acts and Narratives. The Acts, such as speech acts, set in 
a particular setting (narrative) (re)constitute the actors in particular positions, roles, identities with 
respect to each other: ‗leader‘, ‗protector‘, ‗expert‘, ‗victims‘ with the help of specific lexical 
supports (frames, plots). In the context of the present research, it can also reconstitute the frames 
with respect to water: ‗enemy‘, ‗friend‘ or ‗resource‘. 
By positioning oneself, one also positions others in the arena. Parties in conflict co-define each 
other‘s goals and identifies (Kriesberg, 1986). In this respect, I am inspired by van Eeten‘s (1997) 
narratological analysis of conflict on water management in the Netherlands. Van Eeten shows 
how flood risk stories (‗fairy tales‘) take the same narrative form, the discourse coalitions mirror 
each other even though the discursive coalitions finds themselves diametrically opposed to each 
other: the hero of one story is the villain in the other: the former‘s problem is the latter‘s 
solution. Van Eeten‘s approach point at the embeddedness of individual speech acts in security 
stories, a point I will elaborate in the next Section. 
Not all securitising moves are successful, not all stories are believed. Attribution of a threat does 
not necessarily lead to counteraction. In that case, there is security discourse, but no 
‗performativity‘. Securitisation is a ´call and response´ between enunciator and intended audience. 
The authority relation between the securitizing actor and the audience may play a part, or the 
audience does not respond as expected, that is, does not accept the securitising move, or there is 
no follow-up that reproduces the discourse and translates word into action. In that case, there is 
no legitimation for extraordinary measures (Roe, 2004). Gromes and Bonacker (2007) therefore 
also identity non-securitising moves: 
- denying the existence of an existential threat  
- claiming the addressed audience does not possess the legitimacy to decide on the adoption of 
 extraordinary means  
- recommending the addressed audience to reject the call to ‗panic politics‘ 
- resisting the implementation of extraordinary measures 
 
If non-securitisation failed, desecuritisation is the undoing of an existing securitisation: 
- not to talk (any more) about issues in terms of security to keep responses in forms that avoid   
vicious spirals to move security back into normal politics (Roe, 2004). 
 
 
1.4.2 CASE SELECTION  
 
The study involves six cases of flood-related politics in five countries. This set was not pre-
selected, but evolved as I engaged with the politics of water and security (see Methodological 
Annex).  
Allowing for considerable differences between projects and modus operandi, all the studies in this 
dissertation are concerned with national projects presented as new, innovative (non-standard) 
ways of dealing with flood water challenges. The first five studies concern the biggest river 
management project in that country in recent times (all started after 1990, but were in fact the 
largest since the 1960s (Fig. 1.3). In case of a composite, I chose the most recent element. A sixth 
study looks into the proposed revival of a flood protection measure (emergency storage) that had 
fallen into disuse for 50 years. Proposed emergency flood storage in the Netherlands was 
contrasted with that in Bangladesh. 
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Mitchell reminds us that flood management happens in a physical as well as a political, socio-
cultural, etc. context (B. Mitchell, 1990). Any analysis of flood politics should take full cognizance 
of this context. For example, even though England is in the same moderate flood risk-prone 
category as the Netherlands (http://www.espon.eu/), and floods have claimed lives and assets, 
the degree of public intervention displays great difference between the two countries. The 
Netherlands and Bangladesh are both deltas with waterways wherever one looks, but the socio-
economic and political setting is completely different.  
The five countries studied are plotted in the below matrix for their variation on the two 
variables ‗stream intervention‘ and ‗openness of governance system‘ that can be plotted on the 
two continua introduced in 1.2.2. All selected countries can be said to be on the continuum of 
governance ranging from states with a ‗closed‘ (state-dominated) to a more ‗open‘ governance 
regime introduced above.13 
The first two studies, Egypt and Turkey, based on desk research, appear ‘closed systems‘ in 
terms of technical and political control, if with considerable nuances. They are states where, due 
to earlier interventions, flood risk is not a great challenge anymore. Egypt, commonly regarded as 
dependent on only one source of water, the Nile, is downstream to 9 countries, and therefore can 
be expected to make continued access to water a security issue. This case is contrasted with 
Turkey, a state that has rain as well as the geopolitical advantage of being upstream. Due to this 
third dimension, ‗river position‘, The two countries can therefore be expected to take a different 
view of the role in national security (Fig..1.3).  
The felicity of security speech depends very much on what is normal speech in a particular 
setting and rhetorical tradition. Security framing in the press is a crucial mediator of security speech 
acts (Vultee, 2007) exerting a heavy influence on whether an issue will be a security issue14. 
Wilkinson (2007: 10) notes that in non-European cultures, freedom of speech may be 
constrained so it may not be possible for actors to engage in security speech. Indeed Turkey and 
Egypt may be researched as authoritarian cultures with repressive traits. In such cases, protest 
may express a community perceiving an existential threat. Power holders then will label protesters 
as appearing a threat to the regime. Protesters will have to ‗desecuritise‘ their opposition by 
stressing their allegiance to shared values (protective frame) to avoid being securitised themselves 
(Paltemaa and Vuori, 2006). 
The four remaining case study countries concern downstreamers with riverine flood risk in 
‗wet‘ basins  - the Netherlands on the Rhine and Meuse, England downstream to Wales on the 
Thames, and Bangladesh to Brahmaputra, Indus and Meghna. In Bangladesh, despite thousands 
of miles of dikes and embankments, floods invade large swathes of territory every year. Flood 
protection depends very much on external funds so that conditionality as regards the flood 
management philosophy is high. In the Netherlands, half the territory is below sea level and 
potential flood risk from river is large, but flood control has been so extensive that floods had 
been thought to be under control. The UK, finally is a country with low water intervention in 
which the private (insurance) rather than the public sector appears to be charged with risk 
management. 
 
 
FIG 1.3 Case Selection Matrix. 
Showing differences on three dimensions: upstream/downstream, degree of river closure and political closure 
  
River position Degree of River closure 
 Upstream 
 
 High   Turkey  
Downstream Egypt Netherlands 
 Low Bangladesh  
 UK 
 Degree of Political closure  => High (Closed) Low (Open) 
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The study is based on extensive documentary research and, in the latter four case studies (Ch. 
5-8) field visits and interviews with decision-makers and stakeholders. The field interviews were 
conducted in the 1999 - 2001 time window, the majority having been conducted in the year 2000. 
Interviewee selection was based on snowballing. But with due regard to representing the different 
domains of disaster management at local, national and, where relevant, donor scales. 
In both documentary and interview analysis, I identified the ‗lexical field‘ of security and risk 
discourse, their absolutes (unacceptables and sacrosanctities) and threat discourse (destruction, 
despoliation). Following Michael Williams (2003), I have taken discourse to mean both textual 
and visual discourse, taking due note of the staging (Hajer, 2005) of the security discourse, which 
enhance or defeat their felicity. Except for the Middle East cases, I visited the project sites and 
learned about the practicalities of planning and implementing the envisaged project. I made a 
systematic search of the literature. The press, but also official communication materials like press 
releases and newsletters play an important part as a medium in which speakers represent and 
construct issues in dramatic language (Vultee, 2007).  
 
TABLE 1.2 List of case studies discussed in this book 
Country Project Project Core Start of 
 project   
(Projected) 
End of 
project 
Egypt New Valley Project   Toshka channel 1998 2017 
Turkey Greater Anatolia Project 
   
Ilısu Dam (first major dam 
on Tigris) 
2001 2009? 
Bangladesh Flood Action Plan 
   
Compartmentalisation Pilot 
project (CPP) 
1991 (2000) 
Netherlands – Maas Maas works   Border Meuse 1995 2015 
Netherlands – Ooij Controlled emergency flood 
storage  
Ooij polder 2000 Aborted 
UK Integrated Catchment 
Management  
Jubilee Channel 1999 2001 
 
 
 
1.4.3  OTHER METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
Researching actors 
 
Zooming in first on actors in an arena of conflict (and occasional co-operation), what is 
important about those actors? Realists will look at the material power base: in organisational 
terms, budget, size, staff, hardware, political base (size of constituency). This can be inferred 
from annual reports as well as secondary literature from watchdogs, the press etc. as well as from 
the interviews. 
As the research is concerned with legitimacy as political security, material (action) as well as 
immaterial (expressed beliefs) elements will need to be taken into account as well, as constitutive 
elements of actor legitimacy. These can be inferred from how actors are described, both by 
themselves and by other interviewees. 
In the context of strategy, it is important to know actor goals. Overall actor goals inform the 
solutions actors present to a complex problem. It will be recalled that each solution presupposes 
a social arrangement for its implementation in which the actor itself may or may not have a stake 
(take responsibility). 
 
Centring on technology, as suggested by one of the research questions, makes it especially 
relevant to home in on the way actors communicate and interact on technological options. 
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In researching knowledge, expertise, information and technology as regime elements, it is 
relevant to research what the ‗common sense‘ is in the regime over the type of information that is 
relevant and authoritative, and who supplies it (Haas 1992). Whose and what kind of alternatives 
are considered; whose information counts (lay, expert)? How do actors deal with uncertainty and 
ambiguity? This again points at the degree of inclusiveness. I am especially interested in the way 
experts deal with ambiguity and uncertainty. 
Finally, the openness of information matters: if I want to know something, can I get access? 
This, in addition to flow (who gets what kind of information? Is the flow mainly inside out or 
outside in?) is a measure of the permeability of the regime to new ideas.. 
 
Interviews: A semi-ethnographic approach 
Four out of the six cases draw on author‘s interviews, in one case (Ooij polder) carried out in 
co-operation with Dik Roth of Wageningen and Madelinde Winnubst of Nijmegen University. 
In light of the importance of the subjective and intersubjective understandings and uses of 
'security', one-to-one interviews seem are the best research methods to attain an understanding of 
how key actors construct security and risk, as well as a thick description of the project history. 
How to go about interviewing? 
While there is a multitude of approaches to qualitative research, they all prefer a natural setting 
rather than an artificial (experimental) one (Silverman 1993). A particular strength of such a 
methodology lies in the potential to uncover the interviewees‘ own language and issue selection 
(...) a method of seeing through the subject‘s own eyes (Bryman 1988). Instead of responding to 
previously formulated questions, the interviewees inform the researcher of the questions they 
think relevant.15 
Contrary to a positivist approach, in which researchers make great efforts to place themselves 
outside the researched situation and try to make themselves 'invisible', interpretative researchers 
seek to immerse themselves in the culture under scrutiny as well. They make themselves known 
and present themselves as an equal partner, so that mutual learning may take place. To facilitate 
this, the researcher interacts with the researched - the interview becomes a social event, which 
brings in social context as interview data: interviews become conversations (Bijker, pers. comm. 
2000).  
It turned out that interviewees will interpret the interview questions as an inquiry into the 
particular rather than the general. When asked questions of opinion (e.g. who is, ultimately, 
responsible for people's security vis-à-vis water management?) they always related it to their 
personal situation. Likewise, when I ask how privatisation changes the playing field, they will 
interpret this question as: how does privatisation impinge on the way they work. 
Cultural anthropologists do ethnographic research seeking to understand what a (sub)culture 
‗is like‘. While the short duration of field work prevented a full immersion in the decision-making 
culture (‗strong ethnography‘), care was taken to meet people in their own working environment 
and give due note to non-verbal data such as dress code and interaction with colleagues. The 
method can be described as semi-ethnographic: In a pure ethnographic approach, the categories 
used for interpreting what people say and do are not pre-given or fixed. As the research 
specifically sought to explore the usefulness of the Buzan et al.‘s  model, this aspect of 
ethnography could not be fully maintained. 
It soon became apparent that civil engineers commanded the most prominent positions and clout 
among the research population. As a non-engineer, I sought to build confidence by meeting and 
socialising with engineers (interviewees and non-interviewees) to provide context for the 
interviews while seeing to it that the fact that someone had an engineering background however 
had no bearing on interviewee selection. This involved attending CIWEM meetings and, 
enjoyably, becoming a member of the KivI (the Dutch Royal Society of Engineers) philosophy 
group Thales (which involves many non-engineers). My subsequent work at Wageningen 
University and Radboud University and involvement with the London Water Research group at 
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University College London (SOAS and Kings‘ College) widened my expert network significantly, 
allowing me to deepen the Dutch case studies and discuss the Bangladeshi, Turkish and Egyptian 
cases. 
Finally, allowance is made for a learning effect in the course of interviews. This does not only 
entail that descriptions are ‗thicker‘ as one moves down the list of interviewees but also that the 
case studies themselves, while comparative in outlook, are not artificially kept ‗the same‘. The UK 
study was used as a ‗pilot‘ and drew on sometimes quite distant memories of interviewees. The 
Dutch case study on the contrary was more recent and unlike the UK study, the key decision 
whether to go ahead with its implementation was, at least according to several interviewees, still 
up in the air. Also, my skills in verbatim note-taking have improved over time, so more detailed 
information was retained in later interviews. 
 
Interviewee selection 
Stakeholders are defined as institutional actors involved in decision-making on, supervising, 
implementing, monitoring the project or those directly or indirectly affected by the intervention. 
To limit the number of stakeholders to be taken into account, I have grouped stakeholders where 
possible (central government, local government, the construction industry, agricultural interests, 
environmental NGOs), looking for the lead actor within each group. 
A second criterion for selection was, again, contest. As extensive attitudinal surveys have been 
carried out in both the UK and Dutch case studies, and given time limitations, I decided against 
randomly surveying inhabitants for their perception of the scheme. An important sub-criterion 
was whether the non-lead actor had brought in an alternative for action, or at least had a wider 
vision of the management.  
The selection was done on the basis of the case literature, local press review and snowballing. 
Mostly, organisations and sometimes individuals obviously stood out. Also, interviewees have 
suggested other interviewees from other key organisations whose opinion they respected. 
However I have also followed my own judgement to avoid getting drawn in by a self-selecting 
process for the sake of convenience. 
Within the selected organisations, I selected interviewees in this order of priority 
- the contact mentioned in documents; or failing that 
- the contact mentioned by other information providers and interviewees; if none was 
mentioned 
- the contact mentioned by the information desk. 
This rule of thumb emerged in the process as information desks proved less than valuable. 
Alternatively, had I relied on other interviewees only, there would have been a danger of self-
selection within an in-group of people who know and trust each other, shutting out dissident 
views. This bias could be countered as my ‗informants‘ included university researchers, including 
two of my supervisors, who could be expected to take a critical distance to the project at hand. 
Also, an attempt was made to reach local people through the internet. A local Maidenhead 
newsgroup was contacted and yielded two responses 
 
Roughly 60% of respondents agreed to meet me at their office or home. Among the other 
40%, several immediately launched into their project story as soon as I explained the purpose of 
the interview on the phone. It seemed both rude and disingenuous to break off the conversation. 
After all some people are more comfortable on the phone than in a personal interview setting. 
 
The interviewing procedure   
The mixed-method approach to the research design is reflected in the interview design. The 
interview questions were in two stages. The first part was strictly non-directional. My opening 
gambit is to ask my interviewees to tell 'their side of the story'. I roughly indicated the main 
themes and let the interviewees relate whatever they liked. Open-ended questions help elicit 
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feeling and motives that are too complex to report in a single phrase (Selltiz et al q. in Silverman 
1993). The first question therefore always was a variety on the question how the interviewee 
became involved in the water project. In most cases this led to an extensive story in which many 
of the intended subthemes were already addressed. This is an essentially nondirective question 
and therefore, leaves it up to the interviewee to bring in their own subjective reflection on the 
organisation. You end up with similar, but in some significant respects different stories, which 
give voice  to 'communicative experience based on understanding of meaning with social actors' 
in line with hermeneutic (interpretative) methods. Translated in these terms, part of my research 
project is about identifying alternatives and voices. This procedure gave me the opportunity to 
compare accounts from different angles, a form of triangulation. I would only drop in if I felt the 
interview strayed too far and therefore take too much time in light of the number of other 
themes I wanted to discuss. I would also drop in ('Can I stop you here for a second...' ) if 
something relevant to my key research concern came up and ask to elucidate a point of small, 
localised adaptations based on a philosophy of ‘living with the flood‘. 
In constructivist language, this part of the interview gauges the self-understandings of actors 
involved in a flood alleviation project. Indeed it turned out that interviewees will always interpret 
my questions, no matter how ‗objectively‘ formulated (‗What is x‘ instead of ‗How do you feel 
about x‘) as an inquiry into the particular rather than the general. When I ask questions of 
opinion: who is, ultimately, responsible for people's security vis-à-vis water management, they 
will relate it to their personal situation. Likewise, when I ask how privatisation changes the 
playing field, they will interpret this question as: how does privatisation impinge on the way they 
work. So the particular tends to overrule the general. 
 
The second part of the interview would consist of a more rigid set of questions based on the 
central themes, such as specific risks and opportunities, information, success criteria and 
influence of change (climate change and liberalisation). Whenever I came across alternative 
options for risk mitigation I investigated on what grounds the alternative was rejected (if at all 
considered). 
I have noted the interview benefited if I dropped in with prompts and cue-words that reflected 
knowledge I acquired about water management or about recent events. I sensed this caused 
interviewees to take the interview more seriously and in some cases switch from a more 
rehearsed story to a more personal account. The comparative element, comparing schemes in 
different countries, substantially livened up the interview. 
I have avoided sitting directly opposite the interviewee to avoid undue confrontation. The ease 
with which people handle confrontational questions of course varies, but in some cases I have 
interviewed people whose work was in the line of fire and in the few cases I would formulate a 
question more critically in light of something I had heard, there was a palpable cooling. Therefore 
I have generally taken care to phrase questions not just in terms of problems but also of 
opportunities and learning experiences. This took some discipline for an interviewer who has 
been a current affairs presenter-editor for local radio. Especially where I spotted inconsistencies 
between people's statements, I have tried to keep a neutral expression. When prompted for my 
opinion in several instances, I have sought to avoid biasing the interviewee. All this should be 
consistent with an ‗objectivist‘ qualitative research method. 
Drawing on ‗themes‘ (definition of security, risk opportunities, criteria for a successful project) 
rather than set questions allowed me to stray from the script. Also, the ‗prods‘ used consisted of 
topical information or statements from other interviewees presented as hearsay (‗I‘ve heard it 
suggested that...). As the setting was in many cases informal, it was possible to draw out 
information from guarded interviewees. Notably, many interesting things were said during coffee 
and lunch breaks and after the 'last question' had been fielded. While I have tended to indicate 
beforehand that the interview would take about 90 minutes, I sometimes deliberately stayed on 
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and left it to the interview to terminate the meeting, especially if people seemed eager to tell their 
story.16 
 
Equipment and protocol:  I started out using a professional Marantz cassette recorder and sensitive 
microphone, which I would place somewhat to the side of the table to avoid a formal media 
interview setting. This lasted for only a few interviews, when the impression that the equipment 
was a distraction became overwhelming. Thereafter I decided to take continual notes while facing 
the interview as much as possible, trying to give a semi-verbatim account and where physically 
possible taking care not to pre-edit the interview for ease of writing. This has included clearly 
noting where I asked my questions and prompts by means of cue-words. Where possible the 
report was typed up the day after the interview to benefit from the fresh memory of the interview 
in case the notes were somewhat incomplete. 
This method had the obvious disadvantage of having to slow down fast speakers, as well as 
subconsciously pre-editing what the interviewees said. On the other hand, it carried the benefit of 
being able to carry my notepad unobtrusively around when the interviewee took me to the coffee 
machine or canteen, which would have been far more difficult with a recorder. 
  
Other data   An extensive press review was carried out, with input from the project office‘s 
press archive, as well as sources available from the Internet, the Lexis Nexis database, CD ROMs, 
policy documents, annual reports, articles sent by ‗research informants‘ and various other 
sources. The interview questions both drew on and supplemented this written material. This 
provided a wealth of material for analysis. 
 
 
Ethical considerations 
 
Reflective research  Social theories are stories about patterned behaviour. The storyteller has his 
own interests in telling the story. The old adage 'Where you sit is where you stand' has its 
counterpoint in 'where you sit is how you construct the story.' The stories I'm interested in here 
are risk and security stories: what is the threat, what is the cure and who should provide this cure? 
By taking an interactive approach to interviewing, asking questions - what is security; why this 
option and not that – can in fact challenges the taken-for-granted. The research act in itself may 
change the mindset of the interviewee and thus, in its own small way, may contribute to a 
reflexive act, and in so doing, contribute to the desecuritisation and repoliticisation of a taboo 
subject.. 
My engagement with some actors involved in the decision-making must have altered their 
consciousness: my UK case study, for example, covers a 17-year period, and several interviewees 
asked me to help jog their memory, their reminiscences (or the sense they made of them) 
becoming clearer as the interview progressed. (This learning effect might cause a repetition 
(replication) of the research interview to have a somewhat different outcome.) 
The reflexive researcher needs to take into account what effect his work may have on future 
decision-making. If he proposes his analysis as a type of risk management, a problem-solving tool, 
could be another technocratic tool for closing any holes that an ex-ante evaluation might show 
up, including neutralising opposition (political risk). If he recommends the analysis as a procedural 
tool, it may develop into the same managerial tool Environmental Impact Assessment is said to 
have become into the Netherlands. 
That this is not so far-fetched can be inferred from a question on the part of a Rijkswaterstaat 
security planner who invited me (in my capacity as 'expert') to come round and discuss security 
issues with him and some colleagues. As the interviews progressed, my knowledge of the issue 
grew and my questions became more confident. This should enable me to confront some key 
actors with my inferences to see how they respond to them. For example, it became clear to me 
THE POLITICS OF FLOOD INSECURITY 
 
28 
(and, in some cases to my interviewees) that the project initiators' approach in both the 
Netherlands was a 'selling' rather than a participatory approach. It was possible to do this in a 
non-threatening way as some interviewees have invited me to come back in a while to continue 
the discussion. This seems evidence of a substantial 'rapport' in which the interviewer is seen as 
an equal. It is notable that this was not the outcome of all interviews! 
 
Informed consent Each interviewee was informed of the purposes, the organisational context of 
the interview and offered the choice of being quoted anonymously or some statements to be kept 
off the record. No interviewee professed to have a problem with that.  
Any interviewee who requested this was sent a report or a verbatim transcript of the interview. 
It became clear on many occasions that the interviewees did not share my interest in how things 
were said, while getting at 'the facts'. In such cases I did not send a transcript, but a report in a 
more impersonal style. 
Sending reports can mean the respondent provides feedback, either pointing out minor errors 
or providing extra information. In one case, the respondent dictated his amendments, as he 
wanted to use the report for his own agenda. As his changes clarified rather than changed the 
context, I saw no reason to refuse this. 
 
Anonymity  From the start, each interviewee and research informant was offered the opportunity 
to differentiate between personal and organisational views, and between 'on' and 'off the record'. 
Given the critical stage of negotiations at which the Dutch interviews were carried out, almost all 
interviews took great pains to point out how harmful a press leak or attributed quote in front of 
other stakeholders could be. For some remarks I was specifically told not to write them down. 
Even the interviewee who said he ‗couldn‘t care less‘ if I quoted him later on asked me not to 
quote certain statements. On the whole, respondents seemed to relish the opportunity to speak 
their minds but were constantly aware of the dangers of leaks to the press - or for someone to 
share their painstakingly collected data. 
In one instance the interviewee said: 
Interviewee:  'Aha, so you want to me to give you a piece of the Commission's mind!'  
Interviewer: 'If you could…' 
Interviewee: 'Well why not. I'm shrewd enough not to tell you the gory details.' 
 
In light of the sensitivity for some, it has been decided not to name any interviewee in the 
present text, only refer to their type of job role and organisation at the time of interviewing. 
  
 Positionality in Bangladesh   
As a European university student I soon found I was expected to take on a position in the 
social order. Dhaka taxi drivers reckoned having me as a ride would allow them a shortcut across 
the normally off-limits military compoundment, as I was expected to take full responsibility for 
the itinerary of the taxi ride across town. Everywhere I went, I attracted people who wanted to be 
seen with me in public (as ‗social capital‘) and quite directly voicing expectations that I would be 
able to improve their situation. This may have influenced their stories.  
My official letter of introduction from my university clearly helped access to high-level 
respondents. It also provided more important than in the Netherlands to have a gatekeeper 
opening the door to respondents. I got hold of most of my NGO contacts with the kind help of 
my Dutch NGO contact, Laurens Roubos of ICCO, and several governmental contacts through 
an NGO contact. In some cases this may have raised undue expectations as well as anxieties 
about what I might report. However, I have consistently explained the anonymity of the quotes 
and sought to downplay any expectations raised or implied. 
Early on in my research I realised the study would be mainly concerned with elites - people in 
power. This does not square well with the research ideology of the past decades, which has 
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sought to give voice to the excluded. Elite research, it is true, risks perpetuating rather than 
challenging current patterns of inequality. I am not the only one who faces this ideological 
challenge (Herod 1999). However, if the research focuses on the question why some ideas are 
perpetuated, a researcher will have to go and talk to those that express them to understand their 
rationale. My attributed position as an ‗expert‘ representing a (technically oriented) university 
department gave me access I would not have had as a ‗civilian‘.  
 
FHRC as an actor/stakeholder 
The Flood Hazard Research Centre (FHRC) is part of the School of Social Science (Middlesex 
University), which funded the research into three case studies this dissertation draws on. The 
Centre provided me with facilities and information, and I identified myself as a Centre researcher. 
     A conflict of interests was always a definite possibility given the authoritative position of 
FHRC literature in the area of hazard studies. FHRC studies are quoted in academic research as 
well as policy documents. Materially, the Centre have been contracted consultants to both the 
Jubilee Channel on the Thames as well as an advisor to a report that forms part of the key study 
underlying the Dutch case study, the Meuse works, for the Commissie-Boertien (see Ch. 6 on the 
work of this commission).  
In both cases services were rendered a considerable time before my study: 1988-1991 for the 
UK study, 1995 for the Dutch study. The Centre cannot be said to have an ongoing interest in 
the project, unlike most other actors. In the Dutch case, two Centre researchers, Prof. Edmund 
Penning-Rowsell and Sylvia Tapsell were present in a two-day meeting where, they report, very 
little was done with their input (S. Tapsell, pers. comm. 2000) and is not obvious in the report 
(1995). Finally, the anonymous nature of the interviews as mentioned above should safeguard the 
confidentiality of expressions of an independent, critical attitude, which was abundantly in 
evidence. 
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 Chapter 2:  Midnight at Noon? 
The dispute over Toshka, Egypt17 
 
 
 
‗Moving to the desert is a must. There is no better way to inspire people than through a dramatic 
announcement. The President knows his people. Egyptians tend to join hands when they are 
inspired by an urgent national project‘ (Egyptian government official quoted in Bush 2007) 
 
‗Any step taken to this end will force us into confrontation to defend our rights and our life. Our 
response will be beyond anything they can imagine‗, War of Words and Water, Al-Ahram Weekly, 
July 6-12, 1995. 
 
‗When the emperor claims it‘s midnight at noon, the wise man says: behold the moon‘ (Omar 
Khayyam, Rubaiyat). 
 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION: CLOSING THE RIVER 
 
Had the High Aswan Dam not blocked the river Nile, floods would have wreaked havoc in 
Egypt in 1975, 1988, 1998 and 1999. Now Lake Nasser, the giant reservoir behind the dam, 
stores surface floodwater for dry years. But in 1998, Egypt experienced an exceptional peak 
discharge such that even this mega-reservoir might overflow. Previously, such excess water would 
have been drained via a spillway straight into the desert, but the Egyptian government felt this 
was a waste of a precious resource. This time, therefore, when the Egyptians enjoyed an 
unexpected windfall of ´water wealth´, Egypt embarked on a giant desert reclamation plan, 
presented with much fanfare as a 'new civilisation on the Nile'. The plan is far more than an 
irrigation plan, though, the government hopes to house millions of Egyptians in a new city in the 
Western desert, creating extra space to relieve the pressure on the small strip of inhabitable Nile 
floodplain. The Toshka project however will require far more water than the occasional flood can 
provide, and in so doing has the unique feature of planning for more than the maximum.  
In the well-known phrase of the Greek philosopher Herodotos, Egypt is the gift of the Nile, 
but another image comes to mind - that of a diver depending on his oxygen supply (quoted in 
Schiffler, 1997). This extreme dependence has inspired dozens of journalistic accounts and 
scientific studies of violent water conflict with upstream countries. ―The Nile is a war waiting to 
start‖ (cited in MacNeill/Winsemius/Yakushiji, 1991: 56, see also e.g. Bulloch & Darwish, 1993). 
Despite numerous verbal attacks between riparians, these wars never happened. Blanket 
statements such as ‗scarcity leads to war‘ are clearly too simplistic. 
The ―project of the millennium‖18 however (once more) set Egypt on a collision course with 
Ethiopia, which claims more Nile water for its own agrarian development. If all nine upstream 
Nile states were substantially to develop the waters flowing through their territory for economic 
development, Egypt would find itself in dire straits. Nevertheless, Ethiopia is not the only 
country to complain. A half century after Egyptian independence, Nile relations are still largely 
governed by colonial treaties concluded on behalf of Egypt by Great Britain, and the ‗Full 
Utilization of the Nile‘ treaty concluded to placate Sudan in 1959. These agreements oblige the 
upstream riparians not to ‗arrest‘ the flow of the Nile. In 1961, Julius Nyerere, President of what 
was to become Tanzania, proclaimed in the ‗Nyerere Doctrine on State Succession‘, that he 
would abrogate the treaties after two years: 
 
As regard bilateral treaties validly concluded by the United Kingdom on behalf of the territory of 
Tanganyika, or validly applied or extended by the former to the territory of the latter, the 
Government Tanganyika is willing to continue to apply within its territory on a basis of reciprocity, 
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the terms of all such treaties for a period of two years from the date of independence – unless 
abrogated or modified earlier by mutual consent. At the expiry of that period, the Government of 
Tanganyika will regard such of these treaties which could not by the application of rules of 
customary international law be regarded as otherwise surviving, as having terminated (Quoted in 
Phillips et al., 2006). 
 
Still, despite many protestations to the contrary, no upstream country has seriously cancelled 
the colonial moratorium on upstream development on the Nile that Egypt still invokes. 
Why does Egypt embark on a project that, experts argue, will claim even more water when Egypt is already 
approaching water and cash shortage? Are the motives domestic or do external Nile relations play a 
part? Are there opposing voices or is the issue depoliticised in the spirit of the oft-quoted saying 
from the Rubayyat: ‗if the ruler claims it‘s midnight at noon, the wise man says: behold the moon‘?  
 
This chapter will argue that the scheme serves multiple goals, of which ‗greening the desert‘ is 
only one. A parallelism between domestic and foreign policy strategies seems to lend the project 
an unstoppable dynamics. 
The Chapter will first outline the scope of Toshka and its accompanying mega-projects in the 
Egyptian deserts. Thereafter, it will introduce and apply the concept of ‗closure‘ in decision-
making. As the Egyptian state is acutely aware of its vulnerability with regards to the water 
resource, one expects Egypt to exert tight technical control of the river, but also of its population 
and of its riparian neighbours. To what extent does this hold true in practice? The second half of 
the chapter inventories Egyptian relations with its upstream neighbours, assessing the Nile Basin 
Initiative as a co-operation regime. How does Egypt ensure the compliance of its co-riparians and citizens, 
and what is the role of securitisation and closure in this? 
 
 
2.1.1 THE NILE: BEST FRIEND OR WORST ENEMY  
 
―O‘er Egypt‘s land of Memory floods are level / And they are thine, O Nile‖ (Shelley- Sonnet--To the 
Nile) 
 
For five thousand years, Nile floods carried much-needed water as well as a sediment load of 
basalt, rich alluvial soil and silts to a dry and desert area, and flushed out the salt left behind by 
high evaporation in the intense heat and capillary rise in fine-grained, waterlogged soils 
(Murakami, 1995). In ancient times, there was a fragile balance between too much and too little. 
The ideal flooding height was 7-8 metres (Orient.Com). ‗When the flood was too low, cultivated 
acreage might be halved, causing widespread famine; when the flood was too high, small-scale 
riverine irrigation works were destroyed and fields were swamped, also causing widespread 
famine‘ (Shapland, 1997: 60). 
Egypt only needs to point at its neighbours‘ predicament to feel justified in building the mega 
dam to control excess water. In Sudan, floods continue to cause damage and to claim lives. In its 
capital Khartoum, where the Blue and White Nile branches meet, 1.5 - 2 million out of the 4.5 
million inhabitants at the time were displaced by the flood of in 1988.19 The 2005 floods left 1000 
families homeless in Khartoum and killed 8 persons and left 2000 homeless in Darfur.20 In 
Uganda, Nile floods had devastating effects in 1964 and 1998. 
The other extreme, intense drought, claimed 1 million Ethiopian lives from famine in the 
1980s. While disaster experts have shown that the mechanisms underlying famine are far more 
complex than water shortage (food scarcity can also be due to bad infrastructure and hoarding by 
traders, see Sen, 1981 on entitlements), this ‗detail‘ is easily lost in the political discourse.  
Egypt feels particularly vulnerable because it has few alternatives to the Nile. Since average 
rainfall in Egypt is only 60mm/y and it may not rain for years on end in the desert, the only 
significant addition to the 55.5 km2 (= 55 billion cubic meters) coming in at Aswan these days is 
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the reuse of return flows from municipalities, industry and agriculture. These extremes make the 
river both Egypt‘s worst enemy and its life support. This in turn makes regulating the river Nile 
the central focus of Egypt's water security for which, Egypt is willing to sacrifice a lot. For its water 
security, the country uses three water strategies: river development, groundwater development and 
rationalization of use (Murakami, 1995). We will encounter each of those three in the course of the 
chapter. 
 
To contend with the precariousness of exposure to floods and droughts, Egypt has a millennial 
history of advanced water regulation. Egypt and Mesopotamia are commonly bracketed together 
as the first 'hydraulic civilisations'. However, the 'hydraulic imperative' only became an issue in 
the past century, when Egypt was under foreign rule. First, Muhammad Ali, the Ottoman viceroy, 
connected Alexandria (Iskanderiyya) with the Nile for irrigation purposes. Then, at the turn of 
the 20th century, when there was a relative shortage of cotton on the world market, the 
Englishman William Willcocks built the first Aswan dam to ensure the Lancashire mills in Britain 
would be supplied with a constant supply. King Cotton also gave the impetus for the Gezira 
project in the Sudan and, more recently, the Ethiopian Awash irrigation project (Ward 1997: 
113). The original Aswan dam, built in 1902 to trap excess autumn floods to use in the dry 
season21. Before the High Aswan Dam (Sadd el-Aali in Arabic), ‗a third of the Nile water coming 
from Ethiopia flowed into the Mediterranean without being tapped. To gain complete control of 
the river, Egypt replaced the ‗low‘ Aswan Dam in the 1960s by a huge rockfill barrage, the Aswan 
High Dam, and impounded Lake Nasser. Completed in 1970, the colossal storage reservoir 
inundated a ‘land described as the cockpit of the ancient world and both the connection and the 
buffer between the ancient Mediterranean civilisations and the vanished high cultures of Black 
Africa‘.22 Historical heritage like the Abu Simbel temples, which the lake would submerge, were 
rebuilt 210m to the west of the original location. All temples were relocated except the 
monuments of Qasr Ibrim which was built on top of an 80-metre tall rock formation above the 
Nile's level23. Moreover, 50,000 Nubians were resettled in ‗indifferent‘ government housing, and 
many have indicated wanting to return (ibid.)24.  
The project was paid for by the Soviet Union, to the tune of US$1 billion plus technical 
assistance, plus US$650 million coming from Nasser‘s nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956. 
Regulation for storage was never the only objective for Aswan Dam – faced with rising 
population, vast tracts of desert land were developed in the 1960s to be irrigated with Aswan 
water. 
In principle, the 5km long and 100m high Aswan High Dam finally secured total flood 
protection by stopping the floodwater altogether. When Egyptians planned the 565 km long Lake 
Nasser reservoir on the Sudanese border (the Sudanese side has a different name), they had not 
counted on its 163,000 km³ capacity to be too small. The upshot is unexpected excess water that 
needs to go somewhere – either passing through the dam into Egypt if it opens the floodgates, or 
allowed to backflow into Sudan, where it would cause major trouble. To make absolutely sure, 
between 1966 and 1978, as part of the Aswan  project the Egyptians excavated a fourteen-mile 
canal through Khor (Bay) Toshka on the western shore of Lake Nasser, to spill any excess water 
into the Toshka Depression (wadi). As the overflow channel was completed at the start of a 
decade of very dry years, it remained inoperative for many years. 
The Dam tided Egypt over the long spell of drought which hit Africa in the 1980s  Due to 
heavy rains over the Blue Nile and the Atbara, which joins the Nile in Sudan, the Nile discharge 
in 1988 was 106 km2. This heralded a return of a series of high inflows - 1994 (91.9 km³), 1996 
(92.2 km³), 1998 (121 km³), and 1999 (95.2 km³). (Collins, 2003).  
The 1996 flood tested the carrying capacity of the earth underneath Lake Nasser, which 
displayed geologic faults vulnerable to fracture from the increasing weight of the lake. Then 
Minister of Public Works, Radi, declared a state of emergency for Upper Egypt (Collins 2003). 
The inflow was so high that the dam‘s overflow channel had to be opened to ease the pressure 
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(back-flooding) on Sudan. In 1998, the waters rose even higher, and while the excess water was 
drained into the Toshka depression, the floodwater still affected 40 tribal houses (Reuters, 1998). 
But more was yet to come. The 1 in 100 year flood of 1998, thought to be attributable to the 
El Niño southern oscillation, was followed by two La Niña flood years. The excess water - a total 
of 80 billion cubic metres of water – was again duly discharged through the spill channel into the 
desert. But that raised an already rising water table due to the progressive ‗sealing‘ of the bottom 
of Lake Nasser, while infiltration in aquifers is very limited due to impermeable limestone 
underlying the Toshka depression. Four new lakes appeared in the Kiseiba-Dungul Depression25 
– the first (at 172m above sea level) in 1998, the others in 2000. A fifth lake briefly emerged to 
the northwest up in 2001. The lakes are subject to huge evaporation losses, however: 87% 
between 1998 and 200126). ‗Now we have salt marshes there, good for duck hunting but not 
much else‗ (Taher Muhammad Hassan cited by Wener and Bubriski 2007). 
Unsurprisingly the Egyptian government prefers to use that water differently: rather than let all 
this precious water go to waste, it decided for a four-year spillway construction project (1998-
2002) to utilise the floodwater to ‘green the desert‘. A new Toshka channel was constructed from 
1998 to turn an exceptional inflow into a rule: it counts on a structural inflow of 300 m3 per 
second into a whole new irrigation scheme. In so doing, it reverses a very old historic flow: while 
Wadi Toshka used to feed the Nile in ancient times, the Toshka depression will now be used to 
pump water in the opposite direction, aiming to ‗eventually create a second branch to the River 
Nile in the western desert of Egypt, parallel to its prehistoric main course‘.27 
It is not hard to see wider implications for Toshka than agricultural opportunity, however. The 
chapter will first look into the planning history and domestic background to the Toshka project. 
Thereafter, the external conflict potential with nine riparians is looked into. 
 
 
2.1.2 WHAT IS THE TOSHKA PROJECT? HISTORY AND ALTERNATIVE 
CONCEPTIONS28 
 
It is not easy to define the exact scope of the Toshka project (Lonergan and Wolf, 2001: 590) – it 
seems to change and grow as it comes along. 
 
‗Part of the confusion surrounding the project relates to the lack of detailed plans for all aspects of 
development and implementation (...) and the lack of information provided to donor groups, 
potential investors, and other governments regarding specific details of the development project.‘ 
(Lonergan and Wolf, 2001: 591)  
 
To add to the confusion, the project is also known under different names: the National Project 
for the Development of Upper Egypt (NPDUE), the South Valley Development Project, or 
South Egypt Development Project. It is best known as the Toshka project, after Wadi Toshka - 
although Tosca, Tushka, Tashka, Toshki, Tushcan, and Tashkan are also among the spellings 
used (Lonergan and Wolf, 2001). 
Plans for a ‗New Valley Project‘ date back into the 1950s when Egypt was pursuing a 
groundwater development strategy. A first version of the New Valley Project consisted of efforts to 
expand the abstraction from groundwater wells  In 1958, the groundwork was laid for this 
project, and in 1959 the New Valley governorate was created. As I will discuss below, the timing, 
in the middle of grave water and territorial conflict with Sudan, does not seem coincidental.  
The groundwater-based approach however quickly ran into problems of salinisation and loss 
of hydraulic head (pressure), and artesian wells stopped to flow (Murakami 1995). Water taken 
from the massive Nubian Sandstone aquifer, which Egypt shares with Libya, Chad and Sudan, is 
non-renewable. Drawing it down could not just lead to an unwelcome drop in the groundwater 
table but in due course also spark conflict between Egypt and its neighbour to the west, Libya 
(Shapland, 1997, Aramcoworld, 2007). 
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Faced with these early setbacks, the Egyptians redrafted the project. ‗Initial project planning 
began in the early 1960s with a study by the Public Authority for Desert Reconstruction (PADR)‘ 
(Lonergan and Wolf, 2001). These first geological and soil surveys were followed by studies 
between 1971-1973 (aborted by the war with Israel) confirming that a third of the Toshka 
Depression would be arable if irrigated (Collins, 2003). The Planners Association proposed to 
extend the existing Toshka Channel beyond the depression into the western oases of the New 
Valley, over a 310 km stretch, to provide half the water needed – the rest still has to come from 
the finite, aquifers, mostly running underneath the Nile. 
In 1997, construction of the Sheikh Zayyed Canal was begun. The 70km trunk canal has four 
28km branches and is designed to convey 5 billion cubic meters of water a year to the New 
Valley Project. The canal water will have to be pumped up an average of 21 to 53m to get across 
the intervening section of the Nubian Plateau. The channel was shortened by half, from a 
planned length of 158 km to 72 km as the rest was ‗not necessary‘ (el Din, 1999).   
The late 1990s saw several floods so that the spillway could be used in the last four years of the 
20th century. It captured 35% of discharge to Egypt or 20 billion cubic meters. However, in the 
past years there have not been excess floods. A complicating factor is that a climate change-
induced variation of 10 or 20 percent in rainfall leads to 40 - 50% variation in the inflow in Lake 
Nasser (WL: Delft Hydraulics, 2005).‘ 
In the meantime, the bigger picture got ever-bigger. Fig. 2.1 shows how Toshka fits into 
Egypt‘s grand plans for a ‗New Civilisation‘29 in the desert: 
 
 
North Sinai project 
(Northern Sinai Agricultural Development Project, NSADP) 
   El Salaam channel  
 
/   
 
      Toshka 
‗New Civilization‘    
 /  
\ Southern Valley Development Project     
      \ 
 
      Al-Oweinat and New Valley Governorate Oases 
 
FIG. 2.1 Schematic overview of Egypt‟s New Civilization 
 
The envisaged ‗civilisation' consists of a Northern and a Southern valley project. The Northern 
Sinai Agricultural Development Project (NSADP), targets to resettle 750,000 Egyptians. Its core 
is the al-Sala(a)m Canal running from the Damietta Branch of the Nile, fifteen miles from Port 
Said, diving underneath the Suez Canal and emerging to irrigate 92,000 ha west of Suez and 
168,000 ha of reclaimed land in the Sinai (the Suez Canal Region Development Project)30. In the 
context of the peace accords with Israel in 1979, President Sadat hinted that Nile water might be 
diverted to the South of Israel. The diversion of ‗holy‘ Nile water‘ to the ‗Zionist state‘ elicited 
strong protests from Arab Countries, but also from the Egyptian army, and after rumours of 
several plotted coups surfaced (Allouche, 2003), Sadat abandoned the diversion idea, but the 
Salam canal went ahead. An Environmental Assessment drafted for the Government of Egypt 
and the World Bank was suppressed in 1992 but leaked by activist el-Khodary, who is especially 
concerned about the Sinai project‘s outcome for local indigenous Bedouin31. 
The Southern or New Valley project in turn is conceived in two phases, which in turn consist of 
three stages. Stage 1 is the Toshka Project itself, the centrepiece of the project. It consists of the 
Toshka Channel and Mubarek (Mubarak) pumping station, launched on 9 January 1997, 
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consisting of the biggest pumping station in the world, a US$500 million, 24-pump structure near 
Abu Simbel, prepared by Lahmeyer of Germany and built by a consortium of Norwegian-British 
company Kvaerner (inlet), Hitachi of Japan (pumps) and Egypt‘s Arabian International 
Construction would draw water from a point at 147.5 meters above sea level into the canal. Asea 
Brown Boveri is responsible for the electrical engineering  
According to original plans (Lonergan and Wolf 2001), 300 m3/s of surface water was to be 
drawn from the Lake at a site upstream from the Aswan High Dam through six tunnels, each 1.5 
km long, and then lifted up 56 meters via the pumping station  (this requires  200 – 375 MW of 
power!), then through a channel into the desert. In so doing it extends the Aswan spillway 
westward into the Toshka depression, ‗a sand-filled, dry-wash tributary of the Nile 34 kilometres 
north of Abu Simbel‘ (Vance Haynes, 1980), which takes its name from the mythical Egyptian 
queen Tosca. The channel resuscitates what is believed to be an old wadi (a seasonal river valley) 
which, according to feasibility studies, had served to drain water from lakes into the Nile in 
ancient times. Annually this diversion would amount to 5.5 million m3, one tenth of Egypt‘s 
ration under the 1959 Full Utilization of the Nile agreement.. 
Stage 2 of the Southern Valley project, Tasha‘s ‗sister‘, aims to reclaim the governorate of el-
Oweinat (or Aweinat) and the oases of the New Valley governorate, if possible fed by 
groundwater only. The New Valley Canal is to be dug north to three oases then northwest to 
three more beyond the end of the 50km long, $1.2 billion Zayyed Canal (Collins, 2003). 
These projects together - Toshka, Oweinat and the New Valley oases (total cost: $2 billion) - 
form the first phase of a $90bn package, scheduled to be finished in 2017, which would convert 
about half of Egypt‘s surface into agricultural and industrial areas. Agricultural expansion is only 
the basis of the comprehensive project: ‗Industry, mining, alternative energy production, and 
possibly oil and gas production and tourism, are part of the vision, with plans for desert safaris, 
car rallies, conferences and medical tourism, such as sand burial for skin diseases‘ (Pratt, 2001).32 
‗34 resorts are to be built in the Southern desert, eventually creating 10,000 jobs‘.33  
Stages two and three34, however, have been put on hold due to financial constraints. It cannot 
have helped that the Toshka Lakes are receding, leaving a ‗bath tub ring‘ of wetlands35.  A 
consultant observes that the pumps, which commenced action in March 200536  operate only half 
a day per month to guarantee a minimum flow into the irrigation channels. But 2007 promised to 
be a high-discharge year again, the stage of Lake Nasser was so high that the Qasr Ibrim 
monument overlooking it was flooded (el-Aref, 2007). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIG. 2.2 Location of New lakes supplied by Toshka project 
From: Wahby (2004) 
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Certainly, a ‗second Nile‘37 is a dream many like to believe in – Sheikh al-Sayyid (Zayyed) bin-
Sultan Al-Nahayan, president of the United Arab Emirates, made a US$100 million investment to 
enable the main cataract. The Saudi prince and maverick investor, Al-walid bin Talal bin Abdul-
aziz al-Saud, through his KADCO company (Kingdom Agricultural Development Company) 
purchased 100,000 (or 120,000 – Collins 2003) acres for a mega-farm in the New Valley to the 
tune of US$300 million, and contracted Sun World, a subsidiary of Cadiz of California, to help 
him grow cotton and watermelons, grapes, citrus, strawberries and tomatoes, many of these out 
of season, for export to Europe (Cowper 2000). Due to the high temperatures, four to five 
harvests a year would be possible. Despite the savings from drip irrigation (Collins 2003), the 
new firm is predicted to require 1% of the entire Egyptian water quota.38 The world food 
organisation FAO has also shown great enthusiasm39 and the Turkish GAP administration signed 
a collaboration agreement in 2000 labelling both the Turkish and Egyptian projects ‗sustainable 
and integrated‘. 
But the project has elicited considerable scepticism as well. When a US Congress delegation 
visited the project in early 1998, its unpublished report concluded that KADCO, responsible for 
project development and management, had failed to honour its promise to make an 
Environmental Impact Assessment once its development plan is ready. As the ´necessary 
feasibility studies‘ had not been done, the delegation advised American companies not to invest‘ 
(Young, 1999). 
International Nile experts have voiced damning criticism. Dale Whittington and John 
Waterbury doubt the project‘s sustainability even for the short run, claiming ‗the Tushka canal 
spillway will probably never be used again‘ (Waterbury 1997: 279-298, fn. 2) while Tony Allan has 
called the project ―preposterous, a national fantasy…[for Egypt] is going to have less water, not 
more.‖40 
The experts´ criticism suggests that Egypt has embarked on a chimera. The project calls to 
mind the historian Donald Worster (1985)‘s description of the delusions of the American West - 
if you settle a parched area, the water for irrigation will come in due course when you have God 
on your side. Similar ´magic thinking´ seems to have the Egyptian government in thrall, planning 
to green the desert without the necessary water. 
 
The next Section will discuss how the state counters this criticism by securitising its water 
resources and its project. A securitising move seeks to realise discursive closure to legitimise 
extraordinary actions. With amazing political elasticity, closure on living space is given emphasis 
(foregrounded) while ignoring (backgrounding) physical closure with respect to water availability 
in legitimising the Toshka project. 
 
 
2.1.3 GOVERNANCE CONTEXT: POLITICAL STRUCTURES  
 
Egypt became a republic when General Gamal Nasser staged an army coup overthrowing King 
Faisal. Nasser established a nationalist-patriarchal ideology, where ‗the interests of the regime (as 
patriarch) are identified with the nation‘s interests‘, a statist economic system, and a corporatist 
institutional framework. This meant the negation of the political rights of individuals and of 
groups like women and Copts (Pratt, 2001). After the Suez Crisis, Egypt became a socialist one-
party state. Once they had the money and technology for the High Aswan Dam, the Egyptians 
switched back to the capitalist world. Since the 1970s, the Egyptian government has allowed a 
process of infitah (open door). Under IMF pressure, two waves of economic reforms have further 
liberalised the Egyptian economy, with severe repercussions on the agricultural sector. 
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TABLE 2.1      Chronology of domestic and basin events on the Nile 
 Domestic developments Basin developments 
1953 General Nasser comes to power  
1956 Nationalisation of Suez Canal; 
European intervention 
 
1958  Coup in Sudan 
Start of American dam study for Ethiopia 
1959 Creation of New valley 
Governorate 
1959 Full Utilisation the Nile agreement 
1960-1972 Building Aswan dam and spillway  
1961  Nyerere Doctrine defies colonial treaties 
1973 Infitah: economic liberalisation 
reforms after war with Israel 
 
1980-1988 Lake Nasser saves Egypt from 
drought 
Famine in Ethiopia 
1981 President Sadat killed; State of 
Emergency pronounced 
 
1983  UNDUGU initiative for the Nile  
1985  Discontinuation of Sudan‘s Jonglei project after SPLA 
attack 
1987  Hydromet initiative for the Nile 
1992  Tecconile; first Nile 2002 conference 
 
1995 Egyptian president escapes attack 
in Addis Ababa 
Accusations between Nile states after attack on 
President 
1997 Construction of Zayyed Channel Four years of abundant Nile flow 
1998  Acrimony between Egypt and Ethiopia 
2002 Completion of Toshka project  
2006  Basin-wide near-agreement 
1017 Projected completion of Toshka 
project 
 
 
 
The governance context thus seemed to open up. However, the liberalization was offset by 
strict state control of food imports. State-controlled corporatist structures remained in place, 
giving rise to an arrangement where the Egyptian government pretends to liberalise while the 
business sector pretends to invest (Waterbury, 1993). State powers were extended in 1981, after 
the assassination of President Anwar Sadat, the state of emergency was declared and has not been 
lifted since. This allows indefinite imprisonment of opponents of state policies. According to 
Collins (2003), Egyptian state control has become stricter rather than looser of late: 
 
‗The monolithic regime of Egypt today and its structured bureaucracy is more reminiscent of 
Rameses II in the thirteenth century before Christ than the socialists and communists of the 
twentieth century after him. The central government of Egypt appoints its powerful provincial 
governors, the mayors of its 4,000 villages, those who preach in the 60,000 mosques, and the 
presidents of its fifteen universities. They are supported by an inflated bureaucracy encrusted 
through time like a Red Sea coral reef with volumes of regulations that stifle initiative, discourse, and 
dissent. Entangled in a legal and regulatory cobweb spun by the spiders of Arab, Turkish, French, 
and British rulers, a third of the Egyptian people are underpaid civil servants with security of 
employment that often perpetuates their officious and mediocre performance.‘ 
 
Members of Parliament belonging to the Islamic Muslim Brotherhood are tolerated on an 
individual basis but the party remains outlawed, opposition activists were reportedly bullied and 
one shot dead in the last elections.41 
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In 2002 Egypt tightened the reins on NGOs, banning them from foreign funding and political 
activities. ‗―This law seeks to impose the hegemony of executive power on civil society,‖ says 
Hafez Abu Saada, secretary general of the Egyptian Organization of Human Rights.42 A rationale 
for this is that NGOs ‗de-essentialise‘ Egypt as a society of multiple groups and classes. with 
different needs and rights (Pratt, 2001)43, a plurality that might question the unity of the nation-
state and thus promote politicisation. The state prefers avoiding any issue becoming political.44 
The Toshka project remains non-negotiable for the Egyptian government. Irrigation Minister 
Abu Zayd ‗ruled out any attempt to reconsider the project‘45, President Mubarak said it was ‗an 
irreversible venture‗,46 Prime Minister Kamal el-Ganzouri said: ‗Raising doubts about Toshka 
harms the interest of the nation47 and his successor Atef Obeid claimed in 2003: "Our 
commitment to success in Toshka is incontrovertible, for moving out of the Nile Valley into the 
desert is not only an economic necessity but a social and security issue.‖48 
 The depoliticisation of social issues is rooted in a long line of historic experiences. Rebus sic 
stantibus, it is unsurprising that the Toshka project has faced relatively little criticism within the 
political elite. The elevation of the river Nile to the national interest requires a loyalty to Egypt‘s 
water strategy that forecloses any questioning of the sense of its hydraulic projects. As an 
Egyptian state spokesman explained the need for the Toshka Project in Thatcherite style, ´There 
is no alternative´ (World Water Shimbun, 2003). Is pharaonic Etatism so entrenched in Egypt that 
everyone involved is prepared to claim it is ‗midnight at noon‘ because President Mubarak says it 
is? 
 
A Toshka debate? 
Above, we saw that projects like Toshka are depoliticised and ‗securitised‘ as national security 
issues. The state‘s tight grip on parliament, media and society does not preclude occasional 
grumbles about the cost and effectiveness of the project. Rushdi Said, an Egyptian hydro-
geologist, feels that the employment projections are overrated, and is quoted (in Cooperman, 
1997) as warning that "(t)his project is going to employ thousands of people, not millions." 
Magdy Sobhy, of the al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, criticizes the Toshka 
project as unrealistic because it is based on Nile flows during last year's higher-than-average 
flood.  
Egyptian hydrologists also worry about evaporation and degradation of soils, health expert see 
stagnant water leading to increasing schistosomiasis (bilharzia). A full environmental impact 
analysis has not been made, while ecologists worry about flora and fauna of the western desert 
(Collins 2003) which could bring an ´environmental crisis´ (Bush 2007: 1610). Since international 
funding agencies have declined to fund the project, Egypt will have to raise the money alone, 
making some commentators fear the project would be ‗sucking the lifeblood out of the economy‘ 
(Noeman, 2000). 
 
A window of opportunity to domestic opposition to Toshka opened when in the Summer of 
1998, Egypt indeed faced a cash flow crisis. As the cost of the Toshka project spiralled, opposition 
appeared to be growing to the principle and the cost of the scheme, as well as other projects such 
as the East of Port Said hub port project within the ministries [Shouhan, pers. comm.], in the 
nation‘s four oppositional news papers and scientific community. After President Ganzouri left 
office, the project's detractors in the Egyptian opposition wasted no time in denouncing the 
project(s) as megalomaniac and nepotistic though the oppositional press. 
Both the three governmental and four oppositional papers are owned and printed by the 
government, so that it has full control. Still, this is relative: Napoli and Amin (1997) call Egypt‘s 
press the most liberal in the Middle East in the sense that many things can be said if certain lines 
are not crossed. The Toshka project is an interesting example of this. 
In 1999 Abbas Al-Tarabili, the editor of the Wafd opposition party‘s eponymous newspaper 
published two-front page editorials claiming that insufficient feasibility studies had been carried 
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out for the Toshka project, that the terrain is much harsher than expected (with granite and an 
unforeseen depression) causing the project to fall behind schedule, and that project 
implementation is ‗rife with (financial) irregularities‘. The Irrigation Minister, Abu Zayd, denied 
all problems while President el-Ganzouri government decried the ‗hostile campaign‘ as directed 
against the national interest (el Din, 1999). Zakaria Azmi, chief of the presidential staff, requested 
a series of hearings.49 On 6 April 2006, the Egyptian Parliament again discussed Toshka, as 
Members of Parliament tabled memoranda on corruption, arguing the plots had been sold way 
too cheaply. The Muslim Brotherhood‘s Health Commission Deputy El-Shaer called Tushka a 
‗nightmare‘ that failed to meet any of its objectives. Al-Ahram reports every year there are 
complaints that New Valley areas do not receive enough irrigation water.50 Within government 
there appeared some fission too. By February 2006 the Minister of Irrigation announced that just 
23,000 feddans had been brought into cultivation. Minister Abu Zayd disputed the figures, 
claiming the project had already met 85% of its targets.51 
 
The cost issue is particularly painful because the project banks on private capital to supplement 
a maximum 25% public investment. However, foreign direct investment was falling in the 1990s 
from $2.5bn to 1bn in 2000. Egypt further liberalised its investment policies to find the money 
needed to supplement funding for the New Valley project, Egypt‘s Law No. 8 of 1997 deregulated 
investment and offered tax breaks. 
In the New Valley, the state has a hands-off policy. While a minor percentage is held back for 
smallholders and graduates, to attract investors for the scheme it has been decreed that private 
enterprises cannot be nationalised or expropriated. Thus, the public sector cannot interfere with 
management practices and firms can import whatever they like. 
Nonetheless Flemings, an international credit bank, downgraded Egypt as its economy is 
groaning under a host of punishing projects, of which Toshka is only one (Cowper, 2000). 
‗Opposition politicians, banks and development specialists have attacked them [the mega 
projects] for being grandiose, impractical and a severe drain on limited government resources‘ 
(Cowper, 2000). 
 
 
 
TABLE 2.2 Water Resource Use in Egypt, 2002/03 
 Water sources   Mln m3 
/year 
 Uses Share in 
total use 
- Nile Water 55.5    Agriculture 85.0% 
- Rain and floods water 1.0  Industry 9.5% 
- Subterranean water (Valley and Delta) 6.5  Potable water 5.5% 
- Deep subterranean water in New Valley, Oases and 
   Sinai 
1.0   
- Agricultural drainage water 5.0   
- Recycled agricultural drainage water 0.7   
 Total 69.7  100.0% 
Source: Egyptian State Information Service, www.sis.gov.eg/En/Publications/226/538/541/544.htm 
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So, where will the water for Toshka come from? 
In Section 2.1, we have seen that Toshka project depends on infrequent floodwater and non-
renewable groundwater (Fig. 2.2). It is notable that 55.5 billion m3/year at current population 
figures is about 800 m3/y per capita. If this were Egypt‘s only source of water, the country would 
be severely water stressed. 
 
Where will Egypt find the 5-10 billion m3 extra water needed to complete the project?  
Could Egypt diversify? Egypt does have desalination plants near Hurghada on the Red Sea 
coast and Marsa Matruh on the Mediterranean. Desalination is still costly and relatively small-
scale in terms of yield. Egypt has so far not used much of its groundwater resources, but will draw 
on those a great deal more (Hvidt, 1995).  
Of course, Egyptian water managers know that the Aswan High Dam and Lake Nasser may 
have tided Egypt over the extreme droughts of 1979-88, but that in 1988 the water level in the 
reservoir reached a critical low (150m) endangering electricity generation (2.1 million kW 
annually) by its 12 generators. The state therefore seeks to diminish its dependence on 
hydropower from Lake Nasser, which takes care of 50% of the country‘s energy supply52 and is 
using its oil and gas supplies. A dramatic rationalisation programme has been started aiming for a 
less water-intensive type of agriculture, notably cuts in rice and cane sugar, improved drainage, 
stepped-up recycling efforts to reuse reclaimed wastewater, and levelling of arable land slow 
down the level of evaporation - though plans for night-time irrigation have met with resistance 
from farmers. After all, out of the 85% taken by the agricultural sector, a high percentage is lost 
because of inefficient sheet irrigation practised by the fellahin (peasants and labourers, from 
Arabic fellah: ploughman or tiller). Hi-tech solutions such as drip irrigation and even better 
Nilometers are envisaged. There are plans to store water in the Lakes Manzal and Barlus on the 
Mediterranean coast, to repair leaky pipes and line ditches (Cooperman, 1997). Egypt will 
economise, recycle, and modernise its way out - and save, according to Abdelrahman Salabi, 
water policy advisor to Minister Abu-Zayd, 20 billion cubic metres53. Users of Toshka water 
however are not expected to have to pay for it, though, so conservation is unlikely to happen 
there. 
Clearly, these measures are technocratic efficiency boosters, not structural measures. Like 
many of its neighbours, Egypt has officially not really begun to contemplate the kind of 'demand 
management' all water-poor states will eventually have to accept.  
However often sections of the academic community (e.g. Gleick, 1993) may sound alarms 
about water shortages in the region, the Egyptian state has different ideas. 'The idea that there 
should be a water shortage is absurd', says a Ministry of Public Works and Water Resources 
expert54. 
 
 
2.1.4 NOT ENOUGH WATER; NOT ENOUGH SPACE? 
 
Is Egypt overpopulated? 
It is tempting to see the New Valley as 'Mubarak's pyramid', a prestigious French-style grand 
travai'  - a lasting memory of his presidency to follow in the footsteps of his predecessors General 
Nasser (the High Aswan dam) and Anwar Sadat (Abu Simbel) and his neighbour, president 
Muammar Ghadhafi of Libya (the Man-made river). 
But its advocates claim there is an urgent practical reason for the mega-project. A major 
legitimiser of the New Valley project is the supposed overpopulation on a narrow strip of land. 
According to Cowper, referring to Toshka, ‗(f)ear of a demographic and food security time-bomb 
lies at the heart of the argument in favour of two of the most controversial mega-projects‘ 
(Cowper, 2000). The project‘s advocates claim it seeks to create some space to prevent social 
tensions as a consequence of demographic pressure on a tiny strip of land. Each year, some 
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20,000 ha are lost due to urbanisation. Just 5% of Egypt's territory (an area the size of 
Switzerland) is inhabited by some 63 million Egyptians. In 2017, this number will have grown to 
140 million. The Egyptian ‗decentralisation policy‘ has resettled several hundreds of thousands of 
Egyptians and seeks to resettle millions more (Lonergan and Wolf 2001). Thus the new project 
would not only put 250,000ha of land into production but also enable 5 to 7 million Egyptians to 
move into the New Valley within the next two decades55 – though Lonergan and Wolf (2001) 
note that the size of the Egyptian population will have increased by five times that number by 
then. The project would quadruple Egypt's inhabited space56 so that land occupation would rise 
to 25%. 
On the other hand, we should not be taken in by the word ‗overpopulated' - while we should 
not necessarily reach for a revolver when we hear it, as Susan George of the Transnational 
Institute has it (in Mitchell, 1995: 131), it is wise to reach for the calculator. Egypt is still less 
densely populated than Belgium, and on its arable area produces three times as much crop per 
hectare as Bangladesh (Mitchell, 1995). Mitchell‘s (1995) analysis of World Bank documents 
shows that the portrayal of Egypt as a space-constrained country in need of development is an 
unfounded case of ‗spin‘. 
Even if we accept the Lebensraum argument were valid, will 5 million Egyptians move into the 
desert – 3 million to the South-western Desert and 2 million to the Sinai? ‗Historically, Egyptians 
resist moving from their homes to new settlements in the desert, and the Toshka Project is no 
exception.‘ (Wahby, 2004: 90) So far only 15,000 live there57  
 
Is Egypt in a food crisis?  
As for the other argument for the desert reclamation projects – the ‗food security time-bomb‘, 
thinking also seems muddled or selective. Food self-sufficiency is an important policy goal and 
Toshka is part of ‗horizontal agricultural extension‘ to achieve it.58 Egypt has not been self-
sufficient in food since the 1970s, this deficit is more than made up for by the global food 
market. But the new crops are mainly horticultural crops for export purposes. 
Tony Allan (1997) has given an influential explanation of the workings of a political taboo. The 
autocratic technology-driven leadership Egypt has traditionally practised makes it hard to garner 
societal support and legitimacy for a change of mindset toward demand management. This 
adaptation would take money as well as goodwill and adaptability on the part of the population. 
The only regional state to have started such a process was Israel in the early 1990s (Allan, 1997). 
But in Egypt, the dream of 'water sufficiency' is alive and well while Egypt‘s fellahin ‗adapt‘ by 
abandoning the land. Despite increasing ‗water poverty‘ (Ramadan, n.d.), the notion of water 
scarcity remains undebatable. This is made possible by backgrounding an ever greater reliance on 
‗virtual water‘.    
If you stop exporting water-intensive agricultural products (encapsulated water) and take full 
advantage of low international wheat prices a huge percentage of irrigational demand is avoided. 
By switching from food export to food import Egypt saved billions of m3 of premium water. 
Food constitutes 10.8 per cent of Egypt‘s total imports bill (OECD, 2004/2005). Thanks to 
American food aid and the availability of cheap grain on the world market Egypt became less and 
less dependent on its own water. This way, a silent revolution realised economic adaptation 
which spares the government an embarrassing political debate on the question whether the state 
is accountable for a looming water shortage.59 
Up to the 1970s, it was possible for the Middle East to augment the water supply by finding or 
mobilising new resources to ensure food self-sufficiency. Since around 1972, Egypt switched to 
importing, which means importing encapsulated water. Nowadays, imports meet half Egypt‘s 
food requirements, and ‗(m)ore water ‗flows‘ into the Middle East each year as ‗virtual water‘ than 
flows down the Nile into Egypt for agriculture‘ (Allan, 1997).   
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This dependence on food imports evidences a national economic vulnerability (dependence on 
the rest of the world) that Egyptian officials prefer to keep politically silent. Egyptian water 
professionals, who are quite well represented in the international water community60, have not 
wanted to discuss virtual water for many years and – it seems - kept it off the agenda where they 
could.  
Apart from its political silence, there is another advantage to a virtual-water strategy. As Alan 
Richards and John Waterbury (1990) have noted in passing, food imports have proved an ideal 
control mechanism - it is easier to control the distribution of imported food than of food 
produced by millions of fellahin (small farmers) in the countryside. In 1977 the Egyptian 
government cut subsidies, which doubled the prices of food in the cities ‗bread riots‘ broke out 
after draconian price rises following IMF-imposed structural adjustments. Egypt‘s geography 
allows all food imports to come in at a central location (sea port) and distributed for food 
coupons to the urban poor, thus preventing future riots. Like Aswan High Dam, this creates 
what Callon would call an obligatory passage point (Callon, 1987). In this respect, virtual water 
can also play a role in maintaining state control. 
 
A (not-so-)silent revolution? 
What Allan (2001 and elsewhere) has repeatedly described as the ‗economically invisible and 
politically silent revolution‘ of virtual water has propelled an economic adaptation process that 
spares the government an embarrassing political debate on the question whether the state is 
accountable for a looming water shortage and dependency on the rest of the world that Egyptian 
officials prefer to keep silent about. But how silent is this revolution in the countryside? 
In that context, a prescription that Egypt should turn to the world market to import virtual 
water more is anathema. When Beyene and Wadley (2004) discuss this as an option, they voice 
concern that the market mechanism does ‗not account for the different social meanings 
attributed to water across state boundaries. (…) It is hard to predict … how far the Egyptian 
farmers are ready to buy the idea of detaching themselves from producing agricultural products, 
should the Egyptian government agree to implement the ―virtual water‖ scheme.‘ (Beyene and 
Wadley, 2004).  
But what seems to have escaped Beyene and Wadley is that, in fact, Egyptian food producers – 
whether they ‗buy‘ the idea or not- have already been adjusting to a virtual strategy for the last 30-
35 years. 
 
The fellahin are a powerful symbol for Egypt, and when Gamal Abdel Nasser came to power, 
he sought a political support base in the countryside by pushing for land reform. This reform 
proceeded only haltingly, sustaining absentee landownership, but the overall effect of land 
redistribution and collectivisation of the agricultural sector was to create a clientele for the state, 
which had nurtured a class of small-time farmers (fellahin) and guaranteed a good price for their 
corn and cotton (Weinbaum, 1982. See also: Beblawi and Luciani, 1987). Egyptian irrigation is 
still heavily subsidised – Kagwanja quotes a $5 billion per year figure (Kagwanja 2007). 
As a consequence, the first wave of economic liberalisation initially progressed only slowly. But 
after the 1977 food riots, the Egyptian state responded by a policy of subsidies and social welfare 
programs for the urban electorate -  combining welfare and developmental roles (Abdelazim, 
2002), in such a way the infrastructural links with and investments in the countryside were 
neglected. Imported food brought wealth to harbours, not to farmers so that farmers‘ bargaining 
power was eroded, leading to further marginalisation.  
In a second IMF-impelled wave of reforms, Egypt liberalised its agrarian policies, abandoning 
fixed supply and price support in wheat and maize from 1987. After the Land Law (No. 96 of 
1992) previous subsidies on farming inputs were cut. This subsidy cut was especially meaningful 
since disappearance of fertile sediment from the Nile due to the Aswan Dam, 99% of which is 
now trapped in lake Nasser, had to be replaced by chemical fertiliser. Even worse, land tenure 
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was reformed: over a five-years‘ period, tenants had to return their land to the landowners. They 
had rented this land for 40 years at fixed rates; now the rents were allowed to skyrocket. Evicted 
farming families have resisted the police, which has given rise to a ´silent civil war´ in the 
Egyptian South: widespread violence in the countryside has been reported due to police-assisted 
evictions of tenants. The inevitable outcome was for tenants to swell the shantytowns of Cairo 
(Bush 2004, 2005; see also OMCT, 2006) and, who knows, Toshka - had they only been notified 
at all of the possibility and the very short time window) very different farming methods and start 
costs (Hill, 2000: 23, 29). 
The virtual water (import) strategy thus appears to have supported urban political control while 
widening the socio-economic gap between mega-city and countryside. Egypt is a semi-rentier state 
(Beblawi and Luciani 1987), developing with easily obtained income from running the Suez 
Canal, oil production, Western aid, remittances and tourism. Relying on external rents and a 
‗bubble economy‘ (Mitchell, 2002) Egypt now seeks to attract foreign investment in projects like 
the New Valley to generate foreign currency from horticulture and cotton. But rather than 
attracting farmers to produce food, the state appears to gamble on ´rural development without 
farmers´ (Bush 2005). New Valley plots are rather larger than those made available in earlier 
development projects such as 1 to 2.5 acre plots at Nourabayya in the 1980s. A 100,000-acre plot 
was sold to Saudi Prince al-Walid Ibn Talal al-Abdulaziz. But despite the tax breaks, Toshka only 
attracted one significant investor:  
 
[Sun World] was to invest no money of its own in the Toshka project... In the excitement of the 
government‘s announcement that the project had found an American partner, the reason for this 
went unnoticed: Sun World had no money. (T. Mitchell q. In Bush, 2007) 
  
The Muslim Brotherhood MPs have taken the Egyptian state to task for not having sold land 
on the market but directly awarding it to KAC while preaching market liberalisation. 
In the Egyptian welfare state, taxation remains low, urban subsidies are high, state control of 
the economy remains considerable while leaving farmers to their own devices. Beblawi and 
Luciani have argued, and Dorman confirmed for Egypt, that rentier states like Egypt can exempt 
themselves from the need to develop strong state–society relations. The state exerts control, but 
it is not ingrained: it can rely on continuing patronage relations. It tolerates a huge informal 
economy - Dorman (2007) maintains the whole Cairian economy is informal. The state may be 
everywhere, but it can be co-opted and subverted by locals. While open discontent in the streets 
is stamped down, hidden deviance is tolerated: if you do not visibly avoid the law, you are not 
branded an ‗outlaw‘. People retain their rights in a political sense if they keep their heads down 
(Dorman 2007).  
 
An alternative explanation 
We have thus seen that ‗closure‘ is an elastic discourse strategy – Egypt‘s space and food 
insecurity, which are contestable, can be invoked to legitimise a project, while water closure 
(shortage) cannot, because it is a carefully maintained taboo. The project makes neither 
hydrological nor economic sense. At the time of writing, the Ministry of Agriculture appears to 
´behold the moon´, labelling Toshka a model of agricultural investment (State Information 
Service, 2007). But Toshka is not related with the Ministry of Water Resources or even the 
Ministry of Agriculture; it is a Presidential project (Egypt State Information Service, 2007). 
Modern Egyptian rulers continue to have a taste for building pyramids. It may serve a political 
goal, as a symbol for state prowess - not by the ancient mode of exploiting the population - but 
neither by creating a bustling investment market. 
The role of the army may be a clue here. Since Sadat‘s assassination in 1981 Egypt has been 
under a state of emergency. The President is head of the army and relies on their support, 
knowing that the forces can be a danger: in 1985 the Central Security services plotted a failed 
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coup. In the 1990s, the army‘s budget has been cut, but at the same time its mandate has been 
expanded.  
According to both Frisch (2001) and Dorman (2007: 209) the Egyptian army is heavily 
involved in the business of ‗butter‘; not just ‗guns‘. Quite literally so: the mandate extends to 
‗basic needs like agriculture, irrigation and land reclamation‘. Armies got monopolies in non-
military sectors like agro-industry in the new development schemes. Given the scarcity of land, 
the Army profited from sale of military terrains and the development of new lands. The army is 
heavily involved in the agro-industry on land reclaimed by the al-Salam canal and Toshka, for 
which the military in responsible for planning, canal construction and earth removal; giving water 
to nomads and educating Upper Egypt‘ (Frisch, 2001). This raises the alternative hypothesis that 
Toshka provides self-sustaining income for an army that sees its budget cut.  
Moreover, the location of the project so close to the Sudanese border does not seem 
accidental. The importance of a desert development project with questionable economic 
prospects to national security makes more sense from the perspective of controlling border areas: 
the Sudan for the Southern Valley project, and likewise areas close to Israel in the Northern Sinai 
project. This brings in a foreign policy (geopolitical) angle on the Toshka story. For a broader 
perspective, we thus have to look at Egypt‘s external affairs. 
An international approach can also shed more light on the heated response of, especially 
Egypt, to the Toshka project. If Egypt is no longer an agriculturally-based society, as Selby (2005) 
observes, it could afford to grant some water to upstream countries. However, the signs do not 
evidence this. To help us understand how Egypt manages to prevent sharing much, the 
remainder of the chapter will first look into the international overlay of Nile politics. 
 
 
2.2  EXTERNAL HYDROPOLITICS 
 
"The Nile is Egypt‘s lifeline, so it can‘t accept any decline or decrease of water," says Ahmed El-
Naggar of the Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies in Cairo. "Each country has water 
rights, but if any country takes more than its rights, Egypt will not forgive it."-  Sudan Tribune, 16 
February 2004. 
 
"Any action that would endanger the waters of the Blue Nile will be faced with a firm reaction on the 
part of Egypt, even if that action should lead to war." (former Pres. Anwar Sadat, cited in Kendie 
1999).  
 
"The Egyptians treated the waters of the Nile as though they were a purely Egyptian affair rather 
than one concerning all states in the basin (…) And they created facts on the ground that make 
matters very difficult for the future. Hence, we felt we had entered into a game stupidly. We were 
talking about sharing resources, while the Egyptians were making that impossible in future. 
Therefore continuing with the technical talks became, quite simply, a waste of time." (Ethiopian 
President, Meles Zenawi in 1999) 61 
 
 
2.2.1 INTERNATIONAL OVERLAY 
 
The position of Egypt in the international system remains important, and as a consequence, so 
does the overlay of global geopolitics. The Aswan Dam, for example, would not have been 
possible without the Cold War. Although Nasser won the stand-off with Britain and France over 
Suez in 1956, it proved a Pyrrhic victory as it nearly bankrupted Egypt when the West responded 
with a crippling economic boycott. General Nasser still wanted his dam and in 1959 the Soviet 
Union stepped in, willing and able to supply the money and technology. Six years on, USSR 
president Khrushchev was present at the High Dam's inauguration.62 Once the Aswan high dam 
had become operative – it came fully on stream in 1970 - Egypt returned to the capitalist camp 
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and started very carefully to liberalise its economy: the 'open door' (infitah) policy. The return to 
the West seems to have been inspired by both economic as well as political motives. 
When Egypt was defeated in the 1967 war against Israel, the country also lost some of its 
international prestige. The Gulf states' oil boycott in 1973, as bold a move as Egypt's 
nationalisation of the Suez canal, stole Egypt's thunder. On the back of its newly-found riches 
Saudi Arabia became the new regional leader. Peace with Israel in 1979 (the Camp David 
agreement) won President Sadat a Nobel prize but lost his country even more Arab credibility. 
During the Camp David talks it was also proposed to divert 1% of the Nile influx, some 500 
million m3 annually, to the densely populated, heavily saline Gaza strip – the al-Salaam canal 
running into the Sinai as part of the above-mentioned Northern Valley project (see above) would 
not have to be extended by much to reach Rafah, on the Egyptian-Israeli border. The peace 
move made Egypt an outcast among its Arab friends but had other dividends: while Arab 
development aid dried up, Egypt soon became a top-three recipient of American aid.  
There were limits however to the degree Egypt was prepared to alienate the Arab world. After 
President Sadat was killed, relations with Israel became tenser under Mubarak, and his Water 
Minister, Abu Zayd, let it be known that Egypt is not going to be made to supply Israel with 
water.63 As expected, relations with the Arab states and Iran improved as a result.  
Of course Egypt continues to keep a keen eye on the remunerative relation with the U.S., of 
which it is still a major recipient while Egypt remains a cornerstone of U.S. policy to moderate 
the Middle East. When Egypt joined the Allied forces and even sent soldiers to fight in the Gulf 
war of 1990-91, US$7.5 billion of its debt burden was scrapped while Sudan, which had sided 
with Saddam, was punished. But now that America no longer gives Egypt food aid, the spending 
strategy will only work with the help of oil exports (Egypt is a member of the Organisation of 
Arab Oil Producing States, OAPEC), and/or extensive foreign support (Beblawi and Luciani, 
1987). 
 
 
2.2.2 CONFLICT OR COOPERATION? 
 
In water literature, a sometimes unhelpful distinction is frequently made between conflict and co-
operation between states.64 When one state is significantly stronger than the others, the way states 
‗co-operate‘ with each other may be suspiciously like the way a detainee ´co-operates´ with his 
captors. Conversely, ‗conflict‘ sometimes looks like a staged theatrical act to get outside attention 
and funding. A cursory glance at the Nile basin reveals a coexistence of professed co-operation 
and professed conflict, which highlights that both ‗conflict‘ and ‗cooperation‘ are political 
discourses, constructed for specific audiences (Mirumachi and Warner, forthcoming). Egypt has 
made threats to upstreamers, several riparians have made angry noises since independence; news 
that the Nile riparians were close to signing a Nile agreement in early 2007 therefore generated 
considerable international excitement – but at the time of writing of this chapter, the agreement 
still seemed outstanding. The below sketches a background to these ‗signs‘ and seeks to explain 
them in the context of Egypt‘s role in the Nile community. 
The upstream Nile riparians profess to be far from happy with the status quo on the Nile. As 
the last port of call before the Nile reaches the Mediterranean Egypt depends on what the upper 
riparians leave. It seems daring - if not foolhardy – for Egypt to claim even more water. 
The next few paragraphs will analyse Egypt‘s relationships with upstream countries Ethiopia 
(2.2.3), Sudan (2.2.4) and Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania (2.2.5). Ethiopian opposition to the 
Toshka project will be discussed in the context of upstream resistance to Egypt‘s insistence on 
upholding colonial treaties. But also relations with Sudan, which Egypt needs on its side to get a 
greater share of the Nile, are highly volatile, while three East African upstreamers, Kenya, 
Uganda and Tanzania, have become more assertive. The below Sections go into Nilotic conflict 
and cooperation. 
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TABLE 2.3  Area of the states of the Nile Basin (FAO, 1997) 
 
Country Total area of the 
country 
Area of the 
country within 
the basin 
As % of total area 
of basin 
As % of total area 
of country 
 (km2) (km2) (%) (%) 
Burundi 27 834 13 260 0.4 47.6 
Rwanda 26 340 19 876 0.6 75.5 
Tanzania 945 090 84 200 2.7 8.9 
Kenya 580 370 46 229 1.5 8.0 
Zaire 2 344 860 22 143 0.7 0.9 
Uganda 235 880 231 366 7.4 98.1 
Ethiopia 1 100 010 365 117 11.7 33.2 
Eritrea 121 890 24 921 0.8 20.4 
Sudan 2 505 810 1 978 506 63.6 79.0 
Egypt 1 001 450 326 751 10.5 32.6 
Nile basin  3 112 369 100.0  
 
 
 
2.2.3  ACRIMONY WITH ETHIOPIA 
 
A bewildering historic heritage helps Egypt to keep its nine neighbours - Kenya, Tanzania, 
Burundi, Rwanda, Zaire, Uganda, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan - in check; the Nile catchment extends 
way down to Burundi in Central-Africa and to Eritrea in the Horn. It does so on the basis of 
colonial treaties, economic and, if need be, military dominance. Out of these, Ethiopia has the 
biggest claim by far on the Nile. The Ethiopian Highlands are the primary source, of the Blue 
Nile, contributing 76% to the annual flow of the Blue Nile – during the flood period Ethiopian 
sources even provide 95% of the flow of the Blue Nile, and 50% of the White Nile through the 
Machar marsh and Sobat river (Haynes and Whittington, 1981)65. 
Egypt‘s dependence on Europe and France started in 1879 with Egypt‘s bankruptcy in 1879, 
after a failed campaign of Khedive Ismail to conquer Ethiopia and make the Nile an Egyptian 
river66. In 1902, still in the colonial age, England (on behalf of Egypt and Sudan) concluded a 
treaty with Italy (on behalf of Ethiopian King Menelik II) stipulating that any upstream 'arrest' of 
the waters would not be permissible. The English sought to secure the continued production of 
cotton for its Lancashire mills. Almost a century down the road, Egypt still stands by this 
document. Ethiopia, unsurprisingly, is piqued by the situation, as they thwart its development 
plans. Like Kenya and the Belgian Congo, Ethiopia was not a party to the Nile treaty of 1959 - 
and has refused to accept it. The treaty allocated what has become a ‗non-negotiable‘ (Collins 
2003) 55 1/2 km3 a year to Egypt, 18½ to Sudan, which theoretically left something over 10 
million m3 for all other riparians, given the average 84 km3 measured (on average) at Aswan 
annually. Ethiopia has never lodged a formal complaint about the distribution agreement,67 but is 
well aware of its upstream position. Kendie (1999) cites an early instance of linkage politics in the 
14th century when the Negus of Ethiopia threatened to retaliate by diverting the Nile if Egypt did 
not refrain from persecuting its Christian (Coptic) minority. Still, Ethiopia‘s interest in seriously 
developing the Nile materialised as recently as 1956 when Emperor Haileselassie established the 
Ministry of Public Works, recast in 1971 as the National Water Resources Commission. 
According to Collins (2003) this agency and its offspring such as the Valley Agricultural 
Development Authority, lacked sufficient technological knowledge. Only in 1990 a Preliminary 
Water Resources Development Master Plan (PWRD) was drawn up. However, the overlay of the Cold 
War encouraged external drafts in support of Ethiopian water plans. By 1959, Egypt had joined 
the socialist bloc, cemented by financial and technical aid for the High Aswan Dam from the
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FIG. 2.3 Nile River Basin.  www.nilebasin.org/nilemap.htm 
 
 
Soviet-Union. In retaliation, the West, annoyed over the loss of a strategic ally, decided to 
support upstream Ethiopia. In the early 1960s the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation advised the 
Ethiopian emperor on the development of the Blue Nile. 
Between 1958 and 1963 a comprehensive plan for 33 dams (the Blue Nile Development Plan, 
to irrigate 434,000 ha) was developed for the Emperor by the US Bureau of Reclamation, to be 
funded with a loan from the African Development Bank. ‗During the next decade the French 
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reported on the Blue Nile, the Italians on the Beles, and the Dutch on the Tekeze‘ (= Atbara) 
(Collins 2003). These plans were never realised - while Egypt returned to the Western camp, 
Ethiopia joined the Soviet sphere losing the loan. During Mengistu's reign of terror a shouting match 
erupted over the Nile between Egypt and Ethiopia. A minor diversion by Ethiopia of waters of the 
Blue Nile and the Sobat River in the late 1970s triggered threats from President Anwar Sadat of 
Egypt and Minister of State Boutros-Ghali, Egypt warned Addis that it was prepared to declare 
any Ethiopian water diversions a casus belli, a reason to go to war (Phillips et al., 2006). Mengistu 
defiantly responded that the Nile was Ethiopian heritage. 
 
After the Mengistu dictatorship was deposed in 1991, relations between Ethiopia and Egypt 
warmed significantly. Egypt concluded a non-binding general agreement on cooperation and use 
of the Nile with Ethiopia on 1 July 1993, but no quota. But Ethiopia was clearly ‗not amused‘ by 
Egypt‘s announcement of the Toshka scheme in 1997. In 1998 Ethiopian Minister Seyoum 
Mesfin wrote a protest letter with copies to Salim Ahmed Salim, Secretary General of the OAU, 
Kofi Annan, then his counterpart at the UN, and James Wolfensohn, the president of the World 
Bank at the time, saying Ethiopia will not accept its water share to be affected by the Toshka 
project. But the Bank is not funding Toshka, so it cannot veto it. Ethiopia, on the contrary, is too 
destitute to build big dams unassisted. As the lending institute will not fund regionally 
controversial projects. This has effectively stopped international donations to Ethiopian projects 
of any significance.68 So in practice it is Egyptians who find the World Bank uncritically on their 
side. As Tony Allan has often claimed, the World Bank may need Egypt more than Egypt needs 
the World Bank – to the extent that the Bank, too, appears to think it wise to ´behold the moon´. 
All in all, the treaties and threats effectively boil down to a veto on upstream water resource 
development. 
How can downstream use affect upstream rights? Under ‗equitable use‘ principles, Egypt 
would need to share its surplus with upper riparians in periods of slack. Further Egyptian reliance 
on virtual water could create such slack (Waterbury, 2002: 87). Both countries accuse the other of 
seeking to strengthen its hand in the negotiations by diverting water, which could later count as 
'prior use'.  
In response, an increasingly self-confident Ethiopia called for the revision of the 1959 treaty. 
'It is time to build dams', said Foreign Minister Seyoum Mesfin (George, 1998), no doubt mindful 
that famines have precipitated the downfall of Haileselassie and Haile Mariam Mengistu in earlier 
decades (Collins, 2003). To this, Mubarak threatened to bomb Ethiopia, whereupon the 
Ethiopian leadership claimed that nothing and no-one could stop it.69 
However, if Ethiopia‘s response was ‗tit-for-tat‘, as Waterbury claims (Waterbury, 2002: 83), its 
actions came about in a pussyfooting kind of way. Ethiopia pressed ahead with the Teccane River 
dam in Tigray- but that is a hydro-electric project, not an irrigation project – which stalled due to 
the territorial war with Eritrea (Waterbury 2002: 120). The second response has been for the 
country to embark on a series of small-scale dams - some 500 are planned in Tigray province and 
another 500 in Gondar (Waterbury and Whittington 1998)70. The advantages of a micro-dam 
strategy for Ethiopia are obvious: they do not need international funding, they are relatively more 
efficient, they are hardly vulnerable to military attack, and the compounded downstream effects 
are hard to quantify – they are estimated at 2-3 BCM (Whittington and Waterbury, 1998). 
Ethiopia is loath to give information about the dams, although it is not clear whether this is 
because the information is ‗securitised‘ or because there is no data (Mason, 2004: 171). 
Under the more relaxed atmosphere facilitated by the Nile Basin Initiative (see below), Egypt 
will support non-subtractive water uses like hydropower projects at the Blue Nile Falls (Tis Abay 
II, $63 million, 450 MW). Moreover, Ethiopia has meanwhile been enmeshed in repeated wars 
with Eritrea, so that it had other concerns than negotiating with Egypt. 
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2.2.4 STRONG-HEADED SUDAN 
 
Apart from Ethiopia there is another tough customer to appease: Sudan. The Blue and White 
Nile join forces at Khartoum, Sudan's capital city. As Sudan controls both branches of the river, a 
healthy relation with its next-door neighbour is of great importance to Egypt. The country 
however continues to benefit from a shared colonial past with Sudan. Hydraulic co-operation led 
to the construction of various dams for Egypt‘s benefit, which, however have not always been 
very well co-ordinated (Waterbury, 1979).  
Britain recognised the potential for political blackmail of the Nile to play the countries off 
against each other at an early stage. In 1924 the governor of Sudan was killed by an Egyptian. A 
furious British High Commissioner for Egypt then announced that Sudan could have as much 
water as it wished. At that time however Sudan laid very little actual claim on the river. 
Egypt had gained independence from England in February 1922, but remained a de facto 
protectorate. In 1929 Egypt signed a highly favourable agreement with Great Britain, which then 
controlled Sudan, Uganda, Kenya and Tanganyika (future Tanzania). The treaty gave Egypt 48 
billion cubic metres (BCM) and Sudan only 4 BCM as measured at Aswan. But as Sudan 
developed its cotton potential (the Gezira Project), that situation changed. Tensions with Sudan 
mounted between 1954 and 1958. After independence in 1956 the new Sudanese government 
called for the revision of the 1929 Nile treaty. Egypt withdrew its support for the Roseires dam, 
which Sudan had built without consultation, and moved army forces to the border. At the same 
time, Sudan worried over the impact of the envisaged Aswan High Dam, whose storage lake 
straddles the border with Sudan and could easily flood parts of its territory. In 1958 reclamation 
reconnaissance began and in 1959 the governorate of the New Valley was created, adjacent to 
Sudan. A coup in 1958 brought Sudan more Egypt-friendly rulers, who concluded a new 
agreement with Egypt in 1959, the Treaty for the Full Utilisation of the Nile, which had a 30-year 
validity. The bilateral agreement included the establishment of a Permanent Joint Technical 
Commission. 
Full utilisation meant that previously unallocated Nile water was now carved up between 
Sudan (14.5 BCM) and Egypt (7.5) (Hornstein, 1999). Significantly, Ethiopia was not party to the 
treaty. While the allocation in principle left some ‗slack‘ for Ethiopian use and future expansion, 
the Full Utilization of the Nile treaty was not given its name thoughtlessly: ‗the Egyptian 
Government has been extremely vigilant in ensuring that all waters are currently used‘ (Allan, 
1999). The 1959 Agreement set out a 50-50 share of both the costs of the canalisation projects in 
the Sudd (‗blockade‘) marshes in South Sudan, and the allotment of newly accrued water. The 
technical committee established by it, the Joint Permanent Joint Technical Commission (PJTC), 
functioned until 1984.  
One reason why Egypt reasons it can get away with claiming so more Nile water for Toshka is 
that much water gets ‗lost‘ along the way. As the Nile passes through Sudan, it loses much of its 
momentum - and its discharge - in the Sudd marshes. The flow is so slow there that 50% of the 
White Nile flow evaporates under the cloudless sunlight. Much evapotranspiration would be 
avoided if the Sudd marshes could be bypassed – the estimated 5 km3 gain would just offset the 
extra demand resulting from the Toshka lakes project. A planned bypass running from Bor to 
Malakal would bring an additional 4 billion km3 each year into Egypt, improve navigation 
between South and North Sudan and irrigate 200,000 acres in South Sudan. 
But the 360km Jonglei canal project, started in 1979, was destined for trouble. First, because it 
cuts right through the migration routes of transhumant Southern tribes (Nüer, Dinka and 
Shilloth), destroying their livelihoods, subject large areas to desiccation and jeopardise swamp 
fishing livelihoods. A smaller-scale version was tabled to remedy some of those defects in 1979, 
but that plan was rejected by the south because too much water would still drain to the North 
and Egypt, rather than fulfilling Southern dreams of agricultural development (Hornstein, 1999). 
The leader of the Southern separatist movement SPLA, John Garang, even devoted his PhD 
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thesis at an American university to a criticism of the Jonglei Canal (Hornstein, 1999). However, 
the canal had become a flashpoint of conflict in the broader struggle between the Arabic, Islamic 
North and the black, Christian and animist South. SPLA armed attacks to stop construction 
works were successful in 1985, leaving a half-finished canal and a giant ‘bucketwheel‘ cutter, used 
to cut through the dense growth, rusting in the marshes (Hvidt, 1995). 
Perhaps this resistance was to be expected, and one may wonder why Sudan concurred with 
turning the ecosystem into a ‗ditch‘ (Hornstein, 1999) to give Egypt extra BCMs. There may be a 
return of favours, as Egypt had intervened twice, militarily, to rescue al-Numayri's regime, in 
1971 and July 1976, so it stands to reason that in exchange for Egypt‘s help, Sudan concurred 
with the Jonglei Channel (Swain, 1998). 
Sudan borders six Nile countries and is hydrologically well placed for exploiting the river‘s 
water resource. Two out of three Sudanese work in agriculture. Recurring famine and 
malnutrition provide ample legitimation for water development. Sudan‘s population of 40 
million71 is growing at a rate of 2 to 2.4 % per year. South Sudan‘s estimated population of 7 
million is set to increase with the return of up to four million southern refugees.72 This 
demographic pressure will further stress Sudan‘s Nilotic water resources. 
Since the fundamentalist Islamic revolution overthrowing Numeiri in 1985, relations between 
Egypt and Sudan have almost gone back to square one. In 1989 Sudan decided not to renew the 
co-operation agreement and agreed a Declaration of Friendship and Peace with Addis Ababa73 to 
establish a Blue Nile Valley Organisation and study joint projects in 1991. 
Egyptian relations with Sudan worsened steadily in 1994 and 1995. The oil-rich Halaib Triangle 
is disputed between Egypt and Sudan74 - both countries invoke mutually contradicting colonial 
treaties. The unresolved territorial conflict led Egypt to populate the area. In 1995, Mohammed 
Ibrahim Soliman, Minister of State for Reconstruction and New Communities, announced that 
Egypt would erect three settlements there housing a total of 70,000 people. In this context the 
impression comes to mind that Egypt intends to create facts on the ground –  Egypt actually 
plans airports and a road in Halaib. Egyptian and Sudanese troops clashed in Halaib the day after 
Egyptian president Mubarak barely survived an assault in the Ethiopian capital of Addis Ababa in 
June 1995. Egyptian fingers pointed at the Sudanese government, accusing it of sponsoring 
terrorism. Sudan responded by calling off the Nile treaty. The new Sudanese leader, Hassan al-
Turabi declared: 'Sudan has full control of the Nile' whereupon Egyptian Minister Muhammad 
Mussa rebutted: 
 
"If Sudan wants to play with water, it is playing with fire. (..) Any step taken to this end will force us 
into confrontation to defend our rights and our life. Our response will be beyond anything they can 
imagine.‘ (Schiffler, 1997) 
 
In spite of its bold language (Belshaw and Belshaw, 1999) Sudan so far has built little 
infrastructure to back up its tough words, though. It lacks the obstructive upstream power that, 
for example, Turkey has developed in the Euphrates-Tigris basin. Even when the new, 83m 
Hamlab or Meroe dam will have been completed, Sudan will not be able to store a whole season's 
Nile discharge (Schiffler, 1997). The Meroe (Merowe) Multi-Purpose Hydro Project near the 
confluence of the White and Blue Nile on the 4th cataract of the River Nile in North Sudan is 
currently under construction with bilateral funding from both the Gulf states (a loan from the 
United Arab Emirates, Collins 2003) and China, the latter no doubt in exchange for a share of 
Sudan‘s oil wealth (Cascao, under review)75. Once completed, the Meroe Dam can impound 20% 
of annual Nile flow and produce annual electricity yield of 5.5 TWh). Preparations for the Kajbar 
Dam at the third cataract of the Nile are started as well. 
When Sudan‘s warring factions signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement on 9 January 
2004, bringing Sudan‘s long civil war to an end, this opened up – in principle, South Sudan‘s vast 
water resources for development. The peace brokered between North and South may open the 
door to completion of the canal. A referendum will decide the possible secession of South Sudan 
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in 2011. Since the South is also where much of the oil is, secession would be a sensitive economic 
loss. Moreover Egypt still has its eyes on the Sudd and wants to revive the Jonglei (Jangali) Canal. 
Also projects in the White Nile basin, in Machar Marshes and Bahr el Ghazal are counted on to 
increase the efficiency of discharge towards Egypt (Waterbury 1998) - which could create just 
enough slack to accommodate Ethiopia‘s claim for 9.5 km2 without needing to change the 1959 
treaty (El Khodari 2003). Egypt is well aware that it will be very hard to achieve anything in the 
way of pan-Nilotic co-operation without Sudan. When in 1998 a shuttle diplomacy between 
Cairo and Khartoum resumed and Sudan extradited a dozen Islamic activists to Egypt (Egypt 
accuses Sudan of aiding and abetting Egyptian Islamism), this also boded well for long-cherished 
development initiatives for the Nile basin (Alterman, 1998). Sudan therefore had little incentive 
to grumble about Toshka. 
 
 
2.2.5 THE EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY 
 
In addition to uneasy relationships between Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia, the past few decades 
have seen the fledgling formation of a second power block, the East African Community- Kenya, 
Uganda and Tanzania. Rainfall there is much more reliable than in the Eastern Nile, so that the 
aspiration for irrigation is lower. But crucially, the three countries are co-riparians to Lake 
Victoria, fed by 40 rivers and de facto source of the Nile. To forestall a possible counter-
offensive and secure permission to access to this source, Egypt has long used carrots and some 
sticks to keep control. In 1950 Egypt secured access to Uganda‘s water posts at all times to 
capture meteorological and hydrological data from the East African Lakes basin, including Lake 
Victoria. This would help Egypt ‗determine the amount of water it could receive from the upper 
reaches of the Nile, and thus would allow them effective long-term planning‘ (Okidi, 1994). In 
return, Egypt would contribute to the upkeep of the gauging of the posts. Meanwhile, Egypt 
seeks to influence any plans for upstream hydro-electricity generation. Since electricity 
generation, unlike irrigation, is not consumptive (it does not abstract from the quality or quantity 
of available flow) Egypt is not too worried about the dam, and might in fact benefit from 
upstream regulation, but feels the need to make sure it was in control. Thus, Egypt was 
negotiating with the British Government76 between 1948 and 1953 on Uganda‘s Owen Falls 
Dam, intended for the generation of electricity (Howell and Allan, 1994)77. 
After independence in 1963, however, the Government of Uganda declared in a letter to the 
Secretary General of the UN that all colonial-era Treaties would be considered ‗terminated‘ 
unless modified by agreement with the Government. But like in so many other riparian countries, 
Uganda‘s war (with Sudan) and domestic strife have taken attention away from the Nile, and in 
practice Uganda stuck to the agreement with Egypt and reaffirmed them in 1991. Egyptian-
Ugandan cooperation continued including plans to clean out weeds that clogged Lake Victoria 
and Kyoga and caused local floods in Uganda. However, the 1990s have seen a more assertive 
Uganda. Uganda‘s parliament in 2004 proposed to rescind the treaty and charge Egypt and Sudan 
for water use.  
In December 2003 the Kenyan minister of Foreign Affairs stated that "Kenya will not accept 
any restrictions on the use of Lake Victoria or the River Nile" and Chris Oboru, a Kenyan MP, 
said ‗This is a human rights issue. Egypt cannot continue wallowing in wealth, while Kenyans are 
languishing in poverty‘. Egypt did not take kindly to these words and threatened economic and 
political sanctions.78 
The boldest move was made further south: Tanzania is reported to have launched a $27.6 
million project to divert water from Lake Victoria to Kahama in the region of Shinyanga region, 
in contravention of two colonial treaties Britain signed with Egypt and Sudan controlling the use 
of water from the lake. 
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―Tanzania… [has lost] patience with talks involving Kenya, Uganda and Egypt over the validity of 
the two [colonial] agreements signed… Despite engaging in lengthy negotiations over the use of 
waters from Lake Victoria and the Nile, Tanzania has maintained that the two [colonial] agreements 
were illegal‖. (Beyene and Wadley, 2004) 
 
However, Tanzania was quick to point out that its $27.6 billion project would not affect the 
lake or the Nile flow. "The water we get from Lake Victoria is such a small amount of water 
anyway and it does not affect water coming to Egypt."79 
In 1999 the three countries revived the East Africa Community which had broken down in 
1977. (Kagwanja 2007). Joining upstream forces could in principle strengthen their hand in 
making a stance in negotiations with downstream Egypt and Sudan, but in practice appears to 
have led to careful manoeuvering. The next section briefly sketches the history and results of 
Nilotic co-operation. 
 
 
2.3  THE ROAD TO THE NILE BASIN INITIATIVE 
 
The intermittent collision course outlined above has not been lost on the international world. 
Under the Clinton administration, environmental security has become a key issue in American 
foreign policy. Water scarcity, it is feared, could be an occasion for violence, and the United 
States appointed twelve problem areas as 'environmental hubs'.80 Addis Ababa, the Ethiopian 
capital, is one of those hotspots. 
But it is mostly World Bank dignitaries that are now busily shuttling between Cairo and Addis. 
After a series of public relations disasters (Narmada, Arun II) the World Bank seems desperate 
for something to succeed and betting on the Nile Basin Development Plan. Significantly in this 
respect,  Egypt has succeeded in catapulting its leaders on strategic global positions in water and 
environment policy for a (Allan, 1990): Boutros Boutros Ghali (former Secretary-General, United 
Nations), Ismail Serageldin (vice-director World Bank) and, more recently, Egypt's Water 
Minister Mohamed Abu-Zayd (president of World Water Forum 2000 in the Hague). Egypt‘s de 
facto veto on World Bank support for upstream projects on the Nile has been a most effective 
tactic, as Ethiopia lacks Sudan‘s pulling power for drumming up counteracting international 
support. 
Nile co-operation has a pedigree. Undugu ('brotherhood'), an Egyptian initiative, operated 
under the auspices of the Organisation of African Unity since 1983 - but without the 
participation of Ethiopia, Kenya and Tanzania. Within this forum Egypt floated daring plans 
such as an electricity grid from Lake Victoria down to Aswan. A Century Storage Plan for storing 
water near Lake Tana in Ethiopia and Lake Victoria even dates back from 1904. Ethiopia has 
always approached such fora with scepticism, seeing them as a vehicle for Egyptian hegemony81. 
Indeed they have not been very successful so far, and neither have other technical fora such as 
Hydromet and Tecconile,82 especially when a long dry spell put all countries under stress. 
However, a window of opportunity opened in the early 1990s. After a long period of drought, 
Lake Nasser started to rise, easing the pressure on Egypt. In 1993 Egypt offered its upstream 
riparians financial support for projects as long as they would not divert Nile waters. Within the 
six-country Tecconile group, and with the support of the Canadian International Development 
Agency, the US$100 million Nile Basin Action Plan was launched in 1994. The Plan ‗included 
twenty-two projects for water resource management, institution building, training, regional 
cooperation, and environmental protection among the states of the Lake Plateau‘ (Collins 2003). 
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) created the so-called ´D3´ initiative to 
facilitate the first ever meeting of all Nile riparians (Westermann 2003), and after international 
experts called for the NBAC‘s 22 disparate infrastructural projects into a Shared Vision, 
presented at the Second Water World Water Forum in 2000. The initiative‘s role in guiding the 
mission was authorised by the 3rd Council of Ministers meeting in February 1999. The World 
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Bank, Cida and UNDP now put considerable effort into promoting the ensuing Nile Basin 
Initiative, which was enthusiastically condoned by all states in 2001. 
The enthusiasm may well be related to the funds made available in this project, as well as by its 
non-threatening nature. Egypt‘s Al Ahram weekly newspaper (2001) sees a considerable role of 
transnational contracting and water industries in the genesis of the NBI: ‗They lobbied to 
promote these plans and succeeded in obtaining the agreement of the Nile Basin states to enter a 
joint initiative to develop the river as a whole.‘ 
The initiative is resolutely non-threatening, first because technical co-operation carries less risk 
and also less political weight - but also because upstream irrigation is resolutely on the non-
agenda. Important options are still beyond the pale. To address the problem of evaporation and 
seepage from Lake Nasser (12-14% of the annual input (Dasgupta and Chattopadhyay, 2004), the 
most effective option would be to move water storage to reservoirs under cloudier skies. This 
takes considerable international political will. The initiatives seem to have helped desecuritise 
information: ‗The establishment of a grid of sensors all over the Nile to accurately measure water 
level/flow and to predict flooding/drought is another achievement. At one point these data were 
considered ‗national secret‘ in the case of Egypt.‘83 Al –Ahram however still complains about a 
lack of transparency over the Nile initiatives.84 
 
This gives us a perspective on the form Nilotic co-operation is taking. While a paper on the 8th 
Nile 2002 Conference contrasts ‗hydro-cooperation‗ with ‗hydro-politics‘ (Girma, 2000). I would 
argue that cooperation is hydro politics too. A striking aspect of Nile cooperation is that it is 
focused on improving water quality or exploiting non-consumptive water quantities (hydro-
electricity), never on the distribution of water between the countries. Egypt is also very willing to 
initiate projects with joint benefits that will increase the amount of water flowing into Egypt. For 
example, it is interesting to see that the Jonglei Canal is one of the NBI‘s projects, and that a 
second Jonglei channel is being considered. Egypt‘s role in peace building in Sudan appears very 
closely linked to a (Egypt‘s) desire to have the canal completed and indeed Egyptian experts will 
be involved in new dam plans (pers. comm. by e-mail, Eissa, January 2007). 
In terms of epistemic communities, all kinds of technical co-operation (TECCONILE, NBI) 
make sure that experts keep exchanging information even when political communication breaks 
down. It also ensures a ‗sanctioned discourse‘ that prevents a frank debate on the terms of Nile 
co-operation. So while learning and shared benefits are certainly within reach, they do not take 
away from their role of propping up Egypt‘s primacy. 
 
Hegemonic stability or change? 
However, while belligerent discourse is repeatedly voiced both up- and downstream, the Nile 
has seen no armed conflict so far, and is unlikely to do so in future despite increasing upstream 
assertiveness. All involved seem to cooperate more or less happily in the continuation of a 
conflict, which takes on aspects of a ritual, as well as bringing attention and, potentially, donor 
funds. This latter observation seems particularly true of the Nile. 
Waterbury in this context warns that ‗(a)symmetrical rewards always characterize the potential 
outcomes of cooperation in international river basins‘ (q. in Lindemann, 2005). Whether 
hegemonic stability is evaluated positively or negatively depends on whether non-hegemons 
perceive benefit in the status quo. Perspective is decisive for this normative evaluation. Non-
hegemons are obviously interested in blowing up the perspective of conflict, while hegemons are 
interested in projecting an image that all is plain sailing. 
 
Thus, an Ethiopian newspaper could write:85 
‗The arithmetic of the waters of the Blue Nile River is, therefore, a zero-sum game, which Egypt is 
determined to win. It must have a hegemonic relationship with the countries of the Nile Valley and 
the Horn of Africa. When, for instance, Ethiopia is weak and internally divided, Egypt can rest. But 
when Ethiopia is prosperous and self-confident, playing a leading role in the region, Egypt is 
worried‘. 
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In response, Marawan Badr, the Egyptian Ambassador to Ethiopia wrote:  
 
‗Such political commentary, or more correctly, political trash, cannot come [except] from a sick and 
disturbed mind. Egyptian-Ethiopian relations are not in a crisis. We do not even have problems. 
There are serious issues, which need to be addressed‘ (quoted in Kendie 1999: 141-142). 
 
Egypt‘s Water Minister and 3rd World Water Forum chairman Mohammed Abu-Zayd 
expressed more politely that ―there is no conflict or struggle between Egypt and any other Nile 
Basin country‖ (quoted in Brunnée and Toope, 2002).  
The denial of alternatives to the harmonious discourse of course does not mean they are not 
there. According to Waterbury (2002), Ethopia and Sudan are intent on changing the Nile 
regime, while Uganda and Kenya are not. Ethiopa however lacks the material basis that Sudan 
has – oil – and that allows it to escape circumvent established systems of patronage. Sudan‘s 
position is still unclear after John Garang died under mysterious circumstances in 2005, while 
domestic war and suffering in Darfur continues. It is not unimportant that Sudan is a target on 
America‘s rogue state list. According to El-Khodary (in Ravnborg, 2003), Egypt was unhappy 
with US giving $2bn in military aid to Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda, and  intervening in Sudan‘s 
civil war in favour of Southern Sudan‘s liberation army, SPLA-M. If South Sudan will be given 
independence in 2011, the new political entity is likely to pursue its own hydraulic mission on the 
basis of John Gerang‘s vision, which could in turn change the dynamics, and might side with 
Ethiopia (see also Cascao, under review). 
 
 
2.4 CONCLUSION – MIDNIGHT AT NOON OR OUT OF TIME? 
 
Having reviewed Egypt‘s domestic and external strategy, we are now in a better position to 
explain why Egypt might insist on the Toshka scheme in what is surely one of the most 
inhospitable places on earth. 
The sense of the Toshka project is hard to defend. The lack of space is contestable, and living 
conditions in the new area are such that it is unlikely to attract millions of new dwellers. Instead it 
seems to serve foreign hydropolitics, inspired by a ‗prior use‘ strategy to safeguard acquired water 
rights to Nile water rather than meaningful domestic development, and a domestic strategy to 
create work for the army and construction sector. 
The present contribution concurs with Whittington and Waterbury‘s (1998) claim that the 
Toshka channel project is best explained as a plank of a basin strategy to make a claim to prior 
use of Nile floodwaters and in so doing safeguard claims for the long term. Egypt‘s domestic, 
regional and international position is strong enough to risk short-term conflict over this move, 
keeping the pressure on by using the Nile‘s floodwater as fully as it can. Internationally, an 
ongoing position play of threatening language and cooperative agreements can obfuscate the 
ongoing hegemony Egypt enjoys in the Nile. While offering its cooperation to upstreamers and 
initiating Nilotic co-operative initiatives and organisations, Egypt can also be said to hegemonise 
this regime by suppressing alternative discourses.  
In the international arena, Egypt‘s hegemonic position at home and abroad is strong enough to 
be able to claim that there is ‗no conflict‘ on the Nile. Renouncing treaties and threatening 
military action have been a popular but pretty meaningless gesture for upstream Nile riparians. 
Now that political relations between Egypt and Ethiopia have been normalised to some degree, 
some sort of treaty cannot be too far away. The Blue Nile states are also talking about three-way 
co-operation on both the Blue Nile and three of its tributaries.86 
It is telling that most mega-plans under the NBI concern the White Nile, where upstream 
states are less vocal. US and World Bank interest in regional stability has provide a financial 
and/or diplomatic incentive to this process. The Bank seems determined not to let this basin 
plan fail because of neighbourly squabbles. 
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Under the bright rhetoric on cooperation lies the reality that the Nile Basin Initiative has not 
led to talks on sustainable reallocation of the Nile flow. When push comes to shove, both Egypt 
and Ethiopia have so far lent substance on the ground to prior-use claims in preference to co-
ordinated management. The New Valley projects only really make sense in this context. 
Various forms of (regime) closure are part of the country‘s water security strategy in the face of 
the unpredictability of the resource and of upstream state behaviour. In addition to its co-
riparians, Egypt also keeps a tight rein on its own population, and firm control on the waters 
coming in at Aswan. To pull off its international strategy, Egypt keeps tight control of the 
scheme and forestalls or co-opts opposition or alternatives to the project. The securitisation of 
space and development supports a normative consensus, so that domestic and riparian control is 
maintained without resorting much to outright coercion and repression. This has included 
foreclosing a public discussion of the alternative of virtual water, and of what to do about the 
dependency it brings in future. However, the debate in press and Parliament suggest cracks in the 
smooth surface. 
 Chapter 3: Resisting the Turkish pax aquarum? The 
Ilısu Dam dispute as a multi-level struggle 
 
 
 
"I appreciate their fears," [Turkish President Özal said in 1992], "but we will not harm them. To the 
contrary, Turkey will more than make up for the water shortage. I have tried to convince Iraq and 
Syria of our positive intentions."  
 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Both the Euphrates and Tigris rivers have great extremes between their highest and lowest flow 
levels87, bringing risk of both drought and floods. The mortal fear of floods in Mesopotamia, the 
‗land between the rivers‘, is expressed in the Gilgamesh epos and the biblical deluge. 
Downstreamers are normally the first to shield themselves from flooding and develop the flatter 
valley lands, and Iraq is no exception. But the region is also drought-prone, inviting 
impoundment of water in dams. When mid-stream Syria started developing the Euphrates, the 
two countries just stopped short of a violent clash over water in 1976. But the two countries 
share a concern ever since upstream Turkey embarked on its mega-multi dam project to control 
the floodwaters on the Euphrates and Tigris rivers and develop its poor Southeast in the late 
1970s, the Greater Anatolia Project, it has truly been on a collision course with both neighbours. 
It should not come as a surprise that this basin has frequently been presented as a prime 
candidate for ‗water wars‘ (Starr & Stoll, 1987, Bulloch & Darwish, 1993, Homer-Dixon, 1999, 
De Villiers, 1999). 
The present study investigates water securitisation and politicisation in the Euphrates-Tigris basin. 
Given its importance to state building and integration, hydraulic development is a prime 
candidate for securitising moves, that is, being portrayed as so essential for national survival that 
it is non-negotiable and legitimises extreme measures (Buzan et al., 1998). Debate, dissent, 
alternatives are foreclosed, so that ‗normal‘ political processes cannot take place. 
Is the Euphrates basin indeed prone to anarchic, dog-eat-dog conflict, or is there question of 
co-operation? Three different answers to this last question emerge from the literature: 
One voice sees no order at all: 
- ‗There is no cooperation whatsoever... a Hobbesian state of nature... there is no sign that the 
chaos is ever going to end‘ (Kalpakian, 2004: 89).  
Others however take a contrary view:  
 - Turkey pacified the region resulting in a pax aquarum (Kolars & Mitchell, 1991) which makes 
it sound as if the Ottoman Empire still existed. Marwa Daoudy (2005) contends that Turkey is 
the undisputed basin leader (hegemon). Turkey‘s dominance was such that it can ‗do whatever it 
likes‘ with the water, as then President Demirel famously stated in 1992 (Kalpakian, 2004) 
- A co-operative regime has been formed under American hegemony, as Ayşegül Kibaroğlu 
claims (1995 and pers. comm. 2006).  
The chapter will argue that the three narratives can be reconciled by taking a multi-layer 
approach. 
 
Meanwhile, a politicisation process appears to have taken place over the Ilısu dam. Since 1983, 
several Turkish mega-dams for irrigation and hydroelectricity were built over both neighbours‘ 
objections. For a breathtaking moment at the turn of the century, however, the construction of 
the Ilısu Dam, the first GAP dam on the river Tigris, seemed to constitute a break in the pattern. 
The flooding of villages to make room for Ilısu reservoir dam reservoir, including the historically 
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important town of Hasankeyf, exposed the projected dam to resistance from a coalition of local, 
basin and international NGO groups who managed to stop the flow of external funding of the 
dam in 2001/2002. 
What opened up the possibility to politicise the Ilısu Dam and its flooding, and how successful 
was it? 
 
 
 
FIG 3.1 Map of Turkey 
From: www.faqs.org/docs/factbook/maps/tu-map.gif  
 
 
FIG 3.2 Overview of GAP dams 
From: http://www.gap.gov.tr/Flash/Ing/gaphrt/gharita/ggn4.jpg 
 
 
The chapter is structured as follows:  
Section 3.2 explores how, Turkey, as a former empire, learned to be ‘first among equals‘ in a 
‗rough neighbourhood‘, which according to Aydın (2003) plagues Turkey with an ‗insecurity 
complex‘. Does this legitimise claims to exceptionalism at home and abroad, known as 
‗securitising moves‘? (Buzan et al., 1998)  Section 3.3 sketches the genesis of Turkish hydraulic 
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development and identifies it as a domestic ‗concept of control‘ with respect to the Kurdish 
minority. Section 3.4 analyses if such moves for closure have happened in Euphrates hydro 
politics, and what effect they had on decision-making and resistance to the dam projects. Section 
3.5 shows that institutional change (privatisation of the water sector) with a view to accessing 
international funds gave NGOs a look-in to attack construction companies and especially their 
financial guarantors. It focuses on the politicisation of the Ilısu hydropower project, structuring 
the analysis with the help of Buzan‘s security domains. It will especially zoom in on the way the 
campaign played out in Britain. Section 3.6 evaluates a discussion of the elements of the theory 
and their application to the case study. The paper concludes with an assessment of the usefulness 
of multiple-chessboard analysis of hegemony. 
 
 
3.2 THE DISCARDED OTTOMAN: LIFE AFTER EMPIRE 
 
Turkish politics cannot really be grasped without taking the state‘s imperial legacy into account. 
Just like the Serbian trauma over their 1389 defeat (at the hands of the Turks) still informed late-
20th century passions over Kosovo, the memory of the giant Ottoman empire dominating the 
political rhetoric in present-day Turkey. Some Turkish politicians have never abandoned the 
aspiration - at least in political discourse - to regain past glories of the Ottoman Empire (ca. 1299-
1922), which led one Turkish president, Turgut Özal, to proclaim that ‗the 21st century will be the 
Turkish century... from the Adriatic to the Chinese Wall‘ (quoted in Zürcher, 1998). In turn, Syria 
and Iraq have not forgotten they were once under sometimes ruthless (Kapalkian, 1994) 
Ottoman tutelage. 
In 1920 the defeated Sultan signed the treaty of Sevres, which lobotomised the Ottoman 
Empire, leaving a small heartland around Ankara in central Anatolia, ceding West Anatolia and 
Thrace to European powers, creating Armenian and Kurdish states and putting Istanbul and the 
Turkish Straits under international control (Drorian, 2005). 
The revolutionary Young Turks and their ‘people‘s army‘ forced the last Sultan, Mehmet VI, to 
abdicate in November 1922, which put an end to the Ottoman empire, and established a secular, 
European-oriented republic with a strong role for the military. Turkish territory remained 
miniaturized: the Fertile Crescent (Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Jordan) became a Franco-
British mandate, Northern Mesopotamia fell to Britain and except for Thrace all European 
territories had to be ceded. Turkey became a republic without external territories, but the new 
government managed to negotiate in the Lausanne Treaty of 24 July 1923 that the minorities did 
not gain independence and international control was rescinded. According to Drorian, the 
existential threat posed by Sevres continues to be an obsession for the present-day government, 
which explains distrust of European conditionality for Turkish accession to the EU and the 
insistence on unity, nationalism and secularism (Drorian, 2005: 259).  
From the time of the creation of the Turkish republic in 1923, its guiding slogan was ‗Peace at 
home, peace abroad‘. The next sections will look at Turkey‘s foreign and domestic politics, 
respectively, after which it will be explored how the two are linked by hydro politics. 
 
 
3.2.1 TURKEY‟S FOREIGN POLICY: PLAYING THE FIELD 
 
Rather than a has-been, post-Ottoman Turkey manifested itself as a regional player. Turkey is 
historically very well placed at the crossroads between Southeast Europe, the Middle East and 
Central Asia. 
Aydın (2003) however sees a worried soul beneath the bullish exterior. Aydın claims Turkey is 
in a perennial regional ‗insecurity complex‘, a permanent sense of feeling unsafe. In his analysis, 
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being situated in a ‗rough neighbourhood‘ explains Turkey‘s eagerness to exercise domestic and 
external control, and a prominent role for the military sector.  
One of Turkey‘s worries is Iraq (Aydın, 2001, fn.). Especially after his invasion of Kuwait, 
Saddam‘s territorial aspirations had been an ongoing cause for concern for the Turkish state 
(Aydın, 2003) and Turkey lent logistic support to the allied invasion of Iraq in 1991. However, 
Turkey preferred some overture with the Iraqis, as it occasionally needed them to grant rights to 
‗hot pursuit‘ of Kurdish separatists on Iraqi territory. 
Saddam‘s hydraulic strategies against opposition were rather more radical than Turkey‘s. 
Saddam had a ‘Third River‘ dug to connect the Euphrates and Tigris and develop its soils. This 
handily required the drainage of the wetlands between Euphrates and Tigris where the rebellious 
Marsh Arab population lived, the Ma‘adan. While Saddam Hussein‘s marsh drainage strategy 
became an international news story, it is less well known that he apparently planned flooding the 
Kurdish separatists in the north, the Iraq Kurd Federation. According to Middle East Watch, the 
Kurds were uprooted from the countryside with an estimated 40 chemical attacks (most 
notoriously on Halabya) fleeing but trapped by security forces in so called Anfal campaigns. 
Farmland and trees were destroyed, villages bulldozed or dynamited, and it was planned to flood 
large areas of the Kurdish-inhabited areas by raising and breaking barrages.88 An electricity 
embargo against Iraq‘s northern provinces threatened water supply until Turkey started supplying 
electricity to that region in 1994 (Jongerden, 1994). 
The Iraqi Kurds were too divided to put up anything but a united front for long 89. This 
‗realism‘ is tragically mirrored at the interstate level by Turkey and Iraq. Turkey has always 
resented the loss of the Northern Iraqi region. Mosul and Kirkuk are rich in oil, and the 
population there is largely many Turkoman. While the army has emphasised the sanctity of 
Republican borders, President Özal has voiced the claim to the province of Mosul like it was in 
Ottoman times in 1991 – a faux pas he was forced to retract quickly.90 Saddam‘s Iraq reportedly 
found it useful to provide logistic support to the PKK in Turkey (Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan, 
Kurdish Workers‘ Party) to weaken the Turks, while Iraq also cooperated with Turkey to control 
the PKK in North Iraq, where they might ally with Iraq‘s own Kurdish separatists.  
On the other hand Turkey reportedly refused to block the Euphrates in 1991 despite allied 
requests to do so, arguing that ‗water is life‘ and therefore it will not use water as a military 
instrument. While Ankara allowed the allied forces to use Diyarbakir, a key Kurdish-majority city 
in Southeast Anatolia, as a base for its war on Saddam in 1991, Turkey no longer allowed its 
territory to be used as an allied air base in the 2003 war on Iraq. 
Turkey manages to make much political capital out of its geographical location. It connects 
three macro-regions Europe, Central Asia and the Middle East, a geopolitical nexus that virtually 
ensures NATO backing. Turkey has been a long-time member and cornerstone of NATO, and 
was one of the top three recipients of American foreign aid until the war against Saddam (after 
which Iraq entered the top three). 
Turkey has also made considerable concessions to Europe to keep the door open to 
membership of the European Union of which it would, at a stroke, become the largest member. 
Converting Abdullah Öcalan‘s death penalty into a life sentence is only one of many European 
demands for reform Turkey swallowed whole. After the capture of Saddam Hussein, Turkey 
immediately declared its intention to respect the boundaries of Iraq, despite its territorial claims 
on oil-rich Mosul and Kirkuk. Realising that European membership would mean the obligation 
to accede to existing European water legislation (see also Hermans, 2005), Turkey commissioned 
a Dutch consultancy, Grontmij, to make a study of Europe-compliant Integrated Water Resource 
Management of a river it shares with Greece and Bulgaria. 
Finally, the collapse of the Soviet empire has not freed Turkey from rivalry with Russia but 
opened up avenues for Turkey to exert influence in the Turkic countries in Central Asia – a ‗pax 
Turkicana‘.91  While Iran can count on Armenia as its ally, Turkey has natural cultural bonds with 
the four Turkish-speaking states of Central Asia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and 
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Uzbekistan. As the Americans would rather not see expansion of the Iranian sphere of influence, 
they back Turkish inroads in the region. Although Erik Zürcher (1998) reasons Central Asia is 
too embedded in the Russian sphere of influence for Turkey to make much chance of enticing it 
away, that will not stop Turkey from trying. ‗(T)here is ... no local great power in the multi-polar 
Middle East complex. It is also a region in which Ankara, interestingly, acts in a more unilateral 
fashion, and ‗dares‘ more than in the other regions‘ (Kazan, 2005). 
In this regional context it is very helpful for Turkey that its territory is located upstream on the 
rivers Euphrates and Tigris, and (together with Lebanon, which has not succeeded in reaping the 
benefits of its natural advantage) is the only water-rich country in the region. Its geographical 
location at the headwaters of the Euphrates and Tigris, the main sources of freshwater of its 
most troublesome neighbours, Syria and Iraq, is extremely convenient to Turkey. Whether 
intentional or not, the control of water for development in its bold Southeast Anatolia Project 
also meant control of water vis-à-vis its downstream neighbours. An unmistakable effect of the 
intensive damming of the two rivers is that, in principle, it enables the Turkish to turn the tap on 
or off. 
By 1990 the GAP scheme had expanded to 22 dam projects (80 dams) and 19 hydropower 
schemes (involving 66 hydropower stations) on both Euphrates and Tigris92, providing irrigation 
for 1.9 million ha and investment in health, education, finance and transportation to modernise a 
traditional agricultural society in a region twice the size of Belgium (Balat, 2003). It is not easily 
explained how the importance of Turkey‘s Güneydogu Anadolu Projesi (GAP) multi-dam project to 
national greatness can justify spending up to a tenth (on average 7%) of the national public 
budget on the project for several years (P. Williams 2001) without considering other motives such 
as integrating the Kurds and realising regional hegemonic aspirations in the hinterlands. 
 
Regional water trade? 
It was noted above that in the geopolitical lay of the land, Turkey is very well endowed with 
water and premium location. While its upstream position and infrastructural development lends 
the country the position  to control the ‗tap‘ on its downstream neighbours, its enviable position 
as a water-rich state in a water-poor region as well as the (relative) political stability to exploit and 
deliver it water wealth also enables hydro diplomacy with other states. The Turks recognise the 
significant potential for political gain in water exports - even though they have at times great 
difficulty providing water and sanitation for their own mega-cities. 
In 1987 Turkey proposed a twin Peace Pipeline, at the cost of $20bn (1987 dollars) to provide 
water for the whole region: eastward to Saudi Arabia and westward to Israel and Palestine, which 
was universally rejected. While subsequently plans for a mini- and mini-mini-pipeline were 
developed,93 none of these initiatives caught on. With an eye on the hot and dry Central Asian 
region, Turkey has also made a water offer to this region (Hillel, 1995) and proposed a water-for-
electricity swap with Greece (there are also projects with Iran and Iraq – Turkish/Black sea energy 
policy review, n.d.). 
 
While these initiatives remained largely unsuccessful, the water trade pitch appeared to be 
working decidedly better when Turkey signed a military cooperation pact with Israel. Israel 
expressed a keen interest in water deliveries from the Manavgat estuary, close to Antalya. 
Annoying both Arab neighbours and domestic fundamentalists, Turkey signed an agreement in 
early 2004 to transport freshwater in giant, Norwegian-made nylon 'Medusa' bags by sea to Israel 
from the river Manavgat, with regular water supply foreseen from 2006 (Pamukcu, 2003). The 
experimental bags however had an annoying tendency to sink, so it was decided to transport the 
water in super-tankers to Israel instead. But while Turkey was eager for a PR success, Israel was 
slow to proceed with the contract. When in 2004, a deal was struck for the delivery of 50 MCM 
(million cubic meters) per year, no price or company was indicated (Gruen, 2004). Reported 
linkage politics, in which Turkey threatened to call off military orders and participation in GAP 
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projects if Israel continued to tarry with the water contract (Kenon, 2003, Vidal, 2004) seemed to 
be borne out when both the water and arms deals fell apart in the same week in April 2006 
(Middle East Times, 2006). 
Finally, deliveries from the Anamur or Manavgat river to the occupied section of Cyprus, a 
semi-arid area with 200-600mm rainfall, have likewise concerned water transfers by 10,000 m3 
‗water balloons‘, launched in 1998 but considered uneconomic and prone to tearing, as well as 
underground pipelines. Large-scale structural water trade thus has not yet been in evidence (Biçak 
and Jenkins 2000). 
When the intended recipients of Turkish water ignored the offer or declined politely, they will 
have realised that ‗gifts‘ also come with a degree of dependence and vulnerability in terms of 
water quality and quantity. Offering co-operation to domestic and external actors - the ‗friendly 
face of power‘- creates an obligation on the part of the accepting party. In their time, the ancient 
Greeks successfully employed the gift of a horse to fool the Trojans (who lived in what is 
currently northwest Turkey), who couldn‘t resist accepting, but in doing so, found themselves 
beleaguered from the inside. A sense of being at the mercy of others‘ unpredictable wiles, can 
make some actors wary, or even paranoid. 
 
 
3.2.2 DOMESTIC POLICY: HYDRAULIC DEVELOPMENT  
 
Like in many other hydraulic states, Turkey's development trajectory was state-led and 
authoritarian. In 1931 Republican Turkey instated a Kemalist form of Etatism as a third way 
between capitalism and socialism - the ‘strong state‘ took off. Until long after the Second World 
War Turkey was a one-party state and until this day the army often seems to exercise de facto 
control – as the Turkish saying goes, other countries may have an army, but in Turkey the army 
has a country. This prevents political adventurism but also can be a brake on democratisation and 
reform (Aydın, 2003). The antagonism of democratic politics does not sit well with the military‘s 
ideals of unity and ´promotion of the state´ (Drorian, 2005). 
The hydraulic imperative for the development of its hinterland can be seen as a political 
project to weld together feudal and modernising (industrialising) forces into a historic, nationalist 
compromise. Swyngedouw (1999, 2007) sketches how Spain, after losing its empire, regenerated 
itself by colonising its water resources in a hydraulic mission, while securing its international 
position by allying itself with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). The story for 
post-Ottoman Turkey appears to look remarkably similar. The towering figure of Kemal Atatürk, 
played a crucial role in the new strategy. In the 1930s Atatürk, father of the Turks, envisaged 
diverting the Euphrates and Tigris to the drier west of Turkey. This plan gave way to a 
development vision modelled on the Tennessee Valley Authority. The American hydraulic plan 
for integrated regional development project to develop the region out of economic depression, 
proved a model approach to developing one‘s way out of economic depression, spawning similar 
projects in Jordan (Trottier, 1999), the Mekong (Bakker, 1999), Helmand Valley in Afghanistan 
(Cullather, 2002) and elsewhere. 
An aspiration for autarky and exportable food and electricity nourished Turkey‘s internal 
regulation and resource colonisation drive. Turkey may be poor in oil and gas, which necessitates 
imports from Libya and Saudi Arabia, but the country is very well endowed with other raw 
materials. Resource capture (hydro-imperialism), whether by institutional or technical 
intervention, could play an important role in the quest to integrate the Turkish state. The GAP 
supported ambitions for a stronger export position to bring in currency in an often inflation-
ridden and structurally shaky economy. The irrigation schemes could turn the region into a 
'breadbasket' for the Middle East. In the 1970s all three riparians had changed from food 
exporters to food importers, and all other Middle East countries are now massive net food 
importers. At the same time, Turkey‘s energy import bill skyrocketed due to OPEC‘s energy price 
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hike as well as increasing demand. These economic reasons spurred Turkey to speed up the plan 
for Euphrates and Tigris development. 
The GAP project promised to boost both food and energy security, understood by the state as 
self-sufficiency. Annual hydroelectricity production from GAP will produce 22 percent of 
Turkey‘s total energy generation with an installed capacity of 7476 MW. Southeast Anatolia is dry 
(rainfall ranges between 470 and 830mm) but rich in fertile soils. Irrigation enables the 
production of summer crops (cotton, maize, sesame, soybean) which so far was impossible in 
Southeast Anatolia. In all, the irrigation schemes are scheduled to develop a 2 million-hectare 
area, an area the collective size of the Benelux countries. If all goes according to plan, GAP will 
irrigate nearly 1.7 million ha of land out of those 2 million or 20 percent of Turkey‘s total 
irrigable land. The Euphrates is not particularly rich in fish, \but this sector is also promoted, 
especially in the Atatürk dam reservoir. 
After several big dams were built in the 1960s and ‗70s (Keban, Karakaya dams), the scheme 
came to be conceived as an integrated development project in successive stages. After evaluating 
22 different combinations. of four dams of different heights, the State Hydraulic Works 
department, DSI, presented the Lower Firat (Euphrates) plan in 1970 to bring irrigation and low-
cost energy to the surrounding plains between what are now the Keban and Atatürk dams. In 
1977, the Lower Firat plan was integrated into a package with all other schemes in these regions, 
7 hydropower and irrigation schemes on the Euphrates and 6 on the Tigris, by the name of GAP. 
In 1983 construction of the project‘s centerpiece, the Atatürk Dam, started. 
Given the large outlay and uncertainties involved, the GAP Master Plan of 1989 recommended 
to scale back GAP to priority projects (Brismar, 2002), but at the same time continued its radical 
reorientation towards a regional people-focussed rather than water oriented development project  
It sought to propel the region, seen as backward, in terms of education, agricultural practices, 
gender relations, environmental conditions and participation. 
In 1995 the GAP was again evaluated, this time against sustainable development criteria, which 
led to a joint programme with UNDP, ‗Sustainable Development Programme in the GAP 
Region‘, an umbrella project of 29 projects. It sought to promote community participation, 
advance the role of women for sustainable regional development (q. in Brismar, 2002). 
Glowing press releases call attention to tremendous export boosts (in cotton and grain) that 
appear to have been induced by GAP94. The project is meeting all its hydro-electricity goals, 
benefiting urban and industrial interests. However, even in its own terms, GAP so far has not 
been an unqualified success story. The works have tended to promote the development of the 
regions of the West, not the impoverished East. Indeed it is the expansion of energy production 
that is progressing most impressively with the development of irrigable lands lagging, the 
scheme‘s industrial orientation will attract more skilled workers from the west rather than 
unskilled, semi-literate and often poor labour from the southeast. Thus, as McDowall (1996: 434-
435) argue, the development vision will intensify a disparity in income distribution and further 
exacerbate social tensions that the project was intended to ameliorate‘.  Meanwhile, 
agricultural targets are falling short: In 1996 only some 120,000 hectares out of a potential 314 
million were under irrigation and by 2004 only 16% of the agricultural goals had been realised 
(MacQuarrie, 2004). 
Moreover land reform is not progressing well. It was hoped regional development would 
precipitate land reform, to break the feudal power of entrenched landed interests. Agha‘s 
(latifundists) effectively blocked much action in this respect, and may well be the ones to reap the 
benefits of agrarian development, as they are the only ones whose land titles are recognised. 
State-led land reform did not happen; feudal relations prevail and compensation for flooding was 
given to landowners rather than sharecroppers - 38 percent in the region do not own land. ‗A few 
individuals with good party connections have succeeded in getting the state to allocate large tracts 
of land to them‘ (Barkey and Fuller, 1998: 190). 
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The creation of irrigation associations under GAP, meant to improve the participatory 
situation, leaves great scope for local elites who already have access to dominate the process. To 
represent user groups or vote you need a minimum amount of land, which effectively bars 
landless and women from having a voice and being trained in irrigation techniques (Harris, 2002). 
Moreover, the war against the PKK since 1984 (see below) also has its effects on the position 
of the aghas in Southeast Anatolia. The recruitment of village guards from the local elite 
reinforced the position of the agha (Jongerden et al., 1997). The below Section delves deeper into 
the Kurdish issue. 
 
 
3.2.3 INCORPORATING THE KURDS? 
 
When the French and English laid down the current Turkish boundaries at San Remo in 1920 - 
blithely ignoring natural boundaries and denying the Kurds the nation-state they had been 
promised earlier - they laid the basis for many current resource conflicts in the region. Both 
Turkey and Iraq (as well as Iran, Syria and the former Soviet Union) have a sizeable Kurdish 
minority that has not forgotten its aspirations for independence. 
Like many states that harbour diverse ethnic groups within their borders, the Turkish state 
competes for legitimacy with centrifugal actors that have the power to procure vital social 
services and/or identity. In the context of nation-(re)building, the early twenties continued the 
intensive homogenisation of the Turkish populations including a massive exchange of ethnic and 
religious minorities as a consequence of fights with Armenia (1917) and Greece (1921-1922). The 
First Turkish Republic, proclaimed on 23 October 1923, was defined as an indivisible, unitary 
Turkish state in which the Kurds formally do not even exist95 - only as ‗mountain Turks‘ or 
‗Eastern Turks‘ (dogulu). In the 1930s, the Kemalist republic revived the ‗history thesis‘ claiming 
that Turks from Central Asia were the origin of human civilization (Shoup, 2006: 233).   
Although Turkish and Arabic groups are also significant in the area, Kurdish groups dominate 
the GAP region. Southeast Anatolia is a patchwork quilt of landowners and landless, often 
groups of nomadic origin which various Ottoman rulers tried to sedentarise Anatolian nomads 
with varying success since the 17th century. Socially organised along tribal lines in ashirets, a kind 
of clans (Erhan, 1997), Kurdish identity is by no means socially cohesive or culturally unified. 
Kemal Atatürk‘s relations with the Kurdish population started well, as several tribal chiefs had 
supported Atatürk‘s Young Turks to ‗roll back‘ British and French domination of Turkish policy, 
as well as the influence of Christians, Greeks and Armenians. But when the 1920 Treaty of Sevres 
turned out to include an independent Armenian/Kurdish state in the East, relations turned sour.  
As a fragmented ethnicity, the Kurds historically had not organised politically as a nation-state, 
but had seized on the chance of self-rule. The Young Turks made sure the promise of an 
independent state was erased from the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923. In 1924 Kurdish schools and 
organisations were outlawed. Now that the dream of independence fell through, the Kurds 
resisted ‗horizontal integration‘ by an assimilative Kemalist republic, staging several uprisings 
such as the Sheikh Said rebellion in 1925, Bayoum in 1929 and in 1938 in Alevi-dominated 
Dersim (Tencili). The Kemalist republic, in turn, regarded their particularism, but also their 
aversion to secularism as a threat to Turkish unity. This key plank of the Kemalist scaffolding, 
was enforced in a (recently relaxed) curb on Kurdish identity, language and culture, seeking the 
cultural homogenisation (Turkification) of an imagined ‗Kurdistan‘. Atatürk‘s successor Inönü (a 
Kurd by birth) responded to the uprisings with mass deportation of Kurds (Jongerden et al., 
1997). 
When the resolutely secular Kurdish Workers‘ Party arrived on the scene claiming to represent 
the Kurdish cause in the early 1980s, they did not command an obvious following. The PKK 
began as a Marxist-Leninist party which, in true Leninist fashion, sees itself as the 
uncompromising front guard. In 1984, as construction works for the Atatürk Dam got under 
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way, the PKK staged violent attacks on military but also civilian targets. The guerrilla war also 
included attacks on the Atatürk dam, the works for which had commenced a year earlier. 
Reportedly 1100 vehicles and pieces of working machinery were destroyed (P. Williams 2003). 
While the PKK did not manage to stop construction works, slowing down development 
inevitably drove up the costs of the project. 
 
These attacks gave a face to the culturally fragmented and socially incohesive Kurds. Thus the 
Turkish competed for control with the PKK in the Kurdish-dominated areas, while the domestic 
war reduced a multitude of identities to ‗friend‘ and ‗foe‘. The uprising again sparked ruthless 
response from the Turkish armed forces as well as paramilitary death squads (revealed in a 
parliamentary investigation in 1996). Both the Turkish Army and the PKK targeted the villages 
with intimidation, the former to smoke out insurgents from villages and forests, the latter to 
ensure allegiance to their cause.  
When the army appointed ´village guards´ who were left with no choice: if they refused, they 
were suspected of PKK sympathies, but if they later proposed to step down, PKK would be 
unforgiving. Caught between a rock and a hard place, tens of thousands fled the area to the big 
cities: Diyarnakir, Ankara, or left for Western Europe. 
 
President Turgut Özal however saw the GAP project as an opportunity to integrate the 
Kurdish minority with economic incentives. Özal is part-Kurdish himself and after coming to 
power after dictatorship as Prime Minister in 1983 and President in 1989, on a platform of 
political and economic liberalisation, he eased the authoritarian legislation by enacting Kurd-
friendlier legislation in 1991, and accepting the European Court of Human Rights and anti-
torture legislation (Jacoby, 2005). While the celebration of Newroz, Kurdish New year in 1992 
was repressed, Turkey adopted it in 1996 as a national holiday (Jongerden et al., 1997). 
 
When Özal became President in 1989, his vision one of integrating the Kurds and hydraulic 
development was reflected in the programme‘s expansion beyond agriculture and energy. 
The GAP infrastructural plan thus also served a political ideal. Like the TVA model became a 
weapon in the fight against Communism in the Cold War, modernising the ‗backward‘ Southeast 
was also hoped to counter the allure of Islamism for the poor in a constitutionally secular state. 
Even today, the average income in Ankara is still many times that in Anatolia. The Guneydogu 
Anadolu Projesi, more conveniently known internationally as the Greater Anatolia Project 
(GAP), is one instrument aiming to right the balance between core and periphery. The idea was 
that once wealth came to the Southeast, the locals would be less likely to provide sanctuary to the 
Kurdish Workers‘ Party. 
Economic development should also attract Turks from other regions, encouraging ethnic 
assimilation in the Kurdish-inhabited regions. Hydro-powered development seemed a peaceful 
way to integrate (‗de-other‘) the poor Southeast, to prevent immiseration and secessionist and 
Islamic fundamentalist drives. 
In Turkey, landowners, industry and army could subscribe to a hydraulic mission. But from the 
early 1990s on, GAP dams officially became an instrument in the ‗fight against terrorism‘ (Özok, 
2005)96. The internal war against the separatist movement was stepped up after a Kurdish intifada 
in the early nineties.  - not only developmentally but also physically. State officials argue that 
‘terrorists will no longer be able to easily cross from one region to the other [Mardin and Sirnak] 
due to the dams‘. This should help limit ‗terrorist activities‘ in the region (Cerem, 2006). The war 
against Iraq had left Saddam untouched, but created a Kurdish zone in the north which gave they 
PKK a springboard for its attacks. Turkey‘s war with the PKK continued, but so did Kurdish 
support for its increasingly nationalist rather than marxist ideology. Kurdish parties in Turkish 
parliament were forced to the denounce PKK, or closed down if they didn‘t. Özal however saw 
the continuing war as an obstacle to Turkey‘s regional ambitions; apparently in 1993 Özal, the 
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PKK and other Kurdish leaders seemed close to coming to an understanding along the lines of a 
federation, and the PKK felt strong enough to call a unilateral ceasefire to end the intifada 
(Jongerden et al., 1997). But then the President passed away, and his successor Demirel chose to 
reinforce the violence against insurgents.  
 
‗Ankara has continued to devote enormous human and material resources to this conflict which 
costs approximately 3 percent of Turkey‘s GNP [Gross National Product] ($12.5 billion in 1994) and 
for which military expenses absorb 45 percent of the national budget and some 250,000 troops and 
other security forces‘ (Galetti, 1999).  
 
The Turkish army employed a slash-and-burn-tactic to root out settlements suspected of 
collaborating with the militant PKK. The ‗soft power‘ of hydraulic development continues to be 
underpinned by the deployment of ‗hard power‘ in a campaign to crush separatism (repression 
strategy). Both aspects of the strategy caused mass displacement – many Kurdish villages were 
either uprooted to make space for dams, or uprooted of the city of Diyarbakir, and, further afield, 
Ankara as well as Kurdish migration rates into Western Europe, for refusing to take distance 
from the PKK. 
 
As we saw in the conceptual introduction, securitisation of an issue-area or domain may serve 
as an expedient political strategy to add weight to the mobilisation of resources, while pushing 
out the political process of deliberation and choice. The state of emergency is the ultimate 
security closure. Meanwhile the PKK have equally asserted Kurdish unity by force and 
intimidation, which makes criticism and defection a capital offence. This mutually hardened 
stance stands in the way of the vision of peaceful integration President Özal had harboured. The 
conflict made South-east Anatolia a de facto military occupation zone. 
  
TABLE 3.1 GAP Project chronology 
 Domestic chronology Basin chronology 
1922 End of Ottoman Empire; Turkish republic 
created 
 
1966  ruling Ba‟ath parties in Syria and Iraq fall out 
with each other 
1975  Syria and Iraq almost at war over water 
1977 Formulation of GAP  
1982  Syria and Iraq sever ties 
1984 Start of Kurdish uprising in Siirt  
1987 Turkey promises Syria minimum Euphrates 
discharge 
 
1989 Reformulation of GAP  
1994 Privatisation of Turkish water law  
1991 Turkey fills Atatürk dam, Euphrates flow 
impeded for 1 month 
 
1998  - Near war between Turkey and Syria 
- PKK leader Öcalan extradited 
1999 International campaign against Iliszu  
2000 Filling of Birecik dam (under construction from 
1996); Bilkes submerged 
 
2001 Britain refuses export credit for Ilısu Dam  
2002 Swiss USB Bank pulls out  
2006 Restart of Ilısu dam (August) Iraq and Syria: rapprochement 
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3.2.4 DOWNSTREAM FEAR OF FLOODS 
 
The Turkish hydraulic mission does not only impact on the country‘s relations with the 
Southeast, but also with downstream neighbours. The Turkish state saw GAP as a way of 
asserting riparian rights in the absence of a basin treaty (Brismar, 2002). Downstream states in 
turn have loudly complained that GAP is a water control strategy using physical control of the 
flow for political gain.  
Downstream states usually develop water infrastructure earlier than upstreamers, and the 
Euphrates is no exception. Flood control of course brings many benefits: regulated water supply, 
agrarian and industrial development and control of territory. But especially in Iraq, rivers have 
historically brought flood distress and inspired Great Flood accounts like Gilgamesh as well as 
the biblical deluge recounted in the book of Genesis. This especially concerns the river Trogis: 
snowmelt from the Taurus and, via its Zap tributaries, Zagros Mountains add their waters 
causing often destructive flooding.  
 
In ancient Mesopotamia, the Spring floods were a source of acute fear each year; in recent 
times the 1954 flood raised the Tigris by 65 cm and ravaged the capital, Baghad. In response, Iraq 
built the ar-Ramadi and Sāmarrā‘ barrages in the 1950s, to divert the floodwaters into Lake 
Habbaniyah and the Tharthar depression in central Iraq. Even larger works carried out on the 
Tigris tributaries Zap and Diyala further domesticated the Tigris, though the last major Tigris 
flood is as recent as 1988. 
Second off the block in building dams was Syria, which is upstream to Iraq on the Euphrates 
(Syria only has 44 km of the Tigris). The Cold War provided an opportunity for Syria to get its 
Tabqa (or at-Thawrah) Dam built between 1966 and 1973. This reduced flood risk for Iraq, but 
also the much-needed irrigation water and silt (and, less welcome, salt). Moreover Syria filled its 
Tabqa dam reservoir only briefly after Turkey filled its Keban dam in a particularly dry year (Bari, 
1977). Iraq claimed the dam‘s impoundment adversely affected 3 million Iraqi farmers (Starr, 
1991). As a result, in 1975, armed forces of both countries were mobilised at the border. The 
Arab League had to mediate. 
Ever since Syria and Iraq‘s wings of the Ba‘ath (‗Renaissance‘) party split, relations between the 
two countries have been notoriously bad, and the 1975 clash was the closest the Euphrates 
riparian has come to violence over water. However, a common cause against a third party can 
make enemies temporarily set aside their differences and create a joint front. The GAP mega-
project provided the occasion for joining forces and delivering fierce protests and threat to 
Turkey each time a dam is announced. 
The fact that Turkey in principle has the ability to cut off Euphrates water for six months has 
been a source of acute discomfort for downstream countries. But while the ‗water wars‘ literature 
sees resource scarcity as the driver for warfare, water is not particularly scarce in the Euphrates-
Tigris catchment. Malin Falkenmark´s ´water barrier´ is a rule of thumb that postulates that a 
country that has less than 1800 m3 per person per year is water-stressed and 1000 is water poor. 
Turkey and Syria are nearing the 1800 zone.97 Iraq is way above that. 
It is claimed that since 1970, the flow leaving the Turkish borders has diminished by half. 
Frequently, a GAP-induced 40% reduction is predicted for Syria and up to 80% less for Iraq; 
although this latter figure would be a cumulative effect of Turkish and Syrian dam projects 
(estimates differ, see e.g. Shapland, 1997). There are reports that two smaller Syrian rivers have 
run dry as a result of the reduced influx. But more important than the real impact is the potential 
to give the water tap a twist in either direction. If all present dams in the catchment were to be 
closed all at the same time the entire volume of the rivers could now be stored many times over. 
This argument has repeatedly been voiced for the Euphrates98. Most of the megadams have so far 
been realised on the Euphrates (in Turkish: Firat): so far, Turkey has laid relatively limited claim 
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to its sister river, the Tigris (Dicle). The final series of GAP dams will significantly enclose the 
river Tigris however. 
 
A simple sum reveals why the downstream riparians are so upset. The Ilısu storage lake will 
have a total storage capacity of just under 10.5 billion cubic meters and an operating capacity of 
7.5 billion m3. Normally, that would leave a buffer capacity of 3 billion cubic metres. As the 
average annual inflow of the Tigris is 15 billion m3 the reservoir will account for half the total 
annual flow99. Opponents fear that the spare capacity would enable a malevolent Turkey to arrest 
the river influx for some additional months, such that not a drop of Tigris water would flow into 
Syria and Iraq (Berlin Declaration, 1999). While the majority of the catchment is in Iraq, where 
the two rivers merge and drain into the Persian Gulf through the Shatt al-Arab (disputed by 
Iran), the river receives 95% of its precipitation within Turkish territory, and the artesian springs 
just across the Syrian border are fed by rain infiltrated in Turkish soil before it works its way 
down to Syria100. But contrary to the Euphrates, Tigris tributaries also flow into Iraq, so Iraq is 
not wholly dependent on that river (Beaumont, 1998) The reduced amount of freshwater allowed 
to pass the border however would impair the diluting capacity to purify the wastewater flowing 
from the region's major cities and agricultural return flow. Baghdad, for its part, fears its flow to 
be contaminated by agricultural chemicals and pesticides. Another worry is that coarse sediment 
deposits may increase downstream flood levels (Williams and Associates, 2001). 
 
Not just closing but also the sudden opening of the floodgates would be disastrous. While 
admittedly rare, the water weapon has been known to be deployed in the basin. In 689 B.C. 
Sennacherib the Assyria dammed the Euphrates upstream from Baghdad, only to destroy it after 
sufficient water had assembled behind the dam. The sudden flood wave flooded the 
Mesopotamian capital and won Sennacherib the day. According to a Pentagon statement, Iraq 
itself used strategic flooding of the Tigris to stop Iranian advances in the 1980s (CNN, 2003)101 
and indeed there were fears that the river would be used as a defence against the allied invasion in 
2003102. A dam can even break accidentally: half a million citizens in Mosul and Baghdad are 
potentially at risk from a flood wave if the dam break at Mosul. The dam on the Tigris, built in 
1984, was ‗fundamentally flawed‗ to begin with because it is built on unstable bedrock. Currently 
it is in a crumbling state according to the US Corps of Engineers and, according to the Special 
Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), inexpertly repaired in an American project 
(Independent, 8 August 2007).103 Such knowledge, apparently kept quiet so as not to cause a panic104 
teaches the downstream riparians some realism and allows upstream Turkey to be laconic over 
even the gravest threats from its co-riparians. 
Turkish unilateral stopping of the Euphrates flow for a full month to fill the storage lake for 
the huge Atatürk Dam had created an alliance of convenience between Syria and Iraq. When Syria 
joined the anti-Saddam coalition in the Gulf War, the truce with Iraq fell apart and the two 
countries officially were not been on speaking terms since but after a five-day meeting in 1996 
the states decided jointly to dispatch threatening letters to companies involved in building the 
Birecik dam105. When the Ilısu dam, a hydropower and irrigation project near Dargecit, 45 km 
from the Syrian border, and its smaller sister dam, Cizre (46m in height, 240MW in capacity) were 
mooted, Syria and Iraq again joined forces sending protest letters to funders (see below) and 
especially after Turkey concluded an alliance with Arab‘s, arch enemy Israel in 1997, mobilising 
the Arab League against the GAP. Turkey‘s upstream development caused the downstream 
riparians to be sufficiently ´realist´ to agree in 1996 on a percentage distribution of whatever 
Turkey leaves them: 42% for Syria and 58% for Iraq. 
The historic flow before Turkey started its project is calculated at 1,000 cubic meters per 
second (m3/sec) at the border with Syria. The Arab states argue that since there are three states 
sharing the river‘s flow, each is entitled to one-third, giving the two Arab states a total of around 
667 m3/sec (Gruen, 2004). Turkey could not agree with that amount, but signed a protocol with 
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Syria in 1987 promising to release an average of 500 m3/s, which is about half the river flow, 
across the Turkish/Syrian border, and has not flagrantly defaulted. 1991, the dry year in which 
Turkey filled lake Atatürk, was a low flow year anyway (190 m3/s). To honour its obligation 
Turkey did supplement the  flow later. The Birecik dam (see below) was filled in another dry 
period, 1999 until 2001. When 2000 carried an extremely low flow of.75 m3/s, Turkey made 
endeavours to let through 400 m3 (Brismar, 2002). But the Director of the General Directorate of 
State Hydraulic Works commented one year later: ‗I cannot make the rain‘ (q. in Zawahri, 
forthcoming). 
 
 
TABLE 3.2 Overview of dams along the Euphrates and Tigris 
Turkey Syria 
 
Iraq 
Euphrates: 
Keban 
Karkaya 
Atatürk 
Birecik 
Karkamis 
Batman 
 
Tigris:  
Devegecidi Cag-cag, 
Dicle, Goksu, and 
Kralkizi dams 
Ilısu 
 
Al-Baath 
Tishrine 
Tabqa 
Upper Khabur 
 
Al Hindiyah 
Al Qadisiyah 
Fallujah 
Ramadi- Habbaniyah 
 
Source: Water Resources Development, 2004. 
 
Turkey can thus claim to have acted in good faith not to harm downstream interests. But given 
the symbolic value of many securitising moves in this area, I propose to see the security speech 
act within the wider context of strategic representation of danger. Possibilities and fears rather than 
facts on the ground appear to play an important role in this game. 
GAP‘s downstream opponents especially criticise Turkey‘s arrogance in positing its self-
interest as the regional common good without conferring with its neighbours. In 1989, the two 
downstreamers had pleaded for Turkey to fill the Atatürk Dam without stopping the river, during 
the trilateral Joint Technical Committee called by Turkey. The Turks saw the Committee as a way 
to inform the others rather than to negotiate, and declared the decision was final and non-
negotiable (Zawahri, forthcoming). But in 1990 President Özal‘ claimed that the Euphrates-Tigris 
does not have to be shared because it is a ‗Turkish river‘ (cited e.g in Allan, 1995). Declaring the 
entire Euphrates-Tigris basin a single Turkish river pulled off the dazzling feat of declaring 
sovereignty over the entire basin in the name of integrated management. This way, Turkey resists 
internationalisation of the water issue, claiming the water is safest in Turkish hands.  
 
Iraq and Syria furthermore claim a breach of international law and riparian water rights. This is 
not a particularly strong hand. With some imagination a breach of a 1946 Turco-Syrian treaty 
stipulating consultation between riparians could be invoked106 (Gruen, 2000) as well as a Turkish-
Iraqi Protocol signed that same year which allowed Iraq to construct hydrological infrastructure 
and meteorological stations along the rivers inside Turkey ‗to prevent downriver flooding and, 
thus, benefit Iraq‘ (El-Fadel et al., 2002). But international law only provides only cold comfort 
for water plaintiffs - there are no widely shared and enforced principles governing international 
rivers. Iraq may insist on the international law doctrine of absolute territorial integrity, stipulating 
that no riparian is allowed to impair the quality and quantity of the water resources flowing within 
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its territory. But Turkey can with equal vigour juxtapose the doctrine of unlimited territorial 
sovereignty, also known as the Harmon doctrine: each state can treat the water within its 
boundaries any which way it likes.  
Due to the weakness of international water law, Turkey could (along with China and Burundi) 
refuse signing the 1997 UN treaty on non-navigable watercourses claiming the treaty grants 
downstream states excessive rights without immediate - if it also does nothing for its international 
PR.107 
 
The Kurdish card 
As a downstreamer to Turkey, Syria protests against each new Turkish-built dam, complaining 
of failed harvests and interrupted water services in Damascus as a result of interrupted and 
reduced flows. Moreover, Syria itself has many historic issues with Turkey, including the loss of 
the province of Alexandretta (or, from a Turkish perspective, Hatay), which was given to Turkey 
by its colonial French rulers108  Downstream Syria has long betted on the Kurdish card, allowing 
the Kurdish militants to train in the Syrian-occupied Biqa'a valley in Lebanon, as well as the 
extreme leftist Turkish urban guerrilla Devsol and other groups. When Turkey protested, Syria 
moved the Kurds to northern Iran, and when in early 1996 Turkey intercepted five Iranian lorries 
carrying arms, which Turkey claims were destined for the PKK, another diplomatic row ensued. 
The line was toed when on 5 October 1998, Turkish troops were mobilised at the Syrian 
border in Hatay, and President Demirel told Syria to disband the camps, warning it would ‗take 
any measures it deemed necessary‘ and refused to meet Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, who 
had offered mediation between Syria and Turkey.109 Still, Mubarak‘s effort paid off: when Syria 
arrested five PKK activists and expelled Abdullah Öcalan, this signposted the end of the 
´Kurdish card´. There was a strong expectation that Turkey would release more Euphrates water 
as a quid pro quo, although no firm agreement was signed. However, after the signing of the Adana 
accords in 1998, the two countries started to co-operate, including technical exchange of the 
Turkish Gap and Syrian GOLD (General Organization for. Land Development) project. To the 
chagrin of the Turkish government, though, the Kurdish issue keeps figuring prominently in 
international debates over hydraulic projects. International activists picked up on these issues, 
and as we shall see in Section 3, found a point of entrance to put the Kurdish-hydraulic link on 
the agenda in the late 1990s, when they found a convenient point of entrance to link a strategy to: 
funding dams. 
 
 
3.3 THE ILISU DISPUTE 
 
3.3.1 WATER PRIVATISATION: A WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY? 
 
The international overlay on regional security dynamics is notable where project funding is 
concerned. To fund such an enormous project, a continuous stream of funds is needed. Finding 
external money for the GAP project has been a problem for the Turkish government. From Day 
One a key external player, the World Bank (IBRD), has been unwilling to support a regionally 
controversial dam. This Section looks into the institutional transition Turkey made in the 1990s 
to access international funds in spite of World Bank objections. For this, Turkey needed to 
project a vision of GAP bringing mutual hydraulic benefit to an international audience. Instead, 
privatisation preluded a heated internationalised dispute over the Izmit and Birecik dams and, 
more recently and intensely, Ilısu Dams, the first major Turkish dam on the Tigris. 
As the most important donor to the region by far the World Bank has proved highly effective 
in shaping economic policies in recipient states. Its veto on regionally sensitive projects can kill 
off a controversial water project for a considerable time110. Also the Bank now would like to see 
water-intensive agriculture curbed in favour of industry and urban supply. However in denying its 
ILISU, TURKEY 
 
71 
  
flow of funds, the Bank proves unable to kill off a major project when the initiator is determined 
enough to find funds elsewhere. Although the World Bank formally decided not to fund GAP 
projects in 1984, the Turks apparently never even formally applied for Bank backing, sensing the 
Bank would show itself highly sensitive to protestations on the part of co-riparians Syria and Iraq.  
The GAP project thus started on a self-contained basis. But an inflation-ridden economy 
groaned under the development effort, soon coupled with the cost of military engagement with 
the PKK. The lack of multilateral co-operation made itself felt in ever more painful ways when in 
the early nineties projects started to fall behind schedule further and further. More and more, the 
GAP seemed to look like the famed 'white elephant': the costly development project that never 
materialises. The fact that after a temporary lull, the final stage of the Greater Anatolia Project 
has now gathered steam again, is due to a radical institutional move: privatisation. As early as in 
1987 the means to fund the Izmit dam had run out. Izmit is close to Turkey‘s capital metropolis, 
Istanbul, and the project was to provide water for homes and industry. At the instigation of 
President Özal, a private consortium was created, Izmit Su, to complete the works. Stock holders 
are the municipality of Izmit, the Japanese conglomerates Sumitomo and Mitsui, Thames Water 
of Britain and two local companies, Gama and Guris. Funders were British, German and 
Japanese. Thames Water was contracted under a Build, Operate and Transfer scheme to run the 
utility for 15 years before returning it to the municipality of Izmit. 
The Government Audit Department, Sayistay, in 1999-2000 issued a detailed report saying 
that, ‗from beginning to end, "the project was full of violations of laws."‘ In 2002, after the 
contract expired, the Turkish Court of Accounts found irregularities in the contract that made 
the water too expensive.111 
A key cost factor of project development involved the fee of Turkish lawyers struggling to 
legally enable the project. While private investment was possible under the 1984 Build-Operate-
Transfer law, legislative frame and infrastructure were simply not in place112. While privatisation 
had been advocated by several Turkish governments since the 1950s, it is hardly compatible with 
the prevailing dirigisme. Privatisation means an important erosion in the state‘s primacy over 
public services. The privatisation law, opposed by the secular and religious right, was finally 
pushed through parliament in November 1994 by Tansu Ciller, well-timed to coincide with an 
important Galatasaray-Barcelona football match keeping many MPs glued to the TV screen 
(Zürcher, 1998). As a result, the Izmit project (dam, storage lake, sewage works and water utility) 
was ready to go onstream ten years after its abortive start. 
Faced with an acute shortage of project funds for the remainder of the GAP project, Turkey 
needed to co-opt the global jet stream of liberalisation and privatisation in the water sector. As 
we shall see in the next Section, however, privatisation exposed donors and guarantors to activist 
NGO strategy calling them to account for their corporate governance practice. The Birecik and 
Ilısu Dams were the logical targets for this thrust. 
 
 
3.3.2 LOCATING THE ETHICS GAP: EXPORT CREDITS VS. HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
Given the ritualistic aspect of mudslinging every time a new dam comes onstream, the 
controversies over Birecik and Ilısu are unsurprising. But the privatisation in the Turkish water 
sector has brought new actors into play. Until 1994 conflicts over the Euphrates and Tigris 
remained within a neat Realist framework of rivalry between states. DSI decision-making on the 
llisu dam likewise appears to have been made in ´closed´ mode. the ten alternative dam sites were 
not subjected to outside scrutiny113 and competition - the hydro-electricity dam was put to tender 
for Build-Operate-Transfer but when no ‗suitable‘ bid emerged, the project was awarded to a 
consortium (Cerem, 2006). 
However, the privatisation of the Turkish water sector brought new transnational actors into 
play: transnational companies (TNCs), but also hot on their heels, International Non-
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Governmental Organisations (INGOs) as transnational political actors. The campaign over the 
human rights situation in the South East and the opposition from co-riparians targeted the 
Achilles heel of a project of this size and scale: funding. 
 
Private TNCs: ABB, Balfour Beatty, Sulzer Hydro, Skanska, Impreglo; major banks back it 
up 
Public Governments; donor governments insure export (political) risk 
Civil 
society 
NGOs and INGOs: start campaigning. 
 
For construction companies, the projects do not just provide opportunity but for several of 
them it provides much-needed economic security: long-term income in a competitive market. 
However, participation in GAP also carried considerable economic and political risk for them - 
not just by investing in a controversial project in a country that was effectively still at war with 
itself, but also the potential loss of its hardware or people due to attack. An investment in 
Turkey‘s Southeast carries considerable physical, political and economic risk and international 
companies are loath to carry all that risk themselves. Given the securitised status of the project 
area, an export credit is no luxury. Governments of countries where civil engineering is an 
important export sector have so far, turned out surprisingly eager to provide export credits. The 
contractors sought to alleviate this risk by securing export credits from their governments from 
the export credit agencies (ECAs) of Austria, Germany, Italy, Japan, Portugal, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the UK, and the US in Summer 1998. 
 
Export credits were needed to secure the participation of British construction company 
Balfour Beatty, another important international player which had been approached by the 
construiction giant ABB to subcontract the civil engineering works while ABB would take care of 
the electrical engineering and Sulzer Escher Wyss to lead the construction consortium to realize 
the dam, the storage lake and hydropower station - further enterprises involved are Impreglio 
(Italy), Skanska (Sweden), and the Turkish companies Nurol, Kiska and Tekfen. The six turbines 
and generators will have a total capacity of 1200 MW and an average productivity of 3800 GWh 
per year. 
The international private involvement exposed the companies and their governmental backers 
to angry Syrian letters and writs against foreign investors and constructors involved in GAP, Syria 
repeatedly claimed Turkish interventions damaged Syrian agriculture and water supply. Thus, 
when Ilısu was approved, Syria filed compensation claims from constructing and funding 
companies, including Chase Manhattan Bank, and threatened to blacklist/ boycott them until a 
trilateral agreement was signed. Such downstream vocal resistance greets the start of any new 
Turkish dam project and thus was perhaps expected, but the guaranteeing governments had not 
counted on the GAP uniting Syria and Iraq (Gulf War adversaries) and NGOs in an alliance of 
convenience over human rights. 
 
 
3.4  CULTURAL HERITAGE: THE FLOODING OF BELKIS AND HASANKEYF 
 
As the funding for Ilısu Dam became a news item, the Bireck dam, just north of the Syrian border 
also was under fire. Started in April 1996 and completed in 2002, its reservoir necessitated the 
flooding of the 2000 year-old ancient Roman city of Zeugma in 2000. Labelling Zeugma a 
‗second Pompeii‘, opponents not just saw this flooding as a tragedy for local history but also for 
the world‘s cultural heritage. The GAP administration played down the issue noting that the city 
centre and hundreds of historic villas remain untouched: ‗Turkey has so many [historic] resources 
that a single one cannot matter‘ when the cradle of civilisation gives way to a new kind of 
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civilisation (GAP Administration q. in Shoup, 2006)114. An indignant editorial on the Birecik 
flooding in the New York Times was reprinted in Turkey and triggered a petition from Turkish 
archaeologists and architects. A stunning mosaic was salvaged after a $5 million donation from 
American billionaire David Packard (Shoup, 2006). It is not that the Turks have no sense of 
history. Turkey has sought to salvage the cultural richness in thousands of important 
archaeological sites in Anatolia threatened by dam construction. But 4 - 6,500 people in Belkis 
village and others in Sanliurfa, Gaziantep and Adiyaman Provinces were not so lucky, they were 
displaced to make room for Birecik. 
For the Ilısu hydropower project, the lower reaches of the coastal town of Hasankeyf (Hisn 
Kaifã), 36 km from Batman, 203 km east of Diyarbakir, will need to disappear to make the 
Turkish dream a reality. Eighty-one other heritage sites are similarly facing inundation, including 
several holy Muslim and Christian holy sites that are still in use today. Said to be a late Assyrian 
settlement dating back from the 7th century B.C. and a node of the Silk Road in the Middle Ages, 
Hasankeyf is known as the ‗Efes (the Ephesus of the New Testament) of the East‘115. It occupied 
a strategic position as a fortified castle, controlling the caravan route from Diyarbakir to Mosul in 
Iraq. But because the whole region is so rich in historic architecture (Diyarbakir, Mardin, 
Kıziltepe), Hasankeyf did not command much interest until a French historian published on it in 
the 1940s (Meinecke, 1996)116. 
Hasankeyf has long been a neglected, crumbling117 open-air ‗museum‘ with remnants of many 
civilisations. In 1969 a study of Hasankeyf was made and in 1978 Turkey´s Culture Ministry 
pledged full archaeological protection to the town. In 1981 the site was listed among 22 declared 
first-class cultural heritage sites. The year before however, in 1980, an international consortium 
had been commissioned to draw up a feasibility report for the Ilısu hydroelectricity project and in 
1982 the Ilısu dam plan was ready, which included the submersion of Hasankeyf. 
Naturally, Hasankeyf‘s countless caves were first to disappear under reservoir level. The 
biggest stone bridge of the Middle Ages built by the Seljuks and the tomb of Zeynel Bey will be 
next to go under (Sener, 2004). Other threatened heritage is the first minting factory, the 
medieval Koc, and Sultan Süleyman [Ulu / El Rizk] mosque. In 1998 the Hydraulic State Works 
(DSI), which comes under the Ministry of Mining and Natural Resources, contracted 
archaeologists from TACDAM (Centre for Research and Assessment of Historic Environment) 
at Middle East Technology University, Ankara to study the transferability of Hasankeyf‘s cultural 
heritage. According to Ronayne (2005), DSI cancelled its contract with TACDAM over 
‗corruption and incompetence‘.  
Almost US$1 million is now spent to restore the most attractive (seaside) part of it for tourism, 
and US$100 million will now be set aside for moving the most important cultural monuments.118 
But archaeologists point out that while Hasankeyf is in the spotlight, the dam will submerge 280 
other historic places, including several holy Muslim and Christian holy sites that are still in use 
today. Only a few have been researched (Shoup, 2006). 
Although the mayor of Hasankeyf moved into a limestone cave in protest against their 
inundation the cave dwellers of Zagora had already been resettled in the 1970s (Outshoorn, 
2006)119. But the present-day citizens of Hasankeyf town showed themselves unwilling to move. 
The BBC noted that „many of the Kurds say that Hasankeyf is their last stand, the last remnant of 
what is left of any Kurdish identity and dignity‘120. Journalists collected dramatic quotes such as 
‗My family has been living here for 450 years.... they want to extinguish the culture of a thousand 
years for the sake of one burning light bulb‘ (in Shoup, 2006). But Balfour Beatty director Sloane 
however noted that Hasankeyf was abandoned after the First World War and only re-occupied in 
the 1960s (q. in Shoup, 2006). 
 
International Protest 
An ongoing campaign against large infrastructural projects had become successful in the 1990s. 
Local protest against dams like Arun in Nepal and Narmada (Bidaseca, 2004) was amplified to a 
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global audience by an international NGO lobby, making large donors increasingly uneasy about 
funding. In fact when a Swiss consortium won the Ilısu contract in 1996, it not only found the 
Berne Declaration (Erklärung von Bern) breathing down its neck, but a well-orchestrated protest 
on the part of a European NGO coalition. 
The Bundesrat, to which the Swiss central bank USB is accountable, justified its export risk 
guarantee go-ahead for 470 million Swiss francs with a view to new Swiss jobs (1200 full-time 
man years) (Bosshard, 1999), Turkish development, and Turkish promises to look into expected 
negative side effects including forced resettlements, conflict over water rights with the 
downstream riparians, threatened cultural heritage, and malaria vectors associated with stagnant 
water in a storage lake. The Swiss government in 1998 attached to its export credit (also covering 
a project in Ankara) the condition that an independent monitoring mechanism would be 
established. 
Casting the GAP flooding and resettlement as a human rights violation struck a chord in 
Europe, leading to parliamentary questions in Germany and Switzerland. Nevertheless, by 1999 
the anti-Turkish dam campaign so far had not achieved the hoped-for resonance. Birecik had 
acquired export credit without much trouble, and it looked like Ilısu would get the same easy ride. 
The British Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) was ‗minded‘ to issue a 200mn-pound 
export credit to the project leader, Turkey‘s State Hydraulic Works department (DSI) in 1999. 
Bemusingly, DTI's Export Credit Guarantee Department (ECGD) which governs export credits, 
was ready to defend the project as a fine example of its ethical policy, claiming it would 
contribute to Middle East peace (Guardian, 1 March 99). But the agency had failed to confer with 
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) about the diplomatic consequences of such a 
decision.  
However, British water companies were especially vulnerable to negative publicity, Biwater 
having been embroiled in scandal over the Pergau Dam in Malaysia, and Balfour Beatty in the 
Lesotho Highlands Project, both over corruption (1998). Thames Water‘s BOT contract for 
Izmit had raised questions and Watchdog organisations such as PSIRU at Greenwich University 
in London, duly noted that the Export Credit Guarantee Department still had no ethical or 
environmental code governing those guarantees (it developed Business Principles in 2000).121  
In Britain the Ilısu Dam Campaign was spearheaded by Friends of the Earth, for whom the 
project looked a choice opportunity to mobilise its political clout. Opposing the Ilısu dam as a 
symbol of unethical British investment. Friends of the Earth and the Kurdish Human Rights 
Project (KHRP) may have judged the general public to be increasingly blasé over issues of 
environmental quality122 and cultural heritage, which had not grabbed many headlines of late. 
Likewise, NGOs are unlikely ever to be able to win the day claiming the dams are not economic. By 
recasting the issue as a human rights issue, they could play at a concern which to many people is an 
absolute, existential value at the individual and group level. The repression of Kurdish identity as 
a way of extending Turkish control was played by the coalition against the Ilısu Dam on a human 
as well as cultural rights platform. This proved instrumental in strengthening the international anti-
GAP coalition on a platform that also drew on environmental issues. 
The opponents´ discourse was at times heavy-handed. Activist archaeologist Maggie Ronayne 
of Trinity College in Galway, Ireland called the project a weapon of ―mass cultural destruction" 
while George Monbiot, environmental journalist with the British Guardian newspaper and 
Visiting Professor at Bristol University talked of ‗ethnic cleansing‘123 echoed by human rights 
organisation Göc-Der: ‗If you cut down a tree or kill a culture, that‘s war‘ (q. in Shoup, 2006: 
250). 
The left-leaning British media proved very willing to lend their front pages to a more emotive 
frame. While Turkey and the UK foreign office advanced the project as promoting regional 
peace, NGO and sympathetic environmental journalists like Fred Pearce and George Monbiot 
made it sound plausible that the project in fact would spark a 'water war' between the basin states 
(Guardian, 1999, the Independent, 1999, see also KHRP)124. A water war proved a much more 
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effective discursive 'spin' than cultural, ecological or economic arguments. When the flak became 
too vehement, the Trade and Industry minister, Brian Wilson, sought to reassure worried Liberal 
Democrats in the House of Commons that no final decision had been taken. The affair was 
painful to the Labour government which sought to set itself apart from its Conservative 
predecessor, which some four years before was embarrassed by a big dam project in Malaysia.125 
When questions were raised in the House of Commons, claiming the Ilısu‘s ‗security 
implications‘ could extend far beyond Turkey's borders, and could affect our security interests as 
a member of NATO and Turkey's future in the EU‘126 the Blair government decided to wash its 
hands off the project. Hamilton (2003) argues that the desire not to upset regional power 
balances may well have incited British withdrawal from Ilısu. 
 
 
Project Shelved? 
 Activists no doubt hoped that stricter conditions from project backers would mean the end of 
the project. Turkey however went along with opening up the project to international and local 
scrutiny and environmental accountability. This promoted an already ongoing project redefinition 
process. While GAP started in the late 1970 with the intention of reforming the socio-economic 
situation in the most underdeveloped Turkish region, the project‘s objectives have broadened 
quite a lot in response to recurring criticism. In 1989, the Turkish government commissioned a 
Turkish-Japanese consortium to draw up a GAP Master Plan and established the South-eastern 
Anatolia Project Regional Development Administration (GAP-RDA). Headed by the eloquent 
American-trained engineer Olcay Ünver, many ‗enlightened‘ modifications were made, including 
socio-economic, environmental, educational and participatory facilities. Representative reforms 
included the establishment of Water Users Associations with farmer representation and 
decentralisation of decision-making to mayoral level. GAP administration prides itself on having 
turned around from a ‗hydraulic mission-age‘ blueprint to a leading example of participatory 
Integrated Water Resource Management, what it calls a ‗human centred development project‘. 
Turkey now presents GAP as a socially responsible, integrated water management project  
(Kibaroğlu, 2002). As it were, this evidenced another ‗passive revolution‘127 in response to 
prevailing demands at the global level, echoing emerging norms of ‗good governance‘. In the 
Spring of 2000 GAP, in response to many criticisms, was reviewed again (GAP RDA, 2001) 128. 
The GAP Master Plan was the outcome of a ´participatory planning process´, involving groups in 
such specific fields as  rural development plans, social planning, economic planning, environment 
and infrastructure´ (GAP RDA, 2001: 22). Consequently, the project won a Millennium Award 
from the International Water Research Association. 
 In this light, donor conditions such as a new Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) and an 
Environmental Impact Assessment by Environmental Resources Management (ERM) as part of 
the Project Implementation Plan must have seemed minor irritants. In Turkey, an EIA is only 
mandatory for plans drawn up after 1993, Ilısu escaped this obligation. But after the protests, an 
EIA got to be drafted in 2001 (Ilısu Engineering Group, 2001)129. The RAP was drawn up by 
Turkish consultants SEMOL following World Bank guidelines (Mohravardi, 1999). However 
project and resettlement information is not made available in Kurdish, and communication relied 
on word-of-mouth130. 
 In July 2001, the UK Government‘s Export Credit Guarantee Department made the decision 
whether to provide £160 million backing for the project contingent on ‗public comment‘ on the 
Environmental Impact Assessment report. This proved to be harder to swallow for the Turkish 
dignitaries. Among the submissions was that of a prominent lawyer, Mr Vefa. His submission to 
the ECGD, ‗Legal Review of Ilısu (Hasankeyf) Dam and Evacuated Villages‘, was reportedly 
reprinted in a Turkish law paper and immediately triggered a lawsuit. Under the famous Section 
159 of the Penal Code, Vefa was accused by the Public Prosecutor in March 2002 of ‗overtly 
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insulting the moral integrity of the Government and the military and security forces.‘ (KHRP et 
al., 2002). 
 The EIA did not secure access to credit guarantees for Ilısu, as one foreign partner after the 
other backed out. Skanska had already withdrawn in 2000, while ABB – which was leaving the 
hydroelectricity sector anyway - had ceded its involvement to French company Alstom. Together 
with Balfour Beatty, Impreglio withdrew in 2001 after their export credit backers backed out. In 
2002, the main financial partner, Swiss UBS, decided to pull out too, after which funding for the 
project was as good as dead.131 
 This strong response over the ´water war´ argument is surprising as 2001/2002 was a period of 
thawing Turkey‗s relations with both the Kurds and downstream neighbours. After 1998, the 
mood among the basin riparians had changed perceptibly towards conciliation or peaceful co-
existence. Relations between Syria and Turkey improved dramatically after the extradition of 
PKK leader Öcalan. This heralded what seems to be a more constructive era in which military 
and economic agreements were initiated between Turkey and Syria (MacQuarrie, 2004). In 2001, 
the GAP and the Syrian development project, GOLD, signed a GAP-GOLD agreement 
(Kibaroğlu, 2002). In 2002 the two countries shared a Training and Expertise exercise (Protocol 
of 2002) and embarked on Track-Two water cooperation initiatives initiated by former GAP boss 
Olcay Ünver seems to evidence that Turkey is willing to consult with its downstream neighbours. 
Also the PKK scaled down violent hostilities (until 2003) which raised hopes of lifting the state 
of emergency in the region. 
 The international backers pulling out only compounded Turkish financial worries, as the 
country faced another budget crisis in 2001, which made it difficult to go ahead with the 
envisaged expansion of the GAP programme (al-Nahkla, 200x). Still, the Turkish government 
was not letting go of its dam like that, and found new European partners who also could not turn 
such a large, attractive construction project down. After several years of standstill and studies for 
improvement, the Ilısu Dam project was quietly resurrected in 2005 when a new 14-member 
consortium including German, Swiss and Austrian companies formed.132 Alstom (formerly part 
of ABB) again is involved, while Cengiz, Celikler and Lider Nurol are Turkish partners. 
 
 
 Continued protest 
 So far, reforms have failed to win friends downstream. The restart on the Tigris seems to have 
contributed to a recent rapprochement between Syria and Iraq on the Euphrates: 
 
‗In 2005 Iraqis and Syrians agreed to exert joint efforts to make Turkey fulfil [sic] earlier 
obligations regarding water allocation on the Euphrates, exchange information on hydrology 
and climatic changes. Syria consented to release more water for additional electricity 
production in Iraq (Mirkasymov, 2006) 
 
The World Bank proved a perhaps unexpected ally for the anti-GAP coalition in lifting the 
resettlement issue on the international agenda. The alliance scored two important victories by 
enlisting World Bank experts to write critical report of the resettlement plan. In 2000, Ayşe 
Kudat, a Turkish sociologist who had worked for the World Bank, had written a critical report on 
resettlement (Kudat, 2000). In 2006 the Swiss NGO, Berne Declaration, scored another coup 
when they got the famous World Bank sociologist, Michael Cernea, to write a critical assessment 
of the new Resettlement Action Plan for Ilısu as updated by State Hydraulic Works (DSI) in July 
2006, just before the restart of construction works, and the worrying record of earlier GAP 
resettlement (Cernea, 2006). That same month, at a low point in European-Turkish access 
negotiations, the European Court of Human Rights agreed in July 2006 to hear an application 
against the dam lodged by archaeologists, journalists and lawyers united in the Hasankeyf 
Volunteers Association, who say Hasankeyf must be preserved in its natural state.133 
ILISU, TURKEY 
 
77 
  
 Turkish professionals also voiced criticism134. Local (Goc-Der) and international NGOs are 
keeping a close watch on proceedings, notably the Kurdish Human Rights Association, Friends 
of the Earth and German NGO WEED, which produces a critical weekly Ilısu update 
(www.Ilısu.org.uk). The international campaign against Ilısu has been revived, again concentrating 
on the flooding of Hasankeyf. Apart fom this predictable resistance, Turkey seems to foresee 
Kurdish violence against the dam as well, reportedly stationing 5,000 soldiers at Ilısu for the 
period of the construction works (Firat, February 2007). 
 Two weeks before Turkish and Syrian academics presented the nongovernmental ´Track Two´ 
initiative for closer cooperation at the Stockholm Water Week, construction began in August 
2006 on Ilısu, if protested by 8,000 people including leaders of two political parties. Muharrem 
Dogan of The Motherland Party (ANAVATAN) proposed to lower the height of the dam to 
save part of the flooded area (470 instead of 510 meters). However the Minister for what is now 
the merged department of Culture and Tourism, Atilla Koc, made it clear Hasankeyf would not 
be saved: ‗Hasankeyf is already gone, it's been erased from history‘, while DSI General Director 
Eroglu opined: ‗this dam should have been built 30 years ago‘ (quoted by Shoup, 2006: 245).  
 That same month, a Swiss delegation visited the site to verify Turkey was complying with 
international standards before it would guarantee the US$250mn loan. In Febuary 2007, Turkey 
apparently issued a warning that all contracts would be called off if Germany, Switzerland and 
Austria refused to decide whether to issue export guarantees. But they did not, and the Turkish 
government has taken out a US$1.2 bn loan for the dam.135 Ilısu is now due to be completed in 
2014. 
 
 
3.5 DISCUSSION 
 
3.5.1 BASIN REGIME: NOTHING EVER CHANGES? 
 
I have argued that Turkey‘s water strategy is bound up with its political strategy. Despite the war 
moves, it seems fair to say that the Euphrates tussle has essentially been political manoeuvring. In 
this sense, in spite of the apparent anarchy, a kind of regime, in the sense of patterned, 
predictable state behaviour (Puchala and Hopkins, 1987) can be said to be in place. The public 
posturing and linkage politics around GAP displays a strongly ritualistic pattern of near-wars 
followed by near- or placeholder agreements. For this, Turkey basically keeps pursuing the same 
multi-chessboard strategy at home and in the world, unperturbed by the changed dynamics 
around the 'balance-of-weakness' in the region.  
The Turks are investing great effort into trying to convince others that this state of affairs is 
just, legitimate, even that its actions were clearly in the interests of the downstream actors as well. 
The Tigris is more flood prone than the Euphrates - snowmelt in March can cause torrential 
flooding in April, the harvest month, which necessitated early diking, canalisation and diversion 
works in Iraq136  The Turkish dams regulate the hydrological regime so that they not only cushion 
the impact of floods but also improve the timing of the river regime to coincide with 
downstream agricultural needs. Dams will provide a cushion against droughts and premature 
flooding. Several dams are ‗post-bay‘ dams to even out fluctuations upstream. Better timing 
would lead to more productive downstream farming as well. As Bilen notes (Bilen 1997 q. in P. 
Williams, 2003), massive hydropower, which in itself is not a consumptive use of water, limits 
irrigation and guarantees a downstream flow. This state of affairs creates a stability of 
expectations which can be seen as an international public good, though downstream neighbours do 
not usually like to see it this way. Indeed, as Kibaroğlu shows, throughout the GAP the states 
have worked together rather more than NGO material would lead us to believe. Technical teams 
on the Euphrates-Tigris have met on and off despite recurring political threats of military action, 
a pragmatic acceptance of the faits accomplis on the part of the downstream neighbours. 
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The snag is, of course, that Turkey has frequently denied its neighbours any real say in the 
regulatory decisions. In that sense, Turkey is exercising de facto dominance in a context of de jure 
equality. As a result, Turkish regulatory decisions such as the occasional arrest of the flow to 
impound reservoirs, have been perceived as unilateral and self-serving. Vis-à-vis its neighbours, 
Turkey has to act as a hegemon, that is, a ‗primus inter pares‘. Given the stability of expectations 
Turkey‘s primacy procures for the basin, Turkish hegemony may not be all bad for Syria, but the 
Syrians object to Turkey unilaterally setting the terms, as if the Ottoman Empire still existed. Iraq 
and, especially, Syria have made repeated, almost ritual threats (invariably answered by equally 
virulent language from Turkey) and used downstream strategies to counter Turkey‘s actions. 
Overall, the recent initiatives seem to demonstrate a move towards a ‗positive-sum‘ rather than 
distributive (zero-sum) power play. In this respect I agree to a degree with Ayşegül Kibaroğlu‘s 
analysis, if based on slightly different reasoning. Kibaroğlu (e.g. 1996, 2002) has argued there are 
unmistakable signs of regime formation in the Euphrates/Tigris. However, while there seems to be a 
movement from Realist going-it-alone to forms of co-operation, this new stable equilibrium 
remains within a context of hegemonic power relations. The Syrian government, having 
exhausted the leverage the Kurdish card procured them, has had to resign to Turkish primacy – 
since there is hardly question of equal power relations between the partners. If co-operation 
becomes more structural, as seems to be the case, Syria and Iraq lose their leeway for making 
strong stances. 
 
Securitisation and the state of exceptionalism? 
Turkey has sought to enhance its national security since the 1920s by laying great stress on 
cultural identity and integrity (the unitary state) as well as economic development (self-
actualisation, opportunity-seeking), which in turn provides the government with greater 
legitimacy (political security). In crucial decisions, however, the government takes a backseat to the 
army, which sees itself as a guarantor of the Turkish national interest as a secular, modern state. 
After the 1960 coup d‟Etat, the National Security Council (Milli Gùvenlik Kurulu, MGK) was 
established in 1961, which consist of the President, the Prime Minister, the head of intelligence 
the army Chief of Staffs and commanders of the military branches (Jongerden, 1994) and can 
overrule the government in issues of National Security. Until 2001, the Constitution required 
civilian authorities to prioritise its recommendations (Drorian, 2005: 264). 
 Turkey has NATO´s second largest army, which sees it as its role to safeguard both both 
external and internal security (Drorian, 2005: 262). Ataturk saw the army as the guardian of the 
ideals of the Turkish nation (ibid. 263). 
 
 At home, Turkey pursues a mix of coercive and consent-oriented control strategies – carrots and 
sticks. The hydraulic developmental strategy however has not been successful in co-opting the 
Kurdish Southeast, and the GAP has become associated with domestic war. The GAP 
administration‘s many reforms, including decentralisation and participation, has won it 
international plaudits, but at home the struggle goes on. As an instrument to achieve both 
economic growth and integration of the Kurdish minority, the Greater Anatolia Project is 
legitimised and elevated beyond the realm of debate and backed up with exceptional action  - in 
Buzan et al's (1998) terms, the project has become 'securitised'. The violent struggle with the 
PKK has put Southeast Anatolia under a regime of exceptionalism (the state of emergency). 
Dams have thus been planned and built in this securitised context, and therefore moved the 
decision-making process out of political debate. 
 Turkey investing billions into raising the standard of living seemed to promote control of the 
elusive Kurds. After Öcalan‘s extradition in 1998, relations with the Kurds seemed to herald a 
‗desecuritised‘ era in the basin (Table 3.3 below). Radical reforms of the GAP project suggest a 
shift away from the ‗hydraulic mission, making the project more palatable to funders. But when 
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Kurdish incursions restarted in 2003, a repressive military strategy continued. The Turkish stance 
on the Kurds therefore remains two-pronged. 
 While securitisation excludes all alternatives, politicisation opens up the closure. An alliance of 
convenience saw its chance when Turkey‘s pressing funding problem was partly 'solved' by 
liberalising the water sector, Turkey‘s military must have dreaded ceding a degree of (temporary) 
loss of state autonomy over water resources to international companies (political insecurity). In 
the Ilısu controversy each actor group actor mounted different types of security strategies at 
different levels. An astute international campaign sought to get international backers to pull out 
of the Ilısu dam. For this they used heavy verbal artillery: the dam constituted a human rights 
violation and environmental and cultural disaster. 
   The Ilısu case seems an interesting example of active domain linkage. Having generated little 
resonance with economic or environmental arguments, the opposition to GAP made more 
successful moves into the cultural and military domains. I would argue that in each of these 
domains, moves and countermoves were made looking to dominate it (Table 3.4). Casting GAP 
as a human rights issue was countered when the Turkish initiators, sensing the change in 
international mood, pictured the project as essentially humanitarian and ecologically sound, that is, 
it sought to defeat the opposition in the same security domain. Likewise, while Turkish and 
British governments portrayed Ilısu as a project promoting peace, protesters presented the doom 
scenario of ‗water wars‘. It should be noted that in 2001, the water war argument had surprising 
international resonance despite the dramatically improved relations between Turkey and Syria and 
little evidence of worsening Turkish relations with Iraq. This shifted the debate in Europe into a 
different - military - league, which had just been moving towards a Turkish-initiated ‗peace 
discourse‘ of stability and shared benefits. Whatever the rationale, the move was relatively 
successful, as the backers pulled out under pressure of a threat to their reputation. 
    Thus, security speech acts on all sides can be said to have played an important role in the ritual 
dances around dams. By successfully countering security with other absolutes, each camp could 
overrule the other‘s claim to monopoly on exceptionalism. So, in order to improve the political 
strategy, it seems the different domains have indeed been linked or relinked to domains where a 
more successful outcome was anticipated. 
 
TABLE 3.3 Discursive framing moves and countermoves in different security domains 
Type MILITARY SOCIO-CULTURAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
Turkey‟s move GAP is a peace project Humanitarian project; 
Turkish integration 
Project enhances 
environment in barren 
region 
Opposition 
countermove 
Project precipitates war Human rights offence; 
project is part of 
Kurdish suppression 
Project destroys 
environment; brings 
health hazards 
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TABLE 3.4 Control chronology: Type of strategies at multiple levels; challenges in italics 
Level:              National Basin Regional Global 
Control strategy 
by episode 
Resource control Regime formation Short-term 
setbacks, Long-
term aspiration 
Overcoming 
Challenges and  
Constraints 
until 1998 - Hydraulic mission 
- Suppression of 
secessionism 
- economic 
integration of 
Kurds. 
- Hegemonic 
behaviour: 
Unilateral action; 
near-wars threats 
and near-treaties 
- Syria and Iraq: 
intermittent counter-
alliances 
- Seeking sphere of 
influence in Central 
Asia 
- Seeking EU 
membership 
- Water offers 
 
 
- GAP reforms 
responding to 
global IWM 
- Cash crisis: 1994: 
privatisation to 
obtain funding 
1998-2003 - Reforms: 
integrated 
development plan 
- Ceasefire with 
Kurds 
Some technical 
cooperation with 
Syria (regime 
formation) 
- Strategic alliance 
with Israel 
- Heavy 
concessions to 
obtain EU 
membership 
- NGO counter-
campaign against 
Birecik and Ilısu; 
World Commission 
on Dams 
2003-2006 - Ilısu temporarily 
shelved 
Some co-
operation with 
Syria and peaceful 
coexistence with 
Iraq 
- Hardening 
stance towards 
EU 
-  Co-operation 
with Israel falls 
through 
 
 
 
 
3.5.2 MULTI-LEVEL GAMES AND FRAMES 
 
Turkey continues to pursue its water objectives at a considerable price. Internationally, the 
controversy over the GAP has proved bad international public relations (reputation), not 
improving its chances of EU membership, and landed Turkey on the brink of war with Syria on 
several occasions. Also, the project has deprived Turkey of international funding; burdening a 
stressed economy with spiralling project costs. Political actors in all basin states operate within 
the limits of the possible in the power-political arena, and that power horizon still favours 
Turkish leadership. Turkey‘s international acts seem to be aimed at maintaining its role of a 
regional superpower, straddling Europe, the Middle East and Turkic Central Asia, for which it 
competes with Iran, Russia and, more recently, China. Rather than using an aggressive expansion 
strategy, Turkey bides its time and seeks to extends its spheres of influence (Realpolitik), in the 
strong belief that this will benefit all concerned – benefiting the public good. Alliances with Israel 
and the U.S. underpin its regional power position. 
 Playing simultaneous games on multiple chessboards is a slow process with many repeated 
offensive and defensive (often merely symbolic) moves. While the Turkish state seems to be 
enjoying a less strained position at home and regionally since 1998. These ´rituals´ have only 
promoted what American geographers John Kolars and William Mitchell (1991) have termed a 
pax aquarum, a hydraulic ‗imperial‘ configuration under the aegis of Turkey, which would 
underline Daoudy‘s argument that Turkey is currently the hegemonic power (2005). While basin 
relations are now quiet under the American aegis, the last lap of GAP is still not safe from NGO 
attack, now under the umbrella of Save Hasankeyf. Turksh gains in co-opting Syria and regime 
change in Iraq have made international NGO opposition to Ilısu in 2006 less likely to succeed 
than in 1999-2001, and the ‗water war‘ discourse groundless. 
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It is unclear what Iraqis will do in the current anarchic situation, but being caught up in civil 
war while its external relations are under the ‗protection‘ of allied forces provides a safe 
expectation that Iraq will be too self-absorbed to grumble very much over dams in the coming 
years. American dominance in the Middle East is expressed in extensive economic and military 
aid to Israel, Turkey and Egypt. As Coskun (2005) notes, the US enlisting Syria and Turkey in the 
first war on Iraq quashed any hopes of a cooperative basin regime, and now establishing a de facto 
protectorate over Iraq. The Americans can thus operate in the region as a patron and/or 
policeman, but cannot be credited with regime promotion (Coskun, 2005)137.  
While Zawahri (forthcoming) has good reason to doubt whether you can speak of ‗co-
operation‘ when no actor adjusts their behaviour for mutual benefit, the three countries have 
maintained an enduring minimal regime at basin scale, in a sense of stable expectations with 
primacy on the part of Turkey. Turkey‘s ‗peace abroad‘ has been what Wolf (1998) has called 
‗unstable peace‘ built on a degree of brinksmanship, but things get solved by high-level 
negotiation rather than violence. Since 1998 there has been a move towards more basin 
cooperation.  
Despite the water-based regional development strategy and repression, ‗peace at home‘ has not 
arrived in the Southeast, but while the PKK continues its campaigns, the GAP can be expected 
to continue to be realised within a highly securitised context 
 
This chapter has pictured the power play over the management of the Euphrates-Tigris 
constellation as a layer cake of struggles at different levels (over global, regional, river basin, state 
rule) which impinge on each other. The implication of such an analysis would be that while 
hydraulic conflicts notably play out at the domestic and basin levels, they are also subject to the 
dynamics of global political economy and geopolitics. The layers in the cake are permeable, they 
interact with each other. As illustrated by the Ilısu case, this interplay offered a niche in a 
securitised environment to politicise an issue. This reconciles different security narratives, a point 
I will develop further in Chapter 4. 
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Chapter 4: Turkey and Egypt – war, peace and 
hegemony 
 
 
 
4.1 WRITING WATER SECURITY: THREE COMPELLING STORIES  
 
After the end of the Cold War, the international water policy community came to be dominated 
by discourse of crisis and water war. It was felt the basins of the Middle East were almost certain 
to be the theatre of bloodshed over ever scarcer water resources. New river management projects 
in Egypt and Turkey, designed to control and divert the flow for development, elicited loud 
protests and threats from co-riparians into the late 1990s. At present a furore over climate change 
has rekindled fears of violent water conflict138. However, while no magic sources of additional 
water have been discovered, the crisis and conflict discourse has lost its omnipresence in water 
literature. Despite the protests from neighbours, the planned mega-projects on the Nile and the 
Tigris are now under way while a discourse of co-operation and shared benefits and adoption is 
now universally practiced. What happened here? 
The discussion on ‗water wars‘ at times reminds me of an old joke. An Englishman is 
introduced to a Scotsman and asks what he does for a living. The Scotsman replies: ‗I am a lion 
hunter‘. Says the Englishman: But surely there are no lions in Scotland? The Scotsman answers 
with a smile: ‗Not anymore‘. 
Have water wars been successfully been prevented by a ‗Scottish lion hunter‘, have the lions 
gone away, or has the world been redefined such that water wars do not make sense anymore?  
 
Security, like conflict, only acquires meaning in a social context: only when people successfully 
present the image of a security issue, and others believe it, it becomes a reality. As I delved into 
the discourse of water and security around the Turkish GAP and Egyptian New Valley project, I 
realised that the felicity of the concept of ‗security‘ does not only have an immediate policy 
audience (policy makers, electorate, funders) but also a wider regime context, a global discursive 
community. Egypt and Turkey are embedded in a larger international constellation they can seek 
to influence, but cannot easily ignore. To gather support for a security strategy, their concerns 
have to resonate with the international discourse, the grand narratives139 in the policy and 
academic world in which the actors are situated. Three water meta-narratives give quite different 
understandings of what has been going on in Egypt and Turkey over the past 20 years. The three 
frequently encountered narratives can be labelled  ‗water wars‘, ‗water peace‘ and ‗(against) water 
hegemony‘. I found each of these to have considerable resonance in water discourses. 
The selection of narratives is based on Trottier (2003), Stucki (2005) and Brouma (2003) whose 
typologies, while coming from different analytical perspectives, are remarkably similar. Like a 
prism, each of these stories throws a different light on water politics, presenting a different 
understanding of what has been going on in Egypt and Turkey over the past 25 years. The 
differences are exaggerated for analytical purposes140 and organised around key authors: 
 
-   4.2  Water wars: Starr, Kaplan 
-   4.3  Water peace: Wolf, Turton and Ohlsson 
-   4.4  Water hegemony: Shiva, Petrella. 
 
These three narratives lumps together authors and traditions that might find themselves bien 
étonnés de se trouver ensemble. Nevertheless the three composite narratives can be seen as 
recognisable frames of reference within the water debate. yielding quite different understandings 
of and evaluations of security (governance) and security regimes for river management, but can 
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be seen as three sides of the same story. The Annex will apply the three narratives to regime 
formation on the Nile and Tigris. The three meta-narratives will subsequently be applied to flood 
risk management in Chapter 9. 
 
 
4.2 WATER WARS 
 
4.2.1 CLOSING BASINS 
 
In the water wars discourse, water is in crisis, and it is not good news. The image of the world is 
like Titanic: it is sinking while the band merrily plays on. A recurring water crisis (Postel, 1992, 
Gleick, 1993, 202; World Water Council, n.d.141) discourse still bears a strong Malthusian imprint. 
The conflict in Darfur, Sudan, for example, is currently presented by some as a resource war.142 
Malthusians see a linear expansion and degradation process: population growth will inevitably 
exceed the growth in agricultural production and water availability. This world view have 
occupied a strong position in the environmental policy debate ever since the Limits to Growth 
report published by the Club of Rome in 1972, which contained gloomy predictions that our 
resource base would be running out soon, possibly by the year 2000. The report gained 
prominence with the Organisation of Oil Exporting Countries‘ (OPEC) oil price hike in 1973, an 
oil squeeze which led to anxiety about a coming global (induced) fossil fuel scarcity. 
Malthusian literature on ‗closing basins‘ likewise supported the image of imminent resource 
war due to competition for scarce resources, popular in the 1990s. The discourse of fear in the 
water sector raised the spectre of dried out or dead rivers, when the river doesn‘t reach the sea or 
lake anymore, the over-abstraction of groundwater and such pollution overloads that rivers are 
declared biologically dead – all invoking the spectre of inexorable crisis (Molle et al., 2007) for 
which Malin Falkenmark´s ´water stress´ limit (against her intention, Falkenmark, pers. comm., 
1995) became an indicator. 
How has this crisis come about? According to Molle (2006) it is because water can never meet 
their ever-expanding development needs. The Tennessee Valley model of the 1920s, a 
multipurpose dam project generating growth and jobs in an impoverished region, became a 
model for regional development. In the 1960s the export of integrated water development 
projects in the mould of the Tennessee Valley Authority also became a geopolitical weapon in the 
Cold War as an alternative to military might (Schlesinger, 1967). The US and USSR both 
exported this model to their client states in Asia (the Jordan, Mekong and Helmand valleys). In 
Africa the bipolar arena, dominated by rivalling treaty organisations for mutual solidarity (NATO 
and Warszaw Pact) likewise enabled Egypt and, less successfully, Ethiopia to play off the United 
States and the Soviet Union against each other to get funding for their dams, enabling them to be 
freed from destructive floods as well as droughts. However, the river inevitably reached the limits 
to exploitation, development states were faced with the prospect of basin closure. 
While ‗basin closure‘ can be an autonomous process of (over)exploitation, due to population 
pressure leading to resource competition, Peter Gleick‘s Water in Crisis (1993 [1998]) identified 
resource capture as one of the drivers of scarcity-induced crisis, next to mismanagement and 
population pressure. Resource capture takes the form of river enclosure by way of dams and 
diversion channels.  
The fear or actuality of upstream capture leads to what is known in security studies as a defense 
dilemma143. As Paul Williams (2003) explains, upstream enclosure in river basins144 brings a 
´security dilemma´: water capture for upstream development, considered a peaceful goal in itself, 
is seen as a hostile act by downstreamers. While upstreamers in such basins will claim their river 
regulation efforts also benefit the downstreamers, the latter will (rightly or wrongly) attribute a 
failed harvest or unexpected flood to upstream water mismanagement. Feeling their customary 
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influx is being stolen, these others may take preventive action to forestall further capture and 
loss, and counter future hydraulic leverage (P. Williams, 2003: 5). 
 
Fear of scarcity induced by upstream water capture but also fear of intentional flooding can 
trigger threat-defence sequences. This feature is especially salient in transboundary river basins. 
Often resulting from colonial decisions to draw boundaries with little regard for hydrology, rivers 
have become transboundary. The hydrological interdependence between surface waters, ground 
water, not to mention climate, is at cross-purposes with territorial sovereignty issues which are 
only reinforced by interventions in the water cycle to regulate the river. 
After the Cold War ended, however, the attention of the security sector turned to civil wars. 
Security studies experts noticed that the number of international wars had dropped significantly 
while domestic conflicts were on the rise (De Wilde and Wiberg, 1995). Competition for 
resources might be a focus or trigger for non-water conflict, leading to civil war and instability. 
Ethnic conflict in turn could become a pawn in conflicting international relations. In this 
reasoning, resource scarcity can indeed induce the dog-eat-dog world described in Thomas 
Hobbes‘ Leviathan as the ‗State of Nature‘, a condition of permanent insecurity, ruled by force, 
guile and deception, and where conflict to the death is the norm. 
While fear of hunger and thirst incited a global drive for water development, fear of chaos 
(anarchy) incited a parallel call for hegemonic intervention from the global hegemon, the US.  
This was a departure from conventional Realist thinking, which subjects resource politics to 
national security which is concerned with territorial integrity and political control. In Thomas 
Hobbes´ reasoning individuals prevent physical insecurity by entering into a collective ´contract´ 
with the state in which they hand over their individual autonomy, means of violence and, as 
Turton et al. (2001) note, their water resources, to the state. The fear of the coercive power vested 
in the state then prevents violence between citizens. The Hobbesian deal frees citizens from fear 
of each other, as they agree to live in fear of the state instead (Rubin, 2004).  
For Hobbes, fear of the hegemon is a disciplining agent that enables self-fulfilment, taming 
distractive and destructive impulses (Rubin, 2004: 41). Fear of the state is not the antithesis of 
civilisation, it is its ´fulfilment (Rubin 2004: 32). The flipside of this is that if the state is to pacify 
rather than antagonise its subjects, it has to make sure that life in fear of the state is better than 
life in the state of nature.  
In the Hobbesian state, everything is subservient to State unity and stability as the state is the 
‗soul‘ of the body politic. Given its ‗civilising mission‘, the state takes the lead in development. 
Politics and the politicisation of the state are in this view seen as corrupting the rationality of the 
state – not only by statesmen but also, as Hansen and Stepputat (2001) note, by many citizens. 
Politics breaks, fragments the unity in the pursuit of a better life promised by development. The 
state is seen as ´above politics´ - and seemingly above the laws of nature. 
But in order to survive, and protect its subjects from anarchy in the process, the state has a 
blank check to do whatever it chooses – including going to war. The state itself permanently 
needs to survive in the ‗state of nature‘ in the international arena. At the international level, there 
is no central power to protect and arbitrate, so the competition over resources between people 
can become superseded by the competition scramble for resources between states. The global 
‗state of nature‘ consists of other states which can destroy the state. The school of Realism in 
International Relations has a narrative of perpetual motion - the world has always been and will 
be a bad place, hegemonic great powers or alliances will rise and fall, providing temporary 
stability in an unstable world. 
The players in this international arena are unitary, sovereign states. In the Hobbesian world-
view, NGOs and multi-national companies (MNCs) do not really exist and states speak with one 
voice. While a considerable body of international water law has developed, it has so far proved 
powerless to settle disputes. Only one dispute (Hungary vs. Slovenia) was taken to the 
International Court of Justice in The Hague for arbitration. To bring order in the face of anarchy, 
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a hegemonic Great Power imposes his will upon other states, whether by sticks or carrots 
(pressure and side payments). Fear of the powerful hegemon disciplines other states, until a 
contender is strong enough to take on the ´global policeman´ (Rubin, 2004).  
Miriam Lowi‘s Water and Power (1993), rooted in the classical Realpolitik perspective reassuringly 
argued that water is ´low politics‘, and therefore by definition extremely unlikely to spark a war, 
being so subservient to greater goals of domestic development. But her ‗voice of reason‘ was 
soon drowned out by a number of semi-academic books, articles in policy journals like Foreign 
Affairs and in the popular press, all entitled - with singular lack of imagination - ‗Water wars‘ 
(Starr and Stoll, 1988, Bulloch and Darwish, 1993, De Villiers, 1999 are only a few examples). 
This reasoning interprets environmental resources as a national security issue, as high politics: a 
matter for the military and diplomatic service, and a possible casus belli. Gleick (1993, 2002) noted 
that downstreamers were more likely to be embroiled in international water conflict, especially if 
they are stronger than upstreamers. For upstreamers; water infrastructure has been used as 
weapons as well as targets, a means as well as a goal in an international security strategy in ancient 
China and Mesopotamia as well as present-day North Korea (Gleick, 1993). 
 
Such publications resonated with a fear of environmental conflict., the latest in a growing list 
of ´new security concerns´. Starting with Keohane and Nye (1979), a liberal tradition in security 
studies foregrounded that issues in non-military domains could become high politics. Non- and 
semi-academic books incited the US government to prepare for economic (Ezra Vogel‘s ‗Japan as 
Nr. 1‘), cultural (Samuel Huntington‘s Clash of Civilizations) and environmental clashes (several 
works on ´greenwars´).  
Notably the journalist/historian Robert Kaplan provided the unlikely trait d‟union between 
environmental and security worries. Touching a raw nerve by invoking the spectre of a ‗coming 
anarchy‘, Kaplan warned not only of lawless ‗failed‘ states in Africa and US inner cities, but also 
of international resource conflict. This called for intervention in the international arena to restore 
order and prevent environmental conflict. In the process, the Malthusian threat became linked 
with a Hobbesian narrative: to prevent resource war, a strong intervening power is needed. 
Without the disciplinary action of global and regional hegemons, the global stress on resources 
was believed to become limiting and competition over water, violent. While fear of hunger and 
thirst incited a global drive for water development, fear of chaos (anarchy) incited a parallel call 
for hegemonic intervention from the global hegemon, the US. New security threats gave the 
security establishment a new mission145 to bring order and stability (Bush sr.‘s ‗new world order‘). 
Subsequent U.S. governments heeded the call to support regional hegemons and facilitate co-
ordinated development (Starr, 1991) and under Bill Clinton and Al Gore, environmental security 
became a US a strategic priority. 
 
 
4.2.2 TURKEY AND EGYPT AS HOBBESIAN STATES 
 
This book started with two states embroiled in basin politics that seem pervaded by Hobbesian 
security logic. In all water wars literature, the Euphrates/Tigris and Nile along with the Jordan are 
considered most likely to lead to such ‗water wars‘. Turkey‘s GAP project, enclosing Euphrates 
and Tigris water for irrigation and hydro-electricity generation is seen by downstream states as 
resource capture. For example, Berman and Wihbey (1999) noted, ―Despite the signing of a 
protocol ensuring Syrian access to Euphrates water in 1987, Turkish development efforts have 
increasingly threatened to marginalize and even eliminate Syrian access to water‖ (my emphasis, 
JW). Much bandied about in water wars literature about are percentage in the area of 40% of 
Syria‘s and 80% of Iraq‘s water would be captured by Turkey‘s dams. For Syrian and Iraqi rulers, 
not only the potential for resource capture but also that of resource release (induced flooding) 
triggered concerted resistance to new upstream dams. 
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The Euphrates and Tigris are water-stressed especially at the downstream end. In 1975 Iraq 
almost came to blows with Syria over Syria´s Ath-Thawrah Dam claiming adverse impact on 3 
million Iraqi farmers. The Turkish ‗hydraulic mission‘ from the downstream perspective likewise 
induced downstream ‗stress‘ for fear of resource capture, so that each new dam is forcefully 
protested and its builders threatened. Turkey, as an upstream state where rain and snowmelt are 
in ample supply, has few water concerns. Turkey‘s GAP project similarly (in theory) has the 
capacity to detain the Euphrates for 6 months, and is starting to develop storage capacity on the 
Tigris with Ilısu. From a defence dilemma logic, downstreamers will equate hydraulic intervention 
with aggressive resource capture depriving downstreamers of their entitlement to customary 
supply and putting the external cost of resource degradation with the downstreamer. Daoudy 
(2005) argues that Turkey has already used water as a strategic instrument of foreign policy 
initiative, while the Kurdish issue is widely believed to have been used by Syria until 1998 as a 
bargaining chip to force concessions over GAP. According to Starr (1991) Syria even threatened 
to bomb the Atatürk Dam, a move echoed by Egypt‘s threats to obliterate any Ethiopian or East 
African dam structure. It is this defence dilemma that inspired my one-liner ‗upstreamers use 
water to get power, downstreamers use power to get water‘ (Warner, 1992, 2004).  
 
This is most obviously the case on the Nile. It rarely rains in the last 3000 kilometres of the 
river (of which Egypt occupies 1100) and groundwater sources are largely non-renewable. 
Egypt‘s lack of water alternatives made it possible and imperative to exert great control of its 
water resources inside the territory, fully closing the Nile at Aswan and stored any excess 
floodwater in Lake Nasser. 
But its dependency on the Nile fanned a fear of being controlled by an upstream rival. Mindful 
of historic (14th century) Ethiopian threats to divert the Nile, Egypt‘s official policy reveals a 
seemingly paranoid fear of upstream capture. It sought to make sure this could never happen 
thanks to constraining treaties signed by Britain as a colonial state that assured upstreamers could 
not ‗arrest‘  the flow of the Nile. It is no accident that Egypt has the strongest army in the basin 
and, due to the Suez Canal, an internationally strategic protection securing it a structural 
advantage. Upstream threats to rescind colonial treaties, notably the Nyerere doctrine, have led 
Egypt‘s President Sadat to make violent threats, especially directed at Ethiopia, and Ethiopia‘s 
President Mengistu to threaten retaliation if its share was touched. Egypt‘s strategy has consisted 
of preventative threats to forestall upstream leverage against rising challengers and block 
upstream capture and faits accomplis, notably vis-à-vis Ethiopia. In the 1990s this verbal pattern led 
to new threats of appropriation and violence. The announcement of the Toshka project in 1997 
elicited hostility from Ethiopian leaders, which made co-operation conditional on opening up the 
full use of the Nile treaty of 1959, to which Ethiopia was not party. Such a revision had always 
been a non-negotiable position for Egyptian leaders and ministers, who at least until 2004 
(Kagwanja 2007) have made public statements to the effect that they were prepared to go to war 
over their share of water. 
Paul Williams (2003) notes the resource conflict potential is greater if states already have 
historical differences – Turkey‘s lingering claim on Kirkuk and Mosul in North Iraq, Syria‘s claim 
on Hatay, Egypt‘s claim on Halaib Triangle, all play in the background while water is the focus. 
While Turkey would seem the obviously stronger power on the Tigris, Turkish politicians have 
likewise expressed fear that Iraq on the Tigris would be a serious contender (Aydın, 2003). As a 
result, relations remain strained, with the possibility of threats of war always round the corner. 
Not only are the Egyptian and Turkish water projects set in ‗dry‘ rivers, then, they also find 
themselves a highly securitised environment (‗security states‘) both at the domestic and basin 
level: strong security states in ‗securitised‘ basins. In security states, organised to handle threats, 
every aspect of socio-cultural life and environmental resources can be subject to security policy – 
the line between what is public and what is private becomes very thin (e.g. Miniotaite, 2000, 
Drorian, 2005). Seen from this angle, Egypt and Turkey are garrison states. On the Nile, Egypt, 
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Sudan and Ethiopia are all engaged in (civil) war or a state of emergency inspired by fear of 
terrorist violence. In 1985, Sudan‘s Jonglei project had to be abandoned when it had become a 
symbolic focus of the Sudanese civil war.  
On the domestic front, Turkey faces challenges from unruly basin and regional neighbours as 
well as its Kurdish minority as water conflict came to be entangled with non-water security 
concerns. Like the US Corps of Engineers in the United States, the Turkish Devlet Su Isler (DSI) 
are army engineers building civil development works, seek to improving not just nature, but of 
people (social engineering). The GAP, especially since its 1989 reformulation, has become a 
strategy to lift the region from its abject backwardness, a re-civilisation of what once was the 
cradle of civilisation, the Fertile Crescent. Southeast Anatolia became the site of a PKK uprising 
in 1984, which put the Atatürk dam works on its target list. 
With ´water wars´ reasoning in mind, the Clinton Government made environmental security a 
key issue area of its defence strategy, establishing ‗environmental hubs‘ in, among other locations, 
Addis Ababa in 1997 (Dockser Marcus, 1997), while supporting the creation of a basin regime 
leading up to the World Bank‘s Nile Basin Initiative. From a Realist perspective, the presence of 
clearly hegemonic states in those basins, Turkey and Egypt (See Table 4.1), seemed a necessary 
condition for the formation of international co-operation (Lindemann, 2005). Together with 
Israel, Turkey and Egypt, the regional basin hegemons (Table 4.1) also formed the top-three 
recipients of American aid until the intervention in Iraq in 2003. 
 
TABLE 4.1 Basin hegemons in the Middle East and their riparian position (Warner 1992). 
River Hegemonic Country Riparians Hydrostrategic position 
Euphrates Turkey 3 Upstream 
Nile Egypt 10 Downstream 
Jordan Israel 4 Mid-stream 
 
´Water wars´ narratives are thus driven by, a ´hydraulic mission´, unbridled water-based 
development leading to a scramble for resources. Following the Realist school of International 
Relations, American governments in the 1990s strengthened basin hegemonsmade it clear 
 and promoted conflict management and co-operative efforts. This international support 
strengthened Turkey and Egypt at home and abroad. However when a fear of ´water wars´ did 
make the front page in the UK press over the Turkish Ilısu dam in 1999, the international 
community responded not by strengthening Turkey, but by pulling out of the project. Perhaps, a 
different reasoning was at work. The next section delves into a different explanatory narrative: 
‗water peace‘. 
 
 
4.3 WATER PEACE 
 
4.3.1 A CHANGE OF PHILOSOPHY  
 
While water wars discourse dominated the first half of the 1990s, a counter-current of more 
optimistic publications sought to demythologise them. Aaron T. Wolf (1995) at Oregon State 
University demonstrated with overwhelming evidence that water wars are very rare while the 
number of international water treaties explodes. Transboundary rivers, it could be reasoned, 
naturally foster the need for co-ordination, and co-operation between the riparians. In most cases 
where water was a factor in hostilities, such as the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, suggests that the issue 
was really about something else. Rather than the imminence of war, their absence became a focus 
of attention, as water interdependence came to be presented as a driving force for co-operation 
and regime formation, ecological modernisation, multi-stakeholder participation and adaptation.  
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The question exercising water policy analysts´ minds now changed from ‗How do we prevent 
water wars?‘ to ‗What explains co-operation between states? Is there an intermediary variable that 
disrupts the causal relation between scarcity and violence?´ 
A first candidate was ´human ingenuity´, a concept very similar to adaptive capacity. In 
Canada, Homer Dixon and his Toronto colleagues first predicted water wars and researching 
drivers for violent resource conflict and warning about resource war (Homer-Dixon, 1994, 1995), 
but ended the 1990s concluding that crisis releases ingenuity to overcome these limitations 
(Homer Dixon, 1998). Human ingenuity became the core element on which Tony Turton and 
Leif Ohlsson built their argument for water resource reconstruction. Turton and Ohlsson‘s 
‗Turning of the Screw‘ (1999)146 is emblematic of the narrative of ‗water peace‘, as one of several 
accounts (policy narratives) of adaptation to stress (Molle, 2003). It is a narrative of victorious 
adaptation to stress. Crisis is threat and opportunity – an impending crisis (impending closure) 
provides the urgency for a change coalition: As the ‗screw‘ of resource stress tightens, new ways 
out are discovered, opening windows of opportunity that are otherwise not feasible. The 
surprises and adaptation process can be salutary or catastrophic – or both. However, in the water 
peace narrative, the narrators are optimistic. The ‗good crisis‘ in the Cornucopian narratives 
triggers a process of reflection learning and change. It triggers systems to become more resilient, 
flexible and sustainable. 
In his discussion of the ‗Screw‘ and like narratives, Molle et al. (2003) identify three categories 
of adaptation to resource stress: supply augmentation, conservation, and redistribution (demand 
management). The crisis impels augmentation (from external sources) and first conservation. But 
as basins close, it becomes progressively more challenging to add to available water supplies. This 
requires reallocation, both between food crops and outside the agricultural sector. Molle‘s list 
does not exclude less ´ingenious´ trajectories, such as what I would call ´running on empty´- 
ignoring the stress, getting on with one‘s life and pretending there is no problem, and see how 
others deal with it. This would mean further resource mining and degradation, or lowering one‘s 
development expectations. However, in Egypt, in practice - though officially unmentionable -  
the most serious adaptation process to augment the inflow of (embedded) water has been not to 
find new physical sources by drilling holes, but to increase import of food.  
 
By the time Ohlsson and Turton presented their perspective in 1999, many sands had started 
to shift. Post-Cold War globalisation processes appear to have strengthened the sense of 
interdependence and erosion of the state. I will briefly attempt to list the most striking trends on 
the basis of the water literature from the past decade. 
 
1. An increasingly influential international narrative, the ´crisis of modernity´, unearthed the 
´dark side´ of modernisation in the form of disasters and ecological degradation, leading to an 
ecological turn (Brouma, 2003). In the 1990s, events like the BSE crisis and the fallout from 
Chernobyl‘s nuclear power station inspired Beck in Germany, Giddens in Britain and Gilbert in 
France to argue that technology led to uncontrollable risks (risk society). These events, the 
narrative goes, led to a reflexive turn: science and technology lost their untouchability, their claim 
to solve the problems. Greatly increased environmental consciousness turned the attention from 
´certainty´ into ´uncertainty´, opening up the modernist frame.147 In the water world, the late 
1990s saw a multi-stakeholder tripartite process of public, private and civil-society activists 
culminating in the tripartite World Commission on Dams of 2000 (Conca, 2006).148 This brought 
social and environmental costs of dams to the fore, and signalled a mood away from large 
structures. The hydraulic mission had produced many monolithical and not rarely militarised 
dams. Fish and sediment passes were forgotten or inadequate. While the hydraulic mission 
perfected the drainage of wetlands, the ecological ‗crisis‘ brought a different view of river 
management in the West. Wetlands and floods came to be seen as positive values, not just 
destructive and unruly. In response to ecological modernisation, Integrated Water Resource 
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Management needed to include the non-production functions of water, considering 
environmental flows, fish migration, sediment transport, and dilution as equally important. This 
redefinition opened up a wider technological and managerial range of options (alternatives). 
 
2. While many liberal-pluralists stay committed to the idea of the rational, utility-maximising 
individualist actor, for others the preference for diversity, exchange and choice reflects a 
powerful epistemological idea: Human ingenuity can also be expressed as a cognitive, conceptual 
shift. If you perceive a problem differently, new solutions come into view. Representations 
should not be taken for granted as 'reflections of reality'; if we take them apart we can consider 
whose realities they represent.149  This means there are no unequivocal answers - there is always 
an alternative. 
When discussing ‗water wars‘, it was noted that liberal constructivists in security studies took 
on board the notion that non-traditional sources of conflict could lead to ‗new wars‘. In states‘ 
voracity for hydraulic development, they mount technological interventions that lead to 
downstream preventative action and possible escalation. But Williams (2003) notes resource 
capture carries a lot of negatives for the upstreamer, not only because of its uneconomic cost-
benefit ratio due to economic, political (of confrontation) and social cost (of resettlement). It is 
also infrastructurally burdensome: the developing hydraulic economy needs large in-house 
capacity to divert stored water to prevent dam break and flooding and secure the installations 
against military attack. It is not coincidental that dams and large infrastructural projects came 
under fire in the 1990s. Dam infrastructure therefore can only really be justified on security 
grounds – development, food security in the sense of food self-sufficiency. However a defence 
dilemma also increases security interdependence - the security of one state cannot be easily separated 
from security of another. Linkage politics increases interaction between the conflicting sides, 
which can trigger a process of reflection and coordination, a realisation that neither side can fulfil 
individual security requirements at acceptable cost. Such reflexivity can bring new knowledge and 
insight that breaks the impasse in basin politics, promotes more communication and exchange, 
which in turn de-securitises relations. 
Basin closure likewise can be exposed as a construct. To overcome the Malthusian resource 
crisis, you do not need to make more water - the problem can also be reframed. A reflexive mind 
would say that scarcity is a human-induced process due to overdevelopment, such that it that 
outstrips resource and system resilience, it can also be addressed by human action. Up to 90% of 
water is spent on food production. A ´closed basin´ is not necessarily physically overexploited: if 
you delink food security from food self-sufficiency, there are ´leaks´ in the water balance. In that 
case there does not have to be a closure process. Allan (1998) debunked the scarcity myth by 
showing international agricultural trade to be a powerful water redistribution mechanism. Food 
can be imported, so that the water saved can be used for more remunerative endeavours in other 
sectors. The water budget, the heart of any basin plan (Molden, 1997) normally does not involve 
virtual water. The inclusion of ‗virtual‘ water changes the hydrological balance, as well as the 
scope for controlling what goes in and what goes out. 
 
3. This mind shift also made it possible to question the ‗naturalness‘ of national water self-
sufficiency.  
What Bakker et al. (2006) have called an international ‗green market paradigm‘ manifests 
different priorities. While modernism ‗demystified‘ water as a spirit, the rationality of modernist  
national development can also be ‗demystified‘. Water had previously been considered a purely 
local good, costly and capital-intensive to transport over large distances, so that the state was the 
obvious prime actor to ensure universal access and economic development. State-run water 
however led to management as if water has no scarcity value, promoting economically and 
environmentally unsustainable use in inefficient and polluting industries and intensive agriculture. 
Its welfare role providing welfare services had made the state ‗hypertrophic‘, in need of slimming 
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(Bakker et al. 2006: 35). Treating water as an economic good, including pricing, cost recovery and 
protection of property rights, and taking it out of the hands of the state, would counteract these 
inefficiencies (Bakker et al. 2006). If water is just a production factor among others, agriculture 
does not have to be sacralised. Food can come from elsewhere, thanks to competitive advantage 
in open global markets.  
 
4. The liberal focus on global interdependencies demoted the state from a driver to an 
adaptor in an integrating regional and global political economy (Turton, 1999). Rather than 
celebrate the market, policy analysts perceived a trend towards networked governance Kickert 
1998, Goverde 2000) in which each sector works according to its strengths. They may point out 
that while Realist theories normally portray the role of the state as eternal, there were other forms 
of governance before the Westphalian state system emerged in 1648, and globalization may have 
brought the return of the governance patchwork.150 In this web, the state is as an actor among 
others. It may not speak with one voice; its various departments may strike up alliances with or 
against each other together with non-state actors or foreign counterparts (Dougherty & 
Pfaltzgraff 1997).  
In the early 1990s, a ´hollowing out´ of the state was perceived by some and predicted by 
others (Kooiman 1993), and decentralisation and privatisation of services was the order of the 
day. The ‗Hobbesian‘ fear of state of nature came to be replaced by a ‗Lockeian‘ fear of state 
despotism (Rubin 2004), after John Locke‘s political philosophy. 
The belated discovery of civil society promoted notions of participation, accountability and 
‗good governance‘. Overwhelmed in carrying out its public functions, a ´crisis of governability´ 
confronts the state with inevitable failure, the state loses its aura of omnipotence. Therefore, 
other levels (local authorities) and sectors (private sector, civil society) need to be mobilised to 
help the state out and co-ordinate between themselves to provide services.  
The changing governance of security and risk can be seen in the context of an overall 
perceived shift in governance, often portrayed as a sharp shift form unilateral ‗steering‘ to co-
operative adaptation to complexity by a redistribution of responsibility, labelled new (reinvented) 
forms of ´governance´. 
For a Lockeian, the prime mover in releasing and harnessing this creativity however is not the 
state, but civil society: the key social relation is horizontal, not vertical. Not force but exchange is 
the key relation, in trade and deliberation. Ever-lengthening chains of interdependence between 
actors will make war an ever less attractive and economic prospect and foster co-operation and 
peaceful competition rather than violent conflict. The more the global arena becomes a web-like 
network of relations, the more one has to lose from destroying those links. The Hobbesian logic 
of war invites isolation and independence; by contrast, Lockeian liberalism stress freedom, 
diversity, tolerance and interdependence (Rubin, 2004: 53). 
This notion has taken hold in the water world which was going through a process of 
liberalisation and privatization in the 1990s - later than other sectors, as water was customarily 
seen as a public service. Narratives of integrated water management, which sketch an evolution 
from sectoralism to holism, are also accounts of increasing complexity reflecting a perceived 
inevitability of a shift from hard, technocratic management and state dominance to one of soft, 
interactive, participatory, economic governance. 
The complexity, diversity and dynamics of the modern-day world make it impossible to 
attempt policy problems by unilateral, linear steering and control. As Molle (2003) notes, Ohlsson 
and Turton´s ´screw´ narrative (1998) sees complexity as basically problematic and portrays 
simple hydraulic development (augmentation) as the most pain-free option. But adaptation to 
stress can not only be realised by reducing the challenge but also by increasing governing 
capacities (Green and Warner, 1999).  
From a systems perspective, securitisation is a protective response to overwhelming 
complexity by simplifying the information about the environment (Albert 1998). As Ashby‘s Law 
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of Requisite Variety (Ashby, 1957) holds, coping with complexity means the complexity of the 
governing system should echo that of the system to be governed. Rather than steer, governments 
should be flexible enough to adapt to stress (Kooiman and Warner, 1998, Warner and Turton, 
2000, 2001)151 and make space to release the governing capabilities of civil society and market 
actors. Rather than resort to securitisation, a system could also become more sophisticated so it 
can handle challenges in a desecuritised manner 
The imputed erosion of the state has spawned an intensive debate on what should be the 
referent for security: whose security is primordial? In the Westphalian state system, which 
replaced a patchwork quilt of overlapping European jurisdictions in 1648, the prime security 
referent is the sovereign state. The territorial state has the monopoly on the legitimate means of 
violence within its territory. Sovereignty ultimately means the state or its representatives can 
declare the state of exception, in which they shore up normal political rights and procedures. 
Enemies of the state can be placed outside the political order. For Carl Schmitt, this power, how 
it is exercised and how ‗obedience is generated, represented and legitimised‘ (Ophir, 2007: 123) is 
the essence of the political. Arriving at the same conclusion while coming from the opposite 
perspective, Hannah Arendt argued that ‗rights‘ only exist within a sovereign nation–state, and 
that as a consequence the only universal human right should be membership in a nation–state. 
The denial of this right, in Arendt‘s (1985) view, meant the loss of access to a political 
community, which is that what makes a person human. 
The concept of ‗Human security‘, coined by the Palme Commission (1984), opened up this 
state-centered frame. Translated quantitatively in UNDP‘s Human Development Index, the rise 
of ‗human security‘ articulated a ‗preventative ―people-centered‖ approach that focused jointly on 
―freedom from fear and freedom from want´ (UNDP, 1994: 4)152, on protection as well as 
development. It is this Human Development Index that Ohlsson turned upside down to arrive at 
an index of ‗social ingenuity‘ (Ohlsson, 1998). 
Multipolar governance increasingly also appears to encompass a debate on multiple referents of 
security for whom should security be provided. In peace studies, a debate ensued about whether 
the state should be the only security referent and if military security should be the only focus. The 
widening of security referents also put into question whether it is the military that should provide 
security. This led to a vertical (deepening) and horizontal (widening) expansion of security 
referents. But Waever (1995: 48-49) noted that while other levels might stake a claim, they will 
always be overridden by the security of state as sovereign actor: ‗the concept of security refers to 
the state‘. 
This state centricity however appears a case of undue ‗analytical closure‘ (Burke 2007: 12) and 
several security scholars, including Litfin (1997), have cogently argued that non-state groups and 
individuals can successfully speak security. Kerr (2003) argues there is an unresolved dialectic 
between human and state-centric security. They cannot both be sovereign, but at crucial 
interfaces, such as migration, they are interlinked. The two referents are bound to clash and lead 
to a different type of defence dilemmas (see also Chapter 9). 
 
5. In what Brouma (2003) calls ‗post-modern water management‘153, not only the notion of 
scarcity (closure), state primacy, agriculture and science, but also the concept of security and risk 
itself came to be relativised. It may become a ―boundary object‖ (Turnhout and Leroy, 2004), 
one that can be negotiated rather than subjected to absolute quantitative limits, and is not an 
objective given but an inter-subjective construct. The relativist view on security, the starting point 
for the present study is the work by Buzan et al (1998) and others, collectively known as the 
‗Copenhagen School‘ (1996) ever since McSweeney gave them this sobriquet.154 The Copenhagen 
scholars, who became highly influential in the late 1990s, see security threats not as a fact but as a 
construct. This relativism introduces uncertainty in the analysis: risks and threats cannot be 
identified, measured and countered by experts, but are inter-subjective truths. The school claims 
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that there are very few objective security threats – what happens much more often is that 
something is that something is proclaimed a security threat, while something else is not.  
It is notable that Douglas and Wildavsky (1983), from an anthropological perspective, had 
arrived at the same conclusion about risk. Some risks become politicised, while others don‘t, 
quite independent of the seriousness of the risk. It is the ‗adversarial context‘ and not whether 
people are likely to be harmed that matters most (Wildavsky, 1991). 
In stark opposition to the cynicism of Realists and gloom of Malthusians, Constructivists tend 
to take a decidedly optimistic, positive outlook. Constructivists believe that people are not 
individual but social actors, and in so doing they cannot help but interact and learn. There is an 
optimistic expectation that people can improve themselves. A constructivist analysis deconstructs 
taken for granted narratives and frames so that they can be reconstructed, reframed in creative 
ways – not engineered, but, given the right facilitator, growing organically.155 
 
It would certainly be unfair to paint security constructivists as market liberals, and some 
Copenhagen scholars have sought to expose the downsides of privatising security forces. Neither 
are all equally optimistic about the prospects of peace and integration. But their approach put 
into the perspective the primacy of the state, economic self-sufficiency and the inevitability of a 
war dynamic.. The next Section explores to which extent the ‗water peace‘ narrative makes sense 
in the context of Egypt and Turkey‘s river schemes. 
 
 
4.3.2  EGYPT AND TURKEY: OPENING UP THE WATER FRAME 
 
The ‗Screw‘ narrative appeared at a positive moment in both Turkish and Egyptian domestic and 
basin politics. In 1999, Egypt‘s dispute with its East Nile riparians had cooled down, high Nile 
inflows provided a development opportunity that seemed to hurt no one while Sudan was 
moving towards domestic peace, opening up chances to revision the Jonglei channel. Halting 
steps were made with annual multilateral water conferences (´Nile 2002´) to work out a new 
modus vivendi on the basin. 
On the Euphrates, the decade started badly when an initiative for a regional peace conference 
by Turkey‘s President Özal in 1991 failed when Syria and Israel would not sit at the same table 
and a violent clash between Turkey and Syria was only just averted in 1998. But after PKK leader 
Abdullah Öcalan‘s capture and extradition in 1998-99 relations seemed to stabilise relations and 
bring limited cooperation, while giving rise to repeated announcements of lifting the state of 
emergency from the Southeast. 
Looking at Euphrates and Nile hydropolitics from this angle, there are quite a few signs of 
change, beginning with water relations. While some frames remained closed, it appears that 
others could indeed be opened. There are several indications that Turkey and Egypt, too, are 
moving to a more ‗open‘ political economy with public debate and participation and more open 
market access. The present section will explore if it is possible to argue that both Turkey and 
Egypt passed though Turton and Ohlsson‘s (1999) window-opening ´crisis´ events in the course 
of their water project cycles. 
 
Turkey itself is not water-stressed, and indeed the state has offered to export water to Israel, 
Cyprus, and Central Asia, or even the whole Mashrek region through its Peace Pipeline mooted 
in 1987. It should be noted that this bold surplus marketing move backgrounded the country‘s 
internal distributional problems, particularly providing regular supply to the cities. Nevertheless, 
developing the Southeast does not exhaust Turkey‘s water supply and Turkey made good on its 
promise to supply the stimulated account even in very dry years. River regulation appears to 
enable a ‗plus sum‘ for all riparians, and better communication between Turkish GAP and Syria‘s 
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GOLD regional development administrations promises better coordination between the two 
countries‘ water development schemes. 
While on the Nile the ‗Full Utilisation of the Nile‘ signed in 1959 between Egypt and Sudan 
has remained non-negotiable, by 2006-07, the Nilotic states were close to signing a new Nile 
treaty, this time with all ten riparians –without invalidating the 1959 ‗full use‘ agreement. This can 
raise some eyebrows: is it possible to stretch the meaning of ‗full‘ in ‗full utilisation‘ beyond 
100%? First of all, Sudan has never used its quota, giving Egypt and extra margin. Minister Abu 
Zeid claimed in 1998 that only 15% of the Nile potential has been freed up. By joining the Nile 
Basin Initiative, Egypt clearly counts on upstream augmentation from draining the marshes – 
freeing up 5 billion cubic meters (BCM) from the Jonglei Channel to make up for the 5BCM 
claimed for Toshka. 
In addition to augmenting water Egypt seeks to augment land which will require this water for 
its development. In response to land stress Egypt initiated projects for horizontal expansion, the 
land development proposes a way out for the poor South, stressed by agrarian liberalisation, and 
the urban population from overpopulation stress, promised job security and Lebensraum, even if it 
currently turns out so far only few citizens have been persuaded to move to live in the inclement 
desert. 
Mitchell (1995) has cogently disputed the problem frame of population pressure in Egypt. But 
from its actions, it appears that Egypt is currently uninterested in opening this frame. Rather, the 
government ‗opportunitised‘ the floods of 1997-2000 as a way to deflect an impending 
population crisis – opening a window for a development strategy that already had its supporters 
in government.  
 
The reflexive turn in dam management appears to have passed both Turkey and Egypt by - 
countries regulate their river flows with mega-infrastructure. An alternative system of multiple 
smaller dams for Ilısu which would save Hasankeyf was rejected in Turkey. Egypt continues to 
treat water as if it were unlimited and everlasting (no closure). While it changed its agricultural 
policy from state controlled cropping to free choice, it still tries to make sure any crop could be 
grown no matter the water requirement (a ‗paradox of plenty‘ (Merrey, 1998). 
To cushion the impact of floods and drought, Egypt closed off the Nile and created enough 
storage capacity to tide the country over dry years. Between 1980 and 1988, the Horn of Africa 
faced eight years of drought and between 1997 and 2000, four years of abundant Nile flow. The 
centralised, ‗TVA‘-type hydraulic mission approach is reflected in the Aswan Dam and Toshka 
project. For Toshka, Egypt uses the biggest pumping system in the world to transport water into 
the desert. 
Upstream Ethiopia however showed that an alternative route, breaking through the mega-
paradigm, was not only possible but expedient.156 In the late 1990s Ethiopians began erecting 
hundreds of small dams on the river. However, this is not necessarily out of a risk-spreading 
rationale to cushion the impact of floods or droughts, but rather to ‗fool‘ observers on their 
impacts, which are hard to ascertain (Waterbury and Whittington, 1997). In this sense, the move 
is a radical counter-hegemonic idea, not only in its challenge of Egypt‘s ban on upstream 
development, but also in its socio-technical design logic. 
However, in keeping with international developments, both Turkey and Egypt now frame the 
economic exploitation of flood water in a sustainability discourse. Turkey‘s GAP continues to 
regulate the flood for economic growth, but has adjusted its planning to meet environmental and 
social standards better, promising to improve its resettlement plan. Egypt‘s New Valley prides 
itself on organic low-input horticulture and also came round to accepting the potential for water 
conservation and reallocation, together known as demand management. State-instigated adjustments 
include conservation (efficiency in use) and improved co-ordination through Water Users 
Associations. 
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The tacitly endorsed supply augmentation through virtual water enabled adjustment between 
economic sectors. The food security imperative appears to be losing its appeal both for Egypt 
and Turkey. Selby (2005) maintains Egypt is a post-agricultural economy and Egypt‘s New Valley 
has only nominal irrigation, embedded in a much bigger vision of a city, an airport, tourist 
complexes and industry. In Turkey, agricultural export potential (Southeast Anatolia as a 
breadbasket) is extolled in its PR material, but in fact energy production and, since 1989, regional 
development and antiterrorism seem the more important drivers for GAP. 
Apparent shifts in governance are also visible. As a result of water sector privatisation, ´new´ 
transnational actors – transnational companies and non-governmental organisations - made their 
mark on the political scene. This was not so evident in Egypt, whose Aswan dam was a Cold War 
state-to-state technology transfer project, while the New Valley project has only attracted one 
major foreign investor and not much opposition. But in Turkey privatisation opened the door 
first for external participation in BOT projects, later for wholesale reform of the water sector in 
1994, opening the water sector to non-state actors. The new water law to enable external bilateral 
finding for private construction of the dams, and introduced a degree of local participation. 
Turkey has established water user organisations in Southeast Anatolia. Egypt meanwhile is 
experimenting with Dutch-style water boards in the delta, and likewise opened the project area 
with tax breaks for foreign investors, claiming the state would cover only a minority share of total 
project costs. Unusual for an authoritarian state, Egypt established a Supreme Constitutional 
court, with a view to safeguarding the property rights of foreign investors (Tamir, 2003) 
Both countries have had one-party constellations but experimented with forms of multi-party 
democracy – although retaining the right to outlaw certain religious or ethnicity-based parties. 
Both countries have a diverse (if controlled) press which reported on the politicisation of both 
projects.  
The success of international oppositional alliances to large water projects can be seen as a 
resonance of the increasing resonance of individual rights and human security. NGOs could 
effectively mobilise the press to ´speak security´ by calling Ilısu a trigger for ´water war´. The cash 
crisis of the 1990s opened up a governance multipolarity that also put non-state security referents 
on the agenda: the environment, human rights, communal identity. 
Water conflict over the Euphrates has multiple actors and multiple security referents – states, 
but also sub-state actors whose ´human´ security is impacted by harmful or beneficial 
confrontations and interventions, by upstreamers or by one‘s own government (McDonald 
2000). A ´desecuritised´ setting makes these contending values negotiable in political and 
participatory processes, enabling social learning and reframing. While securitised relations follow 
a ‗closed‘ logic of war and emergency (rivalry, threat, defence, escalation, defeat), and a public 
endorsement to resort to violence, desecuritised relations of competition do not aim to defeat but 
to outsmart the other. Due to the de-emphasis of force, power in a Lockeian world then has to 
rely on persuasion in a ‗live and let live‘ world. 
Reforms in Egypt and Turkey show openings to more open processes. Nevertheless, while 
criticism was voiced and, in the case of Turkey, essentially nothing changed to the projects, which 
are going ahead as intended and remain contested. Perhaps ´water peace´ does not tell the whole 
story either. The next Section will introduce a third narrative, as an alternative to both ´water 
wars´ and ´water peace´ narratives. 
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4.4 THE HEGEMONY NARRATIVE 
 
4.4.1 CRITIQUING „WATER PEACE‟ 
 
For critical theorists, the absence of water wars does not evidence an absence of struggle, but 
rather that open antagonism has been displaced by structural conflict between hegemonic market 
capitalism and its marginalised victims. This ‗silent struggle‘ of local actors against global resource 
capture (or resource imperialism, Käkönen 1988)157 became dramatically public when the year 
2000 finally brought what the international press branded a ‗water war‘:- violence over water 
rights in the city of Cochabamba, Bolivia (BOX 4.1).  
 
 
This was not a conflict between states, and did not conform to the normal definition of a war. 
The conflict was more like a ‗water riot‘ (Westermann, 2004), directed both at international water 
companies and the colluding Bolivian state resulting in a sell-out of resource rights at the expense 
of traditional right holders (see also Assies, 2001; Crespo, 2000, Peredo et al., 2003, Crespo & 
Spronk, 2006 and Warner, 2004). Cochabamba showed that local protesters were not convinced 
things were going to be better if coordinated at the global level. The Declaration of Cochabamba 
of 2000 echoes the idea of a social contract for the global community (Petrella, 1998) – not the 
Hobbesian or Lockeian kinds of social contract we encountered earlier, but one that owes a debt 
to Jean-Jacques Rousseau, whose contrat social binds people not to the state but to the 
BOX 4.1   Cochabamba’s water war  (from Warner 2004b) 
Cochabamba, in Bolivia‘s ‗Central Valley‘, has a chronic shortage of water and water quality is appalling. 
To improve water provision for Cochabamba city, the military dictatorship established the state-run utility 
SEMAPA 5 in the mid-1970s but taken almost no formal control of the water sector. Water management 
in the valley was traditionally been carried out and governed by traditional rights, with a tacit 
understanding of non-intervention on the part of the state.  
In the 1980s and 1990s, Bolivia sold off its mines, airlines, railways and electricity sector, and its plans 
to divest itself of its phone system only foundered because no bidders came forward. The privatisation of 
Cochabamba‘s water in 1999, then, surprised nobody, but the way this was done is more controversial: a 
package deal of water management contract, hydroelectricity generation, and a complex tunnel, Misicuni 
to augment the supply of Cochabamba‘s water, a project that had laid dormant as a complex, highly 
problematic project. The $300 million deal involved a 40-year concession, a $130 million dollar dam (to 
store rainy-season water) and a $62 million tunnel as well as water purification plants and sewage farms. 
Aguas de Tunari, an American-Spanish-Bolivian joint venture formed only weeks prior with a majority 
share for Bechtel/International Water, was the only bidder to come forward. Water prices were allowed to 
go up drastically. Tariffs were raised threefold to help complete the dam and tunnel project, guarantee 15-
17% profitability and pay off past debts. The citizens of the Central Valley would have to obtain licences 
for their wells, diversion channels and other water infrastructure. By taking siege of the city, taking it away 
from state control, the protesters ‗(counter)securitised‘ the issue, legitimising illegal conduct on the 
grounds of ‗life and death‘ urgency. Both the protesters and the government responded in ways outside 
the normal rules of political engagement: protesters took control of the city at the start of 2000, blocking 
all entryways. It was an unusual urban-rural alliance including peasants, industrial workers, 
environmentalists joined by street kids, the Coordinadora de la Defensa de Agua y de Vida, that shut the 
city down for four days. Peasant organisations joined the urban protest when they saw communal rights 
threatened by the privatisation of rural water systems. The state of siege was pronounced and protest 
leaders were arrested. However, when footage of an army captain was seen firing into the crowd, killing a 
young protester, these images provoked international outrage and drew responses from NGOs as far 
afield as Australia and Canada. The cause for Misicuni was lost there and then, and soon the government 
declared the privatisation process void. Bechtel/International Water left the country later that year and 
SEMAPA was reinstated as water supplier, its Board now supplemented with representatives from the 
Coordinadora. 
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'community', based on the idea that people are fundamentally equal and mutually interdependent. 
People like to be sociable, Rousseau had noted, therefore they share fundamental values, and 
their views are unlikely to be widely divergent (DeLue, 1997). 
Petrella‘s Group of Lisbon, consisting of scientists, businessmen, international organizations 
and elder statesmen like Portuguese president Suarez, takes op the Club of Rome‘s Malthusian 
agenda and challenges the ‗neo-liberal‘ Lockeian dogmas of protection of private property rights 
to resources  (Petrella, 1998). Water is a ‘common heritage of mankind‘, a contract not with the 
state but with the globe. The interdependence on actions impacting on water is so great that 
water rights can not be individualised. If water is someone‘s property, resource capture is 
tantamount to theft. If water is a global commons, who do you steal from if not from mankind as 
a whole? Enclosure is thus linked with the security of legal property rights. This introduces the 
issue of rights to water. If water is a global commons, enclosure means stealing from everybody, 
turning abundance into scarcity (Shiva, 2002). Most relevant to Turkey and Egypt, the Islamic 
shari‟a (itself a word whose root meaning denotes sharing water) explicitly forbids denying others, 
man nor beast, the right to drink. 
The protest against the flooding of Hasankeyf can be seen as one moment in an ongoing 
counter-hegemonic ‗war of movement‘ against the global homogenisation of cultural values and 
‗obliteration‘ of (Kurdish) identity, in a long chain of counter-hegemonic moves against what 
IRN calls the ‗world water mafia‘ and its depoliticising discourse of development and consensus. 
The Indian feminist environmentalist Vandana Shiva sees these ‗water wars‘ as social struggles 
against hegemonic resource liberalism, the power of global water capital, excluding local people 
from their historic access to water, often displacing them with woefully inadequate compensation 
provisions (Shiva, 2002). They protest the sell-out of natural resources by a state that colludes 
with global hydro-capitalism.158 The critical school therefore welcomes the erosion and 
dissolution of the state, as state security is often a source of insecurity to its citizens (Floyd, 
2007). In this world view, ´security is emancipation´ - from oppression, exploitation and 
hegemony as the Aberystwyth School of security studies has it (Booth, 1997). But security is not 
just a negative (freedom from threat) but also a positive good for society. 
As a consequence, state-to-state conflicts are quite simply the wrong focus of attention for 
critical scholars. The era of the state and, as a result, interstate wars may be drawing to an end, 
but ‗future violent conflicts are likely to pit networks against states and state networks against 
each other‘ (Trottier and Slack, 2004: 137)159. The hollowed-out Westphalian state has lost its 
power to control globalising capital. As an international ‗neo-liberal‘ consensus between 
Northern and Southern state elites emerged in the 1990s (Biersteker, 1992), conflict between 
social groups on one side and a ‗hegemonic bloc‘ (Cox, 1993) of international companies and 
facilitating state actors on the other increased, as these social groups saw their patrimonial rights 
taken away, state services cut, and their welfare compromised, while private capital made double-
digit profits. Restructuring according to IMF recipes cleared the way for private property, from 
the reasoning that people will be more careful with what they own than with public goods. In 
Shiva‘s view, a similar enclosure160 of the global water commons is taking place world-wide, 
making an abundant resource scarce (Shiva, 2002: 25-26). The ´critical turn´ in political ecology 
puts these differential outcomes of hegemonic (imperial) ‗neo-liberalism‘ at the centre of its 
analysis showing how they are systematically exploitative of certain humans as well as of nature 
(´collusive resource plunder´). 
To protesters against international (‗neo-liberal‘) water hegemony, water cannot be owned and 
expropriated, but rights to its use are communal. This flags up kinship, tradition and community 
as referents for security, as the social and cultural value of water connects a community with its 
history (Johnson and Donanue, 1997)161. Water control thus ought to be in the hands of 
community-run water companies (control social, Bustamante et al., 2006) and according to time-
honoured indigenous management self-subsistence practices in which water is often sacred. 
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Modern technology, in this perspective, does not liberate but breaks a crucial bond between 
people and nature (Shiva, 2002) 
 
 
4.4.2 MULTI-LEVEL HEGEMONY IN TURKEY AND EGYPT 
 
A water hegemony162 analysis provides an alternative story of the water sector developments in 
Egypt and Turkey, the role of flood management and global overlay163. For both states, flooding 
creates opportunities to tackle other security concerns. The two projects, Ilısu and Toshka, share 
a communality in that they are not just flood management projects, not even primarily irrigation 
or hydroelectricity projects, but self-proclaimed people management projects -  in Turkey, to 
develop an ‗underdeveloped‘ region and integrate the Kurds; in Egypt, to induce resettlement to 
take the pressure off ‗overpopulated‘ Cairo. In both cases the ambition is ´national unity through 
regional economic development.´ 
Turkey sees the capture of the Euphrates and Tigris as its engine for growth. The flooding of 
Hasankeyf occasions the resettlement of thousands, and thousands more in other villages, a 
process repeated for each large dam. For the Turkish government, the displaced villages and 
historic artefacts are like eggs that need to be broken to make nutritious omelettes. But the 
‗induced flood‘ and resulting resettlement can also be construed as control strategies for the state 
to extend its control of the hinterland. Ferguson (1994) shows how international development 
projects help the government of Lesotho to gain administrative control of the periphery. James 
Scott (1998) shows how government bureaucracies homogenise society to make it ´readable´ and 
hence more governable.  
States do not only face unruly rivers but also unruly people. From a state perspective, Kurdish 
separatism, Islamist attacks and political assassinations are all interpreted as attacks against the 
state. Against such attacks, governments take (back) the reins in a securitised mode. It is easy to 
portray Turkey and Egypt as monolithical, totalitarian states, as accounts of water conflict tend to 
do. Both states have declared an enduring state of emergency and a highly visible army presence, 
notably in their land and water development projects. The Egyptian government has maintained 
a national state of exception ever since the assassination of President Sadat in 1981, and after a 
period of apparent democratisation, Mubarak tightened the screws again in 2005. Turkey (with 
interruptions) imposed martial law in Southeast Anatolia in 1987 to confront the uprising in 
Southeast Anatolia in 1984, in response to the PKK violently claiming its role as a spokesman for 
Kurdish separatism (Neumann‘s ‗violised‘ conflict, Neumann, 1999). The securitised status led to 
the militarisation of water projects, legitimised by fears of the dam being an obvious target for 
terrorism emanating from the periphery.  
The means by which they seek to do this, inspires theories of control and capture. Both seem 
to have a hand on the tap (technical closure) as well as military-assisted control of violent contenders 
relying on the state of emergency (state of exception) as a last resort to achieve closure. Like 
‗closure‘ in technological regimes, we may utilise the phrase ‗political closure‘ pertaining to the 
decision-making regime on resource management. 
The technologies of control in the ‗hydraulic mission‘ mode are crude. In seeking to unite and 
culturally close the states, governments run up against inhospitable nature and resistant minority 
identities for which this nature is home. The rugged, mountainous areas in Southeast Anatolia 
and the Southern desert in Egypt present a tough challenge for cultivation as well as a barrier to 
integrating the groups that eke out a living in this ecology. Draining wetlands and burning and 
gassing communities gave the Iraqi government access to the Ma´adan and sought to crush the 
rebellious Kurds in the north. Jongerden (2006) has argued that the Turkish government is 
smoking out centrifugal groups from their hiding places as a counterinsurgency tactic. ´People 
management´ is also a battle over culture, a civilising mission to ‗normalise‘ (cf. Reyes Gaskin 
2005) the non-rebellious Kurds and Nubians by sedentarising, urbanising and integrating semi-
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nomadic settlements and displacing traditional livelihoods and cultural expressions in non-
agricultural centers. In Southeast Anatolia, a battle over identity forces previously fragmented 
identities to choose: become either assimilated Turks or separatist Kurds. In developing the 
desert for Lebensraum, Egypt has been reminded of the political demands of the Nubian minority. 
Nubians staged peaceful protest to make good on earlier promises to return to what are now the 
banks of Lake Nasser. Here too antagonising language like the ‗annihilation of culture‘ and fears 
of ‗secessionism‘ can be observed, although this is not the major story. 
Power however does not rest on coercion alone. The state maintains hegemonic power and 
control, if with increasing subtlety, to ensure compliance. The greater normative consensus, the 
easier it is easy to ensure compliance and thus, to rule. For radical political ecologists, the 
environment is deeply politicized (Bryant, 1997): power relations not only shape human-nature 
relations, but nature mediates struggles for control. Water development then plays a crucial role 
in shaping society. 
The hydraulic ‗concept of control‘ is embodied by the Tennessee Valley Authority, a mega-
scheme for flood control and development co-opting the working class, agriculture and industry 
to achieve food and energy security. ‗Internal colonisation‘ is built on a Fordist class compromise 
to transform the landscape into a production base. Development, coupled with a degree of 
wealth redistribution and social security to prevent the immiseration and uprising of the poor. 
The development plans for the Anatolian plains and Nubian desert have a strong TVA imprint, 
as integrative projects that marry job creation and regional development with increased control 
(Brouma, 2003). By providing investment, employment, welfare and civilisation, they integrated 
landowners, industry and labour‘s interests. Turkey and Egypt as Hobbesian states modernized 
their economies hydraulically. 
To lend support to control strategy, states seek to draw on the discursive (war on terrorism) 
and material (access to funding) resources from the international overlay to boost their domestic 
position. In the donor world the TVA model of state-led development had fallen from grace, the 
internationally emerging hegemony has become sceptical of big dams (WCD, 2000) and 
encouraged private participation and devolution. As we saw above, Turkey and Egypt have taken 
on board many precepts of participation, integration and sustainability. While the aforementioned 
move from ´Hobbesian´ to ´Lockeian´ governance suggests the decreasing direct control and 
increasing space for people, that does not mean the de facto set-up is necessarily more egalitarian. 
Underneath apparent autonomy, openness and horizontal coordination sovereign state power 
persists. Sophisticated governance arrangements still carry the ´shadow of hierarchy´ (Jessop, 
1998). But as we shall see, this adaptation brings some risks to states that can be exploited by a 
counter-hegemonic coalition.  
 
 
4.4.3 GLOBAL HEGEMONY AND INTERNATIONAL OVERLAY: TURKEY‟S 
PASSIVE  REVOLUTION 
 
Turkey‘s hydraulic state mission (hydro-Etatism) dates back from the 1930s. Plans for hydraulic 
mission, developed in the 1930s had to be updated as the global scene moved on. Turkey initially 
challenged ‗water capitalism‘ by keeping the water sector in state hands under its own conditions. 
But under the leadership of Ünver, the GAP‘s administration started to ´modernise´ the GAP 
project by including more and more aspects of Integrated Water Management in the 
development project. This was at least in part induced by criticism of its initial heavy-handed 
technocratic outlook. A material link, funding, forced the door open to late-modern private 
sector involvement, and on its heels, NGOs. The cash crisis of 1994 Turkey exposed a 
‗Hobbesian‘ contending state to the pressures of global Lockeian hegemony. 
In response, Turkey therefore can be said to have made what Gramsci calls a ‗passive 
revolution‘, a Hobbesian state making a pre-emptive about-turn in tune with the prevailing 
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Lockeian mode (van der Pijl, 1992). It adopted some of the global tenets of the new paradigm 
while making sure not to lose control and being forced to open the economy under tougher 
pressures, in response to the consolidation of liberal water capitalism on a global scale. The cash 
crisis thus provided a pressure point for international overlay, in which the Lockeian 
´desecuritised´ mode penetrated Hobbesian ´securitised´ state, giving rise to a hybrid, a mix of 
the Lockeian and Hobbesian spheres. 
For GAP to survive Turkey had to liberalise its water sector, enabling private participation in 
water projects. Thus, chinks in the state‘s armour became visible which provided a window of 
opportunity for the opposition to voice its concerns about controversial water projects. Unlike 
the domestic context, the state has limited control over the international discourse. If the 
situation at home is securitised, the international situation may not readily accept this. The NGO 
opposition decries the capture of the commons, but equally as part of the assimilation or 
negation of Kurdish culture. The war in Southeast Anatolia united a highly fragmented 
constellation of Kurdish groups into a common identity against Turkish assimilation and regional 
development, while the same ‘logic (and chain) of equivalence‘ made Kurds into ‗terrorist 
separatists‘. 
Bilateral export creditors however proved very willing to guarantee controversial investments, 
enabling the continuation of FAP. The construction sector is one of low margins and high 
employment. Turkey can continue to invest in GAP so because external agencies are willing to 
fund it. 
Hence Jacoby´s (2005) view of Turkey as a schizophrenic nation, liberal and authoritarian, 
Jekyll and Hyde. It invokes Hall and Jacques‘ (1982) description of Thatcher‘s Britain, terming it 
a ‗two-nation‘ political project. Since the early 1980s, Jacoby argues, Turkey has maintained two 
simultaneous national regimes in Turkey. The first has predominated in areas of the country not 
administered through emergency legislation, most fully realised in the economic hotspots: 
Marmara region and the environs of the capital, Ankara. Turkey´s privatisation opened the floor 
to non-state actors: the private sector, NGOs and bilateral credit agencies while a public-private 
alliance bailed Turkey out of its financial straits. The link with the non-securitised global arena 
world implies a percolation of the processes currently hegemonic in that world: cost-benefit 
criteria, participation, openness, environmental values. The National Security Council ‗has been 
downgraded to an advisory body that no longer manages its own budget‘ (Cook, 2007). But the 
state continues to dominate the business sector and no contract can be signed without the 
Minister‘s signature (Munir, ibid.) and while the West of Turkey is increasing civic freedoms, the 
thirteen predominantly Kurdish provinces of the Southeast has remained under a state of 
emergency.. Turkey, then, remains a striking example of a dual-nature state, one that is neither 
only Hobbesian nor Lockeian. 
 
 
4.4.4 EGYPT: CONTROL OR DISENGAGEMENT? 
 
The story for Egypt within a hegemony narrative is markedly different to Turkey and epitomised 
by the instrumentality of the flood. While in Turkey the inundation of villages like Hasankeyf 
induced Kurdish resettlement in the cities, the Egyptian state uses carrots and sticks to lure 
citizens out of the megacity to a different locality opened up by diverted floodwater. In Egypt the 
flood does not require resettlement, it enables it – as deconcentration of the capital in new towns 
continues to eat up arable land.  
There are signs of what may be termed ‗virtual water wars‘ in which international overlay plays 
a key part. For Egypt, the archetypal hydraulic state, dependence on a single source of water in an 
arid area necessitated early co-ordination. The country‘s history of mega-projects goes back to the 
pharaohs. As Wittfogel (1957) theorised, the oriental kingdoms and empires were the first to 
develop their states by mobilising people and means for public works, if at considerable human 
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and economic cost. Egypt as a hydraulic state exemplifies how an edge over others can also be a 
brake on further progress. The Hobbesian ‗hydraulic mission‘ model is based on state-led 
economic growth and political control – as the economy grows, so does the state. In tributary 
systems associated with the hydraulic mission, a state agency can improve its power by 
controlling water development. The tributary state derives its legitimacy from hydraulic 
development, and seeks to maximise tribute from farmers. 
Egypt has been a republic since 1952. In its first decades, republican Egypt could successfully 
play West and East off against each other in the Cold War to obtain funding for the Aswan Dam, 
but post-1989, Egypt is firmly in the western bloc. Structural adjustment in Egypt has forced a 
liberal direction, the progressive opening up (infitah) of the Egyptian welfare state which, faced 
with a cash crisis, has been forced to ´restructure´ (Abdelazim, 2002). 
Under outside pressure, the Fordist/Keynesian dream of state-led development and welfare 
had to be reformed. IMF conditionality in the late ‗70s and again at the turn of the 1990s speeded 
up agrarian reform and urban focus. But Egypt has different strings it can pull. By achieving 
consent from Nilotic states, Egypt can make the cake bigger for itself and its co-riparians through 
access of World Bank and UNDP. Multilateral funders need successes, too -  as Tony Allan has 
noted, citing an anonymous World Bank official, the World Bank may need Egypt more than 
Egypt needs the World Bank (Allan, pers. comm., 2006). 
 
Support from IMF and World Bank requires the kind of environmental, economic and social 
guarantees, and the consent of the riparian neighbourhood associated with the ‗water peace‘ 
narrative introduced earlier on. But while Abdelazim (2002) labels Egypt a post-Etatist state, both 
Timothy Mitchell (2002) and Ray Bush (2005) claim Egypt‘s governance changes are cosmetic – the 
state resists external reform as well as open internal challenges (see also Kienle 2006). 
Egypt has opened its investment market to foreign investors but market competition is not 
impressive. While the private sector pretends to invest, the public sector pretends to liberalise 
(Mitchell, 2002). Egypt only attracted one serious investor, a millionaire emir, to snap up a 
megaplot in the New Valley; and the Californian project partner, KADCO, does not bring in any 
money. 
Mitchell (2002) uses ‗Dreamland‘ as a metaphor for the unreal world of Egypt‘s contemporary 
development projects, mostly built on sand. As we saw in Chapter 2, the state does not seem to 
be working very hard to make its costly mega-project successful, nor to make life better for those 
to stay behind on the countryside (losing their land rights) or in the city of Cairo (no urban 
regeneration). Dorman (2007) places Toshka in a long lineage of development mega-projects: 
desert urbanisation, urban wastewater disposal, cyber city 10th of Ramadan - all non-sustainable 
and, generally, unsuccessful. 
Meanwhile the army appears to become ‗civil‗ (Cook, 2007) but now controls key economic 
sectors, most notably the ‗pyramids‘ envisioned by Hosni Mubarak, himself an air force officer. 
Land speculation in the desert especially involves the military sector, which has enormous 
business interests. The state projects an image of national greatness and high modernity, while 
most people live in poverty. This allows the army to ‗rule not govern‘ (Cook, 2007). 
In contrast to Turkey‘s Ilısu Dam, Egypt‘s Toshka project hardly created a ripple in the 
international press. Egypt‘s mega-project affects only few people and natural resources in a 
remote area, so there are few images of outrage to broadcast. As Toshka is largely self-funded, it 
is less vulnerable to outside criticism and conditionality. This also means there is no focus for 
opponents to engage with a more fundamental state disengagement from society (Dorman, 
2007). This abandonment is captured in Dorman‘s coinage ‗the Politics of Neglect‘. In this sense, 
building a new civilization in the desert seems as much a political as a river diversion. 
Authoritarianism and market liberalism worked so well together they could turn a studied ‗deaf 
ear‘ to rural demands (Bush, 2005). In Egypt, agrarian reform forced tenants off their lands. By 
reasserting absentee land ownership, the state took its hands off the fellahin and instructed the 
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police to support evictions. ‗Lockeian‘ liberalisation clashes with ‗Rousseauian‘ community values 
as Egyptian villagers lament that landowners do not respect custom but cash (Bush, 1999). In 
Egypt, it is not control but abandonment of the countryside (and of Nubians) that appears to 
generate resistance. Where else could displaced fellahin go but Toshka? 
The hydro-hegemonic perspective thus highlights resistance to the capture of resources and 
neglect of cultural values and local autonomy. As both Conca (2006) and Furlong (2006) have 
noted, this capture is not obviously remedied by basin co-operation, as antagonistic states can set 
their differences aside to pursue joint benefits which then go at the expense of third parties. From 
this perspective we can see the Kurds claiming GAP steals their water (Frey, 1993: 64) and space, 
while the South Sudanese claim a share of the Nile ‗disappearing‘ when the Jonglei Canal goes 
ahead. 
For anti-globalists, the state mediates the erosion of customary rights by global forces, to 
which the ´water peace´ reforms provide selective inroads. While resettlement and loss of 
livelihoods is an issue in both countries, only in Turkey did unease with the project connect with 
an international anti-globalist discourse community, underpinned by a human rights and 
environmental discourse. We will encounter this again in the next chapter on a flood control 
dispute in Bangladesh that foregrounds Shiva´s (2002) gender issues rather more than the 
Turkish and Egyptian cases.  
 
 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
 
Maybe Lowi‘s (1993) argument was correct after all: a hegemonic power ensured stability in the 
Middle East hydro-security complexes. Maybe countries have started to see sense and started 
desecuritising water. Taking a cue from the Scottish lion chaser joke, it is also possible that there 
have been no interstate water wars because attention has been focused on their imminence. 
Buzan et al. (1998) have noticed that a threat, a crisis, including the threat of war, commands 
special attention. Perhaps the water wars proponents didn‗t quite believe in ‗water wars‘ 
themselves, but securitised the issue to propel the environment on the agenda. Thus attention has 
had political effects, in that the Clinton administration made resource conflict quite central to its 
defence policy. Then the calendar read 9/11, 2001 and the whole global geopolitical scene 
changed. As the war on terror dominated everything, resource conflict slid down the agenda. 
 
No matter which hypothesis may prove to be correct, each of the above narratives has had 
serious consequences, globally but also for the basins under review. 
The first tale we encountered, ‗water wars‟, considers water as a high-politics (security) issue – 
food security is key, it requires water scarcity, which inevitably leads to violent competition unless 
a hegemon steps in. The chapter has argued that ´enclosure´ and its close cousins, physical, 
political, discursive ‗closure‘, are at the heart of this narrative at the level of the project, as well as 
the national and basin governance context. Euphrates/Tigris and Nile are closing basins 
experiencing a potentially explosive scarcity stress while relations in the river basin community 
appear deadlocked and  ‗securitised´, a situation which drowns out all other concerns (Jägerskog 
and Phillips, 2006) and can lead to all-out or proxy war (Turton, 2001). Water security links in 
with other (high-politics) national concerns so that (Southeast) Turkey and especially Egypt have 
come to look like highly closed political environments with a ´garrison state´ character. 
While regularly revived in light of climate change, this ‗closure‘ narrative now seems ‗so 90s‘. 
An alternative account puts a very different perspective on water availability. In a ´water peace´ 
narrative, in which Malthusian closure is not the end, but a driver for adaptive (positive) change. 
Both countries scrutinised here in their own way appear to move away from a stifling closure at 
home and deadlock abroad towards ‗water peace‘. Virtual water puts the resource ‗closure‘ of the 
Euphrates/Tigris and especially the Nile into question, putting the primacy of water security into 
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perspective. Water sector liberalisation, participation and the beginnings of a ecological discourse 
made themselves felt, seemingly eroding state sovereignty and control. 
An alternative counter-discourse claims while there is no water war, neither is there water 
peace. While the modality of governance changes, this does not necessarily heralds a change in 
control. From a hydro-hegemonic perspective, often plus ça change, plus c‟est la même chose.  
Hydro-hegemony is expressed in ever more subtle forms of control over water – and over 
society. While symbolic of resistance of the periphery to centralising Turkish and Egyptian state 
hegemonies, at domestic level. notably the Ilısu project was a focal battle in an ongoing struggle 
against ´neoliberalism´ in the international arena. 
Perhaps there are dialectics at work, an oscillation between security and non-security discourse. 
While the water wars thesis painted too gloomy a picture, water cooperation thesis appears overly 
too optimistic. In practice, cooperation and conflict, and their associated speech acts, can go 
together - ´though water issues are highly politicised and securitised, at the same time, they 
constitute an element of co-operation‘ (Brouma 2003).164 
While the third narrative posits a permanent hegemonic struggle between rapacious capital and 
grassroots anti-globalist, anti-hegemonic discourses normally do not abandon this world, but play 
the game while looking for counter-hegemonic niches. As a result, the three discourses interact 
and compete in the global water scene. The globalised hydro-industry co-opted and 
accommodated some ideas from the critical opposition, while the water wars narrative appears to 
be gaining ground again, on the back of the global warming and terrorism scares. Thus, while the 
Egyptian project was only weakly politicised, the struggle over Ilısu is, as it were, an arena in 
which all three narratives (water war, peace and hegemony) played out. 
 
 
TABLE 4.2 Summary of the Three Meta-Narratives 
Water Security 
Narrative 
Water wars Water peace Water hegemony 
Security is State security A relative concept Emancipation 
Security referent State State and individual Community or globe 
Governance is Government Redistributed 
responsibility 
A euphemism for 
hegemony 
Water conflict is State rivalry over 
resources 
Pluralist contest Battle for/against 
hegemony of state or 
water companies 
International anarchy is Negative Negative Positive (Anti-
hegemony) 
Floodwater is Essential to food 
security; A source of 
material national 
strength; source of 
conflict 
Social and economic 
good like any other 
Common heritage of 
mankind; subjugated by 
hegemon 
Resource closure brings Violence Reflexiveness and 
innovation 
Appropriation 
Desirable goal Hegemonic stability to 
control ‗minus sum‘ of 
anarchy 
Asecurity, integration; 
Plus sum (peaceful 
competition) 
Ahegemony; Liberation 
of man and river from 
hegemony 
Governance Domestic: Top-down 
International: 
Hegemonic 
Networked (reflecting 
Requisite Variety) 
Community self-control 
 
If we then look at where Egypt and Turkey stand, the Table below shows great similarities in 
the set-up, if with a few interesting differences. A composite picture of the three lenses highlights 
the complementary role of more or less prominent hard, military power enforcing political 
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closure and unity and coupled with hard, structural science closing the river, with the softer 
forces of ideology and social engineering, bringing more subtle controls on a greater degree of 
complexity, diversity and openness. Flood manipulation interventions facilitate state control over 
peripheral areas, if in different ways: while Turkey‘s project seeks to integrate the Kurds with a 
civilising mission of regional development, the Egyptian project seeks to absorb those at the 
receiving end of state disengagement in the countryside and the overcrowded urban areas. The 
resources these drives require differentially expose the governments to the ‗reflexive‘ ideas and 
conditionalities from external donors lobbied by international market and civil-society actors. 
 
 
TABLE 4.3 A comparison of Governance models affecting water project, Turkey and Egypt. 
 Egypt Turkey 
Basin relations Conflictive, moving toward 
formalised basin regime 
Conflictive, some cooperation 
Domestic governance model Etatist, secular development state; 
Authoritarian democracy 
Etatist, secular development state; 
Authoritarian democracy 
Securitised context State of emergency since 1981 State of emergency since 1984 
Role of army Reduced but powerful in 
economy 
Reduced but exerting great power 
in the background 
State‘s ‗other‘ Islamist, poor South Islamist, poor Southeast 
Governance model in project area Army-dominated investment zone Army-dominated ‗garrison state‘ 
Status of water project National security interest National security interest 
State relations with centrifugal 
groups affected by water project 
Peaceful protest from displaced 
Bedouin and Nubians 
War with centrifugal Kurds 
Effect of river intervention Regional development; 
Resettlement away from city 
Regional development; 
Resettlement/dispersal in city 
Repression Muslim Brotherhood outlawed; 
Nubian politicians MPs excluded 
Kurdish parties outlawed 
International overlay Strategic ally of US,  
Support from World Bank 
Strategic ally of US, 
No World Bank support on water 
resource projects from the mid-
1980s 
Window for resistance to project Cash crisis in 2000 Cash crisis in 1994 
Hegemonic Concept of control Disengagement from society ‗Peace at home, peace abroad‘  
Anti-hegemonic protest Rural violence against land reform International protest against 
resettlement of dam displacees 
 
 
Having looked at the hydropolitics of security in two ´dry´ basins, where floods are controlled 
and used as opportunities for development, the next four chapters will focus on ´wet´ basins 
where floods are not yet fully controlled and are securitised as threats to life and limb.  
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CHAPTER 4 - ANNEX 
 
Three faces of basin regime formation on the Nile and Tigris 
 
The explanation on the workings of a basin regime differs between different broad schools of 
thought. These perspectives reflect the narratives discussed in the present chapter. Below, I will 
introduce, then piece together, these three ‗faces‘ of the prism.  
 
 
Realist regimes 
The Realist,165 power-based school of International Relations sees states as unitary ‗billiard 
balls‘. Realists see regimes as a tool for international conflict management, based on a Hobbesian 
fear of international anarchy. A strong hegemon ‗maintains‘ the regime with carrots (side 
payments) and sticks. Thus the presence of a regional hegemon would be enough to avert war. If 
the hegemon weakens, so will the regime (Jägerskog 2004).  
Due to geography, upstreamers can do as they please; the downstreamers just have to accept. 
Thus from a largely Realist (Realpolitik) perspective Miriam Lowi (1993) claimed that the 
formation of a co-operative regime formation requires a downstream hegemon, since that actor has 
an interest in securing the water supply and the power to compensate for its downstream 
position. Upstreamers do not need to co-operate as that would only constrain their room for 
maneuver.  
This reasoning appears to be borne out in reality. The strongest power in the Euphrates-Tigris 
basin, Turkey, so far has had little incentive to co-operate with downstream neighbours. While 
Turkish-Syrian (GAP-GOLD) co-operation on development schemes and a more recent trilateral 
‗basin-wide Track 2‘ process suggest openings for cooperation, Turkey unilaterally went ahead 
with the Ilısu dam.  
On the Nile however a ‗quasi-regime‘ between Egypt and Sudan has been in place since 1959 
(Waterbury 2002), which is a partial rather than basin-wide agreement. Downstream Egypt has 
since taken repeated initiatives for co-operation with all Nile countries. Egypt indeed needs 
upstream co-operation to achieve greater Nile inflow in the long term, and therefore has already 
for decades been motivated to seek co-operation through Undugu, TECCONILE and now the 
Nile Basin Initiative (NBI), to ensure continued access to Nile water. These openings have been 
hailed as international regimes. As Brunnee and Toope (2002)166 maintain from a ‗water peace‘ 
perspective, the NBI promises to ensure the treatment of the Nile as one ecosystem. However, 
the road to getting there was believed to be paved by delinking the White and Blue Nile branches 
to arrive at regime formation on the Nile (Waterbury 2003). The premise of the Nile Basin 
Initiative (since 1999) is that basin-wide co-operation can bring a plus sum. The NBI makes a 
new agreement on the Nile possible to stretch the limits of the ´full´ utilisation of the Nile 
agreement of 1959 for Egypt. As noted, it translates into a reimagined potential for augmentation 
(reframing). Also, co-operative regulation may cushion the shock of climate change, which is 
predicted to bring variability in floods and droughts, a variability that makes Egypt feel even 
more vulnerable. 
On the Nile, some upstream countries seem to have become more assertive vis-à-vis Egypt 
and Egypt is willing to initiate projects with joint benefits that will increase the amount of water 
flowing into Egypt, such as the aforementioned Jonglei Canal. Egypt‘s role in peace building in 
Sudan is very closely linked to a (Egypt‘s) desire to have the canal completed and indeed 
Egyptian experts will be involved in new dam plans (Mason et al. 2006). This seems to signal a 
somewhat greater leniency on upstream development project, helped by a linkage politics that 
broadens the negotiation beyond water to energy. In terms of epistemic communities, all kinds of 
technical basin co-operation have sought to make sure that experts keep exchanging information 
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even when political communication breaks down (so-called Track 2, 3 and 4 processes – Dore 
2007). 
 
Reframing security complexes: Towards integration? 
By contrast, pluralists (Lockeians) take an ‗interests‘ approach to regimes. This interest-based 
approach posits that when two or more countries have a joint interest in co-operation, and need 
contractual security to realise it, they will co-operate. Regimes reduce transaction costs, making 
the costs and benefits of action clearer (Jägerskog 2003). Ever greater integration results from 
ever-lengthening chains of interdependence, promoting peaceful competition (trade and 
democracy). Rather than material ´hard power´, pluralists advocate bringing soft power to bear 
(Nye 2005) capturing the ´hearts and minds´ of non-hegemons, aspiring to enjoy the benefits the 
hegemon enjoys (values). For this school, international regimes are the ‗implicit principles, 
norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors‘ expectations converge in a 
given area of international relations‘ (Krasner 1983: 1). The leading power does not have to be 
the strongest power: Malta was a leading power in codifying the Law of the Sea and as Haufler 
(1993) has argued, regime values often originate in society, then seep through into governmental 
circles. 
In the context of the present research‘s concern with frames it is especially instructive to 
consider the cognitive school within Lockeian pluralism, which similarly focuses on values but links 
those with the emergence of joint use of knowledge and learning to consolidate the technical and 
social ingenuity are needed to establish water regimes (Turton 2001). Complexity and uncertainty 
are reduced through the leadership of so-called ‗epistemic communities' (Haas 1992). Epistemic 
communities are groups of experts and professionals who agree on particular definitions and 
methods. As actors realise their interdependence and as knowledge grows and becomes accepted, 
states will co-ordinate more and more with each other, for example the riparian states of the 
Mediterranean Sea who agreed on the ‗Plan Bleu‘ for cleaning the sea up (Haas 1992). Regime 
formation seals this frame convergence with a pragmatic cognitive ‗closure‘. Such sea or basin 
regimes may be triggered by what Hajer (1996) terms an emblematic event; an environmental crisis 
or shock such as the Sevoso spill on the Rhine in 1976 (Young 1994), or fear of the 
consequences of climate change. 
 
This re-construction gives a whole new perspective of security crisis and war, and has induced 
considerable optimism. If securitised relations suppress ambiguity and diversity, desecuritised 
relations celebrate diversity and toleration. But how do you shift from securitised to 
desecuritised? 
The Copenhagen school sees securitisation and desecuritisation as two sides of the same coin 
in a context in which (in)security is the key concern. Desecuritisation still holds the potential for 
war and resecuritisation is always a distinct possibility. However they consider it possible to 
overcome the security dynamic. As regimes form and war become an increasingly unlikely 
prospect, relations may reach a state of asecurity, in which the belief has settled in that others have 
either lost the capacity to mount an attack, or have no intention to do so even though they can. If 
the securitisation-desecuritisation dynamic is transcended, a situation of asecurity is achieved in 
which war is no longer an issue. This happens when the integration in a region is well-developed. 
Integration creates a security community (Deutsch 1957), a ‗community of friends‘ in which war 
between the community partners has become almost unthinkable. 
A security complex can thus be governed by ‘anarchy‘ (a dog-eat-dog situation in which each 
state ‗goes it alone‘), a regime (some co-operation), or integration. As Buzan and Waever (2001) 
note, the security complex typology maps well with Alexander Wendt‘s constructivist approach 
to relations between states (Table below). In the tradition of the so-called English School in 
International Relations, Wendt sees states as social beings who together form a Westphalian 
‗society‘ of states. Through their interactions, states can learn and redefine their interests and 
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identities. Wendt (1999), spearheading the constructivist turn in International Relations, notes 
that states may see each other as rivals (who see others as a waste of space), competitors (who 
want to outcompete but not eliminate the other, as in a game) and friends (who look out for each 
other)167. Relations between states in a ‗regional complex‘ may be dominated by any of these 
three. 
Transboundary basins like the Nile and Euphrates Tigris can be seen as a hydro-security 
complex, in which states are crucially interdependent for their security needs (Lindholm 1995, 
Turton 2003, after Buzan 1991). In such complexes, the perception of relations between co-
riparians can be transformed from enemy to friend. The Mekong counts as a (flawed) exemplar 
of water-based integration, based on the Tennessee Valley Authority, which survived the Cold 
War and is overseen by a multi-state Mekong Basin Commission.168 The Nile Basin Initiative is 
hoped to enable similar integration. 
Following Wendt‘s (1999) model, it should be possible to describe the relations between states 
at basin level as Hobbesian, Lockeian or even Kantian (see Table below): 
 
TABLE 4A.1    Relations in the hydro-security complex. In the ´water peace´ narrative, defence dilemmas 
lead to conflict relations, but can be desecuritised after which increasing basin integration makes the 
prospect of war ever more remote.  
 
Relations in 
Buzan´s 
Security 
complex 
Relations in Wendt´s 
society of states 
Likelihood of War Key ambition Turkey and 
Egypt in the 
hydro-security 
complex 
Anarchy Hobbesian: Dog eat dog 
rivalry top the death 
Preparation for war Eliminate Threats and alleged 
ploys to destroy 
infrastructure  
Mature anarchy Lockeian: Generally 
peaceful competition; 
Some exchange and 
regime  formation 
War cannot be ruled 
out, but 
interdependence is 
growing 
Co-exist Emerging basin 
regimes. ‗Track-2‘ 
processes 
Security 
Community 
Kantian: Integration, 
Solidarity 
 
War has become 
unthinkable 
Integrate - 
 
 
Critical regime theory 
While usefully expanding a materialist and normative approach with knowledge and ideas, a 
significant problem with the cognitive school in regime analysis is that it only focuses on what is 
being said and established, not what cannot be said as a result of this very closure. The hegemony 
approach brings a different kind of understanding of regime. The stability of expectations a regime 
procures, valued as an international public good, does not mean there is no more underlying 
conflict and asymmetry; the relationship between hegemons and non-hegemons is not necessarily 
peaceful or cooperative. But the term hegemonic stability only tells us that there is no overt 
conflict, as closure makes it difficult to challenge established assumptions and procedures. 
Zaschke (1990) has analysed regimes from a Marxist control perspective, Keeley (1990) has 
taken a Foucaultian perspective of regimes while a political ecology approach helps us link 
regimes institutions, knowledge and nature (Waller 1995).169 What the approaches have in 
common is that they critically engage with the co-operative label of regimes. While, we saw that 
for the constructivist security analysts a security community and integration are the ultimate 
goals, a critical stance would note that the word ‗community‘ in security community presupposes 
a beneficial, voluntary and legitimate nature, and ignores how contestable knowledge always 
needs to be legitimised.  
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The term, ´sanctioned discourse´ (discursive hegemony), reveals that there is also non-
sanctioned discourse: the ‗unspeakable‘ is as important as the spoken word. This aspect of 
‗sanctioned discourse‘ is hinted at but unfortunately not elaborated on by Jägerskog (2004) in his 
work on the river Jordan regime. This gives us a perspective on the form Nilotic co-operation is 
taking. The purpose of official discourse is "to allay, suspend and close off popular doubt 
through an ideal and discursive appropriation of material problem" (Burton and Carlen (1979), 
quoted in Miniotaite (2000).170 This becomes more pressing in a Lockeian arena where open 
display of state power is not acceptable, so that it is even more important that the state concept 
of control appears egalitarian while serving the dominance of the state. ―Which discourse is the 
hegemon (…) often only becomes clear in a crisis – i.e. when even institution and discourse 
collapses and face a total identity crisis at which point several discourses would try to solve the 
situation and one, the hegemon, would succeed and create the new framework for identity and 
meaning‖ (Lindahl and Sundset 2003: 23, my emphasis, JW) 
Yet a ‗mobilisation of bias‘ due to control of the agenda (Lukes‘ second face of power, Lukes 
1974 -2005) may make sure the issue never reaches the agenda while third-dimension, 
normalising power may ensure the issue never even comes to mind. A Foucauldian take on 
regimes would argue that the power/knowledge agreed on in those epistemic community has 
disciplinary force (Keeley 1990), ensuring compliance with hegemonic concerns. Such 
communities can enforce ‗sanctioned discourse‘ and in so doing makes co-ordination easier for 
the hegemonic power: it becomes impossible to touch on certain issues or define them 
differently. 
 
‗How they agree upon and articulate causal linkages within complex issue spaces; how they frame issues 
and define salient discourse; how they define and limit potential solutions or outcomes; and how they 
define state interests within the issue space (...) As technical knowledge disseminates and links 
specialists across political boundaries, we see the formation of knowledge-based power networks on a 
global scale ‗(Ford Brown 1997). 
 
Hegemonic discourse establishes a regime of truth, which ‗dominates, covers up, and discredits 
what Foucault terms ‗subjugated knowledges‘ (Keeley, 1990: 91). 
A striking aspect of Nile cooperation is that it is focused on improving water quality or 
exploiting non-consumptive water quantities (hydro-electricity). Water co-operation never 
touches on the distribution of water between the countries. It also ensures a ‗sanctioned 
discourse‘ that prevents a frank debate on the terms of Nile co-operation. While learning and 
shared benefits are certainly within reach, they do not take away from their role of propping up 
Egypt‘s primacy. 
In this context it is striking to see a paper on the 8th Nile 2002 Conference contrasts ‗hydro-
cooperation‗ with ‗hydro-politics‘, a critical approach would argue that cooperation is a form of 
hydropolitics too. Their separation tells us something fundamental about the conditions under 
which Nile cooperation takes place. Such regime analysis highlights how exposes that the Nile 
regime helps Egypt maintain hegemonic control in a non-coercive way. 
Since the 1980s, Egypt has pursued a basin strategy in which ‗Egyptian primacy would be 
ensured by moderation and consensus-building rather than by revolutionary conquest or militant 
intimidation‘ (Rubin 1998). While Ethiopia and other states resent not being able to develop their 
water resources, they would have little opportunity to do so, economically speaking, and would 
rely on external donors for whom they are not as strategically important as Egypt.  
Man‘s control over the river tends to be far more limited than both captors and their critics 
fear. But the illusion of control sets in motion (hegemonic) projects, and resistance to them. Now 
that Egypt has captured the Nile flow it claims it plans to use 5 BCM for Toshka, and Turkey 
could capture the Euphrates flow, but whether it would do so is also dubious. The Toshka 
spillway justifies a water claim without even necessarily using it. Egypt appears to capture the 
water for development because it can, not because of an urgent need. For hegemony to remain 
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uncontested, it takes the consent of other actors. In the case of the Nile, it is the World Bank that 
upholds the sanctioned discourse, ´talking the talk´ of the Egyptian leadership, which has a 
decisive influence on the formation of the new Nile basin regime. 
While Ethiopia as well as some other upstream countries have become more assertive vis-à-vis 
Egypt, they have never rescinded earlier treaties and appear to co-operate happily under the NBI. 
Likewise, Turkey‘s downstream co-riparians on the Euphrates and Tigris have barked much 
worse than their bite, especially before 1998. The theatre of moves and countermoves for public 
consumption seems to hide a reassuring pattern of stability. 
A hegemonic analysis of Tigris regime politics was already foreshadowed in Chapter. 3. In the 
Realist perspective the Turks, as upstreamers, have little incentive to co-operate. Indeed while 
there has been technical cooperation, there has not been a serious initiative for a trilateral deal. 
On the Euphrates, peace with Syria freed Turkey from the headache of the Kurdish card. Given 
hegemonic rivalry on the Tigris, Turkey had an interest in joining the anti-Saddam coalition in 
1990 and 2003 but the Turks also need the Iraqis to control the Iraqi Kurds. The overlay of 
American global hegemony buttresses Turkey‘s predominance, but stands in the way of Turkish-
Iraqi appeasement. The de-escalation is supported by a ´Track-Two´ (non-official) co-operation 
process between the Euphrates and Tigris neighbours seeking to get things moving at the 
practical level while the official ‗Track-One‘ interaction remains troublesome, however has 
characteristics of the creation of stable expectations that is the crux of a basin regime. At its 
public presentation during the World Water Week 2006 in Stockholm, which I attended, it was 
notable no political issues were discussed, suggesting a sanctioned discourse is at play in this 
context as well. 
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 Chapter 5:  Death of the mega-projects?  
The controversy over Flood Action Plan 20, 
Bangladesh 
 
 
 
 ‗Water management? There is no water for eight months, so what are they doing?‘ (Tangail citizen) 
‗It‘s going to destroy us more than the floods do,‘ Hossain [a Tangail citizen] says. ‗How can they do 
this to us?‘ 
‗Operation successful, the patient died.‘ (Bangladesh consultant on FAP 20). 
 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In age-old South Asian cosmology, the river feeds, the river destroys in an endless cycle of death 
and regeneration.171 Whoever wants to control the river, attempts to control the Mother Goddess 
and play God over life and death. Nevertheless, this is what the initiators of the Flood Action 
Plan sought to do in Bangladesh after the floods of 1987 and ‗88: to prevent flood destruction 
for good. 
Flood Action Plan 20 (FAP-20), also known as the Compartmentalisation Pilot Project172 was 
the Plan‘s flagship project, a Dutch-initiated experiment in participatory flood management in 
North-Central Bangladesh. The compartmentalisation of polders, enabling the controlled 
drainage of monsoon water, was conceived as an innovative and participatory compromise 
between ‗wet‘ and ‗dry‘ flood management (ISPAN 1992; Faaland et al. 1995; Final CPP final 
report, 2000). The drainage between compartments was to be managed by user committees. 
According to its eventual Technical Assistance Project Proform (TAPP), the project‘s Terms 
of Reference laid down in 1993, FAP-20 was intended to establish feasible, achievable and 
sustainable water management systems. While straightforward in engineering terms (Shamunnay 
1996), its operation brought with it a host of socio-economic, environmental and institutional 
issues which unexpectedly politicised the project. 
As Geof Wood (1997) notes, ‗with a centrally important natural resource determining so many 
other features of life (...) it would be surprising if there was no controversy‘. The surprising thing 
about the conflict over FAP-20 however is that a local movement against a fairly small project 
managed to create a global stir. The coordinating World Bank faced busloads of angry women in 
Dhaka shouting ‗break the dams!‘ and ‗stop FAP! Grow forests!‗173 The protesters were decrying 
the project‘s negative impact on landless and fisherfolk in the project area and dwellers of the 
adjoining areas, which led to occasional violence. The European Greens organised a protest 
conference against FAP as a whole, in so doing mobilising international opinion against the 
scheme. Donors started to pull out in 1994, which almost led to the project‘s discontinuation 
after 1995. Disagreement over both the technical (compartmentalisation) and institutional 
(participation) element of FAP-20 led to several reformulations of the programme. 
The case study seeks to understand why and how this happened by analysing hegemonic 
problem frames and counter-frames, securitising moves and countermoves to change the ‗flood 
frames‘ of risk and responsibility. It zooms in on the ‗felicity‘ of security frames and counter-
frames shaping controversies on flood management with their intended audience. Because of the 
strong overlay of international development aid on the domestic scene (Section 5.2), the conflict 
over FAP-20 was played out as much at the international as the national level. After sketching the 
tense Bangladeshi political context in Section 5.3 and the project selection process in 5,4, Section 
5.5 explains the intended participatory structure and experience with participation in FAP, after 
which the focus turns to unintended ´participation´: the strategy of resistance and politicisation 
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of alternatives which, it argues, had striking ´dramaturgic´ content. In 1995, the project was at a 
crossroads. Section 5.6 describes the events and changes introduced in the second phase of FAP, 
and how the project fared in the flood of 1998. In closing, Section 5.7 contrasts the image of 
FAP as a mega-project to stop floods ‗forever‘ with FAP as a programme of studies, as it is now 
sometimes represented. 
As the project was Dutch-initiated, I have mainly focused on the Dutch side in my discussion 
of the donor dimension. Some 30 interviews and informative conversations were held in Dhaka 
and Tangail in November and December 2000 with Dutch donor representatives, BWDB senior 
and diploma engineers, Bangladeshi and Dutch project consultants, a Dutch team leader, a Dutch 
Embassy secretary responsible for the FAP-20 project, Bangladeshi and Dutch NGOs as well as 
local people in Tangail. Interviewees were found through snowballing, while the documentation 
mainly draws on an extensive search of the World Bank, project office and Wageningen 
University libraries. 
The analysis also draws on findings of a group of Wageningen and Delft MSc students from 
both natural and social science backgrounds, who visited Tangail in 2006 to make a quick scan of 
what happened to the FAP-20 project in the context of DHO‘s (Dutch Platform for Sustainable 
Higher Education) North South exchange project.  
 
 
TABLE 5.1 FAP Project history and rationale. Countermoves are italicised 
Date Event  
Autumn 
1987, 1988 
Major flood events in Bangladesh  5.2 
1989 London donor conference; Selection of FAP20; Presidential approval 
BARC report against Green Revolution technologies 
5.4 
1990 Oct Final draft of project proposal FAP-20 (Original TAPP July 1990)  
1991 (December:) FAP-20 inception report  
1992 Euroconsult contracted; public consultation 5.5.1 
1993 FPCO‘s Guidelines for People‘s Participation  
1993 FAP protests in Tangail and Dhaka leading to 
- Dutch IOV Inspection team reports 
- Dutch/German donor review mission advises to shore up FAP 20-Sirajganj 
- FAP TAPP being recast (June 1993) 
5.6.3 
1994 BELA Lawsuit against FAP-20 
Donors starting to reconsider 
5.6.5, 
5,7 
1995, 
May 
- Dutch Mid-term evaluation team - recommends continuation with different     
consultant 
- UNDP (Faaland) report ‗Flood and Water Management: Towards a public 
debate‘ 
5.6.3 
1995, 
Oct 
- CPP (FAP-20) Reformulation Mission Report 
- Change of main consultant 
 
1996 German ODA Minister visits, shores up funding in March, requests Inception 
report for 2nd phase 
5.6.3 
1997 Dutch ODA Minister visits 5.7.3 
1998 1 in 100 year flood hits Bangladesh (see 5.7.4). Absence of famine. 5.7.4 
2000 End of Project; Final Report released - but not underlying studies 5.6.4 
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FIG. 5.1 Location of Tangail and Dhaleswari Closure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 FIG. 5.2 Tangail District 
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TABLE 5.2 Flood Action Plan Proposals  
 
No. 
 
Name of FAP project 
 
Funding Agencies 
 
Committed 
Spent 
approx. 
(March 
1996) 
1 Brahmaputra Right Embankment 
strengthening 
IDA 3.36 3.36 
2 Northwest regional study UK, Japan 4.60 4.60 
3 North Central Regional study EU, France 3.56 3.56 
3.1 Jamalpur Priority Project France, EU 2.85 2.85 
4 South West Area Water Resources and 
Management Study 
ADB, UNDP 3.83 3.83 
5 South East Regional Study DA, UNDP 2.20 2.20 
6 North East Regional Study Canada 14.60 11.99 
7 Cyclone Protection Project Eu, IDA 1.00 1.00 
8A Greater Dhaka Protection Project Japan 3.00 3.00 
8B Dhaka Integrated Flood protection 
Project 
ADB 0.57 0.57 
9A Secondary Towns Integrated Flood 
protection Project 
ADB 0.55 0.55 
9B Meghna River Bank Protection Short 
Term Study 
IDA 1.15 1.15 
10 Flood Forecasting and Warning Project UNDP, Japan 5.70 3.50 
11 Disaster Preparedness Programme UNDP 1.10 1.10 
12 FCD/I Agriculture Study UK, Japan 1.60 1.60 
13 Operation and Maintenance study 
(Phase-I) 
UK, Japan 0.60 0.60 
14 Flood Response Study USA 0.92 0.92 
15 Land Acquisition and Resettlement Study Sweden 0.40 0.40 
16 Environmental Study USA 4.04 4.00 
17 Fisheries Study and Pilot Project (Phase-
I) 
UK 3.40 3.40 
18 Topographic Mapping Finland, France, 
Switzerland, 
Germany 
6.71 6.50 
19 Geographic Information System USA 4.36 4.35 
20 Compartmentalization Pilot Project Netherlands, 
Germany 
17.09 11.84 
21/22 Bank Protection, River Training and 
AFPM Pilot Project 
Germany, France 40.00 19.41 
23 Flood Proofing Pilot Project USA 0.30 0.30 
24 River Survey Programme EU 14.70 10.90 
25 Flood Modelling and Management 
Project 
Denmark, France, 
NL, UK 
4.39 4.39 
26 Institutional Development Programme UNDP, France 3.60 3.40 
(after: Brammer, 1990) 
 
 
5.2 FAP: ‘BIRTH OF A MEGA-PROJECT?’ 
 
5.2.1  PHYSICAL CONTEXT   
 
Bangladesh is situated in the most active river delta in the world and has the highest density of 
rivers per capita. The country is the gift of the three main rivers: Brahmaputra/Jamuna, the 
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largest river in the Himalayan system (extending into Tibet and Nepal), the Ganges and the 
Padma or Padda. The three combine before draining into the Bay of Bengal. In 1987 and 1988, 
Bangladesh experienced two truly devastating floods, the latter hitting the country especially hard 
as the peaks of the three major rivers synchronised within a two-week period (GoB/UNDP, 
1989). The discharge of the Brahmaputra-Jamuna, on average 19,000 m3/s, approached 100,000 
m3/s in 1987/88 (cf. 12,600 for the river Rhine‘s peak as it reached the Netherlands in early 
1995). The 1988 flood, a 1 in 100 year event, put 60% of the country under water for two weeks, 
damaging 7.2 million homes, affecting 45 million people and causing ´2300 immediate deaths‘ 
(Wood, 1999).  
Bangladesh has a very low gradient. Over 90% is alluvial lowland (Raqub Ahmed in Gain 
1998). The North Central Area, where Tangail and the capital Dhaka are located, is very flat, 
between 18 and 4 m above sea level (except the Madhupur Tract). Thus, as soon as the flood 
stage is reached, enormous tracts of land are flooded. This brings irrigation and sediment, but 
also erodes alluvial soils. Riverbank dwellers are plagued by riverbank erosion, especially in the 
monsoon (wet) season, which runs from June until October), accounting for 90% of inflow. The 
soft soils are highly unsuitable for building structures, which makes ‗the cost of building groins 
[sic] and revetments (...) very high‘ (Khalequzzaman, 1994)   
An example is the Jamuna Right Bank Embankment (RBE), an extensive levee built in 1960 to 
stabilise the river Jamuna, whose width averages 10 km. The embankment broke in 1987-88. 
Sudden bank erosion, worsened by human-induced erosion to enlarge living space, displaces huge 
numbers of residents to char land (unstable islands), khas (state-owned) land and to the cities, 
notably Dhaka, intensifying urbanisation. 
Geologically, the Tangail area, along the Jamuna, has been formed by faulting and tilting. 
Floods also carved out the landscape: the Brahmaputra-Jamuna, for example, has shifted 
westward by 100 kms in the past 200 years and can cut a 30-50m deep channel in one flood 
event. Morphological processes can give rise to opening and closing of tributaries, such as a shift 
of the Jamuna into the Dhaleswari offtake. Other offtakes are silted up such that upstream 
discharge is almost zero. This dynamic of opening and closing channels proved a vital factor for 
the survival of FAP-20 in 1995, as will be explained later in this case study. 
The FAP-20 area is bounded by the Dhaleswari and Elanjani rivers in the west, Pungli in the 
east and Louhajang and Gala khal (channel) in the north; the south boundary is an existing road 
between Silimpur and Karatia. Climate is dominated by monsoon winds: a cold and dry 
Northeast monsoon rains from Nov-Feb, while a Southwest monsoon (June-October) brings 
heavy rainfall. While pre-monsoon rains fall in March, April and May, flooding in the Jamuna and 
its tributaries results from a long monsoon rainfall season and snowmelt from the Himalayas. At 
times more important is local rainfall in the Dhaleswari and Old Brahmaputra, both meandering 
smaller rivers that rapidly run drier in the winter season as rainfall tapers off. Backgrounded by 
the problems posed by the flood (kharif) season, in which aman rice is produced. 
But monsoon rains are not the only climatic worry for Bangladeshis. In the post-monsoon season, 
all local rivers are just drains fed by excess irrigation water and ground water - no new water 
comes in to replenish the flow. Especially the end of the dry (rabi) season, April/May, brings 
problematic droughts every three to four years (CPP Interim Report 1995, Annex 6). According 
to Boyce (1990) too little water is a greater threat for the area‘s 250,000 people (living in 202 
villages) than too much. 
The growth in agricultural production in this area has come from irrigated (groundwater-fed) 
winter crops rather than from monsoon crops fed by surface water. In light of these extremes, 
farmers tend to try and diversify their plots between different land elevations to avoid losing 
harvests to peak flooding or droughts (van Koppen, 1998). 
 
Amid the many mishaps striking Bangladesh and other developing countries every year, the 
reason why this particular hazard reached the top of the international agenda seems fortuitous. 
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According to Chowdhury (1992) what spurred the Bangladeshi President, General Ershad to 
initiate a flood protection scheme for Dhaka and protect order was the fact that the 1988 flood, 
unusually, affected the well-to-do in the capital, Dhaka: the American Embassy, the model towns 
and army cantonment as well as his own home. Mme Danielle Mitterrand, the then French 
president‘s wife and well known for her interest in social causes, happened to visit Dhaka and 
Tangail with an international media entourage, and, shocked at the damage, raised the issue with 
her husband, who in turn was eager to raise France‘s profile in the world as a benefactor (Boyce, 
1990). 
Mitterrand promoted the idea of putting an end to floods in Bangladesh - for good - at the G7 
conference in Paris in July 1989. The G7 duly paved the way for the Flood Action Plan and 
endorsed the World Bank/GoB Flood Action programme, presented in December 1989 during a 
specially convened donor conference in London, where donors conducted a ‗bidding war‘ (Dutch 
consultant, int.) between donors. The political will to fund flood protection schemes triggered no 
less than eight flood studies, which will be discussed in the next section. The resulting package of 
26 projects was tabled in London,. While the World Bank did not fund any of the ensuing flood 
studies, it volunteered to co-ordinate between the donor efforts.174 Other donors were the Asian 
Development Bank, UNDP, the USA, European Union, the UK, Germany, France, Netherlands, 
Sweden, Finland, Canada, Switzerland, Denmark, and Japan – 15 in all. Norway decided not to 
support the FAP; but funded a very critical study on FAP by the radical, Sussex-trained 
Bangladeshi activist-sociologist, Shapan Adnan (Hanchett, 1997, Adnan, 1992). 
The Dutch government accepted responsibility for three projects: FAP-20, FAP 5b (the 
Meghna Estuary Study) and FAP-25 (the Flood Monitoring and Management Project), the latter 
co-supported by Denmark, France and the UK. According to Dutch interviewees. enthusiasm in 
The Hague was not great; it was the Dutch Embassy in Dhaka that persuaded a reluctant Dutch 
government to take up FAP-20 as a way to demonstrate Dutch prowess in water and people 
management. The Dutch must have been relieved that the Germans (KfW) showed a keen 
interest to participate in FAP-20. Their original agreement to work on a 50-50 basis later became 
2-to-1: Germany shouldered EUR 20 million and the Dutch EUR10 million, while the 
Bangladeshi counterpart contribution amounted to EUR 2.8 million (Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau, 
2004).175 This brought in German Lahmeyer as a consultant next to Euroconsult, the main 
contractor for the Netherlands. Lahmeyer also provided the (Dutch) team leader, Armand Evers 
as from 1994. 
 
The next Sections sketch how tremendous international overlay impinged on the framing of 
the floods in terms of cause and cure (selection of alternatives). For this it is important to delve 
briefly into the domestic and international patronage relations governing Bangladesh which 
explain how dependence relations play out both within and outside the country. 
 
 
5.2.2 THE SOCIOPOLITICAL CONTEXT 
 
Domestic Patronage: Neo-patrimonialism 
Bangladeshi society is highly fragmented – as it were, compartmentalised (Kemp, 2004). There 
are ‗few overarching social loyalties that can provide the social glue needed to develop (…) social 
and political organisations‘ (Kochanek, 1993). Kochanek identifies the weakness of political 
institutions, an authoritarian and unresponsive bureaucratic culture and highly fictionalised 
political parties as reasons why there is no real threat to a deeply ingrained patron-client system 
mediating access to and influence on the highly centralised political system (ibid.). Right from 
independence, the liberator of the realm, Mujib-ur-Rahman, instated a spoils system creating a 
culture of personal gain (Chatterjee et al., 2006).176 The bureaucratic culture is very top-down 
oriented, training of the civil service is very general, one‘s ascent within the civil service is mostly 
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based on one‘ s length of tenure or political affiliation rather than merit, and public office is 
strongly personalised and ‗politicised‘ (Chatterjee et al., 2006). 
Bangladesh has a vibrant civil society, evidenced by an impressive number (some 20,000) of 
NGOs. They are often crisis-driven, but quickly adapt to new topical challenges with creative re-
formulation of their acronyms.177 Several go back to the late 1960s, and only later were 
‗discovered‘ by foreign organisations as targets for funding. They tend to be established by the 
educated middle class with good connections in the power elite (A. Rahman, n.d.). Indeed, 
NGOs tend to mirror patron-client politics; people follow leaders and look where the money 
goes. Thus, while awareness about FAP-20 was raised by an intellectual elite organised in NGOs 
such as BARC and BCAS, it could be expected that many people were following local patrons 
(NGO leaders) when anti-FAP protest reached the grassroots. 
The systemic legitimacy of the Bangladeshi government is still very low. While an independent 
study shows the poor have great faith in the ability of government to see to their needs (Ali and 
Hossain, 2006) the interviews suggest that the political sector is universally held in low esteem 
even by high-level public servants. This is in no small measure due to the tendency for politicians 
to be in it for the money. Rents obtained from development can be redistributed by legal and 
illegal means, thus providing the power base for domestic patronage. Politics and aid in 
Bangladesh are a means of personal enrichment through sanctioned corruption. While corruption 
and clientelism are also widespread in other case study countries, Bangladesh beats almost 
anyone, ranking 156th out of 163 countries in Transparency International‗s Corruption Perception 
Index 2006178. Corruption played a part in subsequent external interventions to reform water 
agencies. 
As Clarence Maloney put it, ‗payoff is the lifeblood of the country‘ (c. in Kochanek, 1993)179. 
Each externally-funded development project quite openly deducts a percentage for the ruling 
party (ibid.). Business co-opts politics such that loans are routinely forgiven and labour rights 
practically non-existent (the ‗commercialisation of power‘, see Kochanek in Jahan, 2000). 
 
Securitised decision in a politicised society  
FAP began life in a securitised context: a centralised dictatorship, which claimed to create law 
and order in an unstable, deeply politicised society. Each and every single development project 
needed President Ershad‘s signature. While the floods legitimised radical measures, the absence 
of routine political context made FAP likely to remain undebated after the immediate memory of 
the flood had faded. 
While Bangladesh returned to formal democracy in 1990, the FAP issue was only debated in a 
Parliamentary subcommittee after the Dutch government insisted on it, feeling ‗any controversial 
subject of such major importance must get ‗legitimacy‘ from Parliament‘.180 Meanwhile, elections 
continue to be contested and governments systematically undermined by the opposition. A 
fundamental lack of mutual legitimacy between the parties originates in a dispute about heroes 
and villains in and prior to the War of Liberation. Until this day, political disputes are dominated 
by conflicts over definitions and symbols of ethnicity (Bengali vs. Bangladeshi), socialism vs. the 
private sector, secularism vs. Islam, and democracy vs. a presidential system (Kochanek, 1993). 
Mudslinging, inducing socio-economic paralysis through hartals (general strikes)181 and endemic 
political violence between parties is rife. Jatiya Sangsad (Parliament) has played a marginal role182.  
The Bangladeshi judiciary has a better standing than Parliament (Kochanek, 2000), but 
Bangladesh has not succeeded in separating the judiciary from the executive. Judges often have 
links to senior politicians and lower courts are ‗venal‘ (Roberts and Fagernäs, 2004). This makes it 
hard for the Supreme Court to contravene the party in power. Also, the legal regime is not very 
well developed, and competing claims to land ownership can be made with different agencies 
(Wood, 1995)  As the rate of adult literacy is low: 41% of over 15s (HDI, 2003), people are at the 
mercy of the literati. The politics of obstruction and disruption dominate normal political strategy 
and also pervades university life. Political killings of student (chhatra) leaders are the order of the 
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day, stifling academic life. When I was visiting Bangladesh in late 2000, a student (chhatra) leader 
on his way to his physiotherapist was killed by adversaries in Gulshan New Town. The ubiquity 
of private security forces underscores the tense climate (author‘s observations, 2000). 
 
 
 
TABLE 5.3  The four main nationally active political parties (out of 130) in Bangladesh, their claim to fame and 
their main delegitimising characteristics in 2001. In the periods not covered by the dates mentioned, a 
caretaker government was instated, or the country was in chaos. 
 
 period in power claim to legitimacy delegitimising 
claim 
current leader and 
family relationship 
Awami 
League 
1971-76; 1996-
2001 
Mujib‘s heroic role in 
war of liberation; got 
killed (martyrdom) 
Sheikh Mujib was in 
Pakistan during the 
war 
Mujib‘s daughter, Sheikh 
Hasina 
BNP 1976-80, 1991-
96, 2001- 
Zia‘s heroic role in 
war of liberation; 
killed 
Autocracy Zia‘s wife, Khaleda Zia 
Ershad 1982-90 Providing law and 
order; jailed 
Autocracy, 
dictatorship 
Ershad‘s wife 
Jamaat-e-
Islami 
- (in 2001 four-
party coalition) 
Upholding Islamic 
values 
Fundamentalism, 
collaboration with 
Pakistani forces 
Azam (persecuted for 
alleged war crimes) 
 
 
 
As the Government of Bangladesh has proved unwilling to cede much control to allow 
administrative decentralisation and economic liberalisation, local government and the market 
sector continue to be weak. Patronage extends to the business sector and consultancies; debts are 
seldom repaid. Industrialisation has been state-led and the state is extremely reluctant to loosen 
its grip on the economy (Kochanek, 2000). 
Unhelpfully, local politics proves as troubled as national politics. Like Egypt, Bangladesh is a 
textbook example of what Weber has labelled ‗patrimonialism‘, a form of traditional domination 
where the ruler, supported by an administrative staff and military forces, treats the realm as his 
personal property, handing out privileges and favours (Islam, 2006). 
Given this culture, it is not surprising that the key water institute in Bangladesh has a bad name 
for corruption and clientelism - but NGOs are not exempt from these charges, either. 
The key actor in Bangladesh‘s water management is the public works department, the 
Bangladesh Water Development Board (BWDB). The Board, a semi-autonomous public agency 
under the administrative control of the Ministry of Water Resources, emerged in 1971 from the 
division of the East Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority (EPWAPDA) and split 
into separate water and power divisions in 1972.  
The Board derives its legitimacy from erecting large structural works and technical expertise. 
There is an increasing trend on the part of the donors for development projects to involve NGOs 
to promote development. In the Netherlands this has been institutionalised through co-financing 
institutions, which distribute ODA money through private channels. Of those, ICCO and 
NOVIB are the largest active in Bangladesh. The funding obtained from those co-financing 
organisations to a crucial degree enabled Bangladesh NGOs to voice their point internationally. 
In FAP-20 there was likewise an allocated place for NGOs, notably the Grameen Bank, famous 
for introducing micro-credit to the poor. 
Yet, when FAP-20 commenced, the BWDB and the NGOs enjoyed very low mutual 
legitimacy. NGOs accused the BWDB of pilferage and corruption, and of being unable to listen 
to ‗the people‘, given their dismissal of the protests. The Dhaka NGO Shamunnay, for example, 
characterised the BWDB‘s culture as ‗secretive, arrogant and ―exclusive‖‘ (Shamunnay, 1996: 81). 
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From the perspective of engineers, NGOs lack the necessary expertise in water management, 
and engineers are keen to point out their less successful forays into water management. Lack of 
expertise is a major delegitimiser in the eyes of the engineering/consultancy community183.  
A negative mutual image thrives on mutual isolation and indeed, in 1993 NGOs and the 
Government of Bangladesh (GoB) were not talking (IOV 1993). For their part, several Dutch 
consultants I talked to in late 2000 were happy to level criticism at both NGOs and the GoB. A 
Dutch consultant interviewee labelled Adnan Shapan, the NGO sociologist-activist, as a 
‗nincompoop‘ and a ‗pest‘ and the BWDB as ‗hopelessly corrupt‘. Another Dutch consultant 
noted that when BWDB engineers turn up at all, they are ‗arrogant and give orders‘. In the 
context of the latter, several interviewees feel too much money was thrown at Bangladesh 
without tangible results. A third Dutch consultant advocated cutting aid funds by a third, to force 
more rational spending on the part of the Bangladeshis. 
Power, expressed in ‗fear or favours‘ (Kemp 2004), spills over from the domestic to the 
transnational level. There is a strong suspicion that international contractors ‗buy‘ key people in 
Government of Bangladesh which help them to new projects by which a highly competitive 
international construction sector can survive (in Smit, 1993, and interviews). This is especially 
worrying as contractors are in fact preparing Terms of Reference and national policies184. But why 
is Bangladesh so dependent on the foreign aid community? To understand how this is possible, 
we have to look at Bangladesh‘s position in the international arena. 
 
External Patronage 
As Ferguson (1994) has shown for Lesotho and Mitchell (1995) for Egypt, the ‗facts‘ can be 
stacked such that a country seems to be badly in need of international development assistance - 
in spite of both these countries doing rather well economically. Bangladesh for its part has been 
internationally portrayed as the epitome of dependence on everything ever since it was born: on 
India, which surrounds it on three sides; on the regional rivers, 90% of whose catchment is 
outside its territory, and ultimately on international aid185. While, as we shall see, a quite different 
image of Bangladesh is possible, successive governments have done little to change the image of 
dependency, as the picture of Bangladesh as a helpless, hapless victim of circumstance, born in 
famine and floods – continues to strike a chord with donors (Bradnock and Saunders, 2000). 
When global warming came on the global agenda, Bangladesh again was a natural candidate for 
global concern given its sense population - ‗by the time global warming is likely to be well-
established, Bangladesh may well have a population density five times that of the densest 
developed country, Netherlands‘ (Myers, 1995 q. in Bate, 2001: 56). A dependent image, 
constantly at the mercy of others makes it attractive for Bangladesh not to take responsibility and 
ownership of flood mitigation efforts, while creating an expectation of support that make it 
impossible for donors to abandon the country. External donors186 and recipients are locked in a 
Catch-22 that not only keeps Bangladesh in a state of dependence, but also sustains a 
redistributive corruption culture. The development projects bring in money and capacities 
absorbed by amazing adaptability of both the GoB and NGOs to international development fads. 
Bangladesh is thus the dependent ‗downstream riparian‘ to an international flow of aid money. 
This international overlay is reflected in flood policy which, like the flood itself, is predominantly 
transnational (BELA Bulletin, 1998):.The fact that the FAP project was so clearly donor-driven 
reinforced this sense of imposition and victimisation, as if the Bangladeshis had no say at all in 
the FAP affair. As a rule, donors bring in consultancies from their own country, and it is foreign 
consultancies who tend to draw up the Terms of Reference for new tendered projects and the 
new national Water Policy document is drawn up by a UK consultancy, Halcrow, whose 
especially productive connections within Bangladesh government did not sit well with some 
interviewees. 
Yet, while the GoB will not bite the hand that feeds, donors only dominate policies on a 
temporary (project) basis, so that the continuity of the domestic configuration may ultimately win 
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out. Two key players, K. Siddiqi (FPCO, the project management) and Ainun Nishat (IUCN, the 
nature conservation NGO) insist they were involved in ‗everything‘ (pers. comm., 2000). The 
next section provides more detail on the selection of alternatives leading up to FAP and FAP-20. 
 
 
5.3 FAP-20 SELECTION: A COMPROMISE BETWEEN ‘DRY’ AND ‘WET’ 
 MANAGEMENT 
 
5.3.1 OSCILLATING FLOOD MANAGEMENT REGIMES 
 
Flood policy in Bangladesh can be said to have oscillated between a strong belief in flood control 
(zero floods) and a more cautious small-scale, living-with-the-floods approach (zero control) - a 
‗dry‘ and a ‗wet‘ frame (ISPAN, 1992; Faaland et al., 1995). 
The ‗wet‘ approach appreciates that not all river floods are necessarily bad floods. Barshas, 
‗good floods‘, or ‗inundations‘ (Nishat, n.d.187), are those generally perceived as doing more good 
than bad, supporting soil fertility, fish catch, navigation, ecosystems and ground water recharge 
etc. They affect a fourth to a third of the land surface each year (Brammer, 1990). When 
inundation causes damage to property and crops, disrupts communication and brings harmful 
effects to human beings as well as to flora and fauna, however, they are bannas/banyas, ‗bad 
floods‘. Flood proofing fits with this ‗wet‘ approach‘. The ‗dry‘ attractor on the other hand seeks 
to control all floods, emphasising the negatives of flood: fatalities, mass destitution and 
displacement. 
The ‗wet vs. dry‘ debate can also be read as a clash between two ‗concepts of (water) control´: it 
reflects a stand-off between a preponderance of government-supplied and owned flood control 
infrastructure (dry) and NGO-provided and privately owned tube wells for irrigation (wet). Large 
infrastructural works are easier to control, and also to cream off for bakshish, while tubewells are 
far more scattered. 
In more recent years, a corresponding debate has emerged whether agricultural development 
should be surface-water or groundwater based. Rice constitutes on average 71% of Bangladesh‘s 
agricultural output188 and Dhaka and Tangail are in the highest producing areas.189 But should this 
production prioritise protected cultivation of rain-fed T(ransplanted) Aman rice supplemented by 
surface irrigation in summer or groundwater-fed boro winter rice? (Wood, 1999, for flood and 
crop calendar see Faisal and Parveen, 2004). 
An argument favouring surface water is that the expected gains of groundwater irrigation are 
predicted to level off later in the 21st century (UNDP, 1995). Moreover, arsenic in ground water 
may lead to fatalities when consumed over longer periods of time. This will mean a greater 
emphasis on flood control/controlled flooding. In the course of the chapter, we shall encounter 
more dimensions of those ‗attractors‘ (Table 5.4 below): 
 
The international overlay has historically played a key role in flood policies in Bangladesh and 
its predecessor, (East) Pakistan. How did donor preferences influence the oscillation between the 
two flood management attractors? When Bangladesh was still East Pakistan, the report by an 
American mission led by Krüg had to the establishment of EPWAPDA, the predecessor of 
BWDB, in 1959, and the Master Plan of 1964, an ambitious programme of 59 major structures, 
6-7000 kms of dikes and 4300 km of drainage channels, polders in the flood plains to protect 
crops from flooding and enable a Green Revolution. The Master Plan was drawn up in Pakistan 
and for Pakistan, while most BWDB engineers involved in FAP were trained in Pakistan (Pitman, 
1994). 
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TABLE 5.4 Contrasting concepts of flood control: different dimensions. Author‟s inventory inspired by ISPAN 
(1992) and Faaland et al. (1995). 
 Protection paradigm Resilience paradigm 
Type of development Dry Wet 
Governing approach Control of water and people Adaptivity, decentralised 
management 
Technical approach Barrages and embankments 
‗structuralist‘ 
Flood proofing 
‗adaptivist‘ 
Preferred scale of intervention Large Small 
Food security strategy Foodgrain self-sufficiency Diversification 
Knowledge base Science and expertise Lay knowledge 
Supporters Land-owning farmers, 
industry, engineering and 
construction industry, the 
World Bank, engineering 
consultants 
Peasants, fishermen, country 
boat operators, NGOs, 
sociologists 
Key agricultural input Surface water Groundwater 
 
World Bank (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) reviews conducted in 
1966 and, upon Bangladeshi independence, in 1972 supported the aim to reach agricultural self-
sufficiency. But the Bank wanted smaller-scale, quick-yielding projects, and promoted a 
programme for low-lift pumps and small-scale irrigation. In 1983 a UNDP-sponsored 
comprehensive Agriculture Sector Review led to a Water Sector Master Plan in 1986 which again 
prioritised for small-scale irrigation development in the safer dry season (Brammer, 1990). 
While the impression often presents itself that all policy change in Bangladesh is donor-driven, 
some of the change in thinking was at least in part self-propelled. After the 1987 flood, BWDB 
released a fairly self-critical internal report, ‗Floods in Bangladesh 1987‘ which suggested more 
heed should be given to knowledge. Also the original National Water Plan Phase I of 1986 
showed a moderate approach to flood control. This however was drowned out by the 1987 and 
1988 floods triggered a pendulum swing back to the ‗control‘ paradigm. Pitman (1994) argues 
that the Bangladesh government saw the FAP as a way of ‗revamping‘ the 1964 Master Plan, and 
in so doing regain control ‗from what they saw as the unfortunate effects of privatisation of 
minor irrigation‘ (Pitman, 1994: 3). 
After the democratic transition, the new government commissioned a Task Force, who in its 
four-part report (Task Force, 1991) recommended a moratorium on structural works. The report 
went unheeded. Even as FAP was modified, the perspective of water as a problem rather than a 
resource resonated with the GoB and lingered throughout FAP. The next section will go into this 
in further detail. 
 
 
5.3.2  FAP SELECTION OF ALTERNATIVES  
 
The dictatorial, military conditions under which FAP was approved suggests a level of 
depoliticisation that does not bode well for a range of domestically generated alternatives. 
Internationally, however, the donor scramble to release Bangladesh from flooding provided 
plenty to choose from. It led to a spread of eight international plans drawn up after the 1987 and 
1988 floods, in a fascinating lead-up to the World Bank‘s final flood management package. The 
plans clearly reflect the two main flood management attractors (‗wet‘ and ‗dry‘) introduced above. 
It emerges from interviews that the selection of alternatives was based on personal as well as 
technical considerations. From the French side, the economist Jacques Attali led a team of 30 
experts to draw up a ‗permanent solution‘ to flooding in Bangladesh. My Dutch and Bangladeshi 
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interviewees were unanimous on the ineptitude of the French team. An interviewee from the 
Dutch Embassy in Dhaka claimed: 
‗Attali knew nothing about Bangladesh. We were fed up to the back teeth with them. They wanted to 
be involved but not to spend any money on it. Basically theirs was a bad plan‘ (Dutch embassy 
interview). 
The French report, the Pre-feasibility Study of Flood Control in Bangladesh, sought fully-embanked 
flood prevention and industrialisation, following in the footsteps of the 1964 Master Plan drafted 
by the GoB together with IECO, an American consultancy. The floodwall programme sought to 
embank the rivers, similar to the Mississippi (Chowdhurry, 1992) putting in 3-4000 km of 
embankments, as much as had been built in the whole period up until then. It would have cost 
anything between $5.2 and $10.1 billion, with $160-180 million in Operation and Maintenance 
costs each year ‗in perpetuity‘ (Boyce, 1990: 421) presenting Bangladesh with a huge debt. Had 
the French proposal gone ahead, there would indeed have been question of a ‗mega-project‘, a 
technical fix to deal with an ‗Act of God‘. 
In defiance of this ´dry´ river domination and control approach, the Americans took the view 
that embankments constrain river discharge and are ultimately self-defeating as it causes sediment 
aggradation of the river beds and increase flash flooding, so that continuous dredging and re-
excavation is needed (Khalequzzaman, 1994). The US Army Corps of Engineers, the American 
counterpart of the Bangladesh Water Development Board, shifted from a technology-oriented to 
a behaviourist paradigm in the 1960s, which means trying to keep people out of the floodplain 
through stimuli (zoning) and education rather than trying to keep the river out. This would fit the 
government‘s domestic flood frame - as we saw, the government blames irresponsible settling. 
But as James and Pitman (1992) note, non-structural measures such as zoning are also unfeasible, 
due to, among other aspects, the lack of flood-free land. You cannot travel for more than 5 miles 
in Bangladesh without encountering a surface water body. Densely packed poor households tend 
to live in the floodplain where land is cheapest. If floodplain dwellers were evicted from the 
floodplain, where would they go? 
Therefore, Peter Rogers and David Seckler, key water management experts on the American 
team, saw river training (taming the floods) as technically and economically unfeasible, arguing 
instead that Bangladesh not so much has a flood problem but a poverty problem. The way to 
reduce flood vulnerability was to increase incomes through expanding irrigation. The study 
proposed efficient flood warning system and took an integrated, pan-regional (South Asian) 
perspective to flood management. This made USAID‘s ´wetter´ Eastern Waters Study (Rogers et al., 
1989) arguably the most sustainable, environmentally aware and ‗holistic‘ proposal out of the set 
(Shamunnay, 1996), and addressed the GoB‘s external ‗flood frame‘ which lays blame at the 
doorstep of India and Nepal. However a regional solution was also the most politically 
contentious, as it relied on Bangladeshi co-operation with India at a time when the regional 
superpower had just declined to extend its river-sharing agreement on the Ganges (Padma) with 
Bangladesh. 
India dominates the regional, mutually interdependent hydrosecurity complex (Buzan, 1991, 
Ohlsson, 1995), outnumbering its neighbours in terms of demographic, military and economic 
power. This permits the country to pursue a divide-and-rule strategy in the region, concluding 
agreements only when India wants to and only with one neighbour at a time (Crow, 1995). In 
1974-5 India unilaterally built the Farakka dam to divert more water to its seaport Calcutta (West 
Bengal). Bangladesh, as the downstream riparian to three major rivers of which it controls only 8-
10%, claims upstream infrastructure has had a severe impact on water extremes, exaggerating 
both flooding in the wet season and desiccation in the dry season.190 Bangladeshi protest to the 
UN led to the aforementioned Indo-Bangladeshi treaty, but Bangladesh feels this nascent 
international regime still gives the country very little influence on Indian upstream decisions (ur-
Rashid, 2005).191 The U.S. study was dismissed out of hand for being too friendly to India. A 
senior Bangladeshi expert questions the integrity of the team leader of the USAID study, calling 
him a ‗liar‘.192 
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Around the same time, the Japanese produced the Report on Survey of Flood Control Planning in 
Bangladesh. This plan was similarly sceptical of large structures, emphasising urban protection and 
flood forecasting instead. A Chinese study, which compared the Ganges and Brahmaputra to the 
Yangtse, has remained confidential, even to professor Ainun Nishat who was involved in it on 
the part of Bangladesh (Haggart, 1994). It is clear however that the Chinese, like the Americans, 
have abandoned the control orientation. 
Three more bilateral regional studies were drafted in which Bangladeshi flood experts worked 
together with India, Nepal and Bhutan respectively. 
Finally, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) facilitated a flood policy study 
and a flood preparedness study (UNDP, 1989), carried out by local and expatriate consultants 
and completed in 1989. While it also advocated regional co-operation, the study was closer to the 
French study, recommending embankments and river training, but placed a heavy emphasis on 
controlled flooding which requires embankments, but with more regard for eventual drainage of 
trapped monsoon water. This emphasis led to an integrated flood control, irrigation and drainage 
(FCDI) approach being taken in about half the ensuing FAP projects.  
The UNDP/GoB study came out on top: its Eleven Guiding Principles (UNDP, 1989) 
combined controlled flooding with nods at non-structural works and participation with river 
training and channelling as national flood policy precepts. The GoB enacted these Eleven 
Principles and in November 1989, the World Bank and GoB collated the French, UNDP, 
USAID and Japanese reports into a Flood Action Plan, with a strong bias towards the UNDP 
study. There was a significant modification though: while  the original UNDP programme 
proposal was in the same order of magnitude as the French plan, costing $7.5 billion, the total 
budget for FAP was soon whittled down to $200 million. 
About 10% of this budget went to FAP-20, a project that for all practical purposes exported 
Dutch ‗poldering‘ technology in both its social and infrastructural sense. 
 
 
5.3.3 COMPARTMENTALISATION: SOLUTION IN SEARCH OF A PROBLEM? 
 
Like many other projects started under the FAP banner, FAP-20 would very probably have gone 
ahead with or without FAP (Nishat, quoted in Shamunnay, 1996). Both Dutch and Bangladeshi 
interviewees claim that even before FAP, it had been decided that Tangail, on the Jamuna´s left 
bank, and Sirajganj on the right bank would be selected as sites for experimental 
compartmentalisation. The Project Identification Mission in 1989, which included members of 
the FPCO (the Flood Plan Coordination Organization, created to oversee FAP) and the assisting 
international Panel of Experts (Adnan et al., 1991, 1992) merely formalised that earlier decision. 
The planned reinforcement of the Brahmaputra Right Bank Embankment (BRE) became FAP 
21-22, taking up a full fifth of the FAP budget.  
Compartmentalisation was proudly presented as a Dutch innovation. Indeed the Dutch speakers 
at a conference I attended in Dhaka in November 2000, organised by (Dutch-funded) Dhaka 
environmental consultants EGIS and the GoB, did not cease to emphasise the Dutch self-image 
of providing world-class flood management expertise in its fight against water.  
Dutch educational and technical assistance to Bangladesh goes back to its independence. 
Several key Bangladeshi players in FAP-20 have pursued part of their education in the 
Netherlands, either at IHE Delft or ISS The Hague. In the course of Dutch involvement in 
Bangladesh, it has been increasingly recognised that in a subsistence society it makes little sense 
to keep the water out at all costs. Instead, Professor Wybrand van Ellen of Delft, struck by the 
similarity of the Bangladesh Southwest (Khulna Jessore) to the flat and marshy Netherlands 
landscapes developed the idea of compartmentalised polders with British flood experts Hugh 
Brammer and Jim Dampster (interview, Dutch consultant, 2000). All three men were part of the 
Panel of Experts and the idea was more or less implemented as proposed in different FAP 
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projects: in FAP 4 (Khulna Jessore), FAP 3.1 (Jamalpur) FAP–20 (Tangail), in Central 
Bangladesh. The Tangail area was to be divided up into sub-compartments which were fitted 
with regulated inlets and outlets. As FAP-20 was an agricultural scheme, a sub-Compartment 
comprising Tangail Town was originally not planned for, but once created proved the most 
popular flood defence intervention. 
While full control seeks to minimise residual risk of damage in extreme events, a controlled 
flooding regime allows part of the area inside the embankment to flood at lower water levels. 
Inlets allow floods into the area for natural irrigation and fertilisation, and promote fish growth at 
required levels. Breaking polders up into different subcompartments, using existing roads and 
bridges, would make it possible to fine-tune water management, flooding only those areas that 
need the water and retaining it for as long as its users need it before draining it to the river. This 
made it possible to bring in extra water in early monsoon, and shut excess water out in the high 
monsoon season. As the rice crop grows and water rises, higher levels can be allowed, while at 
the end of monsoon the inlet would be shut to allow drainage, so that post-monsoon crops can 
be planted early. The embankments surrounding a compartment would have to withstand most, 
but not all floods, so that a flood would inundate agricultural areas but not (or not much) the 
urban and industrial areas (Euroconsult/Lahmeyer, 1995). 
FAP-20 not only sought to address the regulation of the flood for irrigation, but also the 
drainage aspect by rehabilitating canals. Tangail area, the FAP-20 site, may have the lowest rainfall 
of the country, but it is still a very considerable 1550mm/y. In the FAP-20 area every few years 
the heavy September and October rainfall gives rise to runoff congestion. When rainfall is 
extensive, the area becomes saturated, local flooding takes place and drainage is insufficient.  
Controlled flooding thus seemed a fair compromise between the ―structuralist‖ control school 
of thought and the ―adaptivist‖ living-with-the-floods people. Indeed, the technology itself was 
hardly revolutionary anymore for Bangladesh – it was tried in different Dutch projects (Wester 
and Bron, 1998) and also in the World Bank-funded Right Bank Embankment rehabilitation plan 
(World Bank, quoted in Boyce, 1990). Moreover the Panel felt they had the perfect institutional 
solution to mobilise thousands of farmers to co-ordinate their preferences: the Dutch polder 
model.  
 
 
5.3.4  SELECTION WITHIN FAP-20 
 
The Dutch sought to move compartmentalisation beyond the expected success of the FAP-20 
project alone. Its Terms of Reference see FAP-20 a demonstration project: if the pilot project were 
found feasible, the concept would be replicated in other parts of the country and in so doing 
revolutionalise flood management in Bangladesh and elsewhere. To validate the idea, a series of 
adjacent compartmentalisation projects along the Jamuna were to be tested.193  
As we shall see, the ‗flagship carrier‘ label has come back to haunt the project, while the 
comparative experiment was already compromised at an early stage, As FAP-20 was formulated, 
three areas were handpicked: Tangail, Sirajganj as well as Jamalpur, which was also the site of the 
FAP 3.1, one of the ‗main studies‘ in FAP. Jamalpur was dropped quite early, but Sirajganj was in 
for several years. The original idea was to have compartmentalisation projects on both sides of 
the Jamuna with the Sirajganj project site to be administered by NGOs, and indeed Water User 
Groups helped identify subcompartment sites in Siranjganj. 
Sirajganj was eventually dropped before the project‘s inception, officially because the GoB did 
not produce a written intention to ensure the stability of the Brahmaputra Right Embankment, so 
that the locations might flood anyway should the Brahmaputra Rught Embankment (BRE) break 
again. The Jamuna´s energy has an eastward tendency so that the right bank was under much 
more pressure than the left bank. By comparison, the Tangail area is a relatively sheltered area. 
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The German donor also blames the lack of funds for the deselection (KfW, 2004).194 Dropping 
Sirajganj however deprived the experiment of any ‗control group‘. 
The project was thus limited to a pilot in Tangail. To discuss the institutional challenges of  
compartmentalisation approach at some greater depth, the next section will go into a core 
element of FAP-20: participatory management. 
 
 
5.4 FAP-20 PARTICIPATION AND OPENNESS 
 
5.4.1 WIDENING PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT 
 
‗The government was talking about enacting a law to ensure people‘s participation. It was as if 
the government were saying: ‗We will set up a committee headed by so-and-so who will tell you 
to participate.‘ We (USAID) almost fell off our chairs when the conference secretary responded 
to the idea (...) saying ‗We‘ve decided that if participation is going to work, it has to be voluntary‘ 
(Pitman, 1994). 
While India and Bangladesh are formally democracies, South Asia has been plagued by 
‗antiparticipatory centralism‘ (SAARC, 1992). When FAP started at the turn of the nineties, all 
project information was securitised. As Keith Pitman, an American consultant, related in a USAID 
forum on participation: ‗For example maps were restricted. Field engineers had to go to Dhaka, 
make a tracing of a map, and then go back to the project‘ (Pitman, 1994). Information provision 
to the general public was likewise minimal in this early phase and the topic was undebatable: ‗We 
could not talk‘ (ibid.). 
This was meant to change after the democratic transition, but ‗many began to wonder whether 
the government was trying to keep information from them‘ (Hanchett, 1997: 281). The first 
review process for FAP in 1990 took place behind closed doors; only civil servants and the Panel 
of Experts could attend, with confidential minutes. A FAP consultant sympathetic to the NGO 
position leaked internal project memos, which information ended up in Shapan Adnan et al‘s 
‗offending‘ 1991 and 1992 FAP report funded by Norway (int. Dutch consultant). However, 
things slowly improved when four annual conferences were held in Dhaka, the quite critical 
discussions of which were commendably recorded in (English-language) publications. 
Only in 1992, on strong donor instigation, an open review of the Flood Action Plan was 
organised, a five-day meeting held at the Prime Minister‘s Office in Dhaka, which provided an 
opportunity for some 600 journalists, NGOs and critics to submit written questions (Hanchett, 
1997). A proceedings of this Second Conference was published. 
The third conference in 1993 was organised by the Bangladeshi government. Questions again 
had to be written down and thus could be ignored by the chief engineer (Pitman, 1994). The 
fourth of those conferences however was repeatedly delayed and its proceedings not widely 
published. As the Final Report notes, this was a critical moment as FPCO was supposed to be 
dissolved at the time. The UNDP subsequently distanced itself from the donor-GoB statement 
following it.195 
While FAP has taken much criticism for failing to consult local stakeholders, in fairness it 
should be noted that FAP-20 was unique in the Flood Action Plan in seeking to address the 
institutional aspect head-on. Indeed, the identification report states that ‗unless there is local 
participation from the outset, it is doubtful whether compartmentalisation will ever be practical 
and viable‘ (FAP, 1990). 
Like compartmentalisation, the idea of ‗institutional poldering‘ was not earth-shattering: 
elements of Dutch ‗consensual democracy‘ have tentatively been tried in Bangladesh in the 
Dutch-funded Early Implementation Projects of the 1970s and 1980s. BWDB officials claim that 
informal consultation between engineers and recipient communities (notably landowners) have 
been going on for decades, and they must have thought they were doing the same thing here.  
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But in the case of FAP, the social engineering was to work differently: polder committees were 
to be formed with different stakeholder groups. FAP-20‘s concept of multi-stakeholder 
consultation did not make immediate sense to the Government of Bangladesh, the people of 
Tangail – and perhaps, if truth be told, not even to the Dutch consultants. Indeed as the project 
ran on, the original idea was somewhat obscured from sight. 
 
 
5.4.2 THE CONSULTATION ON FAP-20  
 
The history of participation sketched above indicates that the Bangladeshi government was not 
initially very minded to dialogue with local stakeholders in the context of FAP-20. The donors 
however insisted on it - apart from such noble considerations as democratic accountability, cost 
was a key factor as compartment management in the past had been extremely costly and 
ineffective.  
The meaning of ‗participation‘ changed considerably in the course of the Flood Action Plan, 
even in the early stages of formulation. In 1991 Euroconsult, the FAP-20 consultant started a 
large consultation asking residents which water problems they encountered and what solutions 
they preferred. The original idea was for the people of Tangail to decide to which extent they 
wanted controlled flooding. Polls systematically show that people who are not protected would 
like to see embankments. One reason is that increases their social standing (various interviews; 
Nishat, 2004). Once embankments are in place, drainage problems appear and people will try to 
offload the excess water on others. During the project, according to a Bangladeshi consultant 
some people asked for more structures. Similarly it appears from FAP-3.1 (Jamalpur) that people 
inside embankments are generally happy for the embankments to be there. The embankments, 
then, could count on a support base among the farmers. In this respect, the NGOs seemed to 
have been disingenuous in opposing embankments full stop. 
On the other hand, because of the existing (porous) horseshoe embankment, Tangail was 
already fairly safe from flooding, so that many stakeholders there were perhaps not too keen on 
more flood protection.  
There was logic to the options put to stakeholder in the consultation exercise. During the 
lifetime of a compartment, requirements of different sectors may change, and popular demands 
follow a predictable pattern. Demands for flood protection are likely to increase as an area 
becomes more economically developed. The degree of protection itself also gives rise to socio-
economic change, such as urbanisation, which in turn will give rise to different demands. Based 
on this reasoning, Dirk Frans, a sociologist with a background in engineering, devised four 
(progressively drastic) water management options, lending them a dynamic for the future: 
A) improved drainage 
B) option A + throated inlets where to mitigate danger of additional flooding 
C) option B + gated inlets and extra development works to re-excavate khals  
D) full flood control (Kvaløy 1994) 
 
According to one Bangladeshi expert, FAP-20 was an institutional development project until 
the engineers took over (interview Bangladesh consultant 2000). The engineers, it turned out, had 
a quite different view of participation. Social research of necessity takes longer and may yield 
‗undesired‘ results. While project initiators saw sociological research as a way of ‗selling‘ a project 
on its intended beneficiaries, that is not what sociology is for (interview, Dutch consultant). 
Impatient with the time-consuming participation process, the Board started to keep an eye on the 
clock. 
As a result, the Needs Assessment and Consultation were curtailed under time pressure. 
Interviews and the work of Adnan (1992) suggest that the outcome of the consultation might 
have something to do with it, too. The do-nothing and drainage options, which emerged as 
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popular from the consultation, would require the least engineering effort. The Bangladeshi 
engineers had different ideas: they simply dismissed the do-nothing (or little) option, while the 
Dutch Embassy‘s First Secretary, a Wageningen-educated irrigation engineer, was away 
(interviews, Dutch consultants).196 According to an internal memorandum leaked to RAS, 
‗Flood Protection is a government policy which was reiterated in the Eleven Guiding 
Principles of the Flood Action Plan..., the option of no flood control for Tangail need not be 
discussed with the people‘ (q in Adnan, 1992). In all, 53 water control structures were built in the 
FAP-20 area 
 
 
5.4.3 TESTING THE POLDER MODEL IN TANGAIL  
 
The Eleventh Guiding Principle for FAP says: ‗Encourage popular support by involving 
beneficiaries in the planning, design, and operation of flood control and drainage 
works‘(GoB/UNDP, 1989). The FAP-20 project foresaw a form of participatory decision-
making in the day-to-day management of the compartments, envisaged as the Bangladeshi 
version of the Dutch ‗polder model‘, a consensual, egalitarian model of decision-making, 
predicated on the idea that if not everyone is on board in managing a polder, everybody may 
drown due to the obstruction of a minority. 
In 1992-93 the consultant crafted a system of water management committees at compartment 
(CWMCs), sub-compartment (SCWMCs) and chawk-level (Water User Groups) after the Dutch 
waterschappen. Committees would perform operational tasks, conflict handling, drafting 
maintenance plans and make decisions on preferred gate settings. 
One Water User Group member would liaise with project staff and local government (Union 
Parishads) at subcompartment level, while the CWMCs had Water Board staff and local personnel 
working for Central Government. Much like multi-stakeholder platforms (Röling, 1994, Steins 
and Edwards, 1998, Warner, 2006) these allocate specific seats to four interest groups:  
- users and project-affected persons (PAPs) 
- NGOs 
- (central) Government Organisations 
- Local government 
The first group consisted of farmers, fishermen, women and landless197 
(Euroconsult/Lahmeyer et al., 1995). 
In 1995, water user groups had been formed in three sub-compartments. De Graeff (n.d.) 
reports that in the first year of their existence, chawk committees took care of the new structures 
and resolved some conflicts between farmers and fishermen. Yet, after anti-FAP protests 
focusing on Tangail, which will be expounded later, the donors pressed the GoB to make a better 
job of participation and to involve more disciplines in FAP. Engineers however felt unease at the 
unscientific nature of public involvement in technical discussions on planning, but a consensus 
developed on local people being ‗partners‘ of professionals.  
As a result, the scope of participation broadened. At first the Flood Plan Coordination 
Organisation (FPCO) in charge of FAP thought it sufficient to consult with farmers only while 
―taking into account‖ other interests (IOV, 1993) – which meant the fishermen were not taken 
very seriously. The Euroconsult system had allocated seats to farmers as a homogeneous group. 
In an earlier review however the World Bank had already noted found that in poldering projects, 
farmers at different land heights had quite different views of the ideal water level. ―The need for 
organizing farmers numbering in the tens of thousands to set up equitable polder operations is 
one of the great drawbacks of the polder technology for wet season agriculture‘. The new type of 
participation developed duly dfferentiated between highland, midland and lowland farmers. Yet, 
according to an evaluation by Datta (Datta et al., 1997), who was also involved in the Mid-term 
review, this new system was not well known to the stakeholders and rather ineffective. The 
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Dutch development assistance inspectorate (IOV)´s report (1993) notes the legitimacy of the 
polder-style decision-making process is in doubt in light of a poorly informed population. This 
makes the population potentially more amenable to manipulation - both to donor, GoB and 
NGO arguments. A Donor Mission in 1997 found that sluice-gates were operated in places by 
project staff rather than WUG representatives. By that time, 100 chawk committees and 15 sub-
compartment committees had formed (Lewins and Robens, 2004). 
The system also showed little sensitivity to the marked power differences within rural 
communities198. Both donor and NGO conceptions of ‗the people‘s wishes‘ therefore wanted a 
more careful approach. As Dirk Frans noted, the people are not always right but neither are the 
engineers (interview, 2000). 
 
 
5.4.4 OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE: WHO REPAIRS THE BREACHES? 
 
Another interpretation of ‗people‘s participation‘ in FAP-20 was their involvement in Operation 
and Maintenance. The project uniquely involved a component of ‗people‘s O&M‘ making use of 
people‘s familiarity with such interventions. Groups of local people, Local Contracting Societies, 
both male and female, could be hired to work on the structures, which also circumvented 
institutionalised corruption percentages. Clearing out channels and repairing embankments is 
hard work of bad repute, and contracted work easily drives up cost. In FAP 20, landless workers 
and women erect and repair levees instead, at a fee.  
Curiously, while the problem has been known at least since the 1970s, donors have not insisted 
on better O&M of the projects they funded. The 1993 Dutch Inspectorate‘s Mission, for 
example, explicitly recommends redirecting the donor efforts to O&M of existing projects, but 
this recommendation was not enforced (IOV, 1993)199. This seems to be the case for FAP-20 as 
well - while the Dutch donor maintains there is a considerable amount in the budget for O&M, 
nothing was actually happening on the ground in 2000. 
As a result, no one will be motivated to remove silt clogging up offtakes or pay the sluice-gate 
operator after the project is over. When there are visible dangers, like when in 1995 the Jamuna 
broke through to create a new inlet for the Dhaleswari, people did not wait for the BWDB to 
repair the local embankment. 
While the move to set up local contracting societies can be lauded as pro-poor, this approach 
frames ‗participation‘ as a rather convenient way for BWDB to shed responsibility for Operation 
& Maintenance. But hiring people as labourers does not give them influence on the project and 
in this sense does not score high on any participation ladder. It is fair to say the societies are an 
appreciation the experiential fact that, in light of the Water Board‘s poor O&M record, in 
practice ‗(t)he only ones who do O&M are the farmers themselves. In 9 out of 10 cases they are 
right.‘ Jennifer Duyne (1998) has pointed out many impressive and well-co-ordinated local flood 
management initiatives in Bangladesh. Some of those initiatives may in fact be less than 
spontaneous, but compelled by zamindar-type feudal arrangements for compulsory maintenance 
by sharecroppers. In pre-colonial times mud banks were erected maintained by landlords who 
levied taxes on the population. Under British rule communities learned to wait for the 
government to mend breaches in embankments rather than display initiative. But BWDB is not 
known for solid operation and maintenance works on its 7,500kms of embankments unless there 
is question of a serious flood. Any available funds tend to be ―transferred to new capital projects‖ 
(UNDP, 1995). In fact, a subsequent World Bank project formalises the transfer of O&M to its 
users (World Bank, 2001). 
According to the FPCO-produced Guidelines for participation (version 1994) responsibility for 
and ownership of any water structures was to remain in the hands of the state (Hanchett, 1997: 
286)200. The struggle for space however is always present and eats away at the planning and 
implementation of projects. Embankments are eroded by stealth and drainage channels tend to 
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be under-dimensioned. Local public action, so-called, ‗public cuts‘ of unpopular embankments by 
‗anonymous demolition crews‘, prohibited under the Embankment & Drainage Act of 1952, thus 
remained illegal (Hanchett, 1997). A ‗public cut‘ of course means that the drained water is 
offloaded on the next area, and the suspicion of a cut can lead to intense conflict. During the 
FAP-20 episode, public cuts were made, some of which were stopped by the authorities. 
 
 
5.5 CHALLENGING AND POLITICISING FAP-20: NAMING,BLAMING, 
REFRAMING 
 
5.5.1 UNCERTAINTY, POLITICISATION AND BLAME 
 
To properly address the flood, it makes sense to determine what causes it. But as Thompson and 
Warburton (1985) have shown, there is no consensus between analysts on what causes floods 
upstream in the Himalayas, and likewise there is no undisputed narrative on downstream floods 
in Bangladesh. Depending on whether you believe the World Bank, the government, NGOs or 
an indigenous movement, you get highly ‗contradictory certainties‘ about what caused the 
problem. All these actors and their blame stories can have ‗felicity‘ with the decision-making 
audience, and should therefore be taken seriously in the analysis. These uncertainties promote 
storylines that do bring apparent certainty in the face of uncertainty (van Eeten, 1997).  
 
A closer look at ‗blame stories‘ in Bangladesh, such as in Table 5.5 below, shows a contrast 
between floods as an ‗Act of Man‘, which blames specific actors for the floods, and floods seen 
as an ‗Act of Allah‘ (Schmuck, 2000)201. „Through the events He is showing His will and power against 
which they cannot and should not do anything‟ (Schmuck 2000: 85). The fatalist approach to cause and 
cure is often attributed to the whole of Bangladesh, to the frustration of aid agencies, as it 
hampers flood pro-action and preparedness: ‗It [natural calamity] has been a part of our life as it 
comes every year in one form or another‘, Prime Minister Khaleda Zia told the press in 1991; 
‗No one has control over natural calamities‘ (quoted in Dove, 1998: 51, 53). Wood (1999) on the 
other hand claims that the government blamed tree felling in Nepal and sea level rise, presumably 
on a different occasion. Whichever the blame story, it exposed the government to NGO criticism 
that the government was avoiding responsibility for its people‘s flood vulnerability. The 
attribution of causality also conjures up the question who should take care of the problem. Given 
its dependent self-image, the Bangladeshi government tends to leave responsibility to outsiders. 
This reflects the internal mudslinging between the prime movers in the security debate, ‗engineers‘ 
and ‗sociologists‘, which was foregrounded in the politicisation of FAP-20. This at times made it 
difficult to make out what was ‗really‘ going on. 
 
TABLE 5.5  Risk, Responsibility and Blame: Who/what caused the floods? - after Dove (1998)  
According to: 
 
External cause Domestic cause 
Government - India‘s Farakka Dam, Upstream 
tree felling 
- Act of Allah 
People‘s irresponsible 
behaviour (settling in 
floodplains) 
NGOs - Upstream tree felling; 
- Western carbon emission causing 
climate change 
Government not taking 
responsibility 
 
  
Jesse Manuta (n.d.) identifies two flood ‗master‘ problem frames depicting flood as a natural 
hazard or a development issue. One can visualise a continuum running from fatalist (‗it can‘t be 
helped‘) to a control mindset (‗we can handle everything‘). Somewhere near the control side, the 
developmentalist frame puts great trust in Man to overcome natural hazards, if only the stakeholders 
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are on board (people‘s participation) and sectoral plans are integrated (Manuta, n.d.). Underlying 
these problem frames are moves for securitisation, seeking to legitimise extraordinary 
intervention measures, but are not invulnerable to counter-securitisations. As we shall see below, 
we will need to expand Mantua‘s framework by a third frame and securitised referent: human rights 
(Table 5.6 below). 
 
TABLE 5.6 Expanded set of flood problem frames, after Manuta (n.d.)  
Problem frame Solution frame Proposed by Participation 
Natural hazard problem 
(‗Act of God‘) 
Technical fix French202 Minimal public 
involvement 
Development issue (‘Act 
of Man‘) 
Integrative approach, 
linking sectoral plans 
Americans, Dutch Broad consultation of the 
public 
Human rights issue 
(Project as problem) 
No project; build on 
people‘s resilience 
NGOs, some 
external consultants 
Popular resistance to 
flood project 
 
  
The Flood Action Plan programme was triggered by a dramatic event that had strong 
humanitarian appeal: images of death, suffering and destitution gave the G7 a popular platform 
to start from. The military rule under which the project began allowing the Flood Action Plan to 
be rushed through with little opposition or even communication with stakeholders - a ‗securitised 
mode of decision-making‘. 
However, different discursive coalitions have sought to open up the dominant problem frame, 
away from physical security, and the governance set-up away from top-down intervention. In 
developing a counter-hegemonic alliance, the anti-FAP movement developed a counter-frame by 
‗aligning‘ different discursive frames into a ‗discursive alliance‘ (Hajer, 1995).  
I will categorise these moves in terms of securitising move. The approach to securitisation 
pursued here is highly interpretative, though, as the ‗security‘ aspect was often only implicit, 
rather than explicit, while its usage in the donor literature was rather loose203. 
As noted, the FAP could ride on a platform of national interest and international moral 
outrage at the loss of life and economic assets in the 1987/1988 disaster. Intriguingly, both 
FPCO and NGOs have since downplayed the number of victims in the 1988 floods, originally 
one of the major ‗selling points‘ for the FAP.204 Already at the inception of FAP the rationale had 
shifted from physical protection to the stabilisation of food production to feed a booming 
population (Hanchett, 1997: 280). The dominance of this irrigation aspect however was not well 
communicated, NGOs claimed. Instead there was question of a ‗water management project‘ 
(Houscht, n.d.). In 1993, Tangail protesters still demanded physical security, calling for flood 
control priorities be changed ‗from producing rice to saving lives‘ (quoted in BCAS, 1994) but 
the national water authority took the view that given the relatively sheltered position of Tangail 
vis-à-vis the Jamuna, there was no concrete danger to Tangail lives. The anti-FAP NGO platform 
did not support the view either. „Water is not our enemy but it is our resource‘, as Khushi Kabir, 
its chairwoman, summarised this stance in 1995.205 
Only for urban and industrial areas complete protection - which was thought to be 
‗uncontroversial‘ (IOV, 1993) - would still be feasible.206 While the Dutch kept invoking the ´fight 
against the water´ even in 2000 (EGIS, 2000) the project went ahead ‗because of the greater 
national interest to Bangladesh‘ (Daily Star, 18-3-94). FAP-20 intended to provide a secure 
environment for more risk-taking in food production to help realise food security as well as economic 
advancement, rather than the need to save local lives or livelihoods. Despite highly fertile soils, 
Bangladesh has one of the lowest per hectare rice yields in the world (Boyce, 1990). Any pretence 
of rural flood protection for Tangail was abandoned in favour of controlled monsoon flooding for 
agriculture. 
But the famines of 1943 and 1974 (when 30,000 people died) are clear in the minds of policy-
makers, such that food security is a key priority in each five-year plan. Not just food security but 
food sovereignty is very central to Bangladeshi policymaking. While Myers (1995) claims it is 
FAP-20, BANGLADESH 
 
131 
  
‗generally thought‘ that the country will become ever less able to feed itself, Bangladesh has over 
90% self-sufficiency in food. 
Agricultural development based on Green Revolution technologies, notably High Yielding 
Varieties (HYV) is a cornerstone of five-year plans. The FAP aimed to increase the number of 
harvests per year, per hectare yield, the diversity of crops. Especially FAP-20 hinges on 
‗foodgrain security as the route for food and other kinds of security‘ (UNDP, 1995).  
Environmental concerns were raised from the start, but only become a core concern after 
preliminary results of FAP studies also showed adverse affects (Shamunnay, 1996). To 
established engineers like K Siddiqi (FPCO), the environment is synonymous to the resource 
base, so that he could not see why people would worry over the environment while they were 
going without food (BCAS, 1995). 
At the turn of the 1990s, poverty reduction became the buzzword in programmes run by Western 
donor agencies and Bangladesh was a textbook example. Nearly half of Bangladesh‘s 133 million 
people live below the poverty line. It is the only country categorized as least developed to a 
population over 75 million (Islam, 2004). 
Agricultural development, it was noted, did not necessarily alleviate poverty and might increase 
social inequality. Dutch Inspection agency prided itself therefore on the fact that through FAP-20 
the Netherlands had adjusted FAP policy towards a poverty alleviation orientation (IOV, 1993). 
The dynamic driving force in Bangladesh is a booming population (despite a successful birth 
control programme) (Caldwell, Khuda et al., 1999). Poverty alleviation, according to the 
Association of Bangladeshi Engineers, necessitates large-scale land reclamation and dam building 
(Association of Bangladeshi Engineers, 1995). Once the farmers increase their wealth, other 
sectors of society will start to benefit too. 
The Bangladeshi leadership echoed the view that development was a way out of poverty:  
‗(T)he recurrent problem of flooding inhibits [Bangladesh‘s] development potential and stands in 
the way of the economy taking off in real terms‘ (PM secretary letter to French govt, 1994, cited 
in PANOS/BCAS, 1994). But not only flooding was seen as a brake on development, so was 
resistance against FAP - Ross Wallace, the World Bank representative co-ordinating FAP from 
1990, reportedly went out of his way to discredit the opposition as ‗anti-development‘ and 
‗criminal‘ (Nicolassen, 1993).  
How was the developmentalist discourse countered? This is the concern of the Section 
hereafter. 
 
 
5.5.2 RESISTANCE TO DEVELOPMENTALISM  
 
Eleven days prior to the London donor conference starting FAP in 1989, the well-respected 
Bangladesh Agricultural Research Centre (BARC) issued a report (BARC, 1989) warning that 
introducing Green-Revolution innovations such aqs High-Yielding Varieties (HYVs) of rice 
require more fertiliser, which, if indiscriminately applied, deprives soil of organic matter  Since 
HYV seeds and inputs will need to be bought again and again, this can open a credit trap to 
cover the cost of seeds, fertiliser and pesticides. This can precipitate the ‗debilitation of the local 
food security system‘ and the loss of livelihood resilience to withstand food crises (also noted by 
Wood 1999 and others). The ‗sanctioned discourse‘ of agricultural development however 
brooked no opposition: in response, key members of the discussion forum who drafted the 
BARC policy brief were ‗strategically removed from office‘ (FAP Monitor 1(2), August 1995; 
Chadwick & Datta, n.d.).  
Funded by the Norwegian government, which had decided to stay outside FAP, Bangladeshi 
sociologist Shapan Adnan seconded BARC‘s political economy perspective, revealing that flood 
victims of 1987 and 1988 were mainly the landless poor who lacked clean drinking water and 
food, while the rich hardly suffered because of the bumper crops following the floods (Shapan 
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Adnan 1991; also Clayton-Dalal et al., 1992). The Flood Action Plan only got under way because 
even the richer areas in Dhaka were affected.  
Critical researchers contracted to work on various FAP studies sought to change the 
programme‘s problem definition. The social development and gender consultants Suzanne 
Hanchett and Mahbuba Nasreen, for example, claimed that the problem is not flood but 
economics (Hanchett and Nasreen, 1992). Concentrating on improving monsoon yield benefited 
landowners at the expense of sharecroppers and the landless fishers, widening socio-economic 
disparities.207  
The promised ‗secure environment‘ for Tangail in practice only meant security for landed 
farmers protected by the embankments and, if need be, musclemen. FAP-20 was feared to 
redistribute security between economic sectors and those providing for their livelihood inside and 
outside the system,208 reinforced by inadequate compensation measures for harm to livelihoods.  
‗Flood control and irrigation create new land and enhance the value of existing land. (…) The value of 
land changes when it is protected from early flooding, or drained from water-logging, by embankments 
and canals – but only those landholders with land in the ‗command‘ of such constructions will benefit‘ 
(Wood, 1994).  
Such concerns begged the question: Why support the rice farmers anyway? Rice can be 
imported cheaply from the world market, and much more easily than fish (Faaland et al., 1995) - 
while fish is the only accessible source of food to the poorest. Bangladeshi governments have 
interpreted food security as autarky from the country‘s early beginnings (Faisal and Parveen, 
2004), but it can also be framed otherwise: as developing an export base that brings in enough 
revenue to import food requirements (virtual water). 
FAP‘s ‗dry‘ development model encouraged the enclosure of beels, squeezing the area available 
to fishermen. It created openings for the capture of khas (holy land, commons) land by the 
violent enclosure of common-pool resources. The sluice-gate operators are not paid and the SC 
committees remain unfunded. Thus, despite the intended participatory mechanism, those with 
money to pay the operator, or alternatively to pay musclemen (mastans) to force a decision, are 
effectively in control. Physical insecurity due to police beatings as well as intimidation from hired 
hard men were depressingly regular (e.g. Ali et al., 1998). A FAP-20 team leader also reports 
physical attacks from local contractors (interview, Team Leader). 
Three out of every four Bangladeshis (predominantly women) at the time was involved in 
(part-time) fishing (Faaland et al., 1995). Mitigating measures in the project, notably cultured 
fishing, benefited landowners but not the landless, who often are fishermen. Fish production is 
the main livelihood of the Hindu minority, which makes up 10-11% of the population of 
Bangladesh. Hindus have been traditionally barred from owning land and therefore consigned to 
being fishers and eating fish for their basic protein intake. Their economic and food security 
therefore is crucially linked to the mode of livelihood, with few alternative livelihood 
opportunities. Cultured fisheries also require significant investment, again disadvantaging the 
poor. 
The political economy makes livelihoods and resource conservation issues are impossible to 
reconcile. A Bangladeshi project consultant noted a national trend for draining fish ponds until 
the last fingerling: 
‗What happened in June/July: we put in 2 fish passes. After 15 July all the gates of the periphery were 
open. But what happened: all fishermen came and put their net, they fished up everything. In ‘96 I put 
special police for them not to catch fish, to stop the catch from July – September. But we have no 
jurisdiction beyond my area, no jurisdiction outside the area. The local parishad should take authority, it 
must take care of that. Otherwise there will be no sustainability‘. (interview, Bangladesh project 
manager 2000). 
The most vulnerable group, however, are the millions living on the unstable islands near the 
FAP-20 area and elsewhere on the rivers. In Bangladesh, space is still at a premium, as evidenced 
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most graphically by people living on these islands. Each year, the Brahmaputra alone makes 
30,000 people homeless (Schmuck, 2000). 
Those outside the project area indeed regarded the project with suspicion. According to local 
authorities, the lure of flood protection attracted 30,000 into the area within a few years, and land 
prices went up tenfold (KfW, 2004). But due to the project, those who remained outside were 
worse off than before (Euroconsult et al., 1995) and there were press reports of ‗violent clashes 
between pro- and anti-FAP people in the locality‘ (Independent, 1995), Conflicts between insiders 
and outsiders to the project area came to a head after the Main Regulator was installed at Jugini. 
The BWDB-employed operator of the Main Regulator structure told me he often had to run for 
his life to avoid being beaten up by musclemen (interview, 2000)209. 
Those displaced by Jamuna riverbank erosion, already among the poorest of the poor, had to 
move to highly ‗insecure, unprotected areas‘ (IOV, 1993) known as char lands (‗wadden‟). JCDP, a 
Bhuapur NGO representing char dwellers had tried to file a case against FAP as a whole before 
the 2nd International Water Tribunal in Amsterdam in 1992, emboldened by the attention their 
protest against the Jamana Bridge had attracted210. 
JCDP argued that the food security paradigm underlying FAP-20 (self-sufficiency in monsoon 
foodgrain) was an outdated one for two reasons: 
1) the biggest production advances are made not in monsoon but winter season (boro crops) 
and  
2) ‗food‘ only read as ‗rice‘ neglects fish as a source of protein in people‘s basic food intake.  
 
Bangladeshi NGOs played on their concerns by phrasing their case in ‗conservationist‘ 
livelihoods discourse, championing the case of the fishermen. The title of the Bangladesh Centre 
for Advanced Studies (BCAS)‘ booklet on FAP, ‘Rivers of Life‘ (1995), sums it up. In response to 
the criticisms, a new contingent of consultants was commissioned to take a closer look at 
biodiversity and fisheries and concluded that FAP had done little actual harm that has not been 
done elsewhere (e.g. De Graaf, 1999). 
 A international NGO–led discursive counter-alliance presented their case as a human rights and 
survival issue. Human rights derive from a securitisation of an existential threat, the transgression 
of a boundary (Pia and Diez, 2007). Articulation of a human right where none had been 
established establishes the existence of a conflict, of which armed confrontation is the escalated 
stage. Section 5.5.4 discusses how this frame played out in streets, lobbies and courts. 
 
 
5.5.3 STAGING PROTEST: POLITICISATION OF FAP AND FAP-20 
 
‗The Dutch are funny people. They give money to one group of people, then they give money to 
another to oppose what the first group is doing.‘  (Prof. Ainun Nishat, EGIS/GoB conference talk 
committing on Dutch funding for critical Dutch NGO BothEnds, 22 November 2000). 
 
Initially, FAP was not a major issue with the major NGOs in Bangladesh itself (see also: 
Adnan, 1992, BCAS, 1995) and the NGOs working in the area did not coordinate much among 
themselves (IOV, 1993)211. The first anti-FAP protests were started by international NGOs in 
1991. Only in 1992, the Bangladeshi NGO Proshika contributed a paper to the Rio 
environmental summit in 1992 and in 1993 an international flood coalition of European, 
American and Bangladeshi NGOs formed in Strasbourg (Stiles, 2002).  
We have seen that Tangail as a project site was not selected by donors for its typicality of 
Bangladesh but rather its convenience. Likewise, interviewees note that NGOs perhaps did not 
single the area out for their protests wholly for its own merits but as a symbol that happened to 
be within easy reach from Dhaka. This made it feasible for Dhaka-based NGOs like Nijera Kori, 
a non-governmental organisation very much organised around the activist Khushi Kabir, to 
mobilise and support local protest.   
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Thus in 1992-93, anti-FAP processions and rallies ensued in Tangail and Dhaka, which found 
surprising resonance in the national, but even more the international press and donor 
community. The 10,000 protesters mobilised were mainly women. Women‘s groups such as 
Gram Unnayan Parishad (GUP), took a major role because of their vulnerability to land take, 
intimidation and unfair compensation (Daily Star, 1995, see also Kvaløy, 1994). Female-headed 
households are 35-40% of all households and almost 25% of all agricultural households (Hamid 
cited in Hanchett, 1997, Akhter and Akhter, 1997). The Tangail protesters successfully reframed 
the security issue from a national economic development issue into a local human rights issue 
resonated in Europe and North America.212 
The women‘s groups presented handwritten petitions in several villages, and played a pre-
eminent role in street protests in Tangail and Dhaka. It cannot be ruled out that NGOs stage-
managed these demonstrations by bussing Tangail citizens to Dhaka (Kvaløy, 1994: 39) – many 
of them being illiterate and clients to NGO services.213 While the spontaneity of anti-FAP 
demonstrations can thus be debated, the demos did get the media attention sought. As Hajer 
(2005) notes, NGOs are well versed in the art of dramaturgy (‗staging‗). The manifestations were 
filmed and screened the world over. Through their excellent connections with international 
NGOs and donors, the Bangladeshi groups thus nourished an already effective international 
lobby that just grew and grew, casting doubts in the minds of the FAP consortium over the 
wisdom of investing in FAP. Banking on their existing extensive international network, the 
Bangladeshi NGOs developed a supporting alliance of NGOs and (Green) politicians in the 
West, which helped leverage interest and profile in Europe and the US. The GoB did not 
improve things by threatening measures against involved NGOs and to invoke the anti-
Terrorism act in Tangail in 1993. 
In the Netherlands, Dutch Parliamentarians214 had already asked questions about people‘s 
participation to the Minister in 1991. A corner was turned when in 1992, the Bangladesh People‘s 
Solidarity Centre (BPSC) sent a protest letter to the Dutch government. BPSC, ICCO, Both Ends 
and other developmental NGO coalesced and called on parliament to terminate Government of 
the Netherlands support to FAP, which led to questions raised by liberal-of-the-right (VVD) 
Members of Parliament.  
In Germany, AIO, a platform centring around anthropologist-activist Hanna Schmuck, 
lobbied the German government. An anti FAP-coalition formed in the European Parliament and 
a high-level lobby was created in the United States. NGOs helped the European Greens organise 
a conference in Strasbourg on 27 and 28 May 1993 (interestingly, this is not mentioned in the 
project‘s Final Report‘s chronology) which the heavily criticised World Bank representative left in 
anger. In North America, the University of Texas teamed up with the International Rivers 
Network fuelling a high-power lobby calling for the withdrawal of US support (Mitchell, 1998). 
 
In addition to social issues, FAP-20 was presented as an environmental disaster in the making. 
In itself, FAP-20 was not all that different from earlier (polder) projects carried out in Bangladesh 
for many years with a view to alleviating the population pressure and creating productive land. In 
the 1970s and 1980s, land reclamation in the form of poldering mushroomed. However, 
Bangladesh had failed to emulate Dutch successes, in part for lack of funds to resources to pay 
for powerful water pumps to discharge excess water. As a result, each polder (especially the low-
lying areas within them) inevitably had to contend with drainage problems: both the Meghna-
Dhonagoda Irrigation Project (MDIP), whose dikes breached in 1987 and 1988, destroying crops 
and infrastructure, and the Dhaka-Narayanganj-Demra (DND) project which saw inlets and 
outlets silting up and fields clogged up. Most famously Beel Dakatia, which suffered so much that 
the soil became completely infertile in the 1980s turning the area into a dust bowl, could be held 
up to the donors presenting an similar ‘ecological disaster‘ scenario for FAP-20215 with potential 
for ‗desertification‘ (banglapedia.com, also Atiur Rahman, 1989). 
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The successful international politicisation of FAP (rather than an actual ‗disaster‘ like Beel 
Dakatia or the Brahmaputra Right Embankment or Food for Work projects) must have been a 
surprise to all involved, not least the NGO community.  
Spreading horror scenarios for FAP-20 with great media savvy, the activists fed donor worries. 
Critical reports were now also issued by donors, who were already becoming increasingly jittery 
about whether they were ‗doing the right thing‘ (Soussan, 1999). The successful NGO lobby 
against the Sarwar Sarovar (Narmada) dam in 1991 and the half-successful protest on behalf of 
the char people affected by the Jamuna Multi Purpose Bridge and FAP 3.1216 had opened a 
window of opportunity to lobby a nervous World Bank, and the NGOs‘ obstructive power grew 
accordingly. Post-Narmada, donors became very circumspect about supporting an unpopular 
project. NGOs benefited from the willingness of some donors (Asian Development Bank, 
Netherlands) to work with them, giving them a niche in the project, while they could at the same 
time side vociferously against the World Bank, who refused to engage with them (Stiles, 2002) 217. 
World Bank Secretary-General Wolfensohn reportedly said he did not want ‗another Narmada‘. 
This made FAP-20 a soft target for protesters. 
 
 
5.5.4 SEE YOU IN COURT 
 
In addition to street rallies and political lobbying, the FAP--20 project was fought in court on a 
human rights platform, with a smaller role for cultural heritage.218 
Mohiuddin Farooque, the late founder and Secretary General of the Bangladesh 
Environmental Lawyers Association BELA, a nationally active NGO, predicted massive 
unemployment, displacement of people, damage to the soil and fish habitat and create drainage 
problems (Daily Star Editorial, 27-4-1994). Questions were raised in Dutch Parliament about this 
lawsuit. Jan Pronk, the Minister of Overseas Development Assistance responded that it can take 
considerable time for a case to come through - lawsuits are dealt with in chronological order, and 
in September 1994, the time the case was filed, the Supreme Court was still dealing with 1988 
cases (Rolloos, 1995). 
The Bangladesh Environmental Lawyers Association however persisted and succeeded in 
changing the law to allow a group to litigate pro bono, i.e. on behalf of the community. The 
Appeals court indeed allowed him to fight the scheme on behalf of Tangail, despite not being 
personally affected. In this capacity he tried to stop the FAP-20 on the grounds of 
unconstitutionality on behalf of a Tangail citizen. Notably, in the end the Writ Bench of the High 
Court Division of the Supreme Court219 ordered the government to prove that FAP-20 was in the 
people‘s interest - which the government declined to do. Despite declaring the project illegal, 
though, the court decided FAP-20 was too far down the line to consider stopping it. 
BELA then litigated on behalf of claimants who felt wronged in the land acquisition process 
and seriously under-compensated for the loss of their land, taken for flood defence structures. It 
is an understatement to say that the system for compensation is not well developed. Only for 
externally funded projects are there compensation rules, but they tend to pertain to farmers only. 
Houscht (n.d.) notes that foreknowledge enabled landowners to build large houses on sites they 
knew were going to be needed for the project, expecting to make a killing in a compensation 
claim. Others however are not so lucky. In more recent projects, efforts are made to compensate 
fishermen, but the landless still get a raw deal. If paid out at all, compensation money is siphoned 
off by local elites. The Deputy Commissioner, the acting district head, tends to dole out much 
less money than claimed, and claimants need to make repeated trips to even obtain that money 
(Wood, 1999).220  
 
 
 
THE POLITICS OF FLOOD INSECURITY 
 
136 
5.6 FAP PART II: NEW (DE)SELECTION OF ALTERNATIVES  
 
We have seen that opponent moves for closure managed to reframe the problem definition, but 
not stop the project, which was about to move into its second phase in 1995. A series of natural 
events (5.6.1 and 5.6.4) and political developments (5.6.2 and 5.6.3) events triggered yet more 
changes in the project‘s make-up. 
 
 
5.6.1 ACCIDENTAL CLOSURE? 
 
But by mid-1995 FAP-20 project was suddenly hanging by a thread due to a dramatic physical 
event. The construction of the large Jamuna Multipurpose Bridge necessitated the closure in 
October 1994 of nearby river inlets of the Old Dhaleswari which feeds the rivers Pungli and 
Dhaleswari which in turn feed the upper areas of the Tangail (FAP 20 project) area, spanning 
2560km2. Hydraulic modelling revealed that this would reduce the level of the Dhaleswari river to 
fall by 40-50cm and the Pungli by 100-110 cm (Hydraulic Modelling for Dhaleswari Mitigation 
Study – IMWBD, 1995). This would reduce flood risk, but also the benefits of irrigation and soil 
flushing in the area. 
The Jamuna Multi-Purpose Bridge is a project of great symbolic, economic and political 
importance to Bangladesh -  the bridge provides a shortcut for traffic across the Jamuna, as well 
as making Bangladesh an attractive transport link between two parts of India. The Bridge was an 
important bargaining chip for Bangladesh in sealing an agreement with India over the Ganges: in 
December 1996, Bangladesh obtained a hard-won bilateral fifty-fifty agreement with India over 
the river Ganges.221 In a separate treaty, Bangladesh admitted Indian transport across its territory, 
which cuts the route for east-west transport for Indian businesses to the state Assam222. 
Interviewees (and also: Waterbury, 1997) suggest the two treaties are closely linked. 
But one branch of the Water Ministry apparently did not know what the other was planning: 
there had been no communications between the Roads Ministry, in charge of the Bridge, and 
BWDB or the FAP team. Some water was still coming from two minor spill channels, which due 
to increased hydraulic head [druk] developed a steeper gradient and had started to scour, and 
from the New Dhaleswari intake. But for all practical purposes, the closure would render FAP-20 
practically meaningless. 
On the initiative of FAP-20, the Ministry of Water Resources called an inter-ministerial 
committee representing all parties concerned. Between March and June ‘95 the committee 
drafted a report proposing a new intake channel, 100m in width, to be constructed in the next 
two years.  
But on 8 July 1995, as a FAP-20 workshop report has it (Euroconsult et al., 1995: 64), ‗Nature 
intervened‘ by way of a ‗spontaneous breakthrough‘ of a stretch of river bank south of the 
closure, which found its way into the (blocked, minor) First Spill channel. The water broke 
through from the Jamuna into the Dhaleswari taking several hundreds of houses with it in the 
process. Conspiracy theories abounded. 223 
Meanwhile, it was crunch (go - no go) time for FAP-20 at the decision-making level. By 1994 
most FAP studies had been completed or aborted, only pilots like FAP 20 were due to continue. 
FPCO‗s evaluation of FAP in October 1994224 had culminated in an extensive wish list for 65 
projects to be implemented in the next 10 years. A full fifth of the budget for this programme 
would be taken up by a Bangladeshi Farakka Dam on the Ganges – although Biswas and Uitto 
(2001) claim that it makes no sense to build a dam there, since Bangladesh is a delta. Bangladesh 
would indeed favour dam construction upstream in Nepal, but this would require a multilateral 
treaty, which India is not keen on. 
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The Association of Bangladeshi Engineers claimed with a textbook ‗TINA‘ [There is no 
alternative] – type move for closure: 
 
‗(d)ifferent study reports‘(unnamed in the document, JW) ‗indicate that Bangladesh to feed her teeming 
millions in the future and meet other sectoral water needs has no other alternative but to go for 
barrages in the major rivers‘ (Association of Bangladeshi Engineers, 1995) 
 
But most plans were shot down by a World Bank ‗advisory memorandum‘ to FPCO. A revised 
version produced by FPCO and the Panel of Experts known as the ‗Water Strategy Paper‘ which 
appeared six months later, in March 1995, avoided any mention of the FAP and turned out to be 
very different and much more modest five-year programme (Huq/Rahman, 1995). The Flood 
Action Plan was renamed the Bangladesh Water and Flood management Strategy (GoB, 1995). 
Instead of new hydraulic structures, the paper aimed at the development at a national water plan, 
institutional strengthening and integrated water management, which now meant round-the-year 
water management.  
To the great disappointment of the Association, the Water Strategy paper ‗tactfully denies the 
possibility of construction of barrage [sic] on the major rivers of the country‘ (Association of 
Bangladeshi Engineers, 1995). This, again was an exaggeration: that document and the FAP-II 
budget still provided for a Bangladeshi Farakka Dam on the Ganges, to respond to the lost influx 
due to the Indian Farakka Dam.225 This dam however has not been built so far. 
A new donor conference held in December 1995 did not lead to concrete pledges, but 
recommended better stakeholder involvement in any water-management investment and 
activities, more sustainability and a national water management plan.  
 
 
5.6.2 BWDB HEGEMONY UNDER FIRE 
 
When the Flood Action Plan started, the idea of integrated water management was still way off 
the map. Bangladesh experiences river floods and rainwater floods inland, and tidal and storm-
surge floods in the coastal zone. The Flood Action Plan only tackles river floods. Bangladesh had 
diverted all its resources on flood protection in flood-prone areas rather than treating floods as 
part of an annual cycle of flood and drought that affects the whole country.226 While there was a 
water planning institute that could have taken a comprehensive view, WARPO, the government 
of Bangladesh and its donors chose to superimpose a Flood Protection Coordination 
Organisation (FPCO) to co-ordinate, supervise and monitor the FAP works. This consisted of 
experts seconded from the Ministry of Irrigation, Water Development and Flood Control, More 
than BWDB, the FPCO was exposed to external influences (pressures), causing the IOV report 
to exult that FAP was ‗unprecedented‘ in the level of co-operation between donors and recipients 
(IOV, 1993). A Panel of local and international experts, mainly funded by the UNDP, was formed 
to lend advice. It was expanded in 1992 to incorporate a wider range of disciplines. 
However, the BWDB did not easily adapt to the new winds blowing in the field of water 
management, planning and practice. It traded on its earlier successes in coastal management and 
has taken a long time to learn to live with criticism and adapt. Security, to the Board, lies in 
control, hierarchy and technical indicators, rather than initiative; making mistakes is punished, in 
other words: the culture is risk-averse, which is likely to stifle innovation. One recently retired 
BWDB engineer told me that the BDWB has a centralised, rigid rotation system with little 
institutional memory. Normally, no evaluation takes place of completed projects, as BWDB 
views itself as too short of resources for this (interview, December 2000). Indeed the Dutch 
ODA Inspectorate (IOV) report of 1993 had tersely noted, ―FPCO and BWDB are short on 
learning capacity‖227. However, despite complaints on the part of senior and retired BWDB 
engineers I interviewed, who felt that after a golden age up until about 1975, quality has gone 
down, esprit de corps is very high. 
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The 1995 donor conference recommended structural reform of the water sector. The World 
Bank plan forced the BWDB to shed several thousands of its staff, and restructure to incorporate 
more disciplines. In 1995 FPCO merged with WARPO, the water resources planning 
organisation originally set up to prepare the national water management strategy. In 2006 BDWB 
were ‗twinned‘ with the Dutch public works department which itself had gone through numerous 
downscaling reforms. 
‗They [BWDB] know if they don‘t change they are going to die‘ (Bangladeshi consultant 
interview, 2000). 
On the basis of new Guidelines for participation (version 2000), it looks like the BWDB now 
hopes to ‗solve‘ its burden by trying to hand more projects over to a still weak local government. 
This gives momentum to the pendulum swing towards smaller, decentralised projects, boosting 
the role of the local government ministry, LGED. Upgraded from the Local Government 
Engineering Bureau in 1992, LGED‘s strength lies in small local projects, and it now increasingly 
competes with BWDB for funding. 
 
 
5.6.3 CRITICAL DONORS 
 
The changed donor climate had important consequences for FAP-20. Both donors sent 
Ministerial Missions (1995, 1996, 1997) and at various instances questioned the wisdom of 
pushing ahead. Questions were again raised in the Dutch House of Commons about the lack of 
participatory opportunities. The liberal-conservative party pointed at the minority opinion of one 
member of the ODA inspectorate‘s report (IOV) inspection team of 1993 who disagreed with 
the report‘s conclusion that the project should go ahead. 
The donors were annoyed enough with the controversy over participation to dramatically swap 
consultancies after the Mid-term report. Formally, the reasons for Euroconsult‘s replacement by 
Haskoning are ‗confidential‘‘ – the report intimates they are not being flexible enough and being 
too costly (Schulte Nordholt et al., 1995). However, while those interviewees who brought up 
their experiences with the Dutch consultant were less than enthusiastic about Euroconsult‘s 
performance, a measure of scapegoating and personal politics is strongly implied (interview 
Dutch consultant, 2000). It is also noted the mid-term evaluation report was not officially ratified 
by the donors (CPP Final report, 2000) and it is not agreed by the interviewees that the new 
consultant did much better than the former consultancy. 
Presumably in response to all the turmoil the project management radically changed its stance 
locally by 1995. In December 1994, an Information Centre was opened at Tangail. It made 
impressive efforts to inform the public and listen to its demands. Kamal Siddiqi and his team 
leaders frequently visited the area and held meetings to motivate people and listen to their views. 
The leadership also put in several accompanying measures, such as roads, which had not been 
part of the original plan and a structure of eight different gates in the regulator to regulate fish 
access. The project even issued an anthology of press reports on FAP called The Press Speaks 
(FPCO, September 1995) including some coverage of the BELA legal notice to stop FAP-20. 
In 1995 FAP-20 still ranked as a priority project (FPCO, 1995). But the excitement with the 
donors had clearly waned as the project reached ever more troubled waters. After the Germans 
threatened to stop funding after the 1996 mission, yet another overhaul was instigated based on a 
reformulation mission (Datta et al., 1997, Knaub, 1996). This new system, worked out in 1997, 
created room for fishermen, landless and women, however still did not take account existing 
informal local problem-solving, binding arbitration councils consisting of village elders (salish), 
preferring to superimpose a new system instead. The guidelines were later characterised as 
‗confusing‘ by the Dutch ODA Minister, Jan Pronk (Final Report, 2000). 
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5.6.4  THE 1998 FLOOD AND THE PROJECT AFTERMATH 
 
Just when the momentum for FAP was clearly lost, Bangladesh experienced the ‗flood of the 
century‘ in 1998. Like in 1988, over 2000 people died, millions lost their homes. Despite its 
losses, flood response counts as a success because there was no famine, vindicating Sen.‘s 
endowment theory. The flood also was a major test for FAP-20. 
While the Embankment Management groups, established to maintain the structures for the 
long run, had been less than dynamic – too much trouble for too little gain – but as the project 
area‘s residents could see the water rising with their naked eye, they put in joint efforts to 
reinforce and raise the embankments. While outside the project area, the majority of the country 
found themselves 8m under water, FAP-20 remained a dry spot. In fact people interviewed by 
Chadwick et al. (2001) in Jugini, inside the project area complained that the flow was too low, so 
that insufficient floodwater reached their paddy fields and (agricultural) pollution was 
insufficiently diluted. The area received an inflow from people from the Jamuna left bank, which 
was fast eroding, using their social network and squatting on khas (government) land.  
Some participatory principles took hold in national policy. In the run-up to the NWMP, a large 
countrywide People‘s Participation project was carried out to inventory what kind of water 
problems people identified and what types of solutions they preferred – if, going by BIDS 
information ((see below), far from flawlessly. Thus lay knowledge now plays a role alongside 
expert knowledge. ‗You can discuss [i.e. debate, JW] the methodology but the concept is accepted‘ 
(interview, Bangladesh consultant). 
In the end, UNDP‘s (1995) prediction that the ‗apparent attempt to approve FAP and secure 
funding for some of its major components before (…) public debate, will cost Bangladesh dearly‘ 
was well observed, but one wonders if there is no question of post-rationalisation. Would the 
donors and UNDP have been so critical if NGOs had been less successful at mobilising the press 
and public opinion against FAP? 
The goals evolved and goalposts moved quite significantly over time. The water management 
philosophy changed dramatically in the 11 short years between 1989 and 2000. The protest 
coalition‘s frame was successful in that the water paradigm shifted away from FCD/I (Flood 
Control, Drainage and Irrigation) and the importance of fisheries is now accepted in the National 
Water Management Plan of 2000. Participatory ideas were enshrined in that Plan, new actors 
found a place within the regime, while others were restructured. 
In 1995 it was admitted that one of the key objectives was already outdated - rather than quick 
disposal of monsoon water, retention for the dry season now became key. After the 
reformulation mission, the main criterion became whether compartmentalisation is a good 
investment for contemporary Bangladesh. This made the issue much more economic in nature, a 
benchmark it signally failed (CPP Final Report, 2000).  
The cost-benefit analysis of the project itself elicited much scorn in my interviewees. The internal 
rate of return of a project is supposed to be 12%. However, as a Bangladeshi consultant told me 
in 2000, the consultant who does not ‗get‘ that figure will not get the job, and the only way of 
protesting an approach you dislike is to ‗get‘ exactly 12.0%. ‗They cook up a certain benefit, 
increased production. They don‘t know if it brings those benefits‘ (interview Bangladeshi 
consultant). A Bangladeshi NGO representative calls it ‗eyewash‘ (Bangla NGO interview, 2000). 
No matter the cooking, for FAP-20 the Internal Rate of Return turned out dismal. The final 
project evaluation report (2000) somehow comes up with 3.1%, which it judges to be ‗hardly 
attractive‘. After some re-accounting in which some project cost is reassigned to projects other 
than FAP-20 (as was done for the Jamuna Bridge), the IRR yields 7.3%, which is still too low for 
the discounting benchmark. The Final report pointedly asks whether 12% is a reasonable 
discount rate standard for any water project and notes that the intangible value, delivery from 
‗fear of flooding‘, would itself justify many projects in developed countries. Yet it seems to 
undercut this point by noting the standard of protection is a rather modest 1: 20 (CPP Final 
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Report, 2000: main report). But as FAP-20 team leader commented (interview, 2007) EUR10 
million for 10,000ha may be a lot, but the Economic Internal Rate of Return (EIRR) will never 
be impressive for a pilot project – had the concept been repeated, economies of scale might have 
been realised.  
In 2000 an internal WARPO review decided FAP-20 was neither replicable nor sustainable 
(Latif, pers. comm., 2000). Given the experiences with FAP, no large river schemes are likely to 
be funded externally any time soon, perhaps unless an even bigger disaster strikes. 
When I visited the project site in late 2000, any sign of donor presence had gone, the Tangail 
project information office was nearly abandoned, and any remaining business was taken care of 
by a Diploma engineer228 and a local consultant who would be leaving after 4 months. Despite 
having been on the case for 18 months, the engineer did not seem to know anything about the 
project, and is looking forward to his retirement in 6 months (int. consultant Tangail). Some 
funds were set aside for Operation and Maintenance, but nothing much was done with it 
(interview Team Leader). ‗Land grabbing‘ on the river bank reportedly has further encroached 
and polluted the river, especially in Tangail Town (Shakil, 2006). This was confirmed by two 
Dutch thesis students staying in Tangail for four months in 2007, who reported that many of the 
65 structures put in place (15 – 20 were never built) were in bad shape, with channels being filled 
in to build a house on. The committees had all disintegrated, apart from one committee near the 
Regulator, members of which freely admitted their committee was only for show when donors 
come to visit. Their interviews supported the view that the need to consult and work with local 
people has taken root in BWDB, in part due to the FAP experiences. 
 
 
5.7 COMPARTMENTALISATION OF KNOWLEDGE: FAP AS A PROGRAMME 
OF STUDIES 
 
The final received wisdom is to present FAP as to nothing more than a programme of studies:  
The objective of the Compartmentalisation Pilot Project (FAP 20) was to gather experience with 
the planning, construction and operation of compartments in the floodplain of the Jamuna River 
while taking the local water management, institutional and socio-economic conditions into 
account (KfW, 2004).  
Since FAP has come to be seen as a research programme rather than an action programme 
instead, it makes sense to look into it as such in terms of knowledge generation and 
dissemination within the decision-making regime.229 Those who saw FAP as a study-based exercise 
to find ways to minimise flood damages are not too unhappy with the outcomes. In the press 
(e.g. the Daily Star of 19 July 1995) and in interviews with Bangladesh engineers, project leaders 
professed satisfaction that the project showed compartmentalisation could indeed be done. But 
as we saw earlier, an obsession with deadlines led to rushed implementation before proper needs 
assessment, modelling and data-gathering had been carried out, so that the cart was put before 
the horse230. 
Apart from compartmentalisation, other approaches such as flood proofing were indeed 
studied in the Flood Action Plan as a whole and, as we saw, there was increasing room for a 
critical researcher approach as the project progressed, so that local knowledge and practices 
(Chadwick et al., 1998) become more widely known. So if, as Ericksen et al. (n.d.), claim: 
 
‗(t)he spirit of FAP is ...to examine the advantages and disadvantages of a range of alternatives for 
dealing with the abnormal flood problem and to combine the best options for various locations across the 
country‘ (my emphasis, J.W.), 
 
we can conclude that the closure arrived at in the 1989 London conference was indeed not 
absolute.  
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The research debunked some of the stronger claims made by opponents. NGOs claimed in 
front of the Dutch and German Development Ministers, Spranger and Pronk, that five or six 
villages in the FAP-20 area were turning into sand bowls. A political point had been scored, but 
when research on desertification was commissioned, ‗we couldn‘t find anything‘ (interview, 
Bangladeshi researcher). 
Interviewees contracted to do qualitative research felt they were pressured by their principals 
to skimp on their thoroughness by imposing impossible deadlines. Consultancies hiring them 
often had little truck with qualitative research associated with need assessments and researchers 
felt the end reports were sanitised to comply with donor and GoB wishes. All researchers I talked 
to felt uneasy about the fate of their findings, ranging from misrepresentation to suppression of 
findings (interviews, also Soussan, 1999). Over time, researchers and consultants learned to 
stipulate no interference with the result, or that their findings could be published in accessible 
form elsewhere. 
 
 
5.8 CONCLUSION 
 
Compartmentalisation is, in a metaphorical sense, a state of mind. It is to see things as separate 
from each other rather than related (Kemp, 2004). ‗Despite subsequent attempts to rewrite its 
genesis‘ (Faaland et al., 1995) the emphasis and starting point for the Flood Action Plan was a 
Flood Control and Drainage (FCD) approach -  a technical fix with well-intended participatory 
add-ons (as analysed by De Bruijne, 2007), but became politicised by NGOs and local groups. 
While the compromise contained structural as well as non-structural aspects, the emphasis was 
on structures for agriculture. 
The Flood Action Plan was the biggest riverine flood protection project ever proposed in 
Bangladesh. But it was scaled down well before it took off, and in 1995, only the 
compartmentalisation project continued. The intervention that became emblematic of the Flood 
Action Plan, FAP-20, affects an area of only 13,305 ha. FAP therefore was not the ‗mega-project‘ 
the French envisaged (Boyce 1990) nor what its critics claimed it had become or even a 
predominantly structural flood programme. In hindsight, it was beside the point for FAP critics 
to zero in on the supposed enormity of the technology – the embankments and 
compartmentalisation. The billion-dollar ‗mega-project‘ Boyce had warned about in 1990 was 
scaled back to a US$200 million programme of studies for FAP as a whole. A number of low 
embankments that were already in place before FAP, the ‗Tangail Horseshoe‘ built in the 1960s 
under the World Food Programme, were strengthened and supplemented under FAP 20. But far 
too many structures were put in place (engineers now acknowledge this) that can clog up the 
channels, creating drainage problems. Moreover some structures failed, as did FAP-21, the heroic 
attempt to rehabilitate 225km of the Brahmaputra Right Bank Embankment project.231 
 
Significantly, FAP became emblematic of a much wider range of contests about state-society 
relations (representation) and Bangladesh-donor relations, state-market relations (privatisation) 
and the balance between agriculture and fisheries232. Reforms and participatory initiatives were 
implemented but failed to improve the sustainability of the project beyond its completion date. 
FAP was originally legitimised with reference to ‗physical security‘ and resisted on a human-
rights platform. A concern with security (saving lives) was clearly the impetus behind FAP as a 
whole, but the nature of Bangladeshi life provides less clear-cut positions in the balance between 
protection and risk-taking than it does in the Netherlands, so that the ‗fight against the floods‘ 
made  less sense in a Bangladeshi context. Apart from some local demonstrators, FAP-20 did not 
rate as a physical security concern in the debate.  
Indeed, the constituency of project beneficiaries changed dramatically in the course of the 
project. At the outset, the flood management objective benefited landholders, while apparently 
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not excessively damaging other stakeholders. While Tangail Town was originally not provided for 
under FAP-20, in the end, there was a consensus among the local interviewees I spoke to that the 
main beneficiaries were the townspeople keeping dry feet rather than the farmers. 
Both the river as threat (physical security) and human rights (vulnerability) were equivocal in 
Bangladesh, and had more immediate resonance with a European and American than a local 
audience. They also reinforced mutual stereotypes and antagonisms between ´engineers´ and 
´sociologists´, strengthened by a lack of communication between them. The politicisation of the 
project forced a rapprochement between the two, which also catalysed more integrated thinking on 
water management and participation, which is now widely regarded as positive. The opposition to 
FAP managed to push a more ‗integrated‘ problem definition by putting environmental and 
livelihood (fishing, cattle, groundwater) issues on the map. Protesters placed the ‗development 
and participation for whom?‘ issue squarely on the agenda successfully countersecuritised human 
rights by staging their protest in a media-friendly way.  
The discourse alliance (Hajer, 1995) in the Bangladesh case therefore can be summarised as a 
combination of political fatalism and engineering dominance (control) for economic security, 
based on securitised food security, while the counter-alliance counter-securitised livelihoods, human 
rights and, ultimately, sovereignty.  
Probably the most powerful element in the mix was the way the oppositional alliance within 
and outside Bangladesh managed to portray (frame) FAP as a whole as a most unwelcome 
external intervention - in which Bangladeshis were treated like guinea pigs in a laboratory 
experiment. For them, the flood plan was more like a ‗protection racket‘ (after Tilly, 1992) than a 
help. As transferred technologies, compartmentalisation and poldering did not quite translate. 
The apparent similarities between Dutch and Bangladeshi landscape are gainsaid by the power of 
the Jamuna, which is rather greater than that of the Rhine, and the absence of an economic 
support base233. But apart from a manageable physical environment, compartmentalisation also 
depends on high standards of construction, Operation and Maintenance and a stable rule 
framework, which is sadly deficient in Bangladesh. 
As a programme of action research FAP set out to kill perhaps too many flies with one swat. It 
provided a research opportunity to minutiously chart the hydrological and socio-economic 
situation in a small area. Compartmentalisation and (the later conception of) participation proved 
more popular as an idea than their opponents would have it, but both compartmentalisation and 
participation were far from self-propelling. While in hindsight a great deal was learned, whether 
transferability of this information to the national scale was achieved or even possible is doubtful. 
GoB intention to replicate findings came to nothing and there was limited use of results.  
The success of the NGO lobby seems to have been due to its ability to provide a contrasting 
paradigm that struck a chord with the Zeitgeist. The opponents to FAP wisely concentrated on a 
human rights platform rather than ‘living with the flood‘. They would have a hard time defending 
‗living with the flood‘ in the light of the livelihood consequences of the 1988 flood. While they 
could successfully claim that post-flood years bring bumper harvests, the winners and losers from 
this bumper harvest are not the same people, as Houscht (n.d.) notes. ‗Living with the flood‘ in 
Bangladesh is neither symbiotic nor conflict-free because of the many deaths and relocations 
floods bring. 
 
As the concise history above has shown, it is not unthinkable the pendulum will swing the 
other way again. Until that pendulum swing, the grand ambition to eliminate floods forever has 
given way to an acceptance of uncertainty and institutional reform. When in 1998, the ‗worst 
flood of the 20th century‘234 the number of fatalities was lower than in 1988 (official figure: 1050), 
this was attributed to investment in better flood preparedness (Ahmad et al., 1998) and, by some, 
to an improved food management system inspired by West Bengali economist Amartya Sen‘s 
(1981) theory of entitlements. This seemed to drive home the point that rivers are not the main 
problem and structures not the main solution. 
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When in 2004, around 600 people died in another bad flood, the water agenda had shifted to 
other concerns. It had been noted before that the Flood Action Plan only marginally addresses 
cyclones, which are the bigger killer by far. A cyclone hitting Chittagong in April 1991 claimed 
around 140,000 fatalities by drowning, deafeningly resonating the 1970 cyclone that took 200,000 
lives. The number of fatalities claimed by floods is a relatively modest figure compared to cyclone 
fatalities and with better management it can be significantly reduced – hence the new CPP: 
Cyclone Protection Project. Coastal protection and water contamination with arsenic are now 
seen as far bigger threats to popular well-being in Bangladesh. 
Nevertheless, in 2006 the Asian Development Bank decided to follow up on its original Flood 
Action Plan project in the region of Khulna-Jessore, FAP 4, in the Southwest Area IWRM 
project. Many of the regional FAP reports were uncovered and original consultants like Dirk 
Frans were contacted. It seems that compartmentalisation is getting its second (or third) wind in 
this project, and this time ´water security´ does feature in the project document235. 
 
 
 
Glossary  
 
Beel  A low-lying depression in the floodplain that generally contains water throughout the 
year, a small lake or backswamp. 
Khal  A natural channel, minor river or a tidal creek 
Haartal General strike 
Khas       Commons, owned by the state or religious community  
Mastan Thug, hired to beat people up 
Thana The administrative unit of local government above the union level, consist of three to ten 
unions (the lowest unit of government in Bangladesh 
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Chapter 6: The Maaswerken project: fixing a hole? 
  
 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The Dutch are famous the world over for draining and poldering marshes. So thorough were 
they that only 3% of the country is still marshland. The developed land was defended with dikes 
and embankments. When a high-water event hit the Southeast in 1993 and 1995, the Netherlands 
had not seen a riverine flood since 1926. The near-flooding of the river Maas (Meuse) served as a 
wake-up call for the Southern province of Limburg. Dramatic pictures at Borgharen, where the 
Maas enters Dutch territory, incited national politicians to make bold promises: 1 in 250 year 
safety by 2005 and 100% coverage of the whole Maas in 2015 (van Leeuwen et al., 2002). 
The crisis event opened a window for special legislation in which everything seemed possible: 
special powers, unlimited resources, informal co-operation with citizens and a new lease on life 
for a languishing project, Maaswerken, to enhance the area‘s natural beauty by broadening and 
deepening the river, self-contained financially from the sale of gravel dug up from the river bed. 
While the original project focused on the Common (or Border) Maas area, the Southernmost 
stretch which is a recognised site of great natural beauty the plan developed into something much 
bigger after the flood of 1995. 
The case study especially zooms in on what became a contentious issues: was flood defence 
really a security issue, and therefore eligible for urgent, special treatment, as the province of 
Limburg claimed? 
This chapter sketches this debate as it traces the highs and lows of the Maaswerken plan from 
its conception in 1985 to its contractual formalisation in 2005. After sketching the run-up to the 
plan in Section 6.2, it will pay special attention to the immediate post-high water period (1995 – 
1997), when quick and dirty decisions were made that however casts a long shadow over the 
project‘s future, both under central (Section 6.3 and 6.4) and provincial leadership (Section 6.5). 
Section 6.3 pays special attention to how the definition of security came to be played out in the 
context of the perennial struggle between Holland and Limburg, West and South, core and 
periphery. I will look at the various actors‘ legitimisation and delegitimisation strategies, which 
impinge on the definition (framing) and reframing of the problem. 
The river stretch at issue is delimited by Maastricht (in the province of Limburg) to the South 
and Mook and Boxmeer to the North, in Brabant. While, the whole of the area is affected by the 
eventual project, it originated and generated most of the debate in Limburg. The case study will 
therefore mainly zoom in on the latter province. 
For this case study, 16 semi-structured interviews with key actor groups from the public (local 
and national), private (gravel kings) and civil-society sectors (environmental and parish council) 
were held. Field visits to the project site were made in 2000 and 2005, the key project documents 
and PR materials analysed and a press analysis made based on the clippings from Rijkswaterstaat 
documentation and the LexisNexus data base. 
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FIG 6.1A, 6.1B: Location of the Grensmaas 
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6.2 HOW THE FLOODS SAVED THE MAASWERKEN 
 
6.2.1 QUARRYING FOR NATURE: AN UNEASY COMPROMISE 
 
The Maas originates in Northern France, near Nancy, and carves out a deep valley in France and 
Belgium before entering the Netherlands at Eijsden, where it is a natural border between the 
Netherlands and Belgium for 50kms 236. As the river changed its course in the past millennia, the 
Maas left a large fen in Central Limburg and as the earth crust rose, it caused the river to carve 
out new valleys, the older floodplain became what are now river terraces. As a consequence, the 
river is deeper than the hinterland, uinlike the West Netherlands, so that floods do not cause 
damage beyond the area immediately bordering the river.  
Given the area‘s low population (Grensmaas: 15,000 inhabitants in 1998), extensive agriculture 
(2260 ha of agricultural land; MER Grensmaas, 1998) and relatively high altitude respective to sea 
level there has not been an obvious need to dike up the river Maas in most areas down to Mook 
and Boxmeer. The Grensmaas however was fixed between 1860 and 1890 as a narrow trench of 
some 60 m width. As a result, the river speeded up and eroded the gravel river bed. 
By Dutch standards the Grensmaas has a steep drop -  45 cm per km  - as it enters the 
Netherlands over 800 kms from its source, after which the gradient flattens sharply, and the river 
loses its momentum. This stretch of the Maas, from Maastricht to Maasbracht, was originally a 
braided river, a system of gullies with natural gradients and low-lying islands which were 
frequently flooded. This is an unpredictable river stretch: the mean discharge, 230 m3/s, is not a 
very informative figure. As the rain-fed Maas is prone to extremes, from flashy floods of 3100 
m3/s (in 1993) to zero, an effective flood warning system is no luxury (Duivenvoorden, 1997). 
The steep drop makes the Maas the only Dutch white water river, and badly suited to shipping. 
As ships can use a side channel, the Julianakanaal, the absence of navigation benefits the survival 
of rare fish species. 
The Grensmaas (Border or Common Maas) forms the border with Belgium The stretch 
following the Grensmaas is called the Zandmaas (Sandy Maas), because its slower flow promotes 
sand and silt, which are commercially not very interesting. By contrast, the faster-moving 
Grensmaas, deposits gravel. Given these valuable gravel deposits, the otherwise scenic Maas has 
been exploited as an economic resource. Quarrying deepened the river, creating thousands of 
unsightly gravel pits in Southern Limburg, filled up with water and used for pleasure boating 
(Maasplassen). Gravel digging also generates noise, dust pollution and heavy transport. Cracks in 
houses still evidence damage from the vibrations that come with digging. Together with nature 
organizations, citizens from the affected towns staged protests.  
Meanwhile a greening of Dutch river management was taking place. Environmental 
conservationists started the fire, but were joined in 1980 by notable citizens protesting the 
damage dike reinforcement would do to the historic town of Bakel, Central Netherlands. This 
heralded a new era in river management in which acceptance of security measures could not be 
taken for granted. Environmental consciousness also affected within government, where ‗green 
engineers‘ in the Departments of Agriculture and Public Works made their influence felt. The 
World Wildlife Fund‘s ‗Living Rivers‘ (Helmer et al., 1992) report championed untamed, 
unconstrained rivers. Giving the river more space to braid and meander seemed an exciting 
perspective. Such visions inspired several ‗green engineers‘ to take a fresh look at the Maas‘ 
potential to create 1500 ha of natural values that could form part of a national Ecological Main 
Structure linking habitats throughout the Netherlands. 
The earliest ideas for a comprehensive, greener approach to the Maas valley date back from 
1984. The concept of developing nature came from a group of driven civil servants from the 
Agriculture and Water Departments in response to a prize contest set by the National Planning 
Agency. The underlying dilemma was that agriculture, still a powerful sector, is not a good basis 
for nature conservation, while just buying up land for straightforward conservation seems like a 
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wasted opportunity. Quarrying seemed to offer promising opportunities for integrated regional 
development to create ‗new nature‘ and improve ‗spatial quality‘ (de Bruin, 1987). After a 
Wageningen-based hydrological consultancy found that the Grensmaas area had potential for 
such ‗nature development (Klink, 1985, 1986), another consultancy, Stroming, followed up with a 
concrete plan (Stroming, 1990). 
At the turn of the 1990s, the provincial government decided to phase out quarrying, bringing 
the hope for citizens to be rid of the nuisance after 70 years of excavations. To safeguard the 
future of the excavation, industry gravellers and province concluded a voluntary agreement in 
1990 between to dig up 35 million tonnes more, designating the Maas valley as the final site for 
quarrying - the last profitable gravel site in the Netherlands. Limburg‘s Provincial Council issued 
its intention for a preliminary Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) for a provincial 
excavation plan in November 1990. This EIA however was aborted due to NGO pressures for a 
more environmental approach (Teisman, 1995). 
Combining gravel digging with environmental beautification seemed an elegant way out of a 
bad situation. Inspired by the French river Allier, which the plan‘s initiators liken to the look of 
the Maas in earlier times (Stroming, 1990), the project envisages an exciting natural stream with an 
interesting variety of habitats. Instead of fixing the riverbank, the original channel is broadened, 
which creates space to reduce the flood risk. The topsoil, which is commercially worthless, is 
used to fill the holes created by gravel digging. The Grensmaas river broadening project thus 
became a nature development project with an additional role for flood protection. 
The intention to carry out the ‗Maas valley project‘ was formalised between the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Nature and Fisheries the Ministry of Transport and Public Works (Rijkswaterstaat), 
and the Province of Limburg in November 1992, after which the Netherlands Economic 
Institute (NEI) and Twijnstra Gudde, a well-known Dutch consultancy, were commissioned to 
calculate the project‘s financial viability. 
But the voluntary agreement gave rise to conspiracy theories about political deal making to suit 
the gravellers. Due to the prior history of resource excavation in Limburg, public trust was 
already decidedly low. In the early 1990s the province of Limburg was plagued by political 
scandals over construction and gravel extraction. For example in 1986 Aqua Terra, a shell 
company, bought and enclosed 8000 ha of privatised lakes, arable land and campsites at less than 
EUR 3 million, which some provincial political parties considered an unlikely bargain237. 
Moreover, the original 'green-for-gravel' deal had been promoted by a prominent Limburg 
Labour (PvdA) politician, Riem, who was later incriminated for taking kickbacks and having 
overly cosy relations with, among others, Panheel and Van den Biggelaar, two key gravel 
companies involved in the current project (Dohmen, 1996). This history was to haunt the Maas 
works for a long time coming. 
 
 
6.2.2 THE FLOOD WINDOW (1995-1997) 
 
In response to the 1993 and 1995 high-water events238, the outlook changed radically in 
Limburg. The 1993 flood led to the evacuation of 8,000 people and a financial damage assessed 
at the time at NLG250 million, some EUR 122 million. While nobody died, the quick-onset 
floods caused considerable shock. Older generations were used to water nuisance, and would 
flood proof their house. But new residents, especially those whose Limburg properties were 
second homes, were not so flood-aware. They found the flooding of their basement garages and 
fitted carpets unacceptable. 
After that first flood, timed close to the May 1994 elections, national politicians and press 
flocked to Limburg, sharing the outrage that a flood could happen in this day and age, and 
promising compensation and security measures. True to Dutch form, an advisory commission for 
the Maas, named after its chairman, Boertien, was instated to examine what should be done. It 
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favoured broadening and deepening the rivers to accommodate a large river volume rather than 
raising dikes (see Table below), along with some adjustments in sewer piping and spatial 
planning. 
 
It is at this point that a triad gravel-nature development-security and the ‗zero budget‘ 
precondition took centre stage239. At that time, the potential for cost recovery by combining 
nature development by broadening the river through gravel extraction was perceived as a major 
selling point. Gravel extraction would double or triple the river channel‘s width and lower the 
floodplain over the 45km Grensmaas stretch from Borgharen to Roosteren. After shallow gravel 
extraction for broadening and deepening the river, the Maas would be left to its own devices 
which, it was hoped, would create a varied, attractive form of wilderness. 
The Boertien report claimed its preferred alternative (‗2b‘) could be self-funding at no extra 
cost. Consultants interviewed in 2000 expressed strong doubts about this claim, though. An 
important factor in justifying a flood scheme is damage avoided, inferred from actual damage in 
past floods. One consultant doubted the damage assessment for 1993, and noted it was a 
mistaken assumption that the project would involve no extra costs for the project consortium 
other than for the economy as a whole. Finally, he noted, ‗2b‘ was the alternative marred by the 
greatest degree of uncertainty (int. 5). While proponents promised a billion Dutch guilders 
(approx. EUR 440 million) in additional economic activity and a boost for tourism, no one could 
predict with any certainty whether the costs and benefits of the project would cancel out. This 
point of uncertainty was noted with some frequency in press and other interviews as well. Van 
Leeuwen et al. (2002), to cite one figure, quote a 10-25% fluctuation in gravel revenue.  
The ‗2b‘ alternative however quickly became a political reality when in the closing days of 
January 1995, the water again was at peak levels. Some 8500 people left their homes while others 
braced themselves for the flood at home. Unlike the Rhine and Waal area in Gelderland, where 
250,000 people were evacuated (see next Chapter) the Maas did actually flood at Borgharen and 
Itteren (two parishes near Maastricht) and the cities of Venlo and Roermond further 
downstream. 
Jolted by the public outrage, the Limburg authorities now expressed a far more favourable 
attitude to the Grensmaas project. The Provincial Council now was fully behind ‗2b‘ but 
demanded much faster project implementation than the projected 15-20 years, and wanted more 
money from the national government to realise this. 
This was not as far-fetched as it may seem today. Despite the fact that no dikes breached and 
damage was much more limited than in late 1993, the national authorities really went all-out. A 
Delta Plan for the three main rivers, Maas, Rhine and Waal, was fast-tracked through Parliament 
and a series of temporary flood defences were planned along the main rivers.  
 
Informal and formal governance 
As a first, largely symbolic (Teisman, 1995) response to the high-water events, kaden were put 
into place under an emergency decision making regime. Kaden, literally: quays, are earth 
embankments covered by impermeable clay. There are two types of kaden: revetments in 
residential areas and 'green embankments' for rural areas. These embankments were built around 
several flood-prone villages to provide protection against 50-year floods; the entire project is to 
bring this flood risk down to 250-year floods.  
The emergency measures taken in the framework of the Deltaplan Grote Rivieren (DGR) 
enabled a fast-track process accompanied by, it appears from the interviews, a great deal of 
informality. To realise the crash programme, the DGR pushed aside all legal directives governing 
permits and exemptions. The Special Law governing the DGR, to remain in force until January 
2001, bypassed all regulations including the normally compulsory Environmental Impact Analysis 
(Dolfing, 1996, Driessen and De Gier, 1997). It extended the existing Expropriation Law which 
already provided for immediate sequestering lands where no amicable settlement was possible: 
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where a clear and present danger is applicable, restrictions can be declared inapplicable. It was 
feared that this would not hold once the danger had passed and the waters had receded, so these 
powers were extended (Driessen and de Gier, 1997). One need not have worried, though: out of 
the 600 cases land was needed for the measures in Limburg, only two (0.33%) required formal 
impoundment, the rest of the cases were settled amicably. Social control to co-operate was high: 
no one wanted to be (seen to be) in the way of greater safety (Driessen and De Gier, 1997). 
Where residents started to worry about the loss of so-called LNC-values (landscape, nature, 
culture), which the Advisory Commission for the Maas prioritises, the Raad van State (Council of 
State) ruled that residents' interests (i.e. dry feet) prevail:  
 
‗That was great planning on the part of the river (…) We needed the report [clearance from the 
Council of State, the administrative appeals court] within 2 months. That would be in July or August 
and then the Council of State is on holiday. But we succeeded, so the kaden could be built in two 
years rather than five.‘ (interview, Maaswerken director) 
 
Many stakeholders had other concerns at this time. They just demanded the fastest possible 
implementation and a higher safety standard. 'Everything was possible,' as one respondent puts it. 
Decisions were made on the hoof backed up by 'reparation laws': when the plans proved illegal or 
risky, reparation measures were rushed through, legalising facts on the ground. All this resulted in 
substantial changes in the programme of works being made, which were often at odds with 
zoning and environmental directives. After the 1993 floods, planning permission was effectively 
blocked. But in the general atmosphere of co-operation and informality, the drawings were 
frequently changed to accommodate local interests. A little-known but telling example emerging 
from the interviews concerns the soccer grounds at Borgharen240. In the original plans, these 
grounds were not to be protected from the Maas - only the residential area would be ring-diked. 
Local developers however had set their sights on the grounds for a housing project, 170 
properties in all. Once the football grounds fell within the protected area, the development 
remained on. 
Under the DGR, the water management boards (Waterschappen) were charged with the 
implementation of the kaden programme, and given NLG 100 million (EUR 435,000) to do this. 
The Waterschappen are venerable, elected functional bodies, which exist in parallel to territorially 
based provincial government under different accountability patterns - initiated by farmers and 
monasteries as early as the 13th century, they operated separately from the public sector until they 
were incorporated in 1992. The boards hammered out the details of the kade plan in close 
consultation with Local Authorities and a heavy input on the part of the consultancies - Grontmij 
for North Limburg, the Heidemij (now Arcadis) for South Limburg. These Waterschappen 
convened every conceivable action committee, took them round the area and inventoried 
everyone's wish lists, varying from people who did not want a kade in their front garden to a 
parish that did not want to be split in two by a kade.(interviews) 
In the process, the Waterschappen feel, much local knowledge was gained from citizens who 
knew a great deal about past Maas flood patterns. All in all, co-operation with local actors and 
contractors went, as two interviewees put it, 'perfectly‘. 
But things went a little too smooth for the provincial government‘s liking. A provincial 
interviewee noted:  
 
'fast-track decision-making has its risks too. The Zandmaas project is a 'calamity‗ project, which [fear 
of calamity] is always poor counsel. You will always be overtaken by new ideas.' (interview, project 
leader) 
 
 The provincial authorities progressively pulled out of the informal consultations, fearing it 
would come to blows with the national authorities. Where the Waterschappen saw positive 
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societal energies released by calamity legislation, others saw as a monster, flouting all regulations 
at the expense of the taxpayer. 
This retracting move confirmed the Provincial government's position as 'the authorities', while 
from the interviews and press review a distinct impression imposes itself that the local authorities 
and Waterschappen do not view themselves as such. 
The provincial premonition proved to be fully justified, however. While local stakeholders 
were very happy with the speedy decision-making enabled by informal decision-making, its 
results were condemned by the national Comptroller (Rekenkamer). and the Council of State. For 
some in The Hague, the bunds episode was seen as another example of how things go out of 
hand when done the Limburg way (interviews). This has had its repercussions on the 
Maaswerken multi-project, which in future was to be far more tightly controlled from The Hague 
than the kade-raising operation. The below Table, 6.2, highlights between the Maaskaden and 
Maaswerken:  
 
Although, as we have seen, the floods triggered the fast-tracking of decision-making, the Maas 
project still needed to be legitimised. Not everyone found the emergency intervention so obvious. 
An early dissenting voice from the world of academia came from Professor van der Ven, a water 
management historian and the project‘s most vocal dissenter from the academic world. While 
other actors emphasised one or more of the three rationales – gravel, flood security, nature – van 
der Ven clearly failed to see why there should be a need for the Maaswerken full stop. He felt 
that the floodings of 1993 and 1995 jump-started an unfortunate political process that should 
have been resisted. Whenever the future of water management was debated in the newspapers241, 
van der Ven wrote to the Editor. The professor has called the project a ‗waste of taxpayers‘ 
money‘, a ‘mad plan' and ‗deception of the people‘242, and challenges the need for the river Maas 
works: 
 
‗The Maas has a 4 km floodplain. In a flashy rain river like the Maas, it is quite normal for the 
floodplain to be flooded now and then‘243. 
 
The water historian felt the envisaged tree lines would be a brake on water drainage (van der 
Ven & van Dooren, 1998) and noted that within Rijkswaterstaat, several civil engineers actually 
advised against the kaden - preferring to adjust the resilience of residences to the river's variability, 
e.g. through flood proofing of the most at-risk properties (van der Ven & van Dooren, 1998: 
14).244 Flood proofing, incidentally, could be another useful application for polluted sediment, 
which could be used for building mounds for raising houses (terpen) in new or existing locations 
for flood proofing. Still, when confronted with this alternative, one interviewee, a noted expert, 
rebutted the idea (flood proofing) on financial grounds: ‗Raising a house costs NLG100,000 
(EUR43,500) per house. Raising 14,000 houses would cost 1.4 billion (EUR 635 million).‗245  
 
Security policy and normal politics 
As a result of the two high-water events, the flood protection element in the Maaswerken 
moved up to the top of the agenda which now consisted of four items (Table 6.1): 
 
 
TABLE 6.1 The Maaswerken in brief  
 
What ? Where? 
Gravelling Grensmaas 
Flood defensce Grensmaas, Zandmaas 
Nature development Grensmaas (++) Zandmaas (+) 
Shipping Zandmaas, Juliana Channel 
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In light of the security governance interest of the present study, the contrast between the 
Maaskaden and Maaswerken episodes (Table 6.2) is illustrative of the difference between security 
decision-making and normal politics.  
 
TABLE 6.2 Striking difference between Maaskaden (fast-tracked emergency measures) and Maaswerken (post-
emergency measures) 
Maaskaden (1995-1997/2001) Maaswerken (1997-2005) 
Triggered by calamity Gradually developed by informal group 
Emergency law: Delta Plan Great Rivers Lack of clear-cut legal framework 
Hard (if green) defences for protection Combination of nature creation, flood 
protection and improved navigation 
Waterschappen (water boards) Public/private/NGO consortium 
Fast-track procedure Normal procedure 
Polluted material disposed on no-questions-
asked basis 
Legally questionable disposal of polluted 
aggregates 
Dispensation from Environment Impact 
Analysis (EIA) 
EIA necessary 
Informal participation Formal participation 
Province pulls out Province takes the lead then backtracks 
Openness Self-imposed secrecy 
 
What makes security decision-making so effective in getting things done? A first element has 
moral overtones. It seems that in these secularised days, disasters continue to have religious 
significance even for the secularised. The expression ‗Act of God‘, which is still used in the 
insurance business, indicates that no one can be held responsible. However, the expression is also 
used by those in the engineering community who feel that a disaster is a punishment for human 
negligence. Like the ten plagues of Egypt, a flood disaster can be perceived to ‗discipline and 
punish‘ a society such that it starts to make amends by adopting a pro-active attitude in the face 
of flood risk. 
Taking a step back from this normative approach, there is a strong sense that disasters are 
exploited in the decision-making arena as windows of opportunity for bringing in a set of 
measures that was already waiting in the wings, bringing enough pressure to push preferred 
alternatives through. When there was a support base for a flood scheme, the beleaguered 
Grensmaas plan could be tabled and coupled (linked) with security provision simply because it 
was already there – Teisman (1995) calls this a ‗clever solution‘. 
This perspective, so reminiscent of ‗policy streams‘ or ‗garbage can‘ theories of decision-
making (Cohen, Simon and March 1973), attracted a fair number of supporters in the water 
sector:   
 
‗The TAW [national Technical Advisory commission] thought that after the flood of 1993, the 
strength of the opposition to dike reinforcement would taper off. But soon the scene looked the 
same: the same resistance, more lawsuits (procedures), Thus the second high-water event was greeted 
with open arms, like a second chance. They went all-out, so the evacuation was logical.‘ (interview, 
RWS senior engineer, 2005) 
 
At that stage of negotiation on the Maas works, another flood would not have gone amiss: 
 
'In political terms, it would be a good thing if it would not take too long until the next flood', 
(Waterschap spokesman).246 
 
While the Maaskaden were fast-tracked with special legislation, the Maaswerken project had to go the 
sluggish way of any other major infrastructural project. The flood some hoped for never came, but in 2000 
as well as 2003 water again was pretty high. The mayor of Maastricht seized the opportunity to intervene 
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in the debate. Procedures take too long, he claimed, the national government should do something about 
the structural flood risk in South Limburg.  
 
'Had the water been only two feet higher, the Minister for Transport would have felt the need to 
rush plans for Maas security', said the Limburg Governor247  
'It would be scandalous if a new floodwave were needed to get the money and get all parties in line', 
Limburg Provincial councillor Vestjens.248 
 
It is easy to see what is so attractive about crisis decision-making. At the national level, where 
flood management had previously been unpopular, the mediagenic river floods triggered a fast-
track for decision-making on the River Delta Plan (Dutch abbreviation: DGR). Amid a discourse 
of 'unacceptable social disruption', central government took over in 1997. 
 
 
Rounds Goal Priority Reports 
 
I: Gravelling only 
 
Ways of gravelling that 
minimise  damage to natural 
values 
 
Onderzoek potentiele grindwinnings- locaties in 
Maasdal, Oranjewoud, 1990 
 
II: Environmental 
motives come through 
 
Grensmaas as nature 
development project with a 
gravelling element 
 
- Toekomst voor een Grindrivier,  Stroming, 
May 1990 
- Project Maasdal: natuur- ontwikkeling en 
grindwinning, December 1992 
-  Project Grensmaas, Grind voor Groen, 
startnotitie MER (EIA), January 1994 
 
III: Grensmaas in 
thrall of water 
nuisance 
Nature conservation and 
security on an equal footing 
 
- De Maas meester, advies van de 
Commissie Watersnood Maas (´Boertien´), 
12 december 1994 
 
IV: Part of Delta 
plan for the Great 
Rivers 
Security dominates, 
environment is secondary, 
financial feasibility off the radar 
Deltaplan Grote Rivieren, Public Works 
Department, 1995 
FIG. 6.2 Maaswerken project decision-making up trajectory to 1995: four rounds (Teisman, 1995) 
 
 
FIG. 6.3  Institutional framework for water management in the Netherlands (Based on Havekes, 2005) 
 
 
Provincial government 
Municipalities Water boards 
Citizens 
National government 
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TABLE 6.3 Chronology of the Maaswerken 
1987 First plan Section 
1990 Gravel compromise: only 35 million tonnes more allowed  
1992 Plan-Stroming: ‗green for gravel‘ 6.2 
1993 First high water event  
1994 Report Advisory Committee on the Maas  
1995 Second high water event, DGR, Maaskaden plan  
1996 Maasplassen sold to Province and resold to nature NGO 6.3.1 
1997 RWS steps in; Formation of Maas consortium, linking Grensmaas 
and Zandmaas projects 
 
2000 Scope 2000 plan 6.4.2 
2001 Jan Protest over new plan 6.4.2 
 Jun-
Dec 
Limburg takes over, develops Eindplan, instates Gebiedscommissies 6.5 
2001-2002 Antitrust lawsuits, pollution scandal 
Project leaders dismissed; 
6.5.2 
2002 Tumult over protection level 6.5.3 
2003 Near-high water, new calls for speedy Maaswerken implementation 6.5.3 
2005 Acceptance of Provinciaal Plan, Start of Maaswerken project 6.5.4 
2017 Envisaged completion of the project  
 
 
6.3 HOLLAND VS. LIMBURG, RIJKSWATERSTAAT VS. PROVINCE 
 
6.3.1 REASSERTING HEGEMONY? RIJKSWATERSTAAT TAKES THE REINS (1997) 
 
‗Could it be that Limburg is treated quite differently from the rest of the country?' (interview, 
provincial public officer)  
 
When the Grensmaas project was mooted, central government was involved in a process of 
decentralisation of its environmental and spatial planning policy. The project was presented as a 
nature development plan, and the province of Limburg was supposed to see to the 
implementation of, notably, Strategic Green-Area Projects (SGPs). The national river manager, 
Rijkswaterstaat, was involved in a restructuring process itself, devolving many of its security tasks 
to waterschappen. The water department had been instated under the French Occupation in 1798 
to put an end to long history of competitive diking between polder boards. The agency was said 
to have developed into a ´state within a state´ when it was mandated to start a crash programme 
to deliver the nation from flooding after the 1953 coastal floods. But its defences had seen 
increasing opposition in favour of cultural and landscape values, and a steady greening of river 
management had de-emphasised the flood security aspect. Rijkswaterstaat had become a 
department like any other (see Chapter 7.2 for more detail on this). 
However the high water events of 1993 and 1995 and the handling of the kaden changed all 
that. In 1997 RWS, which has by far the bigger budget and technological expertise in the water 
sector, took over as the pivotal actor in a make-or-break situation: 
 
‗That [the Comptroller‘s criticism of the Maaskaden project management] has resonated in this 
project. Before that there was unease with RWS. Two days after the Comptroller's report, all of a 
sudden RWS says: let‘s create a project organisation together. Let‘s sweep the whole thing together, 
in an organisational sense as well.‘ (interview, Limburg province) 
 
The EUR 340 million Grensmaas nature development scheme was linked with a EUR 900 
million project for the downstream Zandmaas, a project to provide flood protection for a 148km 
stretch (Linne to Hedel), and the Maas route to improve navigation.249 A single Maas works 
consortium now organised both the Grensmaas, Zandmaas and Maasroute works. The collective 
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Maaswerken project organisation still had a tripartite constituency, with Provincial authorities, 
Rijkswaterstaat and the Ministry for Agriculture, Nature Conservation and Food Quality. But the 
Maaswerken was now widely regarded locally as a Waterstaat project, not just by Limburgers but 
also by the Agriculture Ministry which at times formed coalitions with the Ministry of Housing, 
Spatial Planning and Environment (VROM) when they felt too outnumbered (interview, VROM 
2000). 
In the early stages of the Grensmaas project, protests were fairly muted. After the floods, 
Limburgers wanted the project badly and speedily. From 1997, however, when Rijkswaterstaat 
stepped in and made the Maaswerken a ‗security-plus‘ project, protests from vocal locals – 
individuals, NGOs and municipalities - against the plans mounted. 
The ‗takeover‗ of the Maaswerken project by the national ministry in 1997 did not sit well with 
pockets of the Limburg population and politicians. The Maaswerken became a new arena in 
which old contrasts between ‗Limburg‘ and ‗Holland‘ were highlighted.  
The Province of Limburg has a distinct identity, which is bound up with its history. In 1830 
Belgium seceded from the Netherlands, taking the provinces of Brabant and Limburg with it. 
The Dutch responded with military force, reclaiming much of the two provinces. In 1839 
Belgium gained independence and in 1843 the right of trespass was agreed. However, (Dutch) 
Limburg has continued to feel culturally separated from the Netherlands (e.g. Osinga, 1997). 
The feeling of being subjected to 'Hollanders' was reinforced by the fact that Limburg 
traditionally was the mining colony of the Netherlands. Coal, limestone, silica sand and gravel are 
only found in Limburg, and coal mining was a major employer in the first half of the 20th century 
(van der Meulen et al., 2006). 
When the mines closed, mass unemployment and poverty ensued. For decades, Limburg 
politicians demanded, and got, compensating measures. Limburg got its own university the 
University of Maastricht), and the Central Bureau for Statistics (CBS) moved there, creating 
much-needed white-collar unemployment. Limburg lobbyists grew accustomed to having their 
way, which gave its image a bad taint: 
 
‗The perception of Limburg in The Hague is that of a merchant, the type that would sell their own 
mother. They always come [to The Hague] to see what they can get' (interview 3, a Limburg 
administrator himself). 
 
In the 1990s, however, things seemed to turn for the worse for Limburg. Some have linked 
this to the political change at national level: the ‗purple (red-blue coalition of socialists and 
liberals) politics‘ of the 1990. Both in the national coalition Cabinet and in Limburg, the Christian 
Democrats (CDA) were no longer represented after a 70-year rule. Since CDA traditionally has a 
strong base in the province, the party had been most vocal in representing Limburg at the 
national level. In addition, the social-democrats and liberals had no roots in farming. By contrast, 
CDA traditionally represented the agricultural interest and saw nature development plans as a 
threat (interview). 
The feeling that the Maaswerken, originally a Limburg-initiated project, was hijacked by 
‘Holland‘ and engineered by ‗Holland‘ engineers seems important in understanding the 
politicisation, especially after 1997 when Rijkswaterstaat took control of the project. Some 
Limburgers‘ sense of being exploited is reflected in the statute of the local oppositional coalition 
BOM, which ‗doesn‘t want any more Limburg land to be sacrificed to Holland roads.‘ Limburger 
Ria Dielissen said: ‗I am not against a ‗safe‘ Maas and neither am I against nature development, 
but I am against [treating] Limburg as a colony‘.250 
Limburg interviewees professed annoyance that the province had to pay up for its own flood 
security, while the cost of flood protection elsewhere in the country comes out of the national 
Treasury: 
 
'In the West of the country, the House of Commons monitors the state of the dikes for each and 
every square foot of dike [but not here]. I can't really get my head around that.'  
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This issue played out across political lines. As in the UK (see Chapter 8) the Maaswerken 
project provoked an intra-conservative debate: both the Minister and the key provincial delegate 
represented that political party, but stood opposed on the flood issue. Regionally the Maaswerken 
were supported by the same ‗purple‘ coalition of socialists (PvdA) and ‗conservative liberals‘ 
(VVD) coalition as that had formed at the national level.  
One interview called the purple cabinet ‗a Randstad government at the expense of Limburg.‘ 
Such sentiments allowed the centrist Christian Democrats, traditionally the largest party in 
Limburg, to present itself as the ‘true‘ voice of the province. 
But the Rijkswaterstaat initiative also raised expectations in Limburg.  
 
‗When it transpired that the Grensmaas might not be self-funding, the province didn‘t want to bear 
the brunt for that. At the same time, RWS said: the project is insufficiently directed (regie), in the end 
the shortfall will be heaped on us. The [1997] policy agreement makes RWS responsible, in a 
financial sense as well‘ (Interview Limburg, see also Adams, 2002)251. 
 
The Grensmaas had been bound to budget neutrality under the advisory Commission on the 
Maas, which means the Limburgers were expected to pay for their own safety and nature 
development from gravel sale. But the Zandmaas of necessity needed to be funded differently - 
sand is not nearly so rewarding. This led liberal provincial councillor Math Vestjens252, 
responsible for the project from the provincial side, mistakenly to believe The Hague was going 
to cough up the difference. 
However the national government did not see it that way. Leiss and Chociolko‘s (1995) 
axiomatic position that everyone will try to offload risk253 was much in evidence for a long stretch 
of negotiation time, when the cost issue was pushed back until the end of negotiations: 
 
'A large chunk of the financial deficit is due to the question 'who will take which risk'? 'The risk 
debate has been explored but not carried out. It isn't accidental that this (issue) has been deferred 
until the very end. The financial issue is a resultant of the risk issue. Currently we're playing 
hopscotch - so what are these numbers actually worth?' (Interview, Ministry of Agriculture, March 
2000). 
 
‗Whoever, expecting to win the state lottery mañana, builds a fancy mansion [today], may seem a little 
bit frivolous. Nevertheless, the financing of infrastructural plans hardly exceeds this level of solidity‘ 
(VBKO, 1997).254 
 
By taking a non-negotiable zero-budget approach in the face of rising costs, all stakeholders 
entrenched themselves in an impossible bargaining position which endangered the integrity of the 
whole project. In fact the demand for a balanced budget not only came from the government but 
also from the participating NGOs. Land in Limburg is owned by public (Staatsbosbeheer = 
National Forestry Agency), NGO (Natuurmonumenten = Nature conservation) and private 
(mineral extractors) organisations. As a public body, Staatsbosbeheer cannot invest venture capital 
in a risk-taking project, but the other two groups can and, unusually for an NGO, do participate. 
The NGO can only legitimate its participation by insisting on a 'neutral' budget, where costs and 
benefits cancel. Given the extreme unpredictability of costs and benefits, this has proved to be 
something of a political fiction. One interviewee reckoned the uncertainty about the economic 
proceeds of the gravel and sand extraction activities were ‗50%‘. The President of Waterschap 
Roer en Overmaas felt this risk-aversity was ‗too absolute: …Nobody, including myself, can 
predict the gravel price in fifteen years‘ time. You just have to take these sort of risks.‘255 
The water board president was a ´lone wolf´ in this respect. Late 1997 the Public Works 
Minister upset the applecart by announcing that budget shortfalls forced her to postpone 
completion of all flood defence projects from 2005 to 2008. The Cabinet made NLG 560 million 
available for high-water defence on the Maas, but acknowledged this sum was not enough to 
realize a broad, integrated plan, as intended in the DGR. The Minister notes that the amount was 
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the result of a ‗political choice‘. She tried to assuage public concern by pushing forward the flood 
defence aspect of the Grensmaas project, so that 70-80% of flood protection goals would have 
been achieved by 2005. It soon transpired that this would be more likely realised in 2015 or 2017. 
The province of Limburg concluded this still meant additional financial risk and kicked the ball 
back into the central government‘s court. 
When the new Vice-Minister for Water Affairs, Monique de Vries, offered some freedom to 
move budget from the Zandmaas to the Grensmaas budget, Provincial Councillor (Cllr) Vestjens 
refused the offer outright.256 Some money could be found in a roundabout way, though. Given 
the rising costs, nature organisations were taking a bigger share in the management of the areas. 
Also Natuurmonumenten rather than the gravellers was buying the 750ha needed for 
implementing the Grensmaas plan with state subvention, as the Ministry of Agriculture subsidises 
any purchase for nature development257.  
The haggling over the budget made it easy to background that the Maaswerken not only has a 
cost component, but an economic benefit side as well. Economic opportunity has been a 
powerful driver for altering the terms of the project – either expanding the protected area to 
include brownfield development area, or for compromising and subverting security standards.  
The gravellers‘ consortium, Panheel Groep considered the project as vital to its own economic 
survival (interview gravellers 2000). The claim to the need for economic security for Panheel and 
to protect jobs  for the region is delegitimised as 'overdone' by other actors, suggesting the 
support base for these 'partial interests' is far from universal. The project itself holds out great 
opportunity to others too – consultants, contractors and the shipping industry. News of a water 
project had stimulated speculative behaviour to raise the price of land due to be bought up in the 
interests of the project. Lingering annoyance over the handling of the Maasplassen (the gravel 
pits now used as boating lakes) was rekindled when Suytcote NV, a private player linked with the 
company that very cheaply acquired lands in 1986 resold it in 1996 to Limburg province at 
EUR4.5 million, which immediately transferred them again to the nature organisation 
Natuurmonumenten and Limburgs Landschap on condition that they could be used for 
temporary gravel storage.258 The Christian-Democrats in the provincial Council259, felt the 
province indirectly funded the Maas protection scheme by agreeing to questionable deals with 
Aqua Terra in ‘86 and ‘96: 
 
‗We are probably caught in a trap set by the Minister for Transport and Waterways, who herself has 
refused to pay up for the Maas lakes. Suytcote is a shell company; with the same director as Aqua 
Terra, the current owner, who picked them up for peanuts in the 1980s. Suytcote mysteriously 
arrived as a contender to pressure the authorities to buy the lakes, apparently to drive up the price‖ 
(De Limburger, 19 June 1999).260 
 
CDA also renewed lobbying efforts to develop the now-protected floodplain, which the 
improved standard of protection now enabled. There is always a strong push for revoking the 
tightened floodplain development rules for economic and housing needs.  
A local interviewee feels, attributable to the image projected of the 'disaster site' by the national 
media. In the course of the 1990s, Borgharen became symbolic of the Dutch high-water events; 
the national news correspondent, Harmen Roeland, would always turn up in a raincoat and 
Wellingtons. The local respondent claims that the dramatic flood footage was in some cases 
stage-managed to create a more mediagenic image on national TV. This, he felt, caused great 
damage to the local interests (interviewee 11).  
It was the type of image that made then Transport and Waterways Minister Annemarie 
Jorritsma pledge 'safety for all by 2005'. In the next Cabinet (1998-2002) of the same political 
stripe, she went on to become Minister for Economic Affairs261 and Vice Prime Minister. 
Promises made earlier could have backfired as the project ran into delay not only putting her 
personal reputation at stake but that of her Department as well. 
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A standard CBA was never really carried out. The Advisory Commission on the Maas had 
optimistically calculated a positive balance of EUR 50 million. After 1995, a cost estimate of 
about EUR 225 million was made, only to be superseded by a calculation that went up to twice 
that figure. But most of all,  
 
‗It was a political decision in the Zeitgeist. There were many authorities in the field [in 1995] to look at 
the misery. Misery, emotion and stress cannot always be expressed in money terms.‘  (NRC, 20 
March 1999)262 
 
The cost-benefit ratio was already compromised by a systematic underestimation of the project 
cost and overestimation of benefits. In the view of one former project director, the eventual real 
cost usually turns out to be the original estimate multiplied by a factor ‗pi‘ (π). Were this not the 
case, he feels, no major project would ever get started (interview, 2000). In this context, 
commercial interests have often overruled security interests. However, (indirect) benefits also 
accrued when new developments remained exempted from the ban on building in the floodplain. 
This leniency caused some at RWS to despair263. Such lenience can only affect the project‘s real 
cost-benefit equation. 
A social cost-benefit analysis was commissioned by Bureau Maaswerken to be conducted by 
the Wetenschapswinkel264 of Maastricht University, but was never developed past the exploration 
stage. Reasons adduced were that: 
- it is impossible to quantify all the costs and benefits 
- research is not a priority for Bureau Maaswerken to the same degree as is promotion and 
  information. 
- it would not change the decision outcome anyway (Mourits and Potten 1998).  
 
 
6.3.2 SECURITY OR FLOOD DEFENCE? RISK AND RESPONSIBILITY DISCOURSE 
 
The standoff between provincial and national government was to an important extent predicated 
on the definition (framing) of the problem to be solved in the Maas. The security issue provided 
the key battleground of exceptional-project legitimacy, in two respects: is Maaswerken a security 
or flood defence project, and are we talking about flood or high-water nuisance? 
 But while anthropologists claim that people in general dislike uncertainty (Sjöberg et al., 
2004), political actors thrive on a degree of ambivalence and uncertainty (Trottier, 1999). 
Language games (rephrasing and reframing) can help them break a deadlock that would be hard 
to prise open otherwise. The semantic sliding scale on flood and high water (Fig. 6.4) created 
ambiguity. Securitisation on the other hand eliminates ambiguity (Friis, 2004). Especially Limburg 
actors and the project organisation itself have made liberal use of the word „security‟ (veiligheid, e.g. 
in POL, June 2000) in a very wide sense. This could make all the difference as securitisation 
would merit fast-tracking and extra funding for the Maaswerken. 
Civil engineers, on the other hand, like things precise and clear-cut. In Dutch water engineering 
parlance 'security' means 'the degree to which the security standard for water infrastructure is met' in most 
of the technical water management literature, such as the authoritative national Technical Advisory group 
on Water Security (TAW, 1995). The referent of ‗security‘ thus does not relate to people, but to the stability 
of defence structures. In this sense, the collapse of protection structures and soil instability can be ranked as 
physical threats – thus, it is quite correct to state that the security of the kaden should be a 1 in 250 
standard, which means that they are not ‗secure‘ when faced with a flood with a higher return period. 
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    Meaning of „security‟ 
 
broad sense         strict sense 
 
less severe 
Social  
Impact 
Nuisance 
(overlast) 
Damage 
(schade) 
Lives lost (slachtoffers) 
 
     
more severe 
 
FIG. 6.4  Semantic sliding scale of „security‟ which comprises stricter (more severe) and looser interpretations of 
security. 
 
 
Engineers in consultancies were careful to point these distinctions out to me [in 2000]. It 
seemed to irritate civil engineers that the Limburg actors continue to use the security discourse. 
‗There is continuous conceptual confusion. I am trying to make it clear there is a difference 
between [in]security and harm‘ (interview 5). One respondent from the research community 
claimed that even the press, whose reporting tends to simplify and amplify antagonisms and risks 
(Vultee, 2007) have been very careful not to connect 'Maas' and 'security'. 
This idea seems wishful thinking. A trial run through Lexis Nexis, a large database on selected 
newspapers and magazines, yielded more than 1000 hits for the year 1999, only for the 
combination of the two words, ‗ Maas‘ and ‗security‘. Admittedly, all these hits could also contain 
the word 'no(t)', but a more selective survey of relevant regional press clippings from that year 
shows that the words veilig, veiliger, and veiligheid (safe, safer, safety) are prominently featured in 
relation to the Maaswerken. The Dutch word beveiliging (security provision), also quite prominent 
in the discourse, is somewhat more problematic as it can also translate as 'protection'. 
This difference had attendant policy consequences in that the river reinforcements put in 
under the DGR were purposely not called ‗dikes‘ but kaden. This label meant that they were not 
primary flood protection works, and as a consequence did not need to protect against 
inundations, but against ‗nuisance‘ (interview, flood expert, 2005). This definition exempts the 
national government from responsibility. However, after a dispute with the waterschappen, the 
kaden were placed under the Flood Defence Act, so that they are a national responsibility and, by 
inference, come under national security. 
Rijkswaterstaat's definition of security is much more restrictive than 'flood defence' - it is about 
life and death issues only. Limburg‘s comfortable position above sea level renders the security 
argument less convincing. To wit, no one has ever drowned in a Maas flooding (though the 
evacuation claimed a victim due to a sliding/skidding rescue truck), so it is not a security issue, 
strictly. 
 
The deprioritisation of the Maaswerken as a security issue might also be inferred from the 1998 
introductory leaflet to the Maaswerken. While full of the flood imagery typical of such leaflets265, 
it never explicitly mentions 'security'. It drily notes: 
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‗After the flood events of 1993 and 1995 (…) kaden were constructed, so that the most threatened 
areas are now better protected. (...) Reduction of the flood [risk] is therefore (...) the main objective 
of the Maaswerken.' 
 
Schematically, the positions of actors on the question whether the Maas was a security issue in 
2000 can be teased out as follows: 
 
TABLE 6.4 Is there a question of a security issue on the Maas? Condensed analysis of the positions and 
answers taken by the key players, based on the interviews and press review 
Yes:  waterschappen, Limburg province, regional press 
No: WL (national civil engineering consultancy), 
gravellers, VVD Limburg; RWS (qualified) 
 
 
As it turned out, Limburg won a Pyrrhic discursive victory: the project won the security label, 
but lost the expected fast-tracking. Eventually ‗security‘ did find its way into the policy discourse 
with respect to the Maas, including Rijkswaterstaat, which now defines the Maaswerken project 
straight away as: 
 
‗a major infrastructural project aiming to improve security by changing the catchment [stroomgebied] of 
the river Maas in Limburg, North Brabant and Gelderland‘ (www.rijkswaterstaat.nl)266 
 
But there was a snag: by that time the philosophy of security had changed. As explained by the 
then liberal Vice-Minister, Schultz ten Haegen in 2003, the Ministry cannot and does not want to 
guarantee 100% security (Cleveringa Lezing, 2003). ‗Improvement‘ was a good enough promise. 
 
 
6.4 1998 – 2001: A BUMPY RIDE 
 
6.4.1 1998: SELECTION OF ALTERNATIVES IN THE EIA 
 
While local politicians played a part in the first round of Maas troubles, the most formidable 
opponent turned out to be the MER-Commissie, an independent expert committee called to 
approve the EIA document. The Common Maas and later Maaswerken projects were subject to 
an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), obligatory for major works. An ‗unimaginable‘ 
amount of detail was collected. The Environmental Impact Assessment for the Grensmaas, 
weighing in at 7 kg and carried out by WL | Delft Hydraulics, IWACO and CSO, took 8 months 
to draft, and was well received (in 1996) by the MER-Commissie, the statutory body responsible 
for judging it. But for the Zandmaas, the EIA proved a major hurdle. The Zandmaas EIA 
weighed in at 12,5 kg, the biggest such document ever published in the Netherlands, took four 
years to complete, and was rejected by the MER-Commissie for not being precise enough. One 
major criticism was that only one (old) computer model was used, unfortunately named 
ZWENDL (lit: SWINDL). The EIA Commission advised the Minister for Transport and 
Waterways to re-research whether deepening and widening ‗would make the Maas as safe (veilig) 
as the province takes it to be‘.267 'The revised figures show that the level of protection will be 1: 
40 rather than the agreed-on 1: 50.268 
A novelty, inspired by European law, was that the EIA (Trajectnota) was to be used for the 
design stage itself, not after it. The EIA obliges the initiator to bring in three different alternatives 
and subject them to inspraak (giving people a say). Originally, four alternatives were presented for 
the Maaswerken: a 'zero option' (do-nothing), an environment-friendly option, an economy-
friendly option as well as combinations of these (Lamerichs, 1996) to be assessed and presented 
to the general public. 
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In addition to the four alternatives presented in 1998, an engineer called Martens presented a 
'fifth variant', which he rated to be cheaper than the alternatives presented by Maaswerken: 
elongated plastic bags along the riverbanks. Filled up, they push up the water level to achieve the 
necessary draught for navigation, which will cause the groundwater level to go up as well. They 
would be complemented by 10m wide channels alongside the river that take less space than the 
planned 100m wide nature development corridors 269  A regional interviewee expected this to be 
dismissed on financial and technical grounds: 
 
'They cost about three or four times as much per km. Reliability of sand and clay gets better 
over time, while plastic and concrete get worse over time.‘   
 
To my knowledge, this fifth variant was not considered by the Maaswerken. This has not stopped 
the innovative technology from being tried elsewhere in Limburg for emergencies, if on a smaller 
scale.270 
 
Eventually stakeholder consultation was carried out with stakeholder groups and Flemish 
counterparts on over three alternatives: apparently the zero option was dropped. The responses 
were collated into a Discussion Memorandum on the basis of which the final decision would be 
made. 
However, by the time public information sessions were held, a pervasive feeling took hold that 
there was not much choice after all. This early closure of alternatives was in part attributable to cost 
overruns which provided a bias against the more expensive alternatives (various news clippings 
and interviewees). As the project faced increasing financial pressures, a final alternative was 
rushed through without any further consultation with stakeholders. It turned out that a pre-
emptive deal had been struck to enable the Zandmaas pilot project involving a diversion trench 
at Lomm, implying the ‗Combination Alternative‘ had already been selected while the Transport 
and Waterways Vice-Minister was officially still working on the decision271.  
In early 2000, when I conducted most of my interviews, three pilot projects were already in swing, even 
though it was still far from clear how the Maaswerken were going to be funded. Five years before, 
Teisman, a professor of Public Management at Erasmus University Rotterdam, had already warned that 
funding would be a key risk to project survival (afbreukrisico). Foreseeable project implementation issues 
were indeed deferred indefinitely: distribution of responsibilities, costs and how to implement the project 
without increasing the flood risk272. This situation promised to present major risks to the survival of the 
project, which is strongly tied up with the logic of excavation economics. Gravellers will indeed start on 
the most profitable sites, foregoing the unprofitable ones – mandatory clustering of profitable and 
unprofitable sites would be required to ensure the exploitation of all project sites. In its 1993 
feasibility study, NEI had already noted that gravel companies see their profit fall under the safe 
20% margin if they need to invest in clean-up measures. Also, the gravel market is deeply 
dependent on the rate of building activities and subject to heavy competition - by 1991, 60% of 
gravel was already imported from Belgium (Teisman, 1995).  
In 1998 the national government decided to deliberately under-permit aggregates extraction to 
promote alternative materials (Van der Meulen et al., 2006). As a consequence, in 1999 the 
province objected when Maaswerken asked for permission to start digging on six further 
locations, anticipating the Grensmaas plan, fearing the gravel companies would only sign up for 
the most remunerative locations. The Council of State in 2002 ruled the refusal was justified. This 
was a blow to the gravellers who wanted to start work straight away in anticipation of the 
project‘s kick-off which would only take place after 2005.273  
 Market and financial studies were carried out before and after the EIA but not during, and the 
gravel companies were not consulted for strategic reasons while experts in river hydrology, 
archaeology, toxicology, infrastructure etc. were busy devising their best alternative. Perhaps 
inevitably, when the new option was presented, it soon turned out the numbers did not add up. 
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Other professional hole-diggers in the socio-cultural domain were also affected by the local 
misgivings. Under international treaties, new infrastructural projects must be surveyed for 
archeologically important sites. The Maaswerken diligently preserved 143 important sites.274  
While the importance of the heritage information is not disputed by local activists, the parish 
of Lomm however questioned the motives for the archaeological research carried out there for 
the pilot studies (Stassen, 2005). When the Maaswerken asked permission to dig ‗trial trenches‘ 
(proefsleuven) there, it was feared the geological research benefits economic (gravel) interests rather 
than heritage conservation.  
The river experts did not use the EIA as an evaluation tool but as a way to optimise the ‘best‘ 
design. Uncertainties and dissimilarity of truth claims were overcome in true Dutch engineering 
tradition, by over-dimensioning the weak or unknown aspects in their constructs (Leenders, 
2004: 154). Rather than make an integrated evaluation of different alternatives, compensating and 
mitigating measures were built in. 
New uncertainties (climate change) and the rejection of the EIA undermined project support, 
but at the same time opened the door to new alternatives, widening the range of options to 
include retention (G. White, 1974). 
  
Not enough or too much detail? 
Above it was noted that extensive consultation with stakeholders took place for the EIA. The 
Maaswerken Bureau went out of its way to answer to each and every question raised. No matter 
how far-fetched the objection, the experts were called in to win the argument. 
 
‗In the consultations with the public, there was this man, we call him Mr Fear-all, who started this 
thing about malaria. That makes the press. We contacted a health expert and it emerged you need a 
level of salinity [in water] that‘s about ten times higher [than we have]. You have to counter that 
[objection] rationally.‘ (interview, project director) 
 
While all involved were greatly impressed by the quantity and thoroughness of the information 
provided, the ‗promotional‘ approach failed to convince all stakeholders of its impartiality. The 
data conveys the impression that the unease does not so much concern the promotional material 
as the wealth of information gathered. Two of my interviewees spontaneously brought up their 
amazement at the information overload brought in to justify the project, and importantly, the 
information overload upped the ante for any critical questions, which, it was easy to sense, would 
have to be of similar thoroughness inducing one municipality to hire a consultant for his 
expertise. 
The Local Authority for Arcen and Velden felt bulldozed by information.275  
 
‗For each argument advanced by us you get three counterarguments from the public authorities. 
(Note that the Local Authority apparently does not see itself as ‗the authorities‘, JW)  If you want to 
make a good showing (een vuist maken) you will have to spend hundreds of thousands of guilders on 
research‘. As a counterbalance to the ‗enormous PR machine of Bureau Maaswerken bulldozing 
people with information the local authority hired Grontmij consultancy for ‗objective research.‘  
 
Despite the wealth of information, some agrarian actors remained unconvinced by the 
information provided by the Maaswerken project organisation (interview, 2000). 'Wet damage' to 
farms as a result of the Maas project has been calculated at the level of regions, not by plot. To 
be able to claim damages, agrarians will of course need to know what the 'threat' to their plots 
amounts to‘, (Limburger, 8 June 1999). An independent consultant expressed surprise at this 
criticism in view of the vast amount of detailed information unearthed in the EIA report for the 
Zandmaas:  
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‘I can hardly believe the farmers feel there is too little information (...) It went to the point of asking 
us to research vibration-sensitive archaeology: what happens [to archaeological finds] if you jack steel 
floodwalls into the ground (...) There are maps with probability densities (...) you‘re not even sure 
what‘s in there [=the earth]. That request had to be retracted‘ (interview, 2000) 
 
During several of my interviews in 2000 a sense of pessimism and foreboding was notable. 
However, while painting doom scenarios, none of those interviewed actually doubted that the 
project would go ahead in some form. Sunk costs – economic, but also political commitments 
(reputation, legitimacy) are strong project-sustaining forces in the Netherlands. 
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However now that the EIA Commission and Comptroller had been assuaged, the troubles 
really started for the Maaswerken because of three legacies from the securitized time window: 
- a scare over the ‗bathtub effect‘ of Maaskaden (6.4.2) 
- anti-trust litigation (6.5.2) 
- a scandal over illegal discharge of polluted soil (6.5.3) 
 
In 1999 and 2000, parliamentary questions were asked on safety276, a sure sign of the issue‘s 
arrival in the national political arena. In 2001, disputes over competitive tendering and topsoil 
depositing caused expensive delays to the project and the environmentalists, gravellers and at one 
point the Province, threatened to pull out of the project277. Local groups and authorities devised a 
strategy and formed alliances with each other as well as external actors. It is this grassroots 
politicisation that I will now zoom in on. 
 
 
6.4.2 1999-2001: POLITICISATION OF FLOOD RISK 
 
Protection or peril? The issue of risk displacement 
The safety and risk displacement issue was the first controversy to make the headlines in 1999. 
New calculations revealed that the river widening would not realize the safety standard, and 
would therefore be supplemented by higher kaden. But the kaden, it appeared, would change a 
high-incidence, low-consequence material risk into a low-incidence, high-consequence physical risk 
in some areas. 
 
The Boertien Commission-II had already remarked on this consequence of kaden but felt 
necessity warranted them. The area protected by the kaden is like a bathtub (there is no spillway). 
Should the Maaskaden be overtopped in a 1:500 flood, there would be very little time for warning 
and evacuation and lives could be lost (van der Ven & van Dooren, 1997). This possibility 
unintentionally propels the project itself into quite a different security domain. 
 
‗Evacuation used to be done by vehicles when the water is still shallow, now you need boats. Which 
includes the cattle removal. And there‘s still barbed-wire fencing around the area‘ (resident, 2000). 
 
'Should a kade fail, people could even be drowned who used to watch the water rise gradually'. 
(Maaswerken spokesman)278. ‗It‘s the difference between ten soaked carpets and one drowned 
Limburg citizen‘ (interview, former RWS director, 2005). 
 
When this hazard became public knowledge it caused a stir, leading to Parliamentary questions. 
The then Vice-Minister, Monique de Vries, admitted that the personal security of those in 
embanked areas may be endangered if timely evacuation is not realised279. 
 
Meanwhile an administrative debate went on in parallel about risk displacement across space 
rather than time: upstream-downstream equity at inter-provincial level. Due to the Maaswerken 
river intervention, a downstream rise of the water table in Brabant and Gelderland was predicted, 
necessitating additional retention, which would claim 10 to 20,000 ha to store 10 to 20 million m3 
280. In 1999, Waterschap De Maaskant in Noord-Brabant felt the Maas works could render its 
remit more unsafe. During the execution of the works the trajectory Boxmeer to Ravenstein 
would be temporarily less secure. As there is a large gas hub at Ravenstein feeding large parts of 
Holland and Belgium, this situation might be important. The Waterschap therefore wanted the 
trajectory to be realised in the North-to-South direction rather than South to North. Brabant felt 
Limburg should solve its high-water nuisance problems within its own realm and even demanded 
a separate EIA for the retention basins in Brabant281. This debate dragged on until 2005, when 
Brabant was given EUR4.5 million to take measures to compensate for the consequences of the 
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Maaswerken282. Persistent local worries about project-induced damages in Limburg also resulted 
in a compensation deal in 2004. 
 
 
6.4.3 2001: RENEGOTIATION 
 
"At the end of the day, it is the inhabitants and users of the area themselves who should decide on the future 
of the Maas"  from ‗Groen voor Grind, een mooie ruil‘, 1994 Maaswerken promotional film. 
 
Dutch political culture sets great store by inclusion and participation, and the project‘s 
management has aimed for a high degree of consultation. The 1995-1997 ‗securitised‘ episode had 
opened up a window for a high degree of co-operative informal public participation - and hence, of 
'co-ownership' - which included taking lay knowledge on board. As a consequence of the all-
inclusive strategy, few could claim their voices had not been heard. During the EIA, stakeholders 
were again consulted, although as mentioned their influence on the choice was limited. After the 
EIA in 1998, however, there was little doubt that local people would hardly be involved in 
project implementation.  
In 1 July 1999 the project partners signed a protocol, and by mid-2000 the private parties283 
officially formed the consortium Grensmaas. It gradually became clear that the scope of the 
project was going to be less extensive than planned for. As a more cost-effective alternative to 
widening and deepening the Maas in combination with nature development, it was now proposed 
to raise the kaden at Roermond, Venlo and Gennep was now proposed as part of the Zandmaas. 
The city of Venlo was particularly unhappy because the city would lose even more of its view 
on the Maas as a consequence of the raised kade. Its municipality dismissed a dam planned right 
on the high road of Blerick as ‗unacceptable‘284 An alternative ‗Maas corridor‘ plan, which Venlo 
developed with several municipalities, envisaged widening the river and nature development, 
complemented with removable kaden, for which Venlo would shoulder the bill of EUR 0.5 
million. The Maaswerken however said it was simply too late in the day to amend the 
Maaswerken to include the corridor. In the end a compromise was worked out which, as first 
calculations showed, seem to bring an even better safety effect than anticipated.  
The lack of information and consultation in the lead-up to 2001 no doubt heightened public 
frustration and indignation at the political, NGO and community committee level when the final 
Maaswerken plan was presented. The response was for people to ‗participate‘ in the Longian 
sense (Long, 2002), on their own terms sometimes co-operatively (coming up with alternatives), 
sometimes antagonistically – by filing petitions and appeals organising press-friendly protests. 
This issue will be expounded in the next section. 
 
Revolt after the January 2001 plan 
The 1990 voluntary agreement between province and national government had laid down a 
cap of 35 million tonnes of gravel. That agreement had already been changed to 53 m t in 1996. 
But even that agreement turned out to be rather elastic. In July 2000 it transpired that the 
gravellers would be allowed to dig up 55m tonnes to fund the 1,000 ha of nature along the 
Common Maas.285 This Scope 2000 plan combined the Combination Alternatives with elements 
from other alternatives. On the basis of the EIA, a Provisional Design (Voorlopig Ontwerpplan) was 
prepared, released in late 2000. 
Yet, the political solution found in 2001 differed substantially from any of the alternatives 
under discussion. The gravel consortium gained substantially: it was foreseen 66 – 70mln tonnes 
of gravel would be dug from the Maas valley – double the annual nation-wide demand (van der 
Meulen et al., 2006: 167). The gravel industry also got an extra 200 ha, increasing the hectarage of 
the works on 15 digging locations by a third (ANP 502001). 
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The farmers‘ organisation LLTB expressed anger about the loss of more agrarian soil due to 
the extra hectares set aside for digging and dredging. My Mook interviewee is not alone in feeling 
the order of priorities had been reversed: the green security project is there to legitimise gravel 
extraction, rather than the other way round. The Christian Democratic party, a consistent 
opponent to Maaswerken leading the ‗digging holes‘ discourse, claiming it opened the door to 
‗unlimited‘ excavation CDA almost succeeded in vetoing the project in the Provincial Council, 
leading an ad-hoc coalition of the Limburg regionalists PNL, the senior citizens party OU 55+ 
and two parties of the left, GroenLinks and SP. By vetoing the digging in Schipperskerk, a parish 
of Born which had seen decades of gravel dredging, this meant a de facto veto on the Maaswerken, 
since there was no alternative location for the Schipperskerk site. 
Nature organisations like Limburgs Landschap were unhappy that the nature development was 
greatly compromised286 and the 2001 compromise was clearly a bridge too far even for the 
conservationist Grensmaas consortium member, Natuurmonumenten. After consulting with the 
Limburgse Milieufederatie and Staatsbosbeheer they stopped all co-operation on the plan in 2001 
and threatened to sue.287  
There were also successful local appeals against the trajectory of the kaden and two planned 
retention basins invited their fair share of resistance. On 25 June 2001 the Stichting tot Behoud 
Leefmilieu for Buggenum, Haelen, Born, and Nunheim filed a petition signed by 2700 citizens to 
the public consultation procedure of the Maaswerken project on the draft EIA and draft 
provincial plan, which was originally due for 2003. The Heel and Haelen group feared that the 
Maaswerken‘s retention basin would set a precedent for inevitable future gravelling in the area 
west of the Lateral Channel (built 1971). They feared excessive nuisance as well as tourists being 
scared off when the Koeweide harbour was used for transferring soil (overslag). On its initiative, 
Grontmij consultants were commissioned to research an alternative trajectory.288 
Further resistance came from Meerssen against gravelling in Bunde/Geulle. Meerssen sent 
three urgent letters to Bureau Maaswerken, one also signed by neighbouring Maastricht, Stein, 
Sudderen and Echt. Maaswerken was willing to look for alternatives for Bunde but not for Geulle 
and Voulwames.289  
Now Geulle has only 90 households, Voulwames 7. This small number did not deter citizens 
of Geulle and Voulwames to found an action committee, Stichting Leefbaar Geulle aan de Maas 
in March 2001 with a well-designed and informative web site. They felt their natural values in 
their areas will be ‗sacrificed‘ for the Maaswerken,290 Joining forces with other Maas organisations 
led to the foundation of the Samenwerkingsverband Organisaties en Bewoners Grensmaas 
(SOBG), which subsequently evolved into Bewoners Overleg Maas. BOM was a collective of 
local action committees from Eijsden up to Mook291, to represent citizen and recreational 
interests in the Maas valley. BOM feels that the Maaswerken is first and foremost a project for 
extending employment opportunities for companies specialised in digging holes until 2015. 
Another reason for joining forces was a report by the drinking water company that the 
Maaswerken plans would boost algae growth and as a consequence threaten drinking water. 
Dredging would release polluted particles from the river bed which would end up in its own 
reservoir at Heel292. 
Jan van Eechoud, a retired chartered accountant from the tiny parish of Voulwames, became 
the spokesman for BOM. He vowed to put up a good fight: ‗I expect the province and gravellers 
will come to an agreement, subject to an act of God (force majeure). In a supreme example of 
closure discourse he adds: ‗Maybe we can provide that force majeure.‘293 Van Eechoud is now 
regularly sparring with Victor Coenen, ‗project environment manager‘ (stakeholder manager) for 
Maaswerken seconded from Utrecht. 
 
The logic of a large project demands that once a project has been decided on, you have to start 
planning on ever smaller details. The local opposition to the project however, refused to argue 
with the project bureau on those details. While decision-makers are used to moving for closure at 
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the general level, so they can start making decisions on ever more detailed, next stages of the 
project, civil-society opponents keep returning to the main decision. Each vertical bend denotes a 
point of closure and move to a more detailed (funnelled) level of decision-making: (Fig. 6.5)294  
 
 
opposition: 
decision-makers: 
 
 
 
 
FIG. 6.5 Difference between thinking between opposition and decision-makers. Graphic representation 
(after Coonan,, Maaswerken stakeholder management consultant, lecture at Wageningen UR, 
February 2005).  
 
In fact, even after the main decision-was taken, quite a few alternative plans for the Maas have 
been tabled in the water community itself, not just by civil-society actors. This suggests closure 
was not made with sufficient support base, so that local civil society keeps putting spanners in the 
wheel. This suggests that the original decision has not sufficiently been recognised as a political, 
wicked problem by its initiators which has the potential to haunt the decision-makers forever. 
 
 
6.5 LIMBURG TAKES OVER (2001- 2005) 
 
6.5.1 BACK TO INFORMAL GOVERNANCE? 
 
In response to the backlash generated by the plan of early 2001, the province of Limburg spotted 
a window of opportunity to reclaim the project and moved with great speed.295 In this phase, the 
approach to communication and participation also saw radical change. Between July and 
November 2001 a new plan was drawn up, this time in closer consultation with stakeholder. 
Three Gebiedscommissies for the Grensmaas area296 held their meetings in an informal atmosphere 
and in this spirit did not even draw up minutes - the Maaswerken site has minutes only from 2 
November 2001. All (organised) stakeholders were welcome and could directly influence the 
agenda. This degree of informality was to spell more trouble for the Maaswerken in 2005 (pers. 
comm.., consultant, 2005). 
In a multi-stakeholder platform, not everybody can be expected to play along, though (Warner, 
2006a). The Vereniging Federatief Verband tegen Ontgrondingen (‗Anti-quarrying federation‘), an 
environmental group in Born/Grevenbicht, had supported the 1998 plan for the Maaswerken, 
but sided against the new 2001 plan known as the Basis plan297. They felt games were being played 
with the Limburg citizens. While bilateral contacts continued, the Federation refused to sit on the 
Gebiedscommissie. Meanwhile, Lomm, the first targeted project site, were represented on the 
Gebiedscommissie, yet continued to fight the project in court in parallel to the multi-stakeholder 
negotiations. 
The Basis plan targeted gravel deposits outside the floodplain and no plassen inside the area298 
and was rejected by several stakeholders, so that new negotiations were needed. The Final plan 
(Eindplan) was approved by the Limburg provincial authorities in December 2001. It allowed for 
less widening and put a gravel extraction limit at 50 million tonnes. Finally, implementation was 
planned in a much shorter time window. The Eindplan commanded broad support from PvdA, 
VVD, but also CDA and, eventually D66 (liberals of the left). PNL (regional party), the two left-
wing parties, GroenLinks and SP, remained opposed, both because of what they saw as 
inordinate concessions to the gravel kings and because they feel that the Grensmasas required an 
international solution. To this, CDA and VVD raised the time argument: the longer the wait, the 
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more investment in nature will be replaced by investment in kaden and more gravelling will be 
needed to balance the books. In fact in 2003, CDA proposed scrapping the nature development 
element in the Maaswerken plan. With funds getting in ever direr straits, ‗all cards should be 
placed on security‘.299 
 
 
6.5.2 THE ANTITRUST ISSUE 
 
As noted, security decision-making excludes economic competition mechanisms, and invoking 
the complexity of the security project. Antitrust measures against consortia can only be avoided 
when the public partner can invoke an overriding 'higher interest'. Wolsink (2003) shows that the 
Dutch Public Works department, invoking this higher interest, has sought to avoid competitive 
tendering of infrastructural works by cutting up dikes into 5 km segments. Recent Dutch ‗anti-
NIMBY‘ (Not In My Backyard) legislation aims to speed up and, in terms of the present analysis, 
‗close‘ the decision-making process.  
In the same spirit, the province of Limburg had expected to be allowed to carry out both parts 
of the Maaswerken with pre-formed consortia. In anticipation, the province had hired a law firm, 
Loyen & Loeff, to check whether competitive European tendering was needed. While the 
authorities had refused to disclose the outcome of the report300, on the basis of the outcomes 
they must have considered themselves in the clear. 
However, when an ad-hoc alliance invoked antitrust legislation in 2001, it forced the project 
consortium to justify itself in court. Both the municipality of Lomm and citizen platform Lomm 
Actief had appealed against the approval of a detention basin as  part of the Maaswerken 
project301. Digging a retention basin was all right with them if it enhanced security, they felt, but 
not to line the pockets of the local gravel digging industry.302 Together with Belgian gravellers 
who felt unduly excluded from tendering, Lomm Actief and individual members of other action 
committees started a European antitrust case.303 
The European Directive (93/37/EEC) stipulated that all projects worth over NLG 5 million 
(EUR 2.25 mn) needed to open their tendering procedures to all European competitors. These 
rules are aimed at requiring minimum levels of transparency and establishing obligations to 
follow open procedures for awarding contracts, to facilitate fair competition between companies 
in all member states. These rules are also applicable to the tendering procedures for gravel 
extraction. The Maaswerken project leadership had filed an application for dispensation of 
antitrust rules with the Dutch antitrust regulator NMa in 1991. It argued that the complexity of 
the project warranted a consortium rather than open tendering. NMa begged to differ. The usual 
ecscape, splitting the works up into a great number of smaller works worth less than NLG 5 
million, would make co-ordination so much more cumbersome304. 
The Dutch Department of Economic Affairs has tightened its antitrust enforcement such that 
it has already forced some extraction consortia to dissolve. In so doing, it complies with one of 
the cornerstones of the EU, the establishment of an open market, as vigorously pursued by the 
European Commissioner, the Dutch Liberal Frits Bolkestein.  
However, the Dutch gravel extraction companies have tried to pre-empt the official 
procedures by buying land from provincial and local authorities in the gravel-rich parts of the 
Maas valley. By establishing property rights in the area, they avoid the risk of foreign gravel 
extraction companies getting the contract. 
The Dutch government had granted the concession because the land is already owned by the 
excavators, who under Dutch law have the almost Maslowian-sounding right to ‗self-realisation‘. 
Under Dutch law, expropriation is not an option if the land-owner is able to carry out the desired 
work, and gravel extraction companies can arguably carry out river widening measures. A private 
party takes care of the entire project implementation, including obtaining the relevant permits305. 
However, the European Commission did not consider this an overriding argument. 
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The Commission objected to both the Grensmaas consortium306, but also to the Zandmaas 
consortium DCM, composed of regional extractors.307 DCM, which the Maaswerken wanted to 
grant a concession to sand suitable for mortar production, already owned most of the 90ha 
required. For the Dutch authorities, this meant that they were deprived of the chance to conclude 
a contract on better conditions. 
Due to the successful mobilisation of the European competition authority, the process 
collapsed for over a year. The episode impelled D66 (liberals of the left), who had warned two 
years before about this problem, to urge the Maaswerken to prepare alternatives for the 
Grensmaas. The governor however felt that alternatives would give the European Commission 
the impression that Limburg had lost confidence in the Grensmaas plans.308 
In the end, compromise was struck that only polluted topsoil management should be tendered, 
while the 50m tonnes of gravel excavation, as well as bridges and roads, could be carried out by 
the consortium. Parliamentary questions from D66 did not change the government‘s position. 
But while the deal settled the competition issue, but the disposal of the polluted topsoil however 
turned out to be yet another problem for the project. 
 
 
6.5.3 FINDING, FILLING, FIXING EVER NEW HOLES – TOPSOIL AND BUDGET 
 
Topsoil pollution was another legacy of the ‗securitised‘ Maaskaden episode. Next to creating a 
‗loophole‘ around economic competition, the Delta plan for the Great Rivers had overruled the 
need for environmental auditing. The DGR allowed 'class 4 material', heavily contaminated soil 
which normally would have to be disposed of at a controlled site, to be used as topsoil for the 
Maaskaden. After the return to normal politics, however, there was commotion over the use of 
toxic topsoil in kaden, Rijkswaterstaat and three provinces had presented ‗Active soil 
management‘ in 1998 as an innovative way of concentrating, isolating and displacing diffusely 
polluted sediments in the Maas floodplain, as well as the Rhine river branches.309 ‗Clay screens‘ 
(now known as topsoil depots) were to be manufactured from unsalable Maas topsoil, as a useful 
alternative to dumping them in gravel pits.  
A scandal over the deposition of 180,000 m3 of polluted soil dug up for broadening the river at 
Swalmen and Beesel in 2001 seriously compromised the project when the Purification Board (a 
type of Waterschap focusing on water quality) threatened legal action. The contract however 
freed the contractors of any responsibility, as national public agencies carrying out state law 
cannot be prosecuted for environmental offences, only investigated by parliament.310 As a result, 
the Vice-Minister, Melanie Schultz, was formally liable for the damage, to her deep resentment.311 
The stored soil would need to be removed again at great cost-the costs of cleaning up the area are 
estimated at EUR 10-13 million. The provincial council chided the provincial administration, 
feeling there had been far too little control of the Maaswerken, especially when Cllr Vestjens 
failed to respond to any questions asked in the Provincial Council.312 
Meanwhile spiralling project preparation costs had come under increasing attack as well.313 The 
Maaswerken organisation has always claimed that the preparation costs had been comparatively 
low. The Provincial government on the other hand claimed very expensive consultancies were 
contracted and its bureau overstaffed – many functions appeared to be staffed by a provincial 
and by a Waterstaat officer (pers. comm. RWS, 2007). It transpired the project office had spent 
EUR140 million in preparation only: 80mln for the Zandmaas, 20mln for the Grensmaas, plus 
Limburg‘s 10mln investment in the preparation of the Eindplan314.  
The bureau was radically downsized315 and Maaswerken Director Joost Huurman was banned 
from speaking in public316 and the whole management team had to hand in their resignation. The 
new Maaswerken Director, L. Bijlsma, had to deal with the fallout over the topsoils. He predicted 
any new illegal practice coming to light for implementation of both projects to be the ‗death stab‘ 
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for the project. This made the project organization extremely careful, even when environmental 
permission was granted in 2003 by Limburg and later reaffirmed by the Minister of Transport. 
Pressures from the political sector were quite contradictory. After two high water-events in 
early 2002317 and 2003, not all that comfortably withstood by the kaden, both politicians and 
activists called for speedy protection works. But the second half of 2003 saw petitions against the 
Grensmaas project to MPs (Helleman, 2005). The Maaswerken sat out the storms, as it waited to 
get the clean-up legally cleared – while critics claimed that they were in fact waiting for new 
legalisation that will ease the preconditions for managing polluted topsoil the Maaswerken way 
(‗Active Soil Management‘).318 The waiting however was not in vain – in 2005 word got out that 
according to European rules, lakes filled with topsoil are in fact waste dumps which need to be 
totally isolated and monitored. The topsoil issue had meanwhile been taken up to the Council of 
State.319 The national government threatened to call off the whole project in case of a firm ruling. 
In that case a EUR100 million compensation claim on the national government could be 
expected from the Maaswerken consortium. Public officials started to consider a Maaaswerken-
lite. 
Moreover, a two-year standoff was to emerge in 2002 over the future Operation and 
Maintenance of the 40km stretch of kaden at Roermond, Venlo and Gennep/Bergen on the 
Zandmaas. A leaky water pipeline in Stein caused the dike along the Juliana (navigation) Channel 
at Stein to subside, requiring the evacuation of 500 people. The water boards refused to take such 
risks in future. Plus, who was going to foot the bill of an estimated EUR12 million? During the 
negotiations, emotions were apparently so strong that at one point the province threatened to 
pull out. An independent commission, the Commission-Blom, forged an agreement. All kaden 
will fall under the 1995 Flood Defence Act (Wet op de Waterkeringen), which means they are now a 
national responsibility. It also means they need to comply with the standards laid down in that 
act. The state will now have to carry the cost of replacing or resisting antiquated pipelines to 
ensure proper dike functioning.320 
 
 
6.5.4 2002: NEW GAPS IN FLOOD DEFENCE 
 
In addition to the shadow of the past, new information and legislation presented new hurdles for 
the Maaswerken project. Dark clouds gathered again when it transpired that the projected level of 
Maas protection was unlikely to be realised if you took climate scenarios were taken into account. 
RWS admitted in 2002 that both 1:50 for the kaden and 1: 250 for the undiked Maas might not be 
attained, and that it had started the Integrated Maas Exploration (Imtegrale Maas Verkenningen), 
to look beyond 2015 for a 4600 m3/s discharge (Wesselink, 2007). To realise this ambitious goal, 
the co-operation of the Belgians would be badly needed (see also BOX 6.1F). These explorations 
however were initially kept under wraps, as news about these explorations could be interpreted as 
the Maaswerken bureau not having great faith in its own project. 
The standards issue was relatively new for Limburg. In 1996 Dolfing could still note that in the 
reglement GS, a legal document for the provincial governors, there was no stated acceptable risk 
floor, that is, no desired level of protection (Dolfing, 1996b). RWS used an informal standard for 
the Maas, but this is in terms of discharge: originally 3800m3/s, but lowered in the early ‗90s to 
3000. After the 1995 flood, the emergency kaden to be completed by 2002, were intended to meet 
a 1: 50 standard. 
Under the Flood Defence Act 1996, 1:250 became a requirement within the diked areas in 
Limburg. The widened Maas channel, together with the recently erected kaden were deemed 
sufficient to guarantee dry feet on a 250-year basis – though legally the undiked areas did not fall 
within this protection level.321 
Even the adequacy of this normative standard of protection was already in dispute: Mook 
Local Authority felt 1 in 250 to be unacceptably low322. Mook is situated in North-Limburg at the 
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narrowest bottleneck. Any flood event has especially serious consequences for its Middelaar 
parish, which may find itself isolated. But it transpired that not all areas in Central Limburg were 
going to meet that 1 in 250 standard. The several redesigns made in the course of the project 
eroded the protection level in several places, both urban and non-urban323.  
 
 
 
BOX 6.1: Maaswerken: How about the Belgians? 
 
It is notable how the Maaswerken project preferred not to rely on Belgian co-operation, despite the 
fact that the Grensmaas is a natural border river between Holland and Belgium. The Thalweg shifts 
autonomously as a result of the interventions in the Maas (Wetenschapswinkel reports). Despite an 
expected net loss to the country, the issue of territorial integrity due to the now highly variable Thalweg 
so far has not been a diplomatic (security) issue to the Dutch Foreign Office.   
However, the border issue has brought all kinds of practical and political issues.  
1. The Belgians are not always mirroring the natural river bank approach on their side of the river 
or working by different time frames324. This can have considerable effects on bank operation on the 
Dutch side. 
2. Dutch interventions easily have an impact across the border. Upstream effects are always 
possible as water levels are pushed up because of the intervention. The kaden around Roosteren (NL) 
will increase flood risk at Maaseik [Belgian] side. It was agreed that the Maas would be widened on 
the Dutch side near Roosteren.325 The Dutch government made itself responsible for any change in 
groundwater levels in Belgium when the Belgians called on the Habitat directive (Helleman, 2005, 
Maaswerken 2005). 
3. The Maaswerken were not built to accommodate 3000 m3/s, for that, similar measures would 
be needed on the Belgian side (Teisman 1995). The integrated Maas Explorations (IVM), started in 
2001 to explore the period after 2015, are premised on the idea that Belgium and France need to do 
their bit.326 
4.  Linkage diplomacy however could prove a major stumbling block. The Maas is a diplomatic, 
high-politics issue through political linkage politics with other Belgian pet projects. A diplomatic 
stalemate could have set back the project back by years.327 
 
 
6.5.5 2005 – A VIABLE PLAN AT LAST? 
 
On 23 June 2005, the project finally started, now with a projected cost of EUR 473 million, 
out of which 100 will be raised privately for digging two retention basins under ‗self-realisation‘ 
rules328. On 1 July the POL (the Provincial Plan for Limburg) was approved by the provincial 
authority. The way was finally cleared for the Maaswerken project. 
However the opponents do not let off. BOM took the case to court to try and quash the 
decision. It was unconvinced by the need for nature development.329 Aren't grazing cows as good 
for maintaining the lovely Limburg landscape as the Scottish wild cattle the environmentalists 
wanted to import? LNC (Landscape, Natural and Cultural) values330 have strong links with 
people‘s sense of cultural identity, so that any new project perhaps predictably mobilised 
opponents using the discourse of rape and pillage when the memory of acute flooding wore out.  
While in 2006 the Council of State defeated all complaints so that the project could go ahead, the 
Federatief Verband Tegen Ontgrondingen demanded to stop the Maaswerken in light of 
pollution of the river bed. This was rejected in 2007. But individual protests from residents who 
find the kaden going right through their back garden bring more delays, so that the new 2008 
deadline for closing the gaps in Limburg‘s flood defence again is unlikely to be met331. 
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6.6 CONCLUSION 
 
In his famous economic theory, Lord John Meynard Keynes proposes that the problem in a 
recession economy is not scarcity of resources but an inhibition to consume. Consumption will 
lead to more capital accumulation, more employment and more prosperity. Since it doesn‘t 
matter what the consumption is for, governments can boost the economy by spend their money 
on anything - even digging holes in the ground and filling them up again – rather than saving it 
up for the future. 
A strategy of finding, fixing and filling holes, in a literal and figurative sense, also comes to 
mind when contemplating the somewhat dispiriting history of the Maaswerken plan. The river 
scheme that sought to strike a happy balance between flood defence, natural values and sand and 
gravel extraction. Many local stakeholders however continued to see the project in a different 
light: a carte blanche lifeline for the regional gravel-dredging industry by another name. Local voices 
claim that the project sought to re-establish the legitimacy of gravel and sand excavation, which 
had got a bad reputation in Limburg.332 
 
The formal project framing has been contested throughout the Maaswerken‘s history. Started 
as a nature development project, it turned out to require a discursive strategy of securitisation 
(framing an issue as a security issue) for its survival, changing the rationale for the project from a 
trade-off between nature creation and gravel extraction to a flood protection project with 
environmental and economic benefits. In essence, however, repeated politicisation pitted the two 
main problem frames – ‗green security project‘ vs. ‗quarrying project in disguise‘ against each 
other. This got worse in the course of time, since a contradictory set of project goals soon made 
the project run into financial difficulties even before it began, relying more and more on gravel 
digging to fill gaping financial holes. I tend to agree with Van der Meulen et al.‘s (2006) analysis 
that the ‗closed‘ nature of Maaswerken planning put the general public but also contractors in a 
reactive position. Nonetheless what they fail to address are the province‘s post-March 2001 
efforts to do better on this count. In the disastrous year 2001, Limburg regained the lead in the 
Maaswerken, and can be credited with restoring confidence by closer consultation with 
stakeholders. Limburg could however not shake off its image of having sold out the province to 
gravel companies (Van Meurs, 1995). Even now the contract has finally been signed, it looks like 
this image will continue to haunt the Maaswerken project for years to come. 
In the course of its history, security absolutes were thrown into the Maaswerken arena at 
almost every turn, and, interestingly from a theoretical perspective, from every ‗Buzan security 
domain‗. Securitisation became an option in the aftermath of two critical water events. The high-
water events of 1993 and 1995 were a window of opportunity to carry though a number of 
emergency measures that would otherwise be difficult to realise. The problems of these fast-track 
decisions were only becoming apparent in due course: raising kaden, dumping polluted soils, 
forming a consortium without tendering, it all caught up on the project: ‗normal politics‘ involved 
difficult questions on anti-trust, cost-effectiveness, environmental laws/EIA and participatory 
processes. Reframing the project as a security issue also reaffirmed the hegemonic position of 
Rijkswaterstaat, which had been on the decline in the 1980s and 1990s. 
In many respects, however, the security momentum was lost early in the process, the 
Maaswerken became like any normal project and after one of its many crises, Limburg 
successfully reaffirmed its leading role in the project. Perhaps the shadow of the flood was not 
long enough to reap for the initiators the benefits of security decision-making. In the end, the 
project lost five years in overcoming a series of perhaps foreseeable crises. 
 Chapter 7: Public Participation in Emergency river 
storage in the Ooij polder – a bridge too far? 333 
 
 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Should (and can) central government work with local stakeholders to prepare for extreme flood 
events? Can you plan together with citizens what to do in the event of a surprise attack? In other 
words, can the governance arrangement be rearranged such that a type of co-production of flood 
security between government and civil society is possible? 
The international aid community is currently promoting stakeholder involvement in planning 
for and response to extreme events334. They see local participation as integral to integrated flood 
governance. Not only relief experts and public managers should be in charge of calamity 
management, the affected population should also be consulted and updated, to allow for better 
awareness and preparedness. This calls for much better coordination between the public sector, 
the aid relief sector (often private or NGO) and locals. 
Like public security, the institutional set-up for disaster management335 has long been geared to 
a top-down policy mode. As a matter of course, calamities are dealt with in a highly ‗securitised‘ 
(Buzan et al., 1998), non-inclusive, manner, legitimised by the need to protect existential values. 
The logic of disaster relief is one of quick, emergency response, so that there tends to be little time 
for democratic debate. Still, the brunt of coping with disaster is still borne by local citizens rather 
than external or national disaster management experts (Kirschenbaum, 2004). Community-based 
(neighbourhood) organisations have the network and specific local knowledge to improve 
effective communication and help. It would therefore seem prudent to consult and involve 
stakeholders in decision-making on the type and modality of protection they should get when the 
next disaster strikes. Contemporary insights in disaster management emphasise the need for 
disaster preparedness which can be far more inclusive. 
The present chapter sketches the changing governance arrangement for riverine flood control, 
considering the extent of local stakeholder access to calamity decision-making when planning for 
national extreme events (crises) in the Netherlands. 
 
After the floods of 1995, the Dutch government made a radical break, moving from ‗vertical‘ 
(dikes) to ‗horizontal‘ (space claims) security provision. This compelled the Ministry to involve 
itself in the area of spatial planning and negotiating with citizens and local authorities. Does the 
move away from dikes bring a ‗de-securitised‘ mode of governance - a move from ‗vertical‘ (top-
down) to more ‗horizontal‘ decision-making? A case study of emergency flood storage in a polder 
on the river Waal, mooted in 2000, illustrates a clash between ‗securitised‘ and ‗non-securitised‘ 
mindsets vis-à-vis floods, notably between those who propagate public consultation in flood 
management and those who do not. It is discussed whether desecuritisation also necessarily 
means the (re)politicisation of security governance.  
 
Section 7.2 will sketch the policy context as a backdrop for issues of community involvement 
in the ‗integrated flood security chain‘. It shows how security governance in the Netherlands and 
internationally has changed to an approach that seeks greater stakeholder involvement and 
preparedness, although it is noted that flood management has been lagging in this respect. 
Section 7.3 then outlines the history of the decision-making on flood storage to see how the 
decision to flood the Ooij polder in extreme events was taken, legitimised and resisted. Special 
attention will be paid to how the decision-making process produced foreclosure of alternative 
frames, and how alternatives proposed after the polder selection process fared. Section 7.3.3 
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investigates how the planning process was politicised, triggering a (discursive) ‗logic of war‘ on 
the part of its opponents, who advanced a counter-frame contesting the sense in the 
government‘s ´solution´. I will then assess to which extent this politicisation affected the 
involvement and ‗voice‘ of the local community of flood security provision. This leads to an 
analysis what kind of civil-society involvement is meant when calls for participation are made 
(Section 7.4). 
The case study is based on semi-structured interviews with river management experts, public 
officials and politicians at local, regional and national level, advisory committee members and 
local stakeholders, conducted between March 2005 and January 2006, together with Dik Roth of 
Wageningen University and Madelinde Winnubst of Radboud University Nijmegen. The study 
led to a book in Dutch (Roth, Warner and Winnubst 2006), which was presented on 30 July 2006 
at Radboud University Nijmegen. The public presentations and discussion during this launching 
seminar served as additional inputs for this article. As a third source, documentary analysis of 
policy documents and discussion in the expert and public press underlies the analysis. 
 
 
7.2 TOWARDS A DIFFERENT MODEL OF SECURITY GOVERNANCE – HOW 
 ABOUT FLOODS? 
 
In the Netherlands, calamity policy is a responsibility of the Home Office, while flood policy is 
the responsibility of the Public Works department and water (polder) boards. The Home Office 
has pushed for integrated disaster management, and acted as co-ordinator for integrated security 
policy (Lünneman, 2003). In 1993 it published a white paper, Integrale veiligheidsrapportage (Integrated 
security report) together with the Dutch departments of Social Security, Public Works Department, 
and Spatial Planning and Environment, calling for a more integrated security policy. ‗Integrated‘ here 
means coherent, co-ordinated set of instruments and policy measures to reduce insecurity. This 
coherence is operationalised as a ‗security chain‘ consisting of pro-action, prevention, conscientization, 
preparation, response and relief/recovery. 
Who is to take care of this chain? The trend in national government of the last decade has 
been a steady vermaatschappelijking of risk and responsibility – decentralisation, but also the 
involvement of non-public actors. The Raad voor Maatschappelijke Ontwikkelingen (RMO), an 
authoritative advisory body to national government on social issues, has advocated a focus on the 
interaction between the public security provision system and self-organising capability of citizens. 
Local security, it is asserted, can only be provided if NGOs, companies and citizens assume 
responsibilities. While security provision is centrally planned and managed and implemented in a 
top-down manner, in practice, many other institutions need to be mobilised to respond to all 
kinds of threats to security, such as social workers and traffic regulators. These actors become 
rather more important if we extend the spectrum to earlier links in the security chain; hazard 
prevention, conscientization and preparedness. If wider civil society is well prepared for calamity, 
the response to an extreme event much more effective and the ‗impact‘ of an extreme event will 
be reduced. As we shall see in Ch. 8, private insurers take on a key role in Britain, and it is now 
debated in the Netherlands what role the insurance sector can play here. An insurable risk means 
floods are no longer seen as an ‗Act of God‘ but rather as an a risk people can influence by 
location and preventative measures. 
The country‘s institutional set-up for flood management has historically presented an 
interesting hybrid of ‗logic of war‘ (emergency politics) and ‗logic of peace‘ (normal politics)  
security planning that might offer inroads for widening the actor base of the flood management 
regime (see Chapter 1). In the 13th century, long before there was any central government, 
farmers banded together to form the non-public, deliberative bodies, known as water (polder) 
boards, to pool resources for protection infrastructure, negotiating preferred drainage levels for 
groundwater and, more recently, guarantee water quality standards. The verb ‗to polder‘ comes 
from the egalitarian process of bargaining and compromise in creating and managing polders. 
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The water boards, whose number ran in its thousands until quite recently, however competed 
with each other and not infrequently offloaded risk onto neighbouring boards creating hazardous 
situations. In 1798 the French occupying force established a national authority, Rijkswaterstaat, 
to ensure the security of Main River and coast. While the polder boards continued to share 
responsibility for dike operation and upkeep, Rijkswaterstaat came to dominate security 
management, especially after calamities. 
 
 
  
FIG. 7.1  Areas in white are proposed flood storage polders 
 
 
 
 
 
FIG. 7.2  The Ooij polder 
 
 
When flood security has become institutionalised in practices, there is no need to constantly 
make speech acts reminding the audience of the urgency of flood policy:. In the Netherlands, 
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conditioned by a perennial struggle with rivers and sea, even a relatively modest flood event is 
termed a ‗disaster‘ and becomes securitised (Buzan et al., 1998). A grateful nation proudly stood by 
as the Public Works department built the grand Delta Works after the 1953 sea flood. As Dicke 
(2001) explains, technological self-confidence, boosted by Dutch expertise in civil engineering, 
promoted a discourse of invulnerability. This confidence obviated the need to consult end users 
about flood management structures and decisions. As rivers were successfully contained, a 
political space for protests opened up only in the 1970s and 1980s, an alliance of 
environmentalists and local stakeholders who saw their dike houses and cultural landscape 
destroyed by dikes. In response, an era of greener engineering started (Disco, 2002).  
The protection standard had only just been lowered from 16,000 to 15,000 m3/s in 1993 when 
the high-water events of 1993 (Maas) and 1995 (flood on the Maas, near-flood on Waal and 
Rhine) woke the country up to the ‗residual flood risk‘ the rivers could still pose.  
Dire predictions of more frequent and intense climate change-induced extreme events dented 
the sense of invulnerability, a new ‗Delta Plan‘, this time for the rivers Maas and Rhine, was 
rushed through in emergency legislation (Chapter 6). The standard was raised to 16,000 m3/s, 
while the water sector advocated 18,000. However, this did not change the general mood in the 
Waterways Department that dikes cannot be raised forever. In 1995, research started on ‗failure 
factors‘ other than overtopping dikes, and a new, ‗horizontal‘ flood defence strategy was sought: 
finding space for the rivers rather than constraining them even further. 
The final straw that changed calamity policy however was not a flood but a drought inducing an 
unexpected dike shift near the town of Wilnis in 2003 that changed the acting Vice Minister‘s 
(Melanie Schultz van Haegen) mind. She turned round to the view that the government cannot 
promise 100% security and that some calamity is inevitable (Schultz van Haegen, Cleveringa 
Lezing, 2003). In this she joins an internationally growing awareness amongst policy makers that 
all calamity cannot be averted (World Bank, 2000; UNISDR, 2002). The liberal politician 
envisaged a process in which multiple actors jointly take care of the security cycle from sensible 
planning and flood prevention to flood response and compensation. 
 
Thus, the water department belatedly accepted the implication of the 1993 integrated security 
chain memorandum it had co-signed. The study by Rosenthal and ´t Hart (1998) shows flood 
response left much to be desired after the high-water events in 1993 and 1995. Since then, the 
Home Office‘s and Water Department‘s calamity policies became much more aligned. The 
decision-making circle on water management was widened to municipal planning departments, 
the housing department, traffic authorities, the fire brigade etc. An integrated view of (spatial) 
planning, warning and evacuation systems for flood management as contemplated in the 
Netherlands would also invite a more participatory mode of decision-making for disaster 
management. 
Co-ordination is not an easy task even between national ministries, let alone between central 
and local governments. The Ministries of Spatial Planning and Economic Affairs and provincial 
and local government usually do not perceive flood safety as the primary decision criterion, tend 
to lean on the Public Works Department to take care of flood defence, and have seen the 
‗standstill principle‘ on floodplain development as unnecessarily restrictive. Once a site receives 
extra flood protection, the temptation to build right behind that defence is considerable (the 
´control dilemma´, Immink, 2007). The moratorium on building in floodplains put in place in 
1995, was rescinded in 2005. The new role for the Public Works Department as one player 
among others implicates it has to be more assertive/aggressive in negotiations, and less of a 
protector-patron. 
Chastened by opposition to its dike reinforcement projects in the ‗80s and early 1990s, the 
Public Works Department sought cooperation with polder boards, provincial and local 
authorities, who were specifically asked to come up with ideas and initiative themselves for river 
management, which together were dubbed ´Room for the River´. National government also 
OOIJPOLDER, NETHERLANDS 
 
177 
  
decided not to put the new this plan under emergency planning or to fast-track the decision-
making process under a straightforward ‗public planning procedure‘ (Rijksprojectenprocedure), but 
decided to pursue a PKB (Planologische Kern Beslissing). PKB is a lengthy planning procedure with 
much greater scope for participation and redress. The attitude to lower/level authorities and 
citizens thus looked a lot like the ‗logic-of-peace‘ mode of security governance. 
 
The below case study describes an episode in which the modality of citizen involvement in 
decision-making on flood storage became a conflictive issue. 
 
 
7.3 CONTROLLED FLOODING REVISITED 
 
Given the ‗disaster status‘ the 1993 and 1995 were given in the media, many non-regional 
people, including Prince William Alexander, now seem to believe that the Rhine and its branches 
flooded in Gelderland in those years336. But for many local people, the traumatic aspect of events 
was that of leaving the area in panic, when 200,000 people were evacuated in the Central 
Netherlands. Until 1993, the Netherlands had thought itself invulnerable, so there was no 
calamity plan. After the near-flood in winter 1993, however, the responsible water board had an 
evacuation plan prepared in 1994. The peak discharge in early 1995 was actually lower than the 
1993 peak, but now that there was a plan, there was something that could be used, which made it 
compelling to use it.  
While it was still unclear that a disaster was imminent, there was great pressure to do 
something (interview, RWS HID). Our interviews suggest that Nijmegen Mayor d‘Hondt and 
Gelderland‘s Provincial Governor (Commissaris der Koningin) Terlouw considered allowing the 
Overbetuwe region to flood as it had already been abandoned by evacuated citizens, to save the 
downstream Alblasserwaard polder: 
 
‗… (T)he Alblasserwaard had not been evacuated while the (higher up) Bommelwaard had. When 
the Alblasserwaard dikes were on the verge of breaching, that request came up [from there]: please 
cut the dikes on the other side to save us. (...), I thought: in future that should not happen to us 
again. If you want to do something as radical as inundating a whole area with incredible levels of 
damage, you have to reflect on that, confer very well with the political sector and come well prepared 
to make a decision‘ (interview, former RWS director, 2005.337  
 
The dikes were never cut, but the idea of inundation as a last-ditch escape was now on the 
agenda. After the 1995 event, the decision to widen rivers to make more space for flood waves 
had resulted in a series of proposed measures for bypasses, dike shifts and removals, and river 
restoration along the Rhine and Meuse: the Room for the river programme. This involves structural 
changes along the rivers Rhine, Waal, Merwede, IJssel and Maas to enhance river capacity to cope 
with 16,000 m3/s discharge on the Rhine, which is 3,500m3/s more than the highest river 
discharge ever (in 1926 – the 1993 and 1995 peaks were lower). Creating more space for 
floodwater by widening them and digging flood bypasses would mean land take from and 
nuisance for private and civil-society actors.  
As the deadline for the public presentation of the Room for the River plans neared, however, two 
key worries emerged inside the Ministry. First, at the close of the 1990s, flood experts started to 
worry about bigger floods. The 1994 Mississippi flood, and worrying climate change scenarios 
begged the question: What to do if an unusual flood peak hits the Netherlands? It was clear that 
even if all the Room for the River programme‘s measures were in place, this would not be able to 
cushion such an event. Experts started to project a 18,000m3/s peak scenario in light of climate 
change and upstream (German) works. Silva (2001) however claims that in 100 years‘ time, even a 
19,000m3/s peak will indeed be possible.  
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Second, Room for the River would generate an enormous amount of quarrying material (sand and 
clay), which the market might not be able to absorb (int., Room for the River manager 2005). Would 
it not be more sensible to concentrate intervention in a few rather than many locations? 
 
Such considerations put the issue of planning for ‗residual risk‘ of a 1 in 1250 year crisis event 
on the internal agenda of the Public Works Department. Thoughts turned to controlled flood 
storage – allowing excessive floodwater discharges to inundate ‗calamity polders‗, which are 
sacrificed to save other areas. 
This idea was presented in 2000 as the closing piece of a large-scale plan to widen rivers, Room 
for the River. It appears from interviews with the protagonists, that they had hoped that the actual 
decision on the specifics would be delayed until after further study. But they had not counted on 
the political agenda of their political boss, the Vice-Minister for Water Management. 
It should be noted that there is plenty of historical precedent for controlled flooding (drainage) 
in low-population polders or polder compartments. Controlled flooding/drainage was common 
historical practice in the Netherlands all through the ages, including in the Ooij polder area under 
scrutiny here. 
Overdiking (making your dike higher than your neighbours‘ dike) and ‗public cuts‘ of a dike 
opposite yours to keep dry was usual. The Diefdijk, an old compartmentalization dike on the 
border between the provinces of South Holland and Gelderland, has been cut more than once by 
desperate farmers (De Boer, 2003). A difference, as Klijn and van der Most (2001) note, is that 
the Diefdijk has a spillway (overlaat) against unintentional flooding, while calamity polders are 
intentional safety valve. The Beerse Overlaat, the largest of the indicative calamity polders located 
in the Province of Noord Brabant, only lost its function as an emergency flood diversion tool by 
the middle of the 20th century. 
 
The issue of where to direct excess flood water had been dormant for decades – as the last 
river floods had been in 1926 and 1947, there was little incentive for decision-making. But as we 
saw, it became pressing again in 1995. The word ‗calamity polder‘338 was first mentioned in 1998 
in the WL Delft study De Rijn op Termijn (Dijkman et al., 1998) to denote a retention area between 
the dikes in downstream areas. Therefore, others, such as the national government, can step in to 
compensate them for their loss. After the commotion in 2000, the original coinage, ‗calamity 
polder‘, was changed into ‗emergency flood storage‘ (noodoverloop). 
 
 
7.3.1 TO SECURITISE OR NOT TO SECURITISE THE FLOOD? 
 
Is emergency flood storage a calamity or a normal event? This is a key question, as it informs the 
mode of decision-making to be employed – the logic of war employed in life-and-death planning 
or routine democratic decision-making. 
Several interviewees, including the environmental spokesman, were nostalgic about the time 
when all involved were of a similar mind, the Delta Act for the Great Rivers of 1995 fast-tracked 
mode of decision-making was uncontroversially carried through paving the way for swift action. 
The office of the Dutch Institute of Civil Engineering is reportedly emblazoned with a parody of 
the Lord‘s Prayer: ‘Give us our daily bread, and a flood every ten years‘. Yet, as we have seen in 
the preceding Chapter, such periods of closure for the sake of ‗national unity‘ fall apart as the 
memory of the flood fades. Thus, by 2000, the momentum propelled by the 1995 event had 
dwindled and Room for the River had to go through normal procedures. 
Nevertheless, the emergency storage policy for extreme events added on to Room for the 
Rivers added a crisis element that made it a prime candidate for ‗securitised‘ calamity planning. 
Reflecting on the public upheaval that the publication of controlled flooding in Gelderland was 
to generate, many at the Public Works Ministry wished they had kept the policy under their hats. 
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‗Many of us thought: why didn‘t we just send a circular to responsible public officers in a plain 
brown envelope? (pers. comm., RWS policy staffer, 2002). 
Had they done so, the affected inhabitants might never have heard about the calamity plan. 
However, the Vice-Minister for Water decided to publicise it. The Vice-Ministry for Water had 
only been created in 1998. Before that, the Minister of Transport was responsible for water 
management. Because Transport itself is a heavy portfolio, most Transport Ministers had been 
happy to leave water policy to their civil servants. One interviewee paraphrases his former boss, 
Transport Minister Annemarie Jorritsma, as saying: ‗Your job [= that of civil servants] is to come 
up with the solutions, my job is to get it past the House of Commons‘ (Interview, former RWS 
director, 2005). 
But now that the new post of Vice-Minister for Water had been created, the politician 
occupying it, Monique de Vries, felt she needed to put herself and her policy on the map. As her 
policy adviser at the time puts it, there is a ‗direct relationship between the column inches in the 
press and political support for one‘s policy in the House of Commons‘ (policy aide, 2006). Little 
leeway could be gained for effective water policy and convey a sense of urgency. Moreover as a 
non-water expert she found herself in an isolated position within the Ministry. What interviewees 
call an institutional ‗clay screen‘ seemed to seal De Vries and her aides from the high-level public 
officers, who are seasoned, politically savvy water experts. The policy aide therefore advised her 
boss to ‗make a noise‘ to get everyone‘s attention. 
 
The Vice-Minister indeed decided to throw the cat among the pigeons. A choice moment for 
this was the presentation of the Room for the River policy document at Slot Loevestein castle on 
29 February 2000. Many eyebrows were raised when the Room for the River document turned 
out to display maps of controlled flooding areas. Generally, decision-makers prefer vagueness, 
deciding the rough contours (‗search areas‘) but leaving the actual designation of affected areas 
until later. Maps are so politically explosive because they concretise winners and losers, provoking 
people to oppose something to avert the worst. There was an uneasy precedent when in the 
province of Groningen, in the North of the country, ‗search areas‘ for emergency rainwater 
storage were hashed on maps after a polder flooded with rainwater in 1998. Angry farmers 
occupied the Waterschapshuis to force a change of policy (pers. comm. former Waterschap staffer 
2004). The politician‘s pragmatic senior policy officers had not dissuaded the policy when they 
realised she was going to involve controlled flooding in the Loevestein document339. Regional 
Public Works officers also claim the central office had also not bothered to inform the Arnhem 
branch of their Ministry (RWS interviewees).  
 
 
7.3.2 LEGITIMISING EMERGENCY FLOOD STORAGE 
 
After vice-Minister De Vries had gone on the national news and the following current affairs 
programme, Netwerk, the hoped-for ‗panic‘ was generated all right but there was a political risk in 
surprising stakeholders. While the Vice-Minister was prepared to shock her colleagues at the 
Ministry, she expressed surprise at the backlash outside the circles of government. 
The first wave of protest in 2000 was instigated by provincial authorities and well-established 
(corporatist) civil society organisations: the Chamber of Commerce, the Social Partners (i.e. 
employers and employees) of Gelderland, and farmers‘ unions. Immediately after they saw the 
indicative controlled flooding areas hashed areas on the map in the Room for the River document in 
2000 they hired counter-expertise: a report from the same well respected engineering consultancy 
that had mooted the idea of controlled flooding in the first place, WL Delft. The consultants 
predictably reported that controlled flooding in itself is a sound idea, but not in the locations and 
modalities it was proposed now.  
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The Province of Gelderland was the first to question the underlying assumptions for 
emergency storage, notably the need to prepare for 18,000m3/s rather than 16,000. To support 
this doubt, the Province of Gelderland had a report carried out with North Rhine Westphalia 
state in Germany and, in due course, support from the Public Works Department. The report 
found that 15,500 m3/s could flow into Dutch territory in case of flooding in Germany. A highly 
theoretical Super wave would bring 16,500 m3/s. Only in case of no flooding in Germany 
whatsoever, that is, sky-high dikes in Germany, a maximum scenario of 18,700 m3/s would be 
possible. Given the implausibility of such high dikes, Gelderland continued to stick with 16,000 
m3/s as a target for ‗Room for the River‘ and remained opposed to emergency storage. 
The Vice Minister however was determined to explain the emergency storage policy to the 
stakeholders. Her communication expert at the time is a great fan of Social Learning and advised 
a dialogue to develop shared meaning in a one-to-one relationship with the citizens. The Minister 
thus treated controlled flooding like any other Room for the River project rather than seeing the 
deliberate flooding of an inhabited area as a ‗securitisable‘ crisis policy. The envisaged interaction 
with citizens however was soon thwarted by senior policy advisers as well as a hegemonic 
ministerial policy culture that discourages too much communication between minister and 
citizens, or indeed minister and public servants. When a first bus-ride across the ‗backyards‘ was 
made, ‗the coach soon filled with civil servants‘ (policy aide, 2006). 
The Home Office meanwhile was not best pleased with the Water Vice Minister‘s unexpected 
move, either. An internal memorandum indicates it did not oppose controlled flooding as a way 
to deal with residual risk, but saw the issue rapidly becoming unfit for discussion (Minuut, 2002). 
It asked its Minister, Remkes, to demand an explanation in Cabinet meeting (int. Home Office, 
2006). As a result, a commission was instated by Home Office and Water department in 2001, to 
be headed by veteran liberal senator David Luteijn, to research the necessity of the policy 
measure and indicate suitable areas. Other pressing issues for the commission were the operation 
of such polders, compensation for flood-induced damage, public support base. 
The commission took a year, in which seven technical studies were carried out. The 
Commission could rely on an almost unlimited budget – the outlay eventually reached EUR 1 
million.  
 
Early Moves for Closure 
True to Dutch style, the Commission‘s membership had been selected on a good spread 
between political affiliations. It drew both on Luteijn‘s own vast network and veterans of earlier 
water committees. Technical experts were thin on the ground in the commission and some 
interviewees note with surprise that key functions like the two project secretaries and technical 
liaison were relatively junior career bureaucrats. The commission therefore had to rely on the 
supporting technical expert group. 
The Commission‘s president was quite clear on the assumptions with which he started his 
work. Crucially, he treated the ‗18,000 flood‘ and the need to do something about it as a given. 
He brooked no discussion. The exclusion of debate and alternatives is a core aspect of 
‗securitisation‗. In his discussion of the Copenhagen School‘s concept of securitisation, M. 
Williams (2004) points out that visuals are as important as the written and spoken word in 
‗securitising‘ moves. Indeed, to impress the urgency of the task at hand on his fellow 
commissioners, Luteijn had a video animation shown prepared by RIZA Lelystad, representing a 
disastrous flood event. This video drove home to key members that something needed to be 
done. Thus, while others (notably professor Wybrand van Ellen) called for calm, taking a step 
back, doing nothing was not a viable option for the committee: ‗if you do nothing, you will have 
to evacuate half a million citizens‘.340 
Luteijn‘s ‗move for closure‘ was to lead to a clash between ‗converts‘ and ‗doubters‘ with his 
advisory group. Since 1995, research had been on the way into uncertainties in dikes,341 showing 
that many more ‗failure factors‘ than overtopping dikes play a role in flooding – piping, dike 
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systems interaction, and seven other factors (Silva, 2001). An official at Rijkswaterstaat Oost-
Nederland recalls a furious row between those who accepted a degree of uncertainty and those 
who did not (interview, 2005). The mayor of Duiven, a town in the designated Rijnstrangen area, 
part of a ´focus group´ for the commission, likewise sought a hearing for the dissident view. 
This debate however looked to be time-consuming, and Luteijn felt he had no time. Various 
interviewees describe Luteijn as an avuncular, ‗quick and dirty, can-do‘ commission leader who 
delivers had not time for distracting uncertainties both in terms of rationale and of information 
uncertainties. Moreover, when the ‗Purple‘ national governmental coalition (see Chapter 7) fell 
prematurely in early 2002, Luteijn decided to speed up the work to be able to present its report in 
time to set the agenda for the new Cabinet. 
 
While the Vice-Minister‘s intention to interact with the polder came to nothing in 2000, 
Senator Luteijn certainly reached out to the region during the drafting of his report: he made 
three consultative rounds, organising consultation meetings with local government 
representatives, and ‗intermediate organisations‘ of civil society – consumer associations, 
Chamber of Commerce, etc. The modality of participation however was decidedly of a 
‗controlled‘ nature. Dik Roth and I attended one such meeting in March 2002, and were struck by 
how late in the meeting any news was given on the imminent selection in light of the delicacy of 
the issue (see BOX 7.1). Our Wageningen MSc student group was stopped from doing interviews 
in areas that were under consideration for selection.  
The most notable feature of the consultation process however was that the concerned 
‗grassroots actors‘ themselves were not consulted about the designation of their polder for 
floodwater storage. When interviewed by us in 2005, the Commission‘s Chairman Luteijn 
declared security is simply  ‗too important‘ to extend discussion to citizen stakeholders. All this 
suggests controlled, ‗crisis-mode‘ decision-making. 
 
 
 
Site Selection: Lack of Space 
The amount of water detained determines the amount of space needed to deal with top-end 
flood scenarios. Given the Netherlands‘ considerable population density (452 per km2), it is not 
so easy to free up space for floodwater storage. The selection process reflects this quest for 
space.  
In the Loevestein report, the indicative sites for flood storage were both up- and downstream. 
WL Delft‘s counter-report criticised the preliminary site selection, preferring a focus on the 
downstream Alblasserwaard and nearby polders on the lower part of the Rhine. But as the 
BOX 7.1    Attending a Luteijn Commission meeting, March 2002. 
 
Dik Roth of Wageningen University and I attended one of the Luteijn stakeholder meetings in a 
conference facility at Vredenburg Utrecht in March 2002. After a report on social aspects of 
flooding was presented (Slootweg and van Schooten, 2002) several participants asked for more 
clarity on the selection of the areas for controlled flooding, as they had already heard through the 
grapevine that the Commission would advise positively on controlled flooding. The commission 
presented its calculations of controlled vs. non-controlled flooding. Controlled flooding would 
mean the embankment of one population concentration at most. There were questions from the 
floor on the underlying reasoning: why these and not the other, smaller villages in the Ooij? What 
will happen to non-bunded areas? None of these questions were answered; the reply can be 
summarised as ‗you have to start somewhere‘. An environmental NGO interviewee (interviewed 
in 2005) relates that a subsequent question-and-answer session was held when the report had 
already been printed. This reinforced the impression of a ‗selling‘ rather than a ‗consultative‘ 
approach to decision-making. 
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Luteijn commission set to work, the lower Rhine disappeared from view, as the impact of flood 
storage in those polders was held to be much less than upstream areas. As the Ooijpolder, a 3300 
ha area, came into view as a candidate for floodwater storage, the Luteijn commission at first 
considered the whole of the Ooij and Duffelt for storage, which includes a German part, the 
Düffel. Historically Kekerdom and Leuth have long belonged to Germany, Dutch and German 
farming organisations and businesses have social and commercial ties, and attend each other‘s 
annual meetings and New Year‗s functions. Gelderland meets with Nordrhein-Westfalen and 
riverine municipalities meet twice a year. For long-time residents, the binational space appears to 
be one unpartitioned reality (interviews 2005). 
Like the Ooij‘s inhabitants, the river does not respect boundaries either so that inundation 
would also affect German territory. To explain the policy and assuage German fears, Public 
Works officers made well-appreciated visits to visited municipalities in Germany like Emmerich 
and Kleve – in fact rather more so than talking to their Dutch counterparts in the Ooij 
(interview, policy advisor, RWS Oost, 2005). 
It appears that the integration of land, water and society required for Integrated Water 
Management (Mitchell, 1998, GWP, 2000) fell afoul of a classical clash between hydrological and 
administrative boundaries. Inundating German territory (Duffelt) would thus have international 
consequences, which would present a foreign-policy issue the government did not want to burn 
its fingers on. RWS could not or would not take measures that had transboundary effects. But it 
did not appear feasible to flood the Ooij only. Isolating German territory from impacts of actual 
Dutch controlled flooding342 would require a dike of 8, 9 metres‘ height running from the 
German-Dutch border up to Nijmegen to retain the water in case of controlled flooding event 
(Van Ellen q. in Volkskrant, 2003)343. In 2002 the German state of North Rhine Westphalia 
announced it would build a dike itself if controlled flooding were to go ahead. 
By concentrating on the Dutch side, the commission lost a sizeable chunk of the projected 
inundation capacity. The three areas that were finally selected (Ooij, Rijnstrangen and Beerse 
Overlaat - 90, 115 and 365 million m3 respectively) cannot nearly handle as much water as 
originally intended. 
 
 
7.3.3 LOCAL RESPONSE TO THE COMMISSION‟S REPORT 
 
The Ooij‘s population is about 13,000, 10,000 of whom are concentrated in the town of 
Ubbergen en Beek. Many dwellers have lived in the polder for generations, but the region has 
also seen a steady trickle of ‗imported‘ residents from the Western conurbation and elsewhere, 
looking for peace and quiet in a rollicking landscape. These newcomers, it appears from the 
interviews, were not as prone to bowing to authority as the older residents were. The region has a 
history of activism against spatial plans. First in the 1970s, it resisted a plan to widen the 
bottleneck at Lent, a parish where the river Waal narrows from 1 km across to 450 m. This 
widening plan, to make space for shipping, was to eat into the polder. Then in the 1980s, a local 
platform resisted planned dike reinforcement. 
However, the fact that the action committee was formed over 2½ years after the first public 
announcement of emergency flood storage plans and 6 months after the publication of Luteijn‘s 
report, indicates how much time it took for civil opposition to the plans to develop. Two out of 
three eventually selected areas put up scant resistance, while in the Ooij polder, resistance initially 
consisted of isolated protests. When it became clear in 2001 that the Luteijn Commission had a 
preference for the Ooij, the mayor of Ubbergen protested, but citizens appeared to wait and see. 
This changed when the local Rabobank, which had a very strong local client base, stepped in. It 
issued an alarmed leaflet in May 2002, when the Luteijn report came out. In September, Nout 
van der Ven, a Desktop Publishing expert from the region, mobilised a small group which started 
to meet ´chaotically´ in a local function room (local citizen, quoted in Roth, Warner and 
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Winnubst, 2006: 118). Farmers had also caught wind of developments and placed straw dolls 
with slogans in high-visibility locations. Awareness had thus been raised, but without a clearly 
defined organisational focus, when the Rabobank organised their thematic annual meeting for its 
members in November, with David Luteijn (a member of the Rabobank‘s national board) as its 
special guest speaker. 
Once the report was finalised, Luteijn was keen to present it in the region. He felt he had a 
strong hand, being able to give the region far-reaching guarantees for compensation of damage 
from emergency storage. He also came with a catchy metaphor; the calamity polders were like an 
‗air bag‘ to cushion the impact of a crash (Luteijn Commission, 2002). 
Luteijn‘s presentation proved a real eye opener for the Ooij. After a tumultuous question-and-
answer session speaker and audience clearly came away with a different assessment. While Luteijn 
claimed in 2005 that the region was basically ‗won over‘ (interview), Ooij citizens were so 
outraged about the plan that they decided to form an action platform. Unlike many other protest 
groups against water intervention, the protest became driven by well to do ‗bourgeois‘ 
townspeople rather than farmer-led. 
 
Water disasters are normally treated as an external security risk that you cannot influence. 
When a government itself decides to drain floodwater into a low-population polder, the external 
risk fully becomes an internal risk to the flood-affected citizens, i.e. a risk someone (the 
government) is responsible and accountable for. This brings a tension between the local and 
national interest. 
Citizens of the Ooij polder did not fundamentally dispute that their area could be flooded in an 
extreme event to save others. ‗We don‘t lie awake worrying that one day things may go wrong‘. 
As the first area to be affected by a flood wave once the Rhine has crossed the German-Dutch 
border, the Ooij polder dwellers have more or less accepted that risk (int. HWP spokesman, 
2005). But they doubt the ethics of that decision. After all, in any (hydro-) social contract (Turton 
and Meissner, 2000; Warner, 2000, 2004), a government should protect its citizens, not put them 
at risk of drowning. 
Prime target for the campaign was the new Vice-Minister, Melanie Schultz van Haegen. Upon 
taking office in 2001, the liberal politician had been led to believe by Luteijn and her policy 
advisors that the mood was right clear for controlled flooding. In taking office, Water DG Bert 
Keijts presented her with three options: shelve, look for a support base, or take action. The Vice 
Minister opted for taking action (interview, retired policy adviser, 2006). The Platform concluded 
she ‗didn‘t get it‘ and saw her decision as a ‗declaration of war‘ (Sanders quoted in De Volkskrant, 
2003). From now on, the Vice-Minister was the ‗enemy‘ and the platforms started looking for 
allies (int. HWP spokesman, 2005). In terms of our analytical framework, the polder was 
effectively ‗counter-securitised‘. 
 
While the camps were barely talking to each other, they sought to align others for their cause. 
The platform formed three working groups – communication, legal and technical. Inspired by a 
fundamental belief that floodwater should be quickly discharged rather than detained in a densely 
populated area, Professor Wybrand van Ellen, a well-known retired Delft engineer who lived 
close to the area, made calculations for the technical group questioning the assumptions of the 
Luteijn commission, such as the 18,000 flood scenario. In so doing, he opened up the 
government‘s flood management frame. He found likely (the Province of Gelderland) but also 
unlikely allies for this in the engineering community: the Platform caught wind of a critical 
internal technical study underlying the Luteijn Commission‘s report completed in August 2003 by 
two well-respected consultancies, WL Delft and HKV Lijn in Water. The carefully worded report 
did not dispute the merits of controlled flooding, but claimed the plan for the Ooij was 
uneconomic and ineffective – or as one of the consultants later summarised it, ´weird´.344 After 
the legal working group made a call on the Wet Openbaarheid Bestuur (Freedom of Information 
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Act) on the part of the Hoogwaterplatform, the existence of the requested report was first 
denied, then it was ‗mislaid‘ and the wrong document sent (interview, platform spokesman, 
2005). Another critical advisory report was leaked to the Trouw newspaper in 2002345. 
Meanwhile the communication group produced leaflets, a regular newsletter and a 
sophisticated, widely read web site with links to all relevant reports (www.hoogwaterplatform.nl). 
It organised media exposure and a powerful political lobby. At national level, the group bussed 
parliamentarians around the region to show the consequences of river storage in the polder. 
Local business made small donations to fund these activities. 
Not only the Platform made good use of the media, Ubbergen en Beek mayor Wilbers 
preceded the citizen platform in protesting the measure. During an interview platform leaders 
asserted he tried to steal their limelight. Together with nine other local authorities, five Dutch and 
four German, Ubbergen commissioned counter-expertise from Delft sociologist Enne de Boer. 
De Boer had already made a social impact assessment for the Water Department‘s Bouwdienst in 
2000 and concluded it would be a hard sell. His 2003 report ridiculed the ´air bag´ metaphors and 
the 18,000m3/s scenario, claiming that the German river banks will flood long before the river 
reaches the Low Countries since current German efforts aim to control flooding at 14,600 m3/s. 
In sum, the protests had become an (international) public-private-NGO partnership (see Table 
7.1). 
 
 
TABLE 7.1 Resistance to controlled flood storage: actors and their strategies 
Time Stakeholder group Strategy 
March 2000, 2003 - Province, Social partners, 
- KAN 
Counterexpertise 
2002 Mayors Counterexpertise, media 
Nov. 2002 - Rabo Bank 
- Citizen Platform 
Counterexpertise, lobbying, media 
and information campaign 
2003 National Political parties Parliamentarian motion 
2001, 2003 - Water experts in government 
- Experts and consultants 
Counterexpertise, pressure 
 
 
Range of alternatives: Controlled or uncontrolled flooding? 
Now that the solution frame was opened, what options for the Ooij were in the picture? The 
human agency aspect in controlled storage brought an operational uncertainty issue: when to 
open the floodgates. Experience in 1993 and 1995 suggests that when in doubt, mayors and 
engineers tend to make a decision, even if a premature one, rather than waiting and seeing 
(interview retired RWS officer, 2005; van Meurs, 1995). But given the limited storage capacity of 
Dutch polders, opening them too early would mean missing out on any spare storage capacity for 
a second flood peak. 
What about uncontrolled flood storage? Neither flood experts nor politicians liked this variety, 
but environmental groups such as the Gelderland Environmental Federation (GMF) saw new 
environmental opportunities from allowing the water to come when it comes. However as the 
Ooijpolder became a more serious option, the local chapter started to feel uneasy about public 
support and the GMF dropped its support such that discussion of the option became taboo 
(Martinet, pers. comm., 2005). The Ooij platform‘s technical experts found that embanking 
towns like Kekerdom might raise the groundwater level such that the town would flood anyway 
badly affecting residences for months. Thus, while economic damage would be significantly 
reduced (from EUR650 million to 120mln in the Ooij, see Commissie Noodoverloopgebieden, 
2002: 18), controlled flood storage would mean months of nuisance after the polder evacuees 
returned to their homes. A highly effective PR visual deployed against emergency flooding was a 
blown-up photo mock-up of Kekerdom, 4m under water. This striking visual made ‗controlled 
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flooding‘ seem barely preferable to ‗uncontrolled flooding‘ – putting in bunds around the 
inhabited areas would make it more rather than less dangerous, displacing the risk. 
While the Ooij platform did not bring radically different alternatives to the table, at least two 
other actors did in 2003. The Knooppunt Arnhem-Nijmegen (KAN), a regional collaborative 
alliance to promote the region between Arnhem and Nijmegen commissioned a report from 
Haskoning consultants in Nijmegen to research eight options for water management. The 
consultants found for a chain of very small controlled flooding areas, similar to an initiative 
developed at the time in neighbouring North Rhine Westphalia. That same year the national 
forest conservation agency, Staatsbosbeheer, published its alternative in the report ´Lonkend 
Rivierenland´ (‗Enticing fluvial area‘, Staatsbosbeheer, 2003) proposing to dig a whole new bypass 
(green river) through the area. Neither report generated much interest. 
 
Apotheosis  
Meanwhile, the Commission and water department sought to sell the intervention to its 
intended audience. An internal memo (´Minuut´) from 2002 shows that the Public Works 
department‘s communication desk categorised stakeholders view as ´friendly´, ´neutral´ and 
´hostile´ and strategised to convert the fence sitters. But as the Vice-Minister enjoyed maternity 
leave in 2003, the HWP‘s political lobbying effort at national level began to reap success: a 
political deal saw the two largest parliamentary parties (Labour and the Christian Democrats) 
acting in tandem to move the money reserved for controlled flooding to supplement the budget 
for Room for the River which expected a shortfall. Back from her leave, Vice-Minister Schultz 
concluded the race was lost and in April, well before the scheduled date, she presented the 
Cabinet‘s position that emergency flooding would be shelved, reduced to an option among 
others, due to cost ineffectiveness and lack of sufficient public support. 
In September that year the current affairs TV programme, Netwerk, suggested that the case 
might be reopened. Vice-Minister was said to pressure the Nijmegen city authorities to agree with 
a controversial plan to widen the bottleneck at the north bank (at Lent), which was linked with a 
EUR80 -90 million national contribution to a new bridge over the river Waal. If this deal was off 
due to protest from Lent dwellers, reporters claimed, she would table the flood storage plans for 
the Ooij polder again. When this made the press, the Vice-Minister strenuously denied this 
textbook example of linkage politics, and had a bunch of flowers sent by courier to the platform 
chairman with a message that the controlled storage option was off the cards. 
 
 
7.4 DISCUSSION: FOUR TYPES OF PARTICIPATION 
 
This chapter has explored a case of policy making for extreme flood events. The interviews 
suggest that in view of the hitherto lacklustre profile of her newly created office, Water Vice 
Minister De Vries decided, and was not discouraged by her public officers, to take the ‗political 
road‘ to find a legitimacy base for a policy that was not yet in evidence within the bureaucracy. 
Her initial treatment of the policy in a non-securitised mode however was thwarted by that same 
bureaucracy. The Luteijn Commission, instated to defuse conflict and find a public support base, 
broadened the debate to intermediary organisations, but excluded affected citizens with a 
securitisation rationale - national security was too important to involve citizens – thus stirring 
rather than dousing the flames in the region. 
The Commission opted for early closure on controversial issues, and a promotional (‗selling‘) 
policy vis-à-vis stakeholders once the report was finished. The upshot was that a polder whose 
citizens were at root understanding of its flood risk turned against the policy. Only when the 
platform failed to get a hearing and experts sympathetic with the Ooij inhabitants‘ case found 
many technical, legal and economic flaws with the plan to flood the Ooij, did controlled flooding 
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really become a bridge too far for the polder people. The stakeholders in the area only really 
started to rebel when their technical advisors found that the plan was not sound. 
 
Participatory security matrix 
The above case study has highlighted different modes of dealing with calamity. The emergency 
flood storage faced decision-makers with a problem: are we to treat this in a closed, security mode 
or in an open, routine-planning mode? The ministerial flood managers‘ tendency was the former, 
but the Vice-Minister‘s initiative opened up the arena a desire to dialogue with stakeholders. The 
upshot was a mix of both: behind-closed-doors expert deliberation plus a highly Dutch form of 
consultation of non-public stakeholders (civil-society and private sector and local level authority 
leaders), which however bypassed the policy-affected local population. Excluded stakeholders 
then decided on a counterattack, politicising the issue such that it became a parliamentary debate.  
The case study suggests a greater range of modalities for (non)-participation than ‗wartime‘ or 
‗peacetime‘ decision-making, with different degrees of actor involvement in considering policy 
alternatives. Fig. 7.3, compiled and systematised by the author on the basis of various strands of 
literature, applies the modalities found to the present case study; arrows and numbers tracing the 
dispute‘s development through time. Let‘s take a look at each quadrant separately. 
Until the past few decades, the standard response has been a ‗securitised‘ crisis mode of high-
level experts and managers in the security services – with slight exaggeration: while young and 
able-bodied soldiers took care of war, retired army and policemen took care of calamity response 
(Pearce, 2003). In principle, this modality could involve local people in calamity management 
without abandoning the ‗logic of total war‘. This ‗mass emergency‘ logic however reduces citizens 
to not much more than soldiers. The active role of the citizen as a part of the state‘s security 
apparatus would mean a return to ancient Greece, where ‗particular active responsibilities such as 
jury duty, or even the hoplite armies and the notion of ‗warrior citizens‘, made citizenship as 
much about responsibility as entitlement´ (Muller, 2004).  
Such mass mobilisation is unlikely in the Netherlands, but another aspect of normal emergency 
planning is reminiscent of planning for war: secrecy, information on a need-to-know basis. 
Sending mayors a ‗plain brown envelope‘ with instructions for emergency flooding (interview, 
RWS officer, 2004) while keeping citizens in the dark would have been standard procedure in the 
past and therefore is indicated with the number zero in Fig. 7.3 below. 
An increasingly practiced way for governments is no longer to treat risk and calamity 
management like a war but like a normal challenge we can handle rationally. A ‗managerial‗ 
approach to risk (Aradau 2001) ‗defines down‘ threats that were previously constructed as 
extraordinary as normal and routine risks, unless they become ‗disruptive of the social fabric‘. 
This ‗desecuritised‘ approach is more intricate, as the enemy (the river) is not external, it is now 
our friend, but needs to be kept in line. In this modality security governance becomes a public-
private co-production. This ‗participatory desecuritisation‘ however does not preclude a 
depoliticised handling. The road chosen by the Luteijn Commission is most reminiscent of this 
‗managerial‘ approach: civil-society organisations were consulted in controlled focus-groups 
without veto power, but affected citizens were not. 
In the wake of a flood wave, the analysis of the problem and the solution may be 
uncontroversial and a ‗securitised‘ or ‗managerial‘ solution may be accepted. But in the Ooij case, 
the flood had been more than 5 year ago, and both the analysis of the problem and the values 
leading to a solution turned out to be contested, not only with local stakeholder but also within 
the expert community. ‗Wicked´ (intractable) problems‘, where both values and facts are disputed 
or uncertain, cannot be solved by a political process only. They may require a mix of politics and 
technocracy (post-normal science). For such problems Hisschemöller and Hoppe (1998) 
recommend undertaking a signalling and social learning process first. 
OOIJPOLDER, NETHERLANDS 
 
187 
  
 
 Agreement on values   high……….……….…………low 
Threat not open to dispute  Threat open to dispute 
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on facts 
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. 
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Securitisation 
 (foreclosing debate by speech act) 
             
                (0) 
mayor emergency chief; need-to-know top-
down instruction for extreme event                 
Open conflict, internalising 
antagonisms 
(power of argument) 
 
open contest on security policy; 
mayors side with CBO 
     3 
Low Routinisation/Managerialism 
(foreclosing debate by risk 
management)       
                                                2  
                                             
consultation with intermediate organisations 
and local authorities, not with citizens 
Dialogue: (power of better           
argument) 
                        1 
 
 
joint learning with local 
stakeholders 
 
FIG 7.3 How to counter calamity in a participatory way? A „participatory security governance‟ matrix.  
Matrix axes based on Hisschemöller and Hoppe (1998). Arrows denote chronological development 
of Ooij episode. 
 
 
What Vice-Minister De Vries‘s aide professed to have in mind (as related during the Nijmegen 
book presentation session) was indeed a form of deliberative democracy. This approach aims to 
consult with stakeholders to enable social learning to arrive at a policy consensus on the basis of 
argumentation. A dialogue does not see actors as mere rational individualists, but as social beings 
who are aware of the interdependence with regard to the problem in hand, and are willing to 
deliberate for collective action (see also Röling and Woodhill, 2001). Deliberative democracy thus 
enables a dialogue on security itself. While a security speech act is a one-shot activity based on a 
fixed interest definition, a dialogue, in which participants‘ subject positions and preferences can 
change due to force of argument, which in turn could lead to different process outcomes 
(Sjursen, 2004). 
In a multi-stakeholder platform (MSP) it is not the majority-plus-one that decides, but a 
process of consensus building between representatives of pre-identified identities (Dryzek, 2002). 
These identities may be ‗public‘, ‗private‘ and ‗civil society‘ but also based on economic interests 
(farmers, industry, homeowners) or linguistic, ethnic or religious affiliations (Warner and 
Simpungwe, 2003). A multi-stakeholder platform for flood preparedness (Warner, Waalewijn and 
Hilhorst, 2002) does not solve problems, but can promote flood awareness, increase social capital 
and promote joint learning. While I have claimed elsewhere (Warner, 2006) that a tendency for 
‗Habermasians‘ (e.g. Hemmati 2002) to see an opposition between MSPs and politics is often 
spurious, there is still a ´residual risk´ that MSPs lead to depoliticisation, to ‗taming‘ both the 
issue and stakeholders (Currie Alder, 2007). Depoliticised handling of security means conflicts 
remain unaddressed and key stakeholders unincluded. A consensus-oriented dialogue can kill the 
‗vibrant clash of democratic political positions‘ required for a ‗well functioning democracy 
(Mouffe, 2000).  
The matrix makes it possible to trace chronologically the security governance choices made for 
extreme events. Seeking the front pages to boost her political profile, Vice-Minister De Vries 
decided to forego the ‗plain brown envelope‘ option, that is, security policy behind closed doors, 
assigned the top left corner as option (0). The stakeholder dialogue for joint learning she 
appeared to favour (Phase 1 in the diagram) however was swiftly prevented by her department 
and replaced by a commission which allowed a limited, controlled form of societal consultation 
to ‗sell‘ the policy (2). The exclusion of the local stakeholders led to civic protest and indeed 
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skilful politicisation of the issue (3). The opposition pictured the Vice Minister as ´the enemy´, 
conducted a ´knowledge guerrilla´ unearthing an apparently classified document, undercut the 
assumptions of the Department‘s frame, and successfully counter-posed a frame in which 
controlled flooding was the problem rather than the solution. 
Due to the antagonism and polarisation inherent to politicisation, chances are that 
politicisation takes the form of hardened positions. However, if there is no a priori consensus on 
values, depoliticising real social tensions over an issue will only defer politicised confrontation. 
The analysis of the Ooij suggests that, given the basic willingness of local stakeholders, their 
positions were not immutable and a multi-stakeholder process of ‗joint learning‘ might have 
opened alternatives rather than the politicisation that ensued. In this sense the road taken was a 
missed opportunity for hammering out a mutually acceptable deal, a mode of safety governance 
in which Hilhorst‘s three domains of knowledge and action (experts, managers and locals, see Ch. 
1) could act in step. It proves difficult for central government to be less controlling and for 
citizens to break an ingrained culture of relying on government for its security. However, other 
Space for the River experiences, such as interventions at Lent, Noordwaard and Overdiep Polder, 
show that citizens‘ initiatives are not restricted but can also bring alternatives to proposed 
interventions (Roth and Winubst, 2007). 
In light of a perceptibly more concerted effort in shaping calamity policy between Public 
Works Department and the Home Office, the latter of which is more used to dialogue and 
bargaining, a greater role for citizens in future calamity policies cannot be ruled out. But the title 
of current state-funded research into ´Limits to participation´ (´Living With Water´ Project no. 
008), might be a pointer that the Dutch  government is wary of ceding too much space. 
 
 
 
 
Postscript: 
In November 2007 a study by Aachen University was announced on how to handle a dike break at 
Telecom (Fig. 7.2). Such a calamity would flood both the Dutch and German sides of the Ooij and 
Duffelt polder. The study involved the reinstatement of the compartmentalisation of the polder, 
abandoned in the 1920s. The Ooij platform responded saying it would not protest the study, as 
compartmentalisation is about reducing impact rather than cutting dikes to save others (Gelderlander, 
2007).346 
 Chapter 8: The Jubilee River: flood alleviation or  
flood creation scheme? 
 
 
 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Resigned local citizen: ‗We like Venice…‘ (interview, 2000) 
 
 
The floods of July 2007 brought shock and disruption to large parts of England. But while 
flooding caused traffic chaos on the M4 motorway at Maidenhead, the town itself escaped thanks 
to the Thames flood relief channel, the Jubilee River. Though small by international comparison, 
the flood relief channel was the biggest and most expensive riverine flood relief scheme to date in 
the United Kingdom347. Apart from its environmental benefits and technological daring, the 
project sought to be socially responsible by engaging citizens to participate in its decision-making. 
 
The Jubilee River project was a tangible result of a vision of greener, more participatory and 
especially more integrated water management for the Thames imagined by John Gardiner and 
colleagues with the National River Authority, Thames Region, a precursor of today‘s 
Environment Agency.  
Despite a public enquiry, a lawsuit and Parliamentary Questions, Gardiner could still claim at 
the turn of the century that the project was ‗uncontroversial‘ (pers. comm. Gardiner, 2000). 
However, the Jubilee River became subject to more controversy and technical investigation in 
2003 after parishes downstream to Maidenhead (Datchet, Old Windsor, Wraysbury, Horton and 
Staines) experienced appreciable flood damage. This raised the issue whether the flooding at 
Datchet was the consequence of an ‗Act of God‘, of irresponsibility of building in the floodplain, 
or of human failure on the part of the planners of the Jubilee River. 
The present chapter pits three competing problem frames in flood management against each 
other: flooding as the problem, floodplain development as the problem, and the project itself as 
the problem. Different blame and remedy stories clashed, based on different flood, river and risk 
management paradigms. 
The chapter starts with a review of the changing frames in river and flood management as 
identified in the UK literature (8.2 and 8.3). Against this backdrop, Section 8.4 traces the 
selection of the preferred option and objections and alternatives tabled by opponents. A project 
that challenges a dominant paradigm (frame) has to clear a great number of hurdles (Section 
8.4.2). Section 8.5 looks into the strategies to co-opt or confront opponent stakeholders. It 
examines how successful the initiative for a participatory process has turned out in the light of 
conflicts with various stakeholders which necessitated various changes and led to a Public Inquiry 
in 1992. Section 8.6 goes into the recurring floods in 1998, 2000 and especially 2003, which tested 
the flood diversion channel and led to acrimony between flood managers and stakeholders. 
The case study is based on an extensive archival review of published and unpublished project 
and policy documents, some 15 interviews with senior project and policy staff of the 
Environment Agency and MAFF (now DEFRA), the Internal Drainage Board, Buckinghamshire 
county, Taplow parish, Eton College, English Nature, multiple conversations with Flood Hazard 
Research Centre staff at Enfield, as well as exchanges by electronic mail with Maidenhead citizens 
and project consultants, mainly in 2000 and 2001. Interviewee selection was the result of 
snowballing. Apart from project documentation, the research draws on grey project literature 
kindly made available to me by John Gardiner in 2000.   
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FIG 8.1A,B The Jubilee River project area.  
 
 
 
 
8.2 RISK AND RESPONSIBILITY AT THE INTERFACE OF WATER AND 
SPACE 
 
8.2.1 NAMING, FRAMING AND BLAMING 
 
To understand actors‘ positions in a dispute, one has to understand their problem frames. ‗The 
frames held by actors determine what they see as being in their interest, and therefore, what 
interests they see as conflicting‘ (Schön and Rein, 1994: 29)348. Frames mobilise the values against 
which ‗risks‘ and policy ‗problems‘ are judged to exist. Ambiguity and indeterminacy is reduced 
by naming things within a certain frame, to contextualise the issue. ‗Naming‘ (labelling) of problem 
elements influences the range of alternatives that will be examined. It is within a frame that 
problems are judged and synthesised. Framing is defined as ‗selecting and highlighting some 
facets of events or issues, and making connections among them so as to promote a particular 
interpretation, evaluation, and/or solution‘ (Schön and Rein, 1994). 
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The act of ‗naming‘ can make an issue political: it explicitly identifies a culprit causing a loss, it 
attributes an undesirable effect to an undesirable cause. Some issues become embroiled over the 
allocation of blame and the distribution of power, while others appear to be tolerated within 
norms of social values and trust (Tansey and O‘Riordan, 1999: 72). The naming of ‗foreign 
elements‘ and ascribing blame to them for mishaps is a political act. ‗Blaming‘ refers to who or 
what is held responsible for the problem or perceived threat. In the domain of risk and security, 
such ‗blaming‘ is especially salient when it concerns existential ‗survival issues‘. (Buzan et al., 
1998). 
The conception of risk and responsibility underlying different risk frames brings different 
expectations and prescriptions of what government and citizens are expected to do to reduce 
flood risk, that is, the governance arrangement. This section will inventory the frames of risk and 
responsibility in water management, river management and disaster management, as identified in 
the literature: who and what caused the risk and who is responsible for remedying it? These 
frames will be the context for an analysis of the discursive moves made by the main actors in the 
debate on the Jubilee River.  Risk is politicised when someone is felt to be to blame (Douglas, 
1994). The standoffs between planners, developers, citizens and Environment Agency can be 
seen as ´blaming´ narratives (Section 8.6.3). 
 
 
8.2.2 FRAME CHANGE: LOOKING FOR A NICHE  
 
Hegemonic frames provide stability in an issue-area. Change is bound to be incremental, will 
mostly take place within bureaucracies and companies (the socio-technical regime) and will 
eventually bring lock-in (closure) rather than radical paradigm shifts (e.g. Dosi, 1982). By contrast 
a major change in policy frames is marked by a broad public debate (Scrase and Sheate, 2005). 
What changes a dominant frame (policy paradigm)? 
Out of the several available approaches to understanding policy change, a particularly 
appealing candidate is Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (Baumgartner, 1994), which suggests that 
crises and catalytic changes and focusing events are strong candidates to revolutionise dominant 
policy frames. Due to their strong psychological impact, flood events as ‗windows of opportunity‘ 
fit the bill perfectly, and indeed Johnson et al. (2005) have shown that the floods of 1947, 1953 
(coastal), and the river floods of 1998 and 2000 provided the impetus for policy change in British 
river management. However, this is not a hard and fast rule: as Scrase and Sheate (2005: 122) 
note, the landmark Drainage Act of 1930 was not impelled by a flood event, and as we shall see, 
neither was the creation of the Maidenhead, Windsor and Eton Flood Alleviation Scheme 
(MWEFAS), the later Jubilee Channel. Moreover, these policy changes were not accompanied by 
a meaningful change in the constellation of actors and rules that make up the policy regime 
governing an issue area.  
I will therefore consider a different candidate analytical framework than ‗focusing events‘ to 
understand policy transition. I will examine the MWEFAS, largely the brainchild of John 
Gardiner and his team at the National Rivers Authority, Thames Region (NRA-TR) and its 
underlying philosophy of green engineering and integrated river management, as seeking to fill an 
innovative niche within a multi-level perspective of transitions (see Box 8.1). The ‘green 
engineering‘ approach generated a clash between different frames (paradigms) and may have been 
crucial in promoting substantial shifts in the flood management regime. 
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8.2.3 PARADIGM SHIFTS IN UK RIVER MANAGEMENT – CHANGING (MASTER) 
FRAMES AND GOVERNANCE 
 
It is a truism to state that the UK does not have a ‗disaster culture‘: the myth that Britain is 
largely free from natural hazards persists (Bakker et al., 1999). As a result, citizens were not very 
aware of floods and other types of risks until the Easter Floods of 1998. When a flood happens, 
stakeholders perceive it as a freak event, display a pervasive attitude that floods are ‗Acts of God‘ 
and rely on self-help rather than on government. 
 
To make it onto the public policy agenda, a risk has to be perceived as a public risk. When 
people‘s desire for security has to be squared with the change and discomfort that inevitably 
accompanies an intervention that promises to provide protection, there is a tension. People seek 
security, but also stability and continuity (‗ontological security‘). Schon has described the dynamic 
conservatism of social systems as a fight to remain the same (Schon 1971 q. in Fordham, 1998). 
Conservatives perceive risks as less dangerous than progressives (Lupton, 2000). In this dilemma, 
anxiety about flooding can translate as aversity to change, rather than aversity to risk. Thus, the 
Maidenhead flood scheme led to antagonism between liberal newcomers and change-averse 
residents who lived in the areas all their lives. An example of this conservationism is the concern 
for the integrity of the Green Belt, which has long been sacrosanct (Elsen, 1986). The construction 
of the flood channel itself also counts as development of the Green Belt. 
Box 8.1: Multilevel perspective on transitions 
Niche: denotes a space where individuals, based on existing knowledge and capabilities develop 
new technologies or concepts that are geared towards problems of existing regimes. Niches 
provide space for learning processes and development of social networks, which support 
innovations. Innovations generated at this level are usually radical. 
The patchwork quilt of socio-technical regime accounts for stability of existing technological 
development. Regimes refer to rules of the game that enable and constrain activities within 
communities. Patterns may arise here in the form of path dependencies, whereby particular 
innovations are facilitated or constrained by existing networks, investments, or regulations. If 
innovations are generated at the regime level-they are mainly incremental.  
The socio-technical landscape encompasses the wider, ‗harder‘ context of a regime in the form of 
broad economic, demographic and (geo)political processes. The context of landscape is very 
difficult to change and if it does change, it takes much longer than in the case of regimes (after 
Wieczorek and Vellinga 2004)  
 
 
FIG 8.2  Transition landscape (Geels 2004) 
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The untouchability of the Green Belt has increased market pressure on non-Green Belt land, 
in turn increasing flood risk (Norton, 1994: 41). Despite the ban on Green belt development, in 
practice, each year 2400 acres of Green Belt are being developed.349 England‘s South-East is also 
the economic powerhouse of Great Britain. The ensuing housing boom is actively promoted by 
the urban-oriented Labour Government. This puts great strain on both drinking water resources 
and on space. The challenge is thus to balance growth and conservation, between urban sprawl 
and rural values.  
 
A shift in emphasis from rural to urban is also perceptible in the changing philosophy 
underlying flood management. Tapsell, Johnson and Penning-Rowsell (2005) identify three 
phases in flood management strategy in the UK: 
 
-  land drainage to ensure food security (1930s - 1980s), aimed at protecting fertile land. 
- flood defence350 (arterial drainage, 1980s and 1990s). This aims to protect people while 
working with the environment and reducing risk. 
- flood risk management (recent years), focusing on land use planning and development 
control. The ‗risk-based approach‘ not only considers the probability of flooding, but also its 
impact (damage). 
 
These phases can be seen as the expression of quite different (security) problem frames (Table 
8.1). In Britain, Flood Defence Boards, originally known as Land Drainage Boards, are charged 
with improving land drainage for agriculture. After the First World War, food security, which 
underlies the first of the three phases, became a top priority. As late as 1977, 100,000 ha per year 
were drained with grant-aid and the Ministry of Agriculture supported a new drainage project to 
boost food production (Tapsell et al., 2005). In spite of persistent agricultural production 
surpluses since the 1980s, the agricultural sector retained a privileged position in Britain. The rise 
of nature conservationists however successfully took on landowning interests in the 1980s. In 
1984, grants for lowfield drainage came to a stop (Scrase and Sheate 2005) and urban flood 
protection came to be prioritised. The coalition between urban and ‗green‘ flood defence became 
the new dominant problem frame when the Maidenhead flood scheme was conceived in the mid-
80s. This formed the background of the green flood protection scheme. 
 
Gardiner (1992) sketches a different story of three-stage development towards catchment 
management, which complements Penning-Rowsell et al. (2005) (see Table below). An 
exploitation-led phase characterised by single or dual-purpose schemes gives way to integrated 
management as pollution starts to impact on the whole of society (cf. the ‗hydraulic mission‘ 
introduced in Chapter 4.3). The drive to improve water quality through pollution control351 
triggered more integrated modes of river management paradigm creating opportunities for water 
quantity (flood) management – a structural (re)linkage of previously isolated domains. It was to 
take until 1992 for the National Rivers Authority to start drawing up catchment plans – still well 
before the European Water Framework Directive of 2000. Catchment plans were in fact oriented 
at sub-basins, so that a larger river like the Thames has six river section plans. ‗There are flooding 
problems along the whole length of the river Thames, but it was considered impossible to solve 
the problems along the whole length in one go.‘352 The MWEFAS was thus considered a first step 
(niche) for this (with 182 more to follow) towards the a ‗whole-catchment‘ approach (the third 
stage in Gardiner‘s chain) for the Thames, with the hope of following it up with a downstream 
extension, a channel running between Datchet, Chertsey, Staines and Beaconsfield. The present 
chapter assesses how far he got with this striving. 
In the process, the case of Maidenhead, a prosperous commuting town for professionals 
working in London, provides an interesting interface between the new rich and the landed rural 
classes. The traditional countryside dwellers saw the channel as a distortion of an otherwise most 
agreeable landscape for the benefit of the newly rich. 
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TABLE 8.1 Chronological development of flood management and river management, after Gardiner (1992) and 
Tapsell, Johnson and Penning-Rowsell (2005). The MWEFAS project was conceived in the mid-1980s. 
 Flood management paradigm 
(Penning Rowsell et al. 2005) 
River management paradigm  
(Gardiner 1992) 
Pre-
war 
Land drainage (food security) Exploitation-led phase 
1950s Integrated management to control pollution 
1960s 
– 
1970s 
1980s Flood defence 
1990s Catchment management 
Recent flood risk management: land use planning, 
development control 
 
 
The MWEFAS project was born out of a desire to move from traditional incidental flood 
defence engineering (hard structures, straightening rivers and draining wetlands, Green and 
Warner‘s ‗second wave‘ (see Table 8.2 below), to a more environmental and integrated form of 
river management, the ‗fourth wave‘) combined with a stronger control on floodplain occupation 
behaviour – the third wave.  
 
 
TABLE 8.2 Green and Warner‟s (1999) typology indicates a chronology of four flood responses, governance to deal 
with risk and responsibility, each of these implies a threat and a remedy. 
Wave Paradigm Recipe Management focus 
1 Unmanaged (pre-modern) Live with floods Coping 
2 Protection Control river behaviour Risk management 
3 Nonstructural Adjust human behaviour People management 
4 Integrated (Holistic) Mixed approach Uncertainty management 
 
 
TABLE 8.3 MWEFAS/Jubilee River, Project chronology 
Year  Event 
1983 Thames river flood study 
1989 Special Inquiry;  
Permission from Drainage Board 
1990 Maidenhead flooded 
1992 - Datchet flood study 
- Public inquiry on MWEFAS 
1993 Inspector‘s report 
1994 Secretary of State approves planning application 
1995  - Final approval 
- Legal challenge to Compulsory Purchase Order (Eton College) 
1996 Newly created Environment Agency takes on responsibility for scheme and turns first sod 
1998, 2000 Floods in England, Maidenhead area not affected 
2001 Official inauguration of Jubilee Channel (=MWEFAS) 
31-12 end of Environment Agency freehold;  
2002 Awards for Jubilee Channel 
2003 Flood damage downstream of Jubilee Channel 
2004 Ashly Report damns construction of Jubilee Channel 
2006 Environment Agency sues its lead contractors 
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8.3 PLANNING BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE 
 
‗You build houses in the floodplain of a river, that is bound to have some effect.‘ (Maidenhead 
official, 2000) 
 
This section explains the planning set-up of flood and floodplain management in Britain.   
Some public speakers would contend this is a contradiction in terms: the British ´just do not do 
planning´ (FHRC consultant). Flooding, as a case in point, has been attributed to poor planning 
of riverside areas. However, it seems fairer to say that while there are plenty of plans, river 
planning guidelines have not been enforced very much. 
Despite calls for ‗Joined-Up Government‘; the British organisational scene also remains 
characterised by very loose coupling between agencies. Two interviewees claimed a lack of inter-
organisational communication and cooperation to be an aspect of the individualistic British 
culture. ‗We don‘t want to communicate‘ (EA consultant). Relations between central and local 
government have been especially difficult. The Thatcher administration (1979-1990) has sought 
to erode the powers of local government and transfer them to a public-private structure, which 
was only partly rescinded by Labour (Jouvé, 2005). 
 
 TABLE 8.4 Key actors in the UK flood regime  
Central government 
 
- MAFF/DEFRA 
- DETR (The Department of the Environment, 
Transport and the Regions). 
Local government 
 
 
- Local Authorities (Boroughs and Counties) 
- The EA (previously NRA) 
Private sector  
 
- The (land) development industry 
 
Nevertheless, there is a decision-making structure, which will be rendered here in highly 
simplified form.  
The Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF, now DEFRA) can be said to dominate the 
decision-making regime: any plans initiated by Environment Agency and Local Authorities need to be 
accepted by the Ministry (Werritty, 2006). In practice, MAFF considers the 257 Internal Drainage 
Boards (agricultural land), the Environment Agency (main river), and 400 Local Authorities (non-
main river) as its operating agencies,353 and does not appreciate the Environment Agency 
initiating its own policies (Ingen-Housz 2007).  
MAFF, the EA and local councils make up Regional Flood Defence Committees, deciding on and 
implementing flood defence and drainage works in low-lying areas. There is some overlap of 
responsibilities in this system354.  
Obviously, these main actors represent different interests vis-à-vis flood(plain) management. 
Local Authorities of towns have tended to promote floodplain development to raise municipal 
revenue, while the Environment Agency now seeks to stop any development of the floodplain. 
Constraining the river to protect population concentrations in urban areas may well displace the 
problem to rural areas, while Internal Drainage Boards traditionally defend their agricultural 
mandate rather than built-up areas (Penning-Rowsell et al. 1987).355 While the central government 
has various ‗central mechanisms and default powers‘, intervention is politically risky. Central 
government has only scant idea how local government planning works. Central Government is 
therefore content to leave floodplain policy to local authorities. This caused it not to intervene 
despite a deadlock between local authorities and water managers (Norton 1994), playing out their 
strategies in the ever-contentious interface of water and space: local floodplain management. 
Another key national player in flood governance are the private insurers. In 1961, in an act of 
what the Economist has called ‗obsessive avoidance of risk‘, the British government ‗offloaded the 
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burden of compensating damage of victims of flood damage‘ (Economist, 2006). The public-
private gentlemen‘s agreement means that the state takes care of flood defences, while the private 
companies – for fear of nationalisation - agreed to provide cover no matter what the risk, except 
if continual, regular flooding was unavoidable (Huber, 2004). The UK government does not take 
any responsibility in protecting citizens from floods (Scares and Sheate, 2005) nor in 
compensating for losses: 
 
‗Except in limited circumstances  (...) no compensation is payable to those affected by flooding or 
erosion, including cases where it is decided not to defend a particular area, or to undertake managed 
realignment‘ [Government‘s statement on compensation, Government statement on flood 
compensation, q. in OXERA/MAFF, 2001: 16). 
 
However, if a flood happens, the victims carry the can, as the insurance fee for the area will go 
up (Crichton, 2002). 
 
After the 1947 floods, floodplain development risk had briefly become a significant risk frame: 
the Chief Engineer of the Thames Conservancy (created in 1857) called for planned zones along 
the river in which development was banned. Proposed measures were quite radical: ‗When any 
property in the flood plain came up for sale, [he said] the County Council should buy it and 
demolish it. This was not popular and the idea soon died the death‘ (Martin, 2005). Development 
on the urban fringe west of London after the Second World War was thus carried through 
against Thames Conservancy advice. Urbanisation exacerbated runoff volumes and speeds and 
encroached on the floodplain. During this epoch, attempts at comprehensive planning developed 
largely in a vacuum - planners and developers mutually ignored each other. While post-WWII, 
land conservation has been paramount, agriculture and mineral extraction have largely been 
exempted from land-use planning. Local authorities must have a plan but the law is not very 
specific on what this plan should cover. An environmental consciousness on the negative impacts 
of drainage on wildlife emerged in the 1960s, but the Nature Conservancy Council was 
understaffed compared to the drainage authorities. MAFF appointees had a strong voice on the 
local and regional Land Drainage Committees (Scrase and Sheate, 2005: 126-127). 
Until the 1980s, floodplain policy remained liberal. Government Circular No. 17/82, for 
example, called for Water Authorities to adopt a ‗positive‘ approach when considering proposals 
for infilling of the flood plain. Small developments and domestic extensions were not referred to 
Thames Water for comment. The emphasis changed to minimising the number of people and 
buildings at risk to flooding to preventing the impedance of flow and loss of flood storage 
capacity. 
The original Thames Conservancy had meanwhile become the Thames Water Authority in 
1974, to become the National Rivers Authority, Thames Region in 1989. The National Rivers 
Administration-Thames Region (NRA-TR) started with an enhanced environmental mandate 
after the Land Drainage Improvement Works (Assessment of Environmental Effects) 
Regulations of 1988. Annoyed at the laxness of floodplain controls, it decided to show a firmer 
hand vis-à-vis the developers and local authorities. Thames Water‘s River Division started to 
strengthen its Planning liaison team by including experienced planning professionals of the Royal 
Town Planning Institute to a take ‗tough negotiating stance‘ with developers from 1988 
(Gardiner, 1996), the year the Maidenhead scheme was approved. The NRA was well aware that 
its flood defence initiatives did not respond to a widespread public demand, and it was to take 
until the turn of the century that development control was on the agenda again. Because of 
agency under-funding and tight deadlines for appeals, Local Planning Authorities (LPAs) are 
easily outfoxed by developers. But it is not only developers that need persuading to limit 
floodplain encroachment. Local Authorities have great discretion in setting floodplain policies 
and as a result some authorities are far stricter than others. The water authority is a statutory 
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consultee in LPAs, but the environmental authority‘s guidance is overruled in a great many cases 
(Crichton, 2005). 
The authority‘s say has been eroded by institutional reform. The Thatcher administration 
(1979-1990) sought to erode the powers of local government and transfer them to a public-
private structure, which was only partly rescinded by Labour (Jouvé, 2005).The privatisation of 
the water sector pushed through in the 1989 Water Act split Thames Water into a commercial 
water supplier and a quasi-governmental National Rivers Authority (NRA). This separation 
proved extremely disruptive to those left behind in the public sector356. The multiple 
reorganisations left their mark on the continuity of the archives impairing institutional learning 
and loss of institutional memory. Due to the rushed division of the assets, records have proved 
irretrievable. During my visit to Reading in 2000 I observed that the Environment Agency (EA) 
there only had few files left from before 1990. New developments are seldom communicated to 
those who stayed behind and established lines of communications broken down. Commercial 
sensitivity makes information harder to come by, as gleaned from two EA interviewees: 
 
‗You have to find your way round the system. If I try phoning Thames Water and they try to block 
me, I call a friend within TW to put me through.‘   
´The bit you‘re dealing with doesn‘t pass on information to the bit that isn‘t privatised.‘  
 
In 1995, the NRA was again split up and reformed, the next in a long succession of overhauls. 
The new Agency-to-be was intended as a one-stop shop for business to overcome an 
‗administrative nightmare‘ as well as a strong counterpart for the European Environmental 
Agency (Cullingworth & Nadin, 1997). Created under the Environment Act of 1995 out of the 
NRA and other environmental agencies, the Environment Agency has a general supervisory duty 
over all flood defence matters, as implemented by the Flood Defence Committees, but only has 
largely permissive powers over land drainage and flood defence works on main river and only some 
regulatory control over non-main rivers (see below). The Ministry of Agriculture retained control 
of new works through its allocation of grants. 
The Environment Agency, inherited a beleaguered position from the NRA. The agency was 
nearly privatised in 1994 (ENDS, 1994) while its budget was immediately halved by the 
Conservative government of the day. While the EA seeks an enhanced role as flood protector, it 
has little mandate and financial leeway to do so. 
 
 
8.4 SITE SELECTION AND JUSTIFICATION 
 
8.4.1 LOOKING FOR OPPORTUNITIES: WHY MAIDENHEAD? 
 
As the scheme had to be a flagship, a success on the way to something bigger, the choice to 
locate the flood scheme in the Borough of Windsor and Maidenhead seems far from accidental. 
Because of the experimental nature of the scheme, a site was selected for which there was 
sufficient historical flood information as well as a foreseeable positive cost-benefit ratio. The 
Section hereafter looks at the debate over how that ratio should be calculated, after which the 
protection standard is discussed. 
The River Thames rises in Gloucestershire and flows east. When it reaches Maidenhead, it 
reaches a bottleneck: the natural channel only has a capacity for 275 cumecs  - above that level, 
the banks will overflow and a flood will occur. Upstream of Oxford, some areas are therefore 
substantially flooded during relatively minor events. During floods, the River Thames overtops 
its western bank at Maidenhead, Cookham and Bray. After the big flood of 1947, lesser floods in 
1970 and 1990 continued to cause minor damages. The February 1990 flood lasted 14 days, 
affected 520 properties in Maidenhead and entered 40 of them (www.jubilee-river.co.uk), so a 
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popular support base was anticipated in Maidenhead, especially since the number of at-risk 
properties had grown: from 1560 in 1947 to 3303 in 1989 (by 1998 there were 5000).357 
Opponents have pointed out that these houses should not be in the flood-prone zone anyway. 
The stance on the part of the borough of Windsor and Maidenhead on planning has been less 
than firm. The Borough judged that the zoning regulation after 1947 would cause the area to 
become derelict and thus destroy its amenities. Maidenhead‘s Local Authority sought to strike a 
balance between limiting the number of people at risk from flooding and foregoing the benefits 
of development. The ‗town map‘ of 1953 - and Review Town Map of 1965 became the point of 
reference: it is the only document on which decision-making could be based until the 1978 
floodplain policy (Norton 1994: 26). Constructions that would encourage developments in the 
vicinity and in turn radically alter the character of the area were refused. Maidenhead will permit 
development in the 1947 floodplain (1: 50-60 year flood) but not the 1974 floodplain (1:5). It 
controls residential development in the floodplain. Since 1947, Maidenhead Council planners 
have allowed the construction of over 3000 dwellings on the floodplain. Approval of planning 
applications was not even-handed358. While a 1961 appeal established the importance of flood 
risk and a level of acceptable density, Norton suspects that restrictive infilling policy may have 
been instrumental to other goals:  
 
‗flooding grounds were used as an excuse for refusal for applications which were seen as 
unfavourable for other, unspecified reasons. (...) the local planning authority seems to have used 
flood grounds as a method of filtering out the proposals it did not like.‘ (Norton, 1994). 
 
Having found that along the length of the Thames, areas were flood-prone, in 1983, a study of 
the Thames was carried out with a view to developing an Integrated Catchment Management 
Plan (CMP) to ensure drainage would be subject to source control and balancing of the various 
water-related interests (Gardiner, 1992). Seeking to integrate structural, environmental and 
socioeconomic aspects, the study is rated as an early example of multidisciplinary research to 
identify optimum design and routing for a multi-functional land-use project. As there was an 
extensive flood record of Maidenhead flood levels359, the town was a promising first candidate for 
an intervention scheme on the Thames. In 1981, the Thames Water Authority appointed an 
engineering consultancy, Lewis, Fryer and Partners, to study options for the relief of flooding in 
Maidenhead. 
On 26 January 1989 the Regional Land Drainage Committee (RLDC) agreed to allow a flood 
alleviation project at Maidenhead and to investigate the optimum level of protection and flood 
alleviation works for Windsor and Eton. The mainstay of the project is an 11.6km bypass 
designed on the East bank of the Thames, leaving the river at Taplow Mill, upstream of Boulter‘s 
Lock at North Maidenhead and rejoining the river downstream at Black Potts viaduct (Windsor), 
to ease the peak flow at Maidenhead in a 1 in 65 year flood. The ‗River‘ is in fact a traditional 
trapezoidal channel, with a bottom width of about 30 m, and since the slopes are 1: 1.5, the 
channel is 45 m wide at the top. There is a 300mm freeboard to accommodate bank level 
fluctuations (Atkins Closure report, 2007). To give the channel a ‗natural‘ look, the river is 
unlined, divides around islands and has natural river banks and reed beds to recreate habitats lost 
to past land drainage works and channel improvements and the local Thames corridor. 
According to the National Rivers Agency/Environment Agency these works had turned the 
project site into a ‗relatively ecologically uninteresting area‘. MWEFAS envisaged the creation of 
new green spaces: a wetland, providing reed beds, nesting boxes, pools, beaches, etc. to attract a 
wide diversity of birds, amphibians and insects, plus an ecological study area. Walks, picnic areas 
and bird-watching and fishing sites are incorporated for so-called ‗passive‘ recreational purposes. 
A cycle path along the river leads all the way to Heathrow.  
The Maidenhead channel was designed to carry 215 cumecs (42% of Thames flood flow) 
during a 1 in 65 year event - the remainder would be carried by the Thames and the west bank 
channels. In addition, the scheme comprises a flood wall at Cookham and defences at North 
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Maidenhead.360 The Thames flood of 1947, the greatest flood in centuries, had caused great 
damage in Maidenhead, with 2000 houses inundated361. When in 1954 Maidenhead was flooded 
again, however, this was due to two local channels overtopping their banks: the Maidenhead 
Ditch (the main flood route through Maidenhead) and The Cut, rather than the river Thames. In 
the 1960s these streams were widened so as to reduce flood incidence to 1 in 10 to 1 in 20. The 
MWEFAS scheme included the rehabilitation of the silted-up Ditch to provide flood capacity of 
15 m3/s. ‗This remains to be done‘.362 
 
 
8.4.2 CLEARING HURDLES 
 
Community charge 
It would be too bold to maintain that the Jubilee River was built just because there was money 
available, as some interviewees have claimed. However, there is much to be said for the theory 
that it took full advantage of existing institutional opportunities. 
Funding for the Jubilee River primarily came from two sources: the Agriculture Ministry‘s 
grant in aid and the Local Authority community charge. It is mainly townspeople who pay the 
charge, as the rate only goes on properties; farmland is zero-rated. This system means that 
affluent areas can raise far greater sums for flood protection than poor regions. 
This mechanism rewards schemes in wealthy (financially secure) areas, where the value of 
assets to be protected is likely to be high. As the regions in practice have to pay for their own 
flood defence, the richest regions can afford the ‗best‘ defences, while the most flood prone areas 
tend to be among the poorest. 
In Southeast England, six million people live in flood-prone areas. The development of 
floodplain land has more than doubled in the past 50 years, so that exposure to floods on the 
Thames is growing fast. The lower the elevation at which people live, the more flood-prone they 
are, and since floodplain land is cheaper, this land is often developed for social housing 
(Crichton, 2005). As a result, the poor are more at risk from flooding than the affluent. The 
vulnerability school of disaster studies homes in on such systemic inequalities – poverty, 
marginalisation – which explains why people have little alternative but to live in flood plains in 
spite of obvious vulnerability to flood hazard (Blaikie et al., 1994, Pelling, 2003). But in the case 
of Maidenhead, with an average income 15% above the national average, it is the affluent who 
knowingly take the risk of living by the water (interview, consultant). Maidenhead is only 35 miles 
west of London, and commuting to the capital by rail or road is reasonably easy. Successful 
professionals working in London have bought properties in the attractive area on the river. The 
affluence of the area was not lost on newspapers reporting on the 1990 floods. They spoke of 
‗showbiz people and eccentrics‘ and ‗expensive boats mooring alongside‘ during the evacuation 
of 1990. According to one news report, the Maidonians fleeing the flood looked ‗like women 
leaving a ball‘.363 People in the region have no problem conceding that MWEFAS is a project for 
the affluent, that could not have happened in upstream Wales despite Wales being more flood-
prone. 
 
MAFF Grant in aid: Disputed Cost-Benefit Analysis 
In addition to the community charge, the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries (MAFF) 
can give grant-in-aid for capital works for flood protection. In principle, the Ministry‘s 
contribution would be limited in the relatively rich Southeast, where MAFF contributes 15% of 
the value of capital project (elsewhere in England and Wales this figure may run up to 75%). Still, 
given the relative constraints of the Environment Agency resources, MAFF‘s contribution was 
very important to the project. 
Originally, the cost of the combined scheme at a 1 in 55 year flood protection standard was 
estimated at £36.3mln and to provide benefits of about £41.7mln giving a benefit cost ratio of 
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1.15 to 1 (internal NRA memo, 16 February 1989). These figures soon were to be revised 
upwards.364 
U.K.‘s Ministry of Agriculture (MAFF, now DEFRA) is populated by engineers and 
economists (Bakker et al., n.d.) and economic justification has been the only criteria in MAFF‘s 
‗decision rule‘ for funding flood schemes (Crichton 2002). A healthy cost-benefit ratio coupled 
with a punishing discount rate for the life span of the project – required by the Treasury - proved 
a major hurdle to have the MWEFAS accepted and funded. MAFF took a strongly tangibles-
oriented stance, only accepting cost-benefit analysis as a viable funding criterion.365  Since 
everything depended on the economic viability of the project, the choice of methodology to 
arrive at the numbers was crucial. 
The NRA wanted to develop a different scoring system with due regard for indirect costs 
(such as costs of disruption to traffic and emergency services to cope with a flood) and socio-
economic values. For example, people need medical care and run a greater risk of dying from 
stress after a flood. This brings direct medical costs, which are not often counted but also indirect 
social costs.   
The Agency was especially interested in the success of the MWEFAS scheme as it would open 
the door to a follow-up, Datchet-to-Wraysbury flood scheme, further down the river as part of 
an integrated Thames protection plan. Therefore, it welcomed a method that would boost the 
‗benefits‘ side of the CBA. This could be done in two ways: by increasing the tangible (material) 
benefits, e.g. by higher assessment of property values, or by involving intangible (immaterial) 
costs, such as psychological and environmental damage – not counting the cost of social 
disruption when a major traffic corridor, such as the M4 is flooded (www.jubilee-river.com 
quoting NRA (1992b)366  
In 1990, the NRA commissioned the Flood Hazard Research Centre, Middlesex University, 
whose flood manuals form the basis of flood damage assessment in the UK to calculate that ratio 
for MWEFAS. Gardner had worked for years with the Centre‘s Director, Prof. Edmund 
Penning-Rowsell, and in 1995 was to become a professor at Middlesex. 
FHRC researchers (e.g. Parker, 1983) had long argued that non-monetary (non-tangible) 
aspects such as disruption, trauma of displacement may be as crucial as monetary values. FHRC 
findings for the Maidenhead scheme (Penning-Rowsell et al., 2005) underscored this earlier work. 
Apart from this, the brunt of this work concerned flooding from sewers (Green, 1988) and salt 
water (Parker et al., 1983). The debate over the quantification of environmental damage 
complicates the equation even more. The FHRC calculation did not rule out that 200% could be 
the more realistic figure. 
To reflect the greater affluence of the residents of ‗upmarket‘ (Norton 1994) Maidenhead, 
Eton and Windsor compared to the South East average, a ‗Maidenhead factor‘ was introduced. 
This inflated the value of assets to be protected and, as a consequence, the benefits of the 
scheme. This was significant since the first calculated benefit-cost ratio had not been impressive 
to start with: At first it was assessed at 1.21 : 1 but the ‗Maidenhead factor‗ boosted the figure to 
1.41 : 1, which the Environmental Agency called a ‘very robust figure‘ (EA, Oxford visit, 1998). 
However, inclusion of recreation and amenity benefits were disputed by the Treasury, reducing the 
cost-benefit ratio to a less convincing 1:1.07. The cost at that time was assessed £45 million, the 
damage prevented over its lifetime as calculated at £50 million.  
Environmentalists argue that monetisation of social and environmental values don‘t hold 
water, as other types of values are at issue. There is no commensurability between the two 
(Espeland, 1998). Scrase and Sheate (2005: 118) for example consider cost-benefit analysis part of 
the ‗naturalised‘ flood frame: ‗in flood defence policy few people ever question the application of 
cost-benefit analysis, which is essentially a test for national economic efficiency, in a context that 
was once framed as one of unpredictable and local risks.‘ 
But the water agency was in no position to defy the quantitative frame. The political nature of 
the calculations caused opinions over the way the calculations should be done to be widely 
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divergent. The assignment was perceived by a MAFF interviewee as a ‗numbers-fiddling‘ exercise 
to promote the scheme (interview, DEFRA, 2000). However, while others interviewee called the 
MAFF policy officer a ´dinosaur´, the FHRC numbers also failed to satisfy the NRA: ‗in 1990, 
the flood in Maidenhead, our figures were quite a lot higher than the Middlesex Uni assessment‘ 
(int., EA, 1999). 
Only after the floods of 1998, the intangibles camp scored a victory after the Agricultural 
Select Committee urged to include social and environmental values in the economic justification. 
The outcomes of these evaluations however remain subject to much dispute, given the 
necessarily subjective way these costs and benefits are calculated. After the 2003 floods the 
MWEFAS numbers were ‗reassessed‘ (JMP Flood Report 2003367). 
 
NPV and CVA    Apart from disputes over the values included in cost-benefit analysis (CBA), 
the discussion was complicated by studies using different methods of calculation. Other 
commonly practiced ways of evaluating flood investments ex-ante include the Economic Internal 
Rate of Return (EIRR) practiced in FAP-20 (Chapter 5) and Net Present Value (NPV). FHRC 
commissioned Nigel Arnell from the Institute for Hydrology to do a run to determine the Net 
Present Value of the future 50-year benefit of the scheme. Arnell concluded that there was a 66% 
probability that 50-year benefit would be less than the scheme costs, then placed at £26,68mln – 
in other words, a 34% chance of cost recovery (Arnell 1988). 
These measures however do not take social benefit perception into account. Another 
consultant, Jan Brooks, carried out a Contingency Valuation study into the value of the scheme 
to the local community. This brings out non-market values, since the trauma from evacuation 
and invasion of the private sphere368  may well be very different from actual market values of 
damaged goods and properties. ‗The questionnaire yielded a £3mln benefit. MAFF threw that out 
completely‘ (interview, consultant).  
 
Proceeds from Gravel?   
Given that the Thames has a gravel bed, how about paying for the scheme from gravel 
proceeds? As profits from gravel can be anything between 40-60p to £1 per tonne, potential 
profits from an expected 3.5mln tonnes would be substantial. One observer even charged that 
gravel proceeds were the main driver for the Maidenhead project (Clearhill 1994). But prior rights 
to land sold by the Environment Agency would eat into the EA‘s proceeds: the land owners can 
claim royalties, which makes it hard for the Agency to derive any profit from the sale (Legal 
Counsel, p. 5). Indeed when disputing the Valuation Office‘s decision that the minerals extracted 
from the river were rateable (taxable) as a commercial operation on the basis that it does not 
make a profit on mineral sales. This Valuation Tribunal decision saved the Agency half a million 
pounds in rates.369 Still, an economic risk was that the project was in competition with Eton 
College‘s rowing course, which would produce 4.5 million tonnes in 11 years for a ‗contracted 
market that is already fully supplied‘370. Unlike in the Netherlands case, gravel royalties were 
eventually not included in the benefits but showed up as ‗negative costs‘.371  
 
 
8.5 SELECTION OF ALTERNATIVES 
 
The need to arrive at a favourable cost structure limited the number of feasible river management 
alternatives for flood defence, but still left often a range of possibilities for selection. For 
example, there is no a priori reason why there should be a channel. The present section looks at 
the selection process.  
The Thames is a rain river in a rainy area - average rainfall at Bray (Borough of Maidenhead) 
over the 18 years leading up to 1997 was 735.4 mm. Floods tend to be the flash flood type.372 
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Moreover, the Thames is highly regulated, with a sequence of weirs along its length, which 
increases the speed of flow.  
Possible technical options to reduce flood risk on the Thames are upstream storage, protective 
banks, dredging or a relief channel (R. Venables, 2005). Upstream storage to detain the 1947 peak, 
500 m3/s, would require a detention area of 720,000,000 m2, an area the size of Oxfordshire. The 
embankments along the length of the river are minor. Flood banks up to 2 m high were considered 
but it was realised landscaping would be a major problem and raised water levels would lead to 
increased groundwater levels leading to further flooding. River deepening and widening, the 
‗apparently simple options‘ (Fryer, 1999) would encounter environmental but also social hurdles, 
as it would require the removal of several islands. Dredging between Reading and Teddington 
(where the Tidal Thames starts) to allow for navigation also contributes to the drainage of 
floodwaters,373 but after 1997, dredging up 100,000 tonnes of aggregate a year was stopped374. 
This was done in the full expectation that the new relief channel, the Jubilee River, would take 
care of the flood risk at a stroke – though as we shall see, it did not. 
A channel option was deemed most acceptable from an environmental standpoint375  Yet, in 
the selection process, at first the Environment Agency seemed willing to consider non-structural 
approaches to Maidenhead flood defence, such as flood proofing. This was a relatively new idea 
in an environment where flood infrastructure is the norm.376 Penning-Rowsell, Winchester and 
Bossman-Aggrey of the Flood Hazard Research Centre were commissioned to look into 
(cheaper) alternatives which effectively implied a non-structural approach: flood proofing of each 
individual property, constructing bunds around each neighbourhood and around the main built-
up areas. While their alternative would be substantially cheaper in capital cost than the £83.5mln 
of the prevailing option at the time, the authors grant that non-structural measures entail other, 
social requirements: individual effort (sandbags, flood proofing of buildings) and more 
community support for their maximum effect (Penning-Rowsell et al., 1987). Also, continuous 
information and education is required, which may be costly. The ‗non-structural‘ report was 
never formalised and summarily dismissed for ‗arriving too late‘, although ‗cold feet‘ on the part 
of the project initiators may also have played a part (interview, EA officer, Reading). 
How did the National Rivers Authority, the forerunner of the Environment Agency, come up 
with this particular channel? In all no less than 29 alternative scheme elements with 492 possible 
combinations of channel routes were considered (Fryer, 1999). 
The NRA commissioned Lewin & Fryer, a well-known U.K. consultancy (now part of Black 
and Veatch), to select 10 alternatives. Given the weight of economic considerations, the channel 
should follow the shortest route, and limit the number of structures (Eton College Presentation 
by J Gardiner and G Fryer, 1998). The last and cheapest alternative out of the ten was selected in 
1987. While the report provides technical and economic reasons (practicability and cost) to justify 
this option, a consultant admits that ‗potential solutions came into your mind conditioned by the 
strategic views of the NRA‘ (int. 5, MWEFAS consultant) on east-bank (or north bank: R. 
Venables, 2005) channel. For a time, a west-bank channel through the centre of Maidenhead was 
favoured, a section that was currently ‗extremely unattractive‘ and, unlike the East bank variant, 
mostly contained gravel (Lewin and Fryer note to Gardiner, 12 April 1988). Residents in Taplow 
and Dorney, which would be affected by the channel works, were in favour of this alternative, 
but objections from the National Trust and cost factors counted against it.  
 
 
8.5.1 STANDARD OF PROTECTION (SoP): HOW SAFE IS SAFE ENOUGH?  
 
Underlying the cost-benefit ratio for the Maidenhead scheme was the extent to which the 
scheme would reduce the return period of damaging flood from the local 5-year return period, 
which the EA deemed ‗unacceptable‘. The eventually selected scheme was to a still modest 1 in 
55 year standard. Any protection level under 1 : 75 may be too low even to qualify for insurance 
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 (Crichton, 2005)377 - flood protection standards in the United Kingdom are uniformly set at 1 in 
100. In Scotland, flood defence grants are not given for anything under 1:100. The Maidenhead 
scheme was never going to meet that standard, either. 
While these could be brushed aside as technical debates, the more pressing psychological 
problem is the acceptance of residual risk by the project beneficiaries. When project leader Colin 
Martin admitted - in conformity with EA policy - that the 'possibility of floods [is] not entirely 
ruled out', Alistar Forsyth of Taplow (then parish chairman) expressed horror: ‗There was never, 
ever any suggestion that it [the scheme] would not eliminate flooding in the Maidenhead area‘ 
(emphasis added).' Such a zero tolerance perspective of flood risk has an impact on the risk and 
responsibility issue, which will be discussed at the end of the chapter. 
 
The second channel  
John Gardiner‘s vision was to connect planned gravel developments on the Thames such that 
they did not just result in a bypass for Windsor, Eton and Maidenhead but also further down for 
Datchet, Wraysbury, Staines, and Chertsey (DWSC). His view was that the ‗quality and quantity 
of a catchment‘s water environment is determined by land use‘. While the MWEFAS scheme had 
‗nothing to say about the management of the floodplain‘ (Gardiner 1996), the Datchet extension 
would become the UK‘s first floodplain management plan (FMP) (Imperial Engineer, 2005). A 
flood study for this areas was carried out in 1992378.  
While most options for this stretch involved channels of various lengths, a fifth option 
proposed reprofiling a section of the Thames between Datchet and Wraysbury (see Table 8.5, 
below; Option 1). Digging out the riverbed by up to 1 metre379 would avoid the need to create a 
channel. MAFF, expected to contribute 15% to project costs, proved reticent to spend this 
money for either project unless there was overwhelming support. The DWSC stretch failed to 
clear the cost-benefit hurdle:  
 
´all the options turned out to be marginal. In the end it never happened, the benefit-cost ratio was 
not there, it was below 1.‘ (interview, consultant) 
 
Here, too, public hearings were held, which attracted few stakeholders. As we shall see below, 
this stance also summed up the role distribution on the MWEFAS scheme. This caused a lot of 
modifications to the original alternative.  
 
 
8.5.2 CONVINCING LOCAL STAKEHOLDERS: NO TAXATION WITHOUT 
 CONSULTATION 
 
‗Look, I‘ve got a lot to do, let the engineers tell us what the options are and we‘ll say what we want.‘ 
(local fisherman, 1992)  
 
This section looks into the nature of the participatory process for MWEFAS and seeks to explain 
how the project came to be conflictive from the start despite the EA‘s best efforts to be inclusive 
and open. This was not self-evident: Green and Tunstall (2003) call the planning process in 
Britain ‗secretive‘ while Cosgrove and Petts (1990) warn that ´the link between water 
management and power remains unbroken.380  Perhaps in part necessitated by the EA and its 
predecessors´ limited mandate and means, the idea for the MWEFAS was to enable a greater 
extent of prior stakeholder consultation and openness.  
Due to the absence of a powerful mandate, Gardener‘s team realised the Agency needed an 
inclusive strategy to pull the project off. This section looks into the nature of this participatory 
process and seeks to explain how the project came to be politicised from the start despite the 
EA‘s best efforts to be inclusive. Gardiner‘s team sought to close the gap between experts and 
stakeholders by designing a public participation process.  
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TABLE 8.5 The five options for proposed Datchet channel 
Option Works SoP Problem 
1 Major reprofiling of River Thames 
with no diversion channel 
1: 18 Loss of ecology and impacts on aquatic 
biology, fisheries and water quality. 
2 No works to the River Thames with 
(~40m) diversion channel 
1: 20  
 
 
Need for landfill removal; impacts on 
groundwater quality. 
3 Minimum works to the Thames 
with medium channel (~50m) 
1: 40 
4 Significant works to the Thames 
with major channel (~60m) 
1: 65 
5 Extensive works to the Thames 
with extensive channel (~70-80m) 
1:100 
 
 
What kind of participation were the NRA-EA seeking? As Arnstein‘s Ladder below shows 
(Table 8.6), there is rather a marked difference in power sharing depending on what form of 
participation you privilege. 
 
 
TABLE 8.6 Arnstein‟s Ladder of participation (Arnstein 1967) 
 8   Citizen    
     Control 
 Stakeholders handle the entire job of planning, 
policymaking and managing a programme.  
Varying degrees of citizen 
power 
 
7   Delegated  
     Power 
 Citizens holding a clear majority of seats on 
committees with delegated powers to make decisions. 
Public now has the power to assure accountability of 
the programme to them. 
 
6  Partnership 
 
 Power is in fact redistributed through negotiation 
between citizens and power holders. Planning and 
decision-making responsibilities are shared e.g. 
through joint committees. 
 
5   Placation 
 
 For example, co-option of handpicked 'worthies' 
onto committees. It allows citizens to advise or plan 
ad infinitum but retains for power holders the right to 
judge the legitimacy or feasibility of the advice. 
Varying degrees of 
tokenism 
 
4  Consultation 
 Attitude surveys, neighbourhood meetings and public 
enquiries.  
 
3  Informing 
 
 A first step to legitimate participation. But too 
frequently the emphasis is on a one way flow of 
information. No channel for feedback. 
 
2  Therapy 
 Both are non-participatory. The aim is to ‗cure‘ or 
educate the participants. The proposed plan is best 
and the job of participation is to achieve public 
support by public relations. 
Non-participation 
 
1  Manipulation 
 
 
 
Fordham (1998-99; quoting Sewell 1974) notes an alienation between engineers and the general 
public, as it is engineers who define the problem and select the options. Traditionally few 
stakeholders were consulted beforehand, so that if no one complains, decision-making can be 
swift. Projects were presented as a fait accompli package, so that NGOs and local citizens had to 
make a big noise in order to exert some influence. Since the 1980s however there are more 
statutory consultees for new projects such as Roads and Highways, the Royal Society for the 
Protection of Birds and English Nature. From its instatement in 1989, the project team held five 
years of talks with the mandatory consultees such as the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds 
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(RSPB) and English Heritage and other environmental and conservation groups. One result of 
this was that English Nature was contracted to oversee the tree felling programme for MWEFAS, 
in light of the project‘s environmental ambitions. At the time, this process was lauded as 
progressive. 
While the statutory stakeholder consultation rules prioritised intermediate civil-society groups, 
information sessions were held with local stakeholders as well. The fact that these hearings were 
held before any public enquiry was new to Britain, but several stakeholders nevertheless felt caught 
as they were consulted after the decision had already been taken. FHRC surveys found that 
stakeholders would like to be consulted on a number of options rather than just the one the 
project initiator prefers (Tunstall et al., 1994 q. in Tunstall and Green, 2003) 
Gardiner and his team however maintained that you ‘cannot promote 101 alternatives´ (...) 
project development cannot be totally open, protocol has to be maintained. Professionalism, 
customer-orientedness and careful advertising sells a good product‘ (Gardiner, 1992). Thus, when 
a local survey of local attitudes towards the scheme was commissioned to Middlesex Polytechnic 
(now University), 
 
‗(t)he Environment Agency were very difficult about the questions we could ask. There are some very 
peculiar questions in there. We felt it was better social science if we asked them [= the respondents] 
about different options but they [the NRA] wanted to ask about the preferred option. But they got into 
trouble over this, as expected.‘ (interview, university researcher, 2001). 
  
The survey showed that people did not share the NRA‘s view that the MWEFAS project area 
was neglected and in need of environmental gentrification – they valued the landscape as it was. 
Nevertheless, the EA felt that the locals would be on their side if they recognised the extent of 
the threat. To sell flood protection you have to sell the idea of flood danger. ‗Memories are short‘ 
(Gardiner, 1990) - therefore the project‘s public information documents constantly reminds 
readers of it in its appeals for support. The EA‘s 1997 leaflets (Protecting your homes) emphasise the 
50th anniversary of the 1947 flood almost as if it were a cause for celebration.  
Significantly, after the 1998 floods his colleagues at FHRC (where he had meanwhile been 
appointed professor) criticised this approach in their submission to the: ‗it is (...) not the Agency‘s 
function to promote schemes but to determine whether any scheme is justified and to identify 
the best option available.381 
It should be noted that Gardiner‘s interpretation of ‗promotion‘ has a wider scope than selling 
an innovation to the public. A project initiator has to invest heavily to persuade the planning 
committee at county level. This is no different for the EA, whose flood works affected the 
integrity of the Green Belt. Gardiner notes that while planning authorities are easily outfoxed by 
developers, the Agency has to play fair: 
 
‗The cost to promote schemes of this size is 10% of the total cost before you even start. You need 
that amount to go through the planning process. If you ask: where did we go wrong, this is it. If a 
developer starts it he puts in 2 identical applications. He negotiates with the council with one of 
them. If the council hasn‘t determined in 14 days it‘s a nondetermined application. That effectively 
forces it into a public enquiry for DETR determination. Sometimes it‘s a public enquiry, sometimes 
it‘s a written representation, but for structures of this size it‘s a public enquiry. It can get extended 
and extended forever. Either party can refer it to the Minister to call it in. Most Local Authorities 
don‘t like public enquiries - they have to foot their own bill. Planning applications get through 
because the LAs run out of money. It can take tens of thousands of pounds. 
Meanwhile for the second application they talk to the local authority. For example Reading fought 
them twice for the detail, by the third one Reading Borough Council gave up. They reckoned it‘s 
gonna happen anyway, this is the best of a bad job.‘ 
 
We will encounter the regional planning authorities further down, as the planning application 
with Buckingham Council is discussed.  
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Clashes with Eton  
So far, I have mentioned issues that could be solved by relatively minor accommodation. The 
NRA also had to contend with hardy and skilful adversaries who were not easily swayed. When 
the preferred channel option was selected (at that time it was still to protect Maidenhead only) 
and the general public consulted on the basis of the NRA‘s ‗preferred outline scheme‘ in 1987, 
such ‗details such as the precise route were still under consideration‘ (Tunstall and Green, 2003: 
42). Eton College was first off the block to send the Environment Agency back to the drawing 
board over the stretch of the canal that crossed its famous playing fields, known as Agar‘s 
Plough. It had to resite a dog kennel and save a prehistoric site there382. Eton would not accept a 
£1mln drain under its ‗hallowed‘ playing grounds, which necessitated an £8mln detour for the 
Maidenhead channel. The College was not swayed by the level of protection the channel would 
provide the college itself: Eton is situated in a more elevated area and therefore less flood-prone: 
‗we held out in 1947, so we‘ll hold out now‘ (interview Eton, 2000). 
While territory (land take) at first glance seemed to be an issue with Eton, in fact the land take 
was much more framed in terms of scenic and cultural values of a history-laden area. Eton is part 
and parcel of English national heritage, the college proudly claims it is older than the royal family. 
Its lofty heritage made its playing fields ‗hallowed ground‘, where Prime Ministers had played 
rugby, and gave rise to the famous (if historical dubious) quote attributed to the Duke of 
Wellington: ‗The battle of Waterloo was won on the playing fields of Eton.‘ To touch the playing 
fields was to touch the core of the college‘s identity. 
Eton also did not accept the compulsory purchasing order (CPO), which forces a landowner to 
cede land to carry out public works. The College refused to abandon the rights to the land even 
temporarily, and was prepared to take its fight against the CPO up to the High Court383, 
questioning the Minister‘s ability to confirm the Order. It would have taken an Act of Parliament 
to force Eton to comply. 
By way of compromise, Guy Roots, Counsel for the National Rivers Authority, suggested 
splitting the scheme up into two schemes, one for the Maidenhead area, one for Eton and 
Windsor ‗as the more controversial route passed through the latter area. This would have the 
advantage that the whole scheme would not collapse if not given parliamentary approval‘384. This 
alternative was dismissed and the College won the court case385. 
More prosaic economic interests may have played a role here. Eton College planned a 150ft, 
GBP 10 million Olympic rowing channel386, which was to be built simultaneously with the Jubilee 
Channel. The gravel from two projects would flood the construction market with quarrying 
material and depress the fetching price. Because gravel disposal from two projects, MWEFAS 
and the rowing lake, would flood the market with gravel, a deal was struck that the Jubilee River 
would be dug first, and the Eton Rowing Scheme at Dorney after that, by the same 
consortium387: Eton Aggregates, formed by four quarrying companies: Lafarge Redlands 
Aggregates Ltd, RMC, Tarmac and Summerleaze, ―an excellent example of co-operation within 
the quarrying industry for the benefit of the wider community‖. 
However, relations between the NRA and Eton over MWEFAS remained strained when in 
2001 Public Hearings were held over the newly adopted Planning Guidance (PPG 25), which laid 
down flood contours within planning for development was to be constrained. Eton expressed 
scepticism about the EA‘s ability to provide adequate information, citing the MWEFAS episode 
as evidence: 
 
‗I am afraid to tell you that in our recent dealings with them (the Agency), they have been less than 
helpful. The EA has consistently refused to release information about the effects of the Maidenhead 
scheme. They simply will not tell us what the flood levels will be when the scheme becomes 
operational….. I suspect that the EA may not have the available expertise or resources to properly 
undertake the role as anticipated in PPG25‘ (Eton College, 2001, during the second consultation for 
PPG 25). 
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Parish protest 
 
The rowing lake issue brought in another player: Dorney Parish Council. The parish 
councillors were fighting a ‗trench war‘ with Maidenhead‘s local authority as Eton College‘s 
Olympic rowing channel (Dorney Lake) was to be routed across the common in Eton Wick and 
Dorney. The Maidenhead scheme again would pass through Dorney Common. Two channels so 
near to each other seemed too much of a good thing in terms of nuisance from construction. 
 
‗We knew that the Dorney Common plan was unpopular but when we were only planning to protect 
Maidenhead there was no other route economically or environmentally viable  Extending the scheme to 
Windsor made it possible to rethink the whole route.‘ (Jean Belcher, Thames Water, my emphasis)388 
 
In response a new version of the flood diversion project was proposed, extending the 
Maidenhead (7,000 at-risk properties) to Eton and Windsor (8,000 more). This enabled the 
protection of a sum total of 15,000 at-risk properties. The window of opportunity resulting from 
the need to replan the channel also created an opening to address some complaints: The 
extended channel would ‗not now skirt the south-west side of the village in full view of many 
residents‘ gardens as was originally feared‘ (ibid.). 
Dorney was not the only parish councils displaying considerable activism. For Taplow, just 
upstream of Maidenhead where the MWEFAS channel begins, the struggle against the MWEFAS 
was part of a long ‗fight‘ against various infrastructural schemes, such as an extension of the M4 
motorway and a fifth runway for nearby Heathrow Airport. 
Taplow parish council were among the ‗hundreds‘ of local people voicing complaints which 
later led to a Public Inquiry of 1992. They were especially worried about Taplow‘s historic 
gardens. While floods are usually seen in quantity terms, they bring pollution into people‘s 
houses, too - ‗The residents of Taplow do not want Maidenhead‘s dirty water´389  
Parish councillors are volunteers. The ‗tonnes‘ of evidence amassed by the EA made local 
stakeholders feel outgunned. Taplow faced a ‗battery of lawyers´ and a roomful of evidence, 
while it itself could only hire a very junior barrister.390 But Taplow Council had its day when the 
Maidenhead flood scheme was first discussed in the House of Commons: 
 
‗A county councillor at Taplow Parish Council also acts on the Flood Development Committee so 
they had a little inside info about what was going on, and using that to wind everybody up. I think 
they overstepped it, lobbying their MP like crazy. (...) On 9 November, I went to the House of 
Commons. Every MP can start a adjournment debate at the end of a day. One name out of the hat 
can raise every subject he liked. Tim Smith (Cons) raised it. We had been primed so it wasn‘t wholly 
unexpected. He brought the audit office in to audit the scheme twice. It didn‘t seem nice at the time 
but it was quite nice later because we got a clean bill of health.‘ (interview, Taplow Parish councillor) 
 
Bucks County 
The above protests reflect the issue of ´nuisance distribution´: Dorney and Taplow parishes 
claimed the risks and benefits of the project were adversely skewed towards them. A similar issue 
emerged at county level. The flood relief channel is routed such that its bulk would end up in 
Buckinghamshire to save a population concentration in high-damage flood-prone areas in 
Berkshire391. The county of Berkshire supported the project in the name of progress, while 
Buckinghamshire opposed it in the interest of landscape conservation. 
Buckingham County voiced objections based on landscape values. Since it was the policy of 
Buckinghamshire County Council not to grant permission for the extraction of minerals in the 
area affected by the proposed flood relief channel, the County proved an important adversary. 
The council argued there was no pressing need for development in the Green Belt (interview, 
Buckingham Council officer). Bucks County could go along with a lesser scheme for 
Maidenhead, but worried about the impact on the landscape. The authority commissioned a 
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consultancy to come up with smaller-scale alternatives which aimed to minimise impact on the 
landscape. In fact Taplow parish, too, fearing damage to its historic gardens, commissioned a 
report with a design for a smaller project. Both bids for a smaller scheme were dismissed by the 
Agency on practical grounds: ‗If you want to do half the channel width, you don‘t have less land 
take‘ (interview, EA officer). 
 
‗Apart from the channel itself, there was lengthy controversy over the nuisance from and disposal and 
valuation of aggregates, especially gravel (see above, in the benefit-cost section), which again opened up a 
choice between alternatives. The NRA had sought to pre-empt this issue by constructing most of the bridges 
over the channel before it was excavated, which made it possible to move excavated material along the channel 
and out onto major roads, ‗rather than create congestion, nuisance and environmental damage along minor 
roads crossing the Scheme‘ (R Venables, 2005). 
 
A key issue was who was to transport the aggregate from there, by what means of transport. 
Strong contenders for the contract were ARC Southern (Greenways) proposing transport by 
railway line, which was thought to be more environmentally sound. Parliamentary questions (16 
December 1998) urged Her Majesty‘s Government to look into this option. Yet the rail haulage 
option has seen strong opposition from Dorney and Marlow councillors. Dorney council, 
complaining of 'intolerable noise from haulage‘, went on to portray the Environment Agency as 
'uncooperative and uncaring‘. Yet team leader Colin Martin claims he had no complaints from 
the council (op. cit.), suggesting the parishes‘ bark was much worse than their bite. Although 
ARC had obtained planning permission for importing the minerals from the Scheme into their 
pit at Sutton Courtenay, Oxon, they did not get the contract after all. Nuttall‘s removal bid by 
truck turned out to be more cost-effective. A GBP1 million conveyor belt enables transport on 
the river Thames saving residents lorry nuisance392. 
 
The Public Enquiry 
Given the limited mandate and low enforcement of floodplain development controls, it is not 
so surprising that the NRA/EA has placated stakeholders rather a lot, with a view to ‗keeping the 
peace‘. As illustrated by the above saga of Taplow and Eton the Environment Agency proved to 
be inclined, if sometimes under pressure, to take many local objections into account. 
Environmentalists were co-opted by modifications to facilitate badger traffic, provide for 
alternative bat roosts and the isolation of a contaminated area at Manor Farm. 
The EA‘s Project Team was prepared to go quite a long way to obtain the planning application 
from the counties involved by negotiation with stakeholders. But in light of ‗hundreds‘ of 
complaints the planning application was refused, and an appeal had to be made to the Secretary 
of State who ‗called it in‘. 
The NRA had to organise a public enquiry before an Inspector of the Planning Inspectorate, 
held between 20 October and 17 December 1992 at Reading. The inspector called on to assess 
the Maidenhead scheme, David Bushby, was a MAFF appointee. Tunstall and Green (2003: 34) 
notice that public inquiries in other types of infrastructural project (e.g.  roads and railways) in the 
UK have been formalities, ´no project has ever been turned down.´ But in flood defence, earlier 
cases brought painful defeats, so the NRA knew it was not going to be an easy ride. In the UK, 
public enquiries have been dominated by the ‗public interest‘ (as defined by the government) 
rather than an ideology of participation - government reckon most opponents to act in their own 
interests (Norton, 1994) and see no need for publicly funded protest as found in the Netherlands. 
Stakeholder interest shown was far from overwhelming, though, enabling the public enquiry to 
be cut from 16 to 8 weeks. 
The Inquiry led brought several minor amendments to the scheme, as well as a firm promise 
that downstream Datchet would not be suffering from the channel, now that the MMWEFAS 
would be going ahead but the Datchet extension would not. It is indicative of the NRA‘s 
approach that it managed to persuade one of the project‘s fiercest critics, the independent 
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Taplow parish councillor Ewan Larcombe, that the Enquiry might have been ‗one-sided‘ but 
‗scrupulous and fair‘ (Larcombe, thamesweb posting, 29.03.04). After the Inquiry, the EA 
continued to make significant amendments, such as changing the timing of traffic lights to reduce 
traffic tailbacks due to the temporary M4 motorway diversion (Maidenhead Advertiser, 18 June 
1999; interview Taplow Parish, 2001). Such amenities could come in handy as a bargaining chip: 
in case sand and gravel transport by lorry were not accepted, there was also not going to be a new 
roundabout for locals affected by scheme ('Gravel pipeline backed').393 
The only group left empty-handed seem to be boating enthusiasts, who expressed unhappiness 
with the limited navigability of the Thames River. No money could be found however to put 
locks in the weirs to make the Jubilee River navigable, which would be difficult anyway due to the 
varying channel depths (R. Venables, 2005). 
 
 
8.5.3 THE 1997 REVIEW: REOPENING THE FRAME ONE MORE TIME 
 
‗11. Beware cost reductions that masquerade as value engineering‘ 
(Dodds and Venables 2005)  
 
In spite of all concessions to stakeholders, the MWEFAS project went through crunch time in 
1997 when it was time to finalise the agreements for channel construction with the contractors  
The negotiation of ‗Contract 6‘ with the contractor, Balfour Beatty, in light of the project‘s 
spiralling costs had caused almost a full year‘s delay.394  This quiet crisis (it did not reach the press 
and was not mentioned in the interviews) came to light years later when MWEFAS project leader 
Colin Martin revealed the meeting to project critic Ewan Larcombe of Taplow. According to this 
information (Larcombe, 2005) 395, Balfour Beatty proposed an alternative design. Along with five 
other cost-reducing modifications, such as a trapezoidal channel instead of rectangular one, the 
contract included a ‘value engineering‘ clause that promised further cost reduction. The 
Environment Agency, the Designers, and the Construction Contractors got together for a one-
day ‗Value Engineering Workshop‘ away from work, to discuss whether and how to change the 
design of the Jubilee River. This opened up the project frame rather drastically: a ‗divergence‘ ideas 
phase included suggestions not to have a channel at all, or to build a large-diameter pipeline. A 
few weeks later, the Design Change Group whittled down the list of possibilities to about 10 
items. At a second meeting, technically viable and (expected) cost-saving alternatives were 
selected. 
Thus, one may legitimately wonder if the Jubilee Channel, held up as an excellent example of 
the Royal Academy‘s sustainable engineering principles 2 (‗innovate and be creative‘ ) and 3 (‗seek 
a balanced solution‘ ) had not sinned against principle 11 (‗ avoid cost cutting masquerading as 
Value Engineering‘). Whatever the driver for this rethink, the new approach was to become 
controversial after the Thames flooded in 2003. 
 
 
8.6 FLOODS AT LAST 
 
8.6.1 THE 1998 AND 2000 FLOODS 
 
´This is not a time to blame. If you are on the Titanic and you have hit an iceberg, you focus on 
getting everyone off before you shoot the captain´ (Horton and Wraysbury councillor quoted in 
Terri Judd, ´You can´t stop it, so you get your stuff out of the way´, The Independent, 25 July 2007). 
 
It was noted above that the EA often had to take recourse to sell the project to its intended 
beneficiaries, verbally and pictorially, to the floods of 1947 and 1974 (Protecting your homes, 1997). 
No one died in these floods; the level of ‗threat‘ concerned shock and discomfort rather than 
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danger. The 1990 floods helped put high water on the policy agenda but had smaller impact. This 
was only to change when the UK experienced a run of flood events at the turn of the century. 
Since major floods had not happened for five decades, the Environment Agency did not give this 
policy area the highest priority during its first few years of its existence. When the police, who 
were charged with flood warnings, unilaterally shed this task (Crichton 2005), the EA felt 
compelled to take over the responsibility for flood warning in 1997, so it was understandably ill-
prepared for the job when floods hit England at Easter 1998. The flood warning did not reach 
many people it should have. The EA was subject to fierce criticism for the mismatch between 
those actually warned and those in need of a warning. In the ‗Bye Report‘, the parliamentary 
Easter Floods Review Team lambasted the ‗complicated, confusing for the public and regionally 
varying arrangements‘396. Had the 1998 Easter Flood, in which five people were killed, been seen 
as national disaster, the ensuing public outrage could have empowered the Agency as a national 
flood managing institution. 
Nevertheless, the Minister reacted to the Agricultural Select Committee‘s inquiry (House of 
Commons) into the 1998 floods by setting high-level targets that included a supervisory duty for 
the EA. According to Jean Venables, the Chairperson of the Thames IDB, ‗no one knew what it 
meant so nothing was done about it until recently. Now we‘re collecting information from other 
authorities to see what isn‘t done. Some didn‘t even knew they had it (..) ‗Defending properties is 
not a must-do - There is no legal responsibility; most of it [= flood protection] is permissive. No 
heads will be dismissed if we don‘t.‘ (J. Venables pers. comm., 2000) 397 
In November and December 2000, heavy rains again caused floods in England, affecting some 
10,000 homes. The MWEFAS channel had been excavated but not yet connected to the Thames 
so that the Channel could not be of much help in withstanding that year‘s winter floods. After 
these events, attitudes on risk and responsibility started to change rapidly (Johnson, Tunstall and 
Penning-Rowsell, 2005). The EA got its chance to be stricter on floodplain development  The 
precautionary principle (flood warning, self-help) and land use planning/development control 
were the core of the ‗PPG 25‘ (Planning Policy Guideline) issued in 2001 in response to the Y2K 
floods (Tapsell et al., 2005). This guideline sought to restrict development of the floodplain inside 
the contours demarcated in the flood maps provided by the Environment Agency. Insurers take 
these flood maps as an indicator for the ‗insurability‘ of properties. But short of a national 
disaster event it will be impossible to evict or buy out the people who already occupy the 
floodplain.398 PPG 25 will therefore likely only affect new developments. 
Meanwhile, pressure for intervention mounted both from the private and civil-society sector.  
The insurers‘ umbrella organisation, ABI, put a moratorium on flood coverage until 2002, urging 
the government to review its commitment to flood protection, as the insurers could not ‗keep 
subsidising‘ losses of this scale (some GBP200 million) (Huber, 2004). The ABI qualified its 
definition of what constitute ‗exceptional circumstances‘. so that it does not have to provide 
cover for lack of ‗sustainable defences‘). The flood premiums would go up according to historic 
damage, shifting responsibility to homeowners (Huber, 2004). A ‗flood tax‘ on properties was 
proposed, but eventually rejected.  
 
This move forced the government to speed up its flood defence efforts at a time EA budgets 
were eroding. Disappointed citizens had expected much more of the EA in terms of structural 
defences and flood warning than it could muster, and – as we have seen – more than it was even 
mandated to provide. The discrepancy between governmental capabilities and citizen 
expectations, as well as a discrepancy between perceptions of who caused what, came to a head in 
2003, when Datchet, Chertsey and Wraysbury suffered major flood nuisance. 
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8.6.2 THE CHANNEL‟S INAUGURATION AND THE 2003 FLOODS 
 
By the time it opened in November 2001399 the Jubilee River had cost GBP 110 million. 
Consultants Lewin & Fryer, Nuttall and Balfour Beatty won plaudits for their ‗soft engineering‘ 
approach, which was seen as the way forward in flood relief. The Royal Society of Engineers 
singled the project out for its Hambley medal in 1998, it won the ICE Award in 2002400 and the 
Royal Town Planning Institute Award for Planning for the Natural Environment that same year. 
Good press was also generated by a spectacular crossing under the M4 and the Western 
Region Railway (Walford, 1998). To enable traffic moving at all times, the culvert structure was 
frozen, then jacked underneath the bridge in 1999 to allow the river underneath a Victorian 
railway embankment. The preservation of another Victorian railway, Black Potts viaduct, which 
leads up to Windsor Castle, also attracted attention. 
The costly modifications can be said to have been successful in Public Relations terms. 
Satisfaction with the resulting environmental enhancements seems high, as epitomised by one 
interviewee who had rejected the project first but proudly showed me round the project gushing 
about how nice everything looked.  
But was the channel also ready to withstand the next high-water event? Because the channel is 
not lined with concrete, it depends on vegetation for river bank stability. It appears that bank 
vegetation had not yet settled as the Thames started to rise at the turn of 2003 (R. Venables, 
2005). Over the New Year, signs of erosion started to show in the banks of the Jubilee River and 
the cycle path progressively fell into the stream. Environment Agency workmen carried out 
stabilisation works with bags and stones and inflow was temporarily reduced to 144 cusecs. The 
EA had closed the radial sluice gates at Taplow, as the waters started to rise in the biggest flood 
since the Great Flood of 1947. A ‗Severe Flood Warning‘, denoting danger to life and property, 
was issued. On 4 January the sluicegates were opened again to prevent Maidenhead flooding. 
According to procedure: 
 
‗(t)he Jubilee River is operated when the flow in the River Thames at the Old Windsor Weir in 
Wraysbury exceeds 190m3/s. When that occurs 20m3/s is diverted to the Jubilee River. As the flow 
in the River Thames increases, the flow into the Jubilee River is increased in steps of 15m3/s.‘ (JMP 
report 2003). 
 
This allowed the water in the channel to rise at what the Agency claims to be ‗a very, very 
gradual rate‗. Opponents claim however that the increase allowed the flood level at Windsor to 
rise to 320 cumecs (140 cumecs above the target flow) much too fast, and to contributing to 
flooding nearly 130 properties in Datchet downstream because the flood water travelled faster 
between Maidenhead and Datchet than pre-Jubilee River and seem to have been a cause in 
breaching the bank of the local Myrke Ditch. 
Thus, while 1000 properties were saved – only one low-lying flat building in Maidenhead was 
affected -  128 were flooded 6 miles downstream in Datchet, a parish under the jurisdiction of 
Maidenhead and Windsor Borough. Chertsey, which falls under Runnymede borough, also 
flooded, in part due to the (un-dredged) local river Bourne, a tributary of the Thames. In addition 
to downstreamers, the parishes of Marlow, Bourne End, Bisham and Cookham, just upstream 
from the Thames bifurcation, also blamed the Jubilee River for the floods (JMP, 2003) The local 
MP; Michael Trend, said: ‗People who live upstream of the beginning of the scheme feel 
intuitively—I hope that this is not an urban myth—that there may have been a bottleneck effect‘, 
(Parliamentary question, 13 January 2003).  
In response to the shock of being flooded, there were calls for a public inquiry, to clarify 
concerned questions about the effect of the Jubilee River. To the disappointment of downstream 
parishes but also Maidenhead council401 the EA felt a new public enquiry would take too long and 
cost too much. Instead, the Agency instated an Independent Commission in January 2003, to be 
headed by a senior engineer, Clive Onions, to publish a report for three yet-to-be established 
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FRAGs402 (Flood Relief Action Groups, now called Thames Flood Teams)403 which he was to 
chair. These FRAGs are made up of Local Authorities, Representatives from affected 
communities and other relevant Agencies. Two community action groups had meanwhile 
formed, The Upstream Group (TUG) and ThamesAwash. Together with the River Thames 
Society‘s Flood Committee they applied to join the FRAGs. Maidenhead´s local authority 
rejected this, but accepted their participation via two Community Support Groups, and be 
chaired and represented on the FRAG by two Parish Councillors, appointed by the Council.  
The Onions report concluded that ‗the flooding was (...) exacerbated by loss of the floodplain 
at Maidenhead, Dorney and Eton Wick and by the cessation of dredging since 1993 for economic 
and environmental reasons, which reduced the river capacity over time.‘404 
The EA also organised FRAG Open Days. During one of those ‗road shows‘ at the Borough 
of Spelthorne405, the EA admitted the Datchet banks could also breach and need reinforcing. 
Ewan Larcombe (Chairman of Datchet Parish) questioned the openness of the FRAGs, feeling 
the Open Days were a cover-up. Larcombe called for the immediate closure of the channel by 
welding the gates.406 Later, he insisted the Agency should seek full planning application for the 
repair works near Datchet. That same month there was still a concern that angry citizens of 
Wraysbury, ‗decimated‘ by the 2003 flood, would disturb a council meeting about the issue.407 
Further anger ensued when it became clear the next month that the ´independent´ FRAGs 
chairman, Clive Onions, was in fact a senior associate of Arup consultants who were involved in 
the design of the Jubilee River as a subcontractor.408 
The affected local authorities did not await the Onion reports. A report by JMP Consulting 
was commissioned by the Royal Borough of Windsor and Maidenhead together with Spelthorne, 
Elmbridge, and Runnymede Borough Councils (JMP, 2003409). JMP concluded that rainfall in 
2003 was significantly higher than in 2000, but not extreme – more such floods can be expected. 
When citizens of Spelthorne, Elmbridge and Runnymede were interviewed for the independent 
JMP report investigating the flooding of 2003, a great majority of the respondents blamed the 
Jubilee River (ref. Report). But JMP concluded that at most 10% of the effect on Datchet can be 
attributed to the Jubilee River. 
This finding did not rehabilitate the flood scheme, though. The most damning report was 
drafted by structural engineers from WS Atkins, environmental consultants. They found in 2004 
that the Jubilee River´s banks were too low and too steep, and that inappropriate materials were 
used.410  Up to 700m of embankment was ‘A1‘, that is, in need of immediate replacement. Only 
35% were ‗erosion-proof‘. Also the report criticised the use of non-standard procedures which 
made response to floods unpredictable. To Atkins´ surprise, a stilling basin (to dissipate energy 
from high waters) downstream of radial gates was missing at Taplow, the weir‘s apron came loose 
and almost all structures were found flawed.411 It concluded that even at the best of times, the 
Jubilee River and the Thames can together carry just 325m3/s, 63% of the original design 
specification. After completing the works, the channel will still be 10% below design capacity. 
Yet Ian Tomes of the EA feels the agency has done all it can, short of starting a whole new 
project.412 
The report also claimed the Lower Thames model for the Datchet-to-Wraybsury stretch was 
flawed and should have estimated downstream levels by 30 cm higher. "The news has shattered 
our confidence in the entire scheme", commented Maidenhead local authority cabinet leader 
Mary-Rose Gliksten. No wonder - as a consequence of this embarrassing episode, the EA found 
itself compelled to review the flood contours which form the basis of PPG 25, reclassifying ‗areas 
that it previously described as safe from flooding as being back in the floodplain‘ –which was 
bound to have restrictive effects on allowable planning permission in Maidenhead, notably in no-
more-safe Cookham, and on flood insurance rates. It became clear that the 550 cumecs design 
capacity would not be realistic – especially while climate scenarios predict 20% extra rainfall. 
The Agency‘s initial reaction was still soothing: the EA had it be known that '(t)he Flood Relief 
Scheme is not a failure'413. Chris Birks, EA manager, responded to citizen complaints that it‘s a 
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‗learning process‗ but ‗you can't countenance going back to straight sided trapezoidal channels‘, 
meaning a return from soft engineering to hard engineering. However, in 2006 the Agency 
decided to concede defeat414 and file a suit for damages. Given the complex management 
structure (some 30 consultants involved), it is not easy to assign liability to anyone but the 
Agency decided to take their engineering consultants, Lewin and Fryer, to task.415 The matter was 
settled with an out of court: Fryer & Partners will have to pay £2.75mln in damages. 
416 
 
New lease on life for integrated river plan? 
The flooding of Datchet and Wraysbury also reopened a window for John Gardiner‘s original 
vision of a second channel. EA promised to investigate the feasibility of the second channel 
down the Thames, as part of a new River Thames Strategic Flood Defence Initiative. The original 
five options for a 16km extension of the Jubilee Channel tabled by Gardiner in 1992 were 
compared with a do-nothing and a do-minimum option417. But the cost of these options had 
meanwhile tripled (in 2004 sterling) and would now range from GBP92 million (river reprofiling) 
to 248 million (different lengths of channel)418. The editor of Thamesweb believed DFRA would 
rule the scheme out principally because not many people would be expected to die in the event of 
the Thames flooding and secondly that houses on the Thames do not qualify as belonging to the 
socially needy.‘ (Thamesweb). Indeed while options 2 to 5 were thought to be economic, the new 
report concluded that only a ‘do-minimum option‘ would attract DEFRA funding in light of the 
Ministry‘s grant standards.419 Indeed the scheme was rejected on the basis of a low Defra priority 
score. In response, the Thames Flood Forum, a Berkshire flood action group said it could cough 
up the GBP200 million needed for such a scheme itself.420  
The momentum for the second channel may have been sustained after the 2007 floods, the 
new Brown Government promised to spend a billion pounds a year on flood defence (by 2024). 
In response, Adam Afriyie, Conservative MP for Windsor, asked the Environment Minister, 
Hilary Benn, in Parliament session (20 July) to reconsider the lower Thames scheme.421  
 
It is interesting that the debate has backgrounded the fact that Datchet itself has done little to 
reduce its exposure to flood risk. While Datchet never actively promoted floodplain 
development, Neil and Parker (1988, see also Parker, 2000) had taken the Local Authority as well 
as the Department of Environment to task long before for poor recognition and awareness of 
the risks from flood plain development there. The town had been safe from floods since 1947, 
and simply taken this safety for granted. 
 
 
8.6.3 NAMING, FRAMING AND BLAMING 
 
We can summarise the story of the MWEFAS in terms of contrasting risk narratives (see also van 
Eeten, 1997). Protecting a well-to-do area made it possible to use the scheme as a choice 
opportunity to enhance the area‘s environmental quality while still expecting a good cost-benefit 
ratio. This facilitated a discursive alliance between flood protectors and environment 
conservationists. As noted, this was a clean break with the existing disaster culture in which 
citizens had to rely on self-help. Contrary to Leiss and Chociolko‘s claim (1995) that actors will 
always seek to offload responsibility for risks, the Agency could see a clear benefit in assuming 
responsibility. Offering to ‗protect your homes‘ raised expectations and responsibilities, which 
would also boost the Agency‘s standing and mandate in the policy regime.  
In the 1980s, as in the 1930s, floods still seemed an ´Act of God´ (Frame 1, Table 8.7) in a 
country without a disaster culture. But flood defence without a zoning policy works as an 
incentive to build more, which is contradictory with the long-running NRA ambition to curb 
encroachment on the floodplain. Real-estate developers are keen to build in the floodplain, while 
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the local authorities of Windsor and Maidenhead have not exactly discouraged it. The lax 
enforcement of development on the river meant the value of properties to be protected helped 
tip the balance in the cost-benefit analysis in favour of the project. 
This confluence of interests did not fit the NRA/EA‘s preferred storyboard. In the NRA 
story, the developers are the sometimes ruthless villains who expose the citizenry to unnecessary 
flood risks (the ‗dragon‘). Some Local Planning Authorities aid and abet the flood by their lax 
attitude, allowing the Thames flood plain west of Oxford to be developed. In this story, only the 
NRA can deliver the good people of Maidenhead, Windsor and Eton from this risk, but only if 
the LPAs stop fuelling the ´dragon´s´ expansionist drive. So, from around 1988, a new problem 
frame arrived on the scene, in which developers and LPAs were blamed for exposing riverine 
towns to flood (Frame 2). 
The niche it found to accompany the self-imposed protector role was green technology and 
openness (participation). The National Rivers Authority perceived a heightened environmental 
awareness and recognised that a social support for ‗holistic‘ flood management projects required 
a shift from technology-centered ‗monologue‘ to stakeholder ‗dialogue‘. The NRA/EA initiative 
to hold public meetings - an ‗iterative process of explanation and listening‘ (Gardiner, 1992) before 
protests were staged was a marked step ahead in the UK context, if no clean break with the 
paradigm. But while the MWEFAS was ahead of its time in stakeholder consultation, ‗promotion‘ 
and placation after the decision had already been taken formed the mainstay of the EA 
perspective on participation. The protests continued and led to a Public Inquiry. 
To support their case, local protesters adduced a different problem frame altogether (Frame 3): 
it was not so much the flood risk as the flood scheme that threatened the citizens. They also took 
very different view of the local cost-benefit ratio. The locals‘ ongoing counter-story sees the 
channel itself as a costly and ineffective monstrosity, despoliating the countryside and its historic 
and cultural values. What the EA saw as a neglected area, they saw as a thing of beauty (also 
Tunstall et al., 1991). Several locals concede that infilling of the floodplain means increased risk, 
but the flood risk is something people have lived with for centuries, which makes them 
themselves the unsung heroes who ‗keep fighting the scheme‘422.  
When the Jubilee Channel plan was not extended, downstream stakeholders were worried that 
they would be more rather than less at risk in a flood event. They were promised in the 1992 
Public Enquiry that they would not, but harboured doubts. When the EA‘s initial response to the 
2003 flood however was to deny any problem in the structural design, their distrust in the Agency 
was vindicated. Seeing an ‗imbalance of benefits and sacrifices‘ (see also Fordham 1998/99) they 
voiced concerns like: ‗Wraysbury pays council taxes to Maidenhead and does not want to be 
sacrificially flooded for Maidenhead‘s safety.‘423  
Technical experts concluded that the bypass can only have contributed up to 10% to the extra 
flooding. Ironically, the Agency seemed to see the bank failure as an Act of God (problem frame 
1) and put in place structural, remedial measures. ‘Open Days‘ continued the promotional 
approach, while reducing public participation by refusing a public enquiry. It took until 2004 for 
the EA to admit that most (but not all) of the initial allegations were correct, after which the 
agency decided to hold the structural engineers liable, effectively passing on the blame to its 
subcontractors. As an inhabitant of Windsor commented on the EA´s insistence on 
blamelessness: 
 
‗I wish that someone would put up their hand up and say sorry, we made a mistake, won‘t happen 
again‘ (You and Yours programme, BBC Radio 4, 10 Oct 2005). 
 
We can conclude that the EA´s increased role in flood protection created previously non-
existent expectations, changing the flood governance scene in Britain. Speller (2005) wryly 
observes that public risk communication with communities may have brought about a process of 
blaming the government when something goes wrong, which previously would have been dealt 
with through self-help in the absence of any state responsibility or duty for flood protection. The 
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EA remains caught between rising demands for flood security and a shortfall of funds to supply 
it, although its flood budget is set to rise sharply in the aftermath of the 2007 floods. 
The preferred way out for the Agency to handle flood governability seems to be a campaign for 
flood acceptance. A recent report notes that ‗Communities need to be helped to accept a certain level 
of flood risk, to accept that they need to share some of the responsibility, and to accept that by 
designing spaces to flood safety ecological benefits will also be increased.‘ (Speller, 2005). A 
‗tripartite partnership‘ between citizens, politicians and public servants would be an appropriate a 
way of devolving power to citizens, ‗sharing responsibility as well as rights to good environmental 
quality‘ as co-producers424 (Skidmore et al., 2003). This would indicate a move toward a new model 
of governance (sharing responsibility), which has yet to crystallise. One step in this direction is the 
‗Making Space for Water‘ document released in 2005, which promises to adopt an holistic, ‗risk-
based‘ approach and promises to ‗involve stakeholders at all levels of risk management‘ (DEFRA 
2005). It foresees Catchment Management Plans, longer planning horizons adopted, and EA will 
receive most of its funds in the form of grant-in-aid rather than from council taxes and IDB fees. 
 
 
TABLE 8.7  Competing flood narratives 
 
Who caused floods What caused floods What should be done? Who should act? 
    
1. Act of God Extreme weather event Self-help 
Arterial drainage 
Floodplain dwellers 
Catchment Board 
 
2. Act of Man Floodplain 
development 
 
Restrict development Developers and LPAs 
3. Act of the EA Flood defence scheme Stop flood defence Government 
 
 
 
 
8.7 CONCLUSION 
 
When I started investigating the Jubilee Channel, it struck me that so little seemed to have been 
said and published about it.425 Quizzed on this point in 2000, the project‘s initiator, John 
Gardiner, claimed this is because the scheme was ‗non-controversial‘ and cites low turnout of 
consultation as circumstantial evidence (pers. comm. 2000). Given the largely successful 
bargaining during the planning stage sketched above, this assessment seemed obvious. A flexible 
attitude on the part of the initiators took away, or sailed around, many obstacles. But even at the 
time of the interview, ‗non-controversial‘ seemed rather too rosy a view if we juxtapose an 
encouraging PR record with a High Court law suit, Parliamentary questions and a call-in by the 
Minister of Agriculture. 
The Environment Agency took a considerable financial and political risk by initiating the 
Maidenhead bypass. It was planned as a relief channel, and as such was legitimised as a green 
security-enhancing project. However, as floods in Maidenhead are widely seen as a nuisance for 
the rich and famous rather than a life-threatening issue in this area, any security strategy was 
bound to risk opposition by perceiving more harm than benefits from it. The weak position of its 
initiator moreover presented a number of procedural and funding risks to the survival of the 
project.  
Perhaps this weak position necessitated the EA to make (too?) many concessions to maintain a 
support base. The Agency managed to sway or accommodate important opponents by rerouting 
the channel and providing additional amenities, arguably also in view of the symbolic value of a 
successful precedent for further projects. When the scheme did not deliver on its first test, the 
THE POLITICS OF FLOOD INSECURITY 
 
216 
EA lost public confidence. The Borough of Windsor and Maidenhead remains the second most 
flood-prone area in the UK426. In response it developed a ‘Building trust with the Community‘ 
toolkit to turn the anger of flood-affected citizens into something more constructive. 
The floods of 1998, 2000, 2003 and 2007 cumulatively appear to have punctuated an 
equilibrium. Still, while the EA‘s flood-related mandate has been enhanced and it is actively 
seeking new projects, it remains constrained by relatively limited budgets and a limited mandate. 
In this sense, the ‗revolution‘ did not happen. 
 
Has the MWEFAS project as an innovation revolutionised the flood management regime and 
socio-technical landscape? The Agency certainly secured the niche it sought for it. Its green 
engineering approach has certainly widened the scope of flood management options. An 
opportunity can take on the same urgency as a problem when the deadline is tight. The 
availability of money can be the driving force or accelerator for the project. This can be a ‗use it 
or lose it‘ outcome of budget negotiations. It can be argued that the Maidenhead scheme would 
not have been possible, or experienced great difficulty without the availability of national funds 
and regional wealth. Once the decision has been taken, it is very hard to stop an infrastructural 
project despite the spiralling cost. 
A ‗selling‘ rather than ‗participatory‘ approach was opted for, which several stakeholders felt 
led to a foregone conclusion in the selection process. The consultation process, while rather 
flawed, was largely successful in persuading key stakeholders. Alternative options suggested by 
Taplow and Buckinghamshire County were discarded out of hand, while one developed by 
FHRC was never made public. Eton was more successful in ‗bulldozing‘ significant changes in 
the plan invoking the sanctity of heritage. Stakeholders did not come forward with anything 
radically different. But while the project enhanced the EA‘s standing as an innovator, until the 
channel‘s collapse sent it back to square one, DEFRA is still dominant and has made it clear EA 
should concentrate on its operational role. The floods of 1998, 2000 and 2003 seem to have been 
more decisive in opening windows for reform in floodplain management and a review of the 
funding mechanism. The NRA thus appears to have lost some crucial battles but won the war:  
its vision of catchment management a floodplain management has arrived and established itself 
on the UK flood management scene. In that sense, John Gardiner can be satisfied. 
 Chapter 9: The politics of six river interventions – 
a Synthesis 
 
 
 
‗Security is not a number, it is a feeling‘, Huib de Vriend, a professor of civil engineering at Delft 
university, cited in Technisch Weekblad, 27 January 2007. 
 
 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Because they instil primordial fears in people, floods have strong securitisation potential. 
Securitisation legitimises swift interventions in crisis mode and the control or exclusion of 
particular actors from the normal decision-making regime. What is more: successfully linking 
floods with security changes the domain, tilting the power constellation towards security 
professionals and cutting out the politics. It gives unusual powers over the environment, over 
people and procedure. 
What does securitisation mean in flood management and how successful are securitising moves 
in river management? Does it they strengthen or challenge the position of the leading actors, 
does it change the way things are done? Does it matter if the context was securitised before? 
The past Chapters have presented six cases, each varying in their physical and administrative 
context and technological intervention. The present Chapter evaluates the six cases to see if and 
how security and risk talk influenced decision-making on river interventions, and if the flood or 
the flood project impacted on the decision-making regime. Following Balzacq (2005) it looks at 
agency, audience and context. The analysis will be guided by the insights from Chapter 4, where 
we encountered three narratives of water war, peace and hegemony. These three world views 
appear to map well onto the hazard, risk and vulnerability approaches in disaster studies. A hazard 
approach sees hazards as forces of nature, seeks to prevent the hazard ever happening, so that 
society can worry about other things. It thus invites structural defences. A risk approach by 
contrast accepts that risks can happen in spite of the best efforts to prevent their incidence, and 
needs the co-operation of society to reduce the impact. 
 
TABLE 9.1 Three disaster narratives structuring the present chapter, their focus and parallel to metanarratives in 
Ch. 4. 
Disaster 
narrative 
Cf. Chapter 4 Security is about Immediate Security 
Referent 
Hazard 
(Securitised) 
War with water Reducing Probability Dikes 
Risk 
(Desecuritised) 
Peace with 
water 
Reducing Probability x Impact Floodplain / polder  
Vulnerability Hegemony Reducing Probability x Impact 
x Vulnerability 
Community 
 
To start with, Section 9.2 unpacks the key elements for securitisation analysis and categorise 
the different cases in which securitising moves were attempted according to securitised or non-
securitised context. (9.3). Thereafter, attention shifts to audience. Sections 9.4 – 9.7 investigate if 
securitising moves were accepted for the sake of survival, or if they triggered resentment, 
rejection and resistance with the audience – intended target groups and uninvited interventions. 
Non-acceptance can be expressed in non-compliance, but also the politicisation (9.5), 
‗countersecuritisation‘ and even outright conflict (9.6). 
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Buzan et al. (1998: 72) predict that environmental securitization will fail. Analogously, we may 
predict that declaring ‗war with water‘ (flood securitization) is likely to fail. How do water managers 
deal with this failure potential? Are they prepared to deal with water threats in a ‗peace logic‘ (the 
everyday politics of decision-making) On the basis of the ‗water peace logic‘ introduced in 
Chapter 4, Section 9.7 investigates what de-securitised (peace with water) flood management looks 
like, in terms of regime rules, participants and knowledge in project planning and 
implementation. Does this lead to normal politics or can desecuritised projects, like securitised 
projects also trigger criticism and conflict and (re)-securitising moves? 
The ‗felicity‘ of a desecuritised logic will be analysed in light of the vulnerability narrative in 
disaster studies. The approach is sensitive to differential security outcomes, highlighting that not 
everyone is equally exposed to risk, but rather that the way the political economy is organised 
structurally exposes some groups more to risk than others – a vulnerability approach (9.8). In light 
of the constructivist approach taken in this study, I did not assess the solidity of the structural 
defences, the good sense of actors‘ behaviour or the vulnerability of specific sections of society, 
but whether perspectives associated with these prisms appeared in the case literature and 
interviews. 
Section 9.9, finally looks at the impact of flood and flood projects on the actors, rules and 
knowledge in the decision-making regime. The three narratives bring a layered perspective of 
regimes, showing that changes at surface may not evidence change at deeper power structures. A 
Conclusion ends the chapter. 
 
 
9.2 SECURITISATION ANALYSIS: WHAT IS IT? 
 
Securitisation releases extraordinary resources and powers to counter the threat, exclude 
(discussion of) alternatives and dispel uncertainty and ambiguity, and trumps the debate by 
invoking existential, survival values, assigning the issue to the state as if by definition. Let us 
consider more fully what the defining steps and elements of securitization are, and thus what 
steps are in order to analyse the case studies under scrutiny. 
 
1. Naming a threat to a prized referent object (protégé), which may be material (homes) or 
immaterial (cultural values, holy sites). The declaration of a threat implies it has to be acted on 
urgently. If the threat is implicit or taboo, it is unlikely to trigger action. 
 
2. Framing a threat: a theory of what caused the threat (blaming and claiming).  
Attribution theory teaches us that in case of complex causal relations, people seek to attribute 
agency and blame for risk and accidents to a single causal (f)actor, which then helps legitimise 
security measures. The source of the threat, the enemy, may be considered as external 
(upstreamers, polluting industries) or internal (irresponsible/deviant behaviour from within the 
community). 
 
It seems obvious that the enemy in a securitised flood is the river. But as the river is generally 
not seen as ‗acting‘ itself427, so that the tendency is to blame someone or something for the high 
water event: God/Allah, climate change, upstream flood action, irresponsible settlement, and 
claim damages or remedial action. 
 
3. Call for an unambiguous remedy, a (simple) solution for countering this threat. Attribution 
not only pertains to causality in hazards, but also to remedies – you still need a dose of ´magic´ to 
contain risk: ‗if we only do ´this´, the problem will be solved‘. Possible remedies are: 
- constraining/containing the river by infrastructural measures 
- seeking to change the behaviour of the supposed culprit (limiting degrees of freedom)  
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This is done by means of:  
- a counter-threat, a ban on upstream river development; 
- institutional measures: settling (dis-)incentives (e.g. zoning, fines, withholding insurance). 
 
4. Follow-up: implementation of intended security measures.  
The issue is tackled in a crisis (‗panic politics‘) mode, legitimising the use of force, secrecy and 
shoring up of certain rights, debate and criteria. Securitisation legitimises actions that are 
normally unacceptable: flouting rules of accountability, environmental regulation and acquired 
(human) rights. Not only does securitisation reduce the range of actors consulted to the state only, 
but also the range of alternatives considered. A security mode closes channels of communication, of 
open tendering and accountability, and makes space to ‗get on with it‘.  
Attribution of a threat does not necessarily lead to its validation and authorisation by the 
audience. If saying ‗security‘ makes it so for the enunciator, it does not have to be ‗perlocutionary‘ 
(convincing)  for others: it may be found illegitimate, false, or irrelevant. A securitising move may 
thus be made without being followed up by action. Vocally blaming an upstreamer for a flood 
does not automatically translate into a declaration of war and may not have been intended that 
way. The securitising move, in such a case, can be said to lack performativity due to resistance 
from its intended audience who try to ‗break the spell‘. 
 
 
Danger 
 
Representation Security 
speech act 
Felicity Acceptance 
 
Uncertainty 
 
Risk story 
 
   
   River management regime Decision 
 
FIG. 9.1 Conceptual model underlying this study 
 
  
9.2.2. CONTEXT MATTERS: HISTORY AND OVERLAY IN FELICITY 
 
Thierry Balzacq (2005) has noted that ´speech acts´ are not unidirectional communications, but 
require agency, audience, and context. A speech act only works because an audience approves and the 
context validates the (speech) act. Buzan et al. (1998) take context into account when they expect a 
security speech act to perform better if it refers to a recognised threat that people are familiar 
with. Securitisation can be institutionalised - you do not have to explicitly say ‗security‘ all the 
time to trigger the desired response: 
 
‗(I)t is implicitly assumed that if we talk of this (...), we are by definition in the area of urgency: 
by saying 'defence' (or in Holland, 'dikes'), one has implicitly said security and priority‘ (Buzan 
et al., 1998: 27). 
 
The case studies can be categorised according to context as follows: 
 - securitised and non-securitised states  
 - securitised and non-securitised rivers 
 
-   Securitised context: the garrison state428 (Turkey and Egypt –Bangladesh until 1990) 
While the going definition of a ‗crisis‘ normally would imply a short incidental peak on a longer 
time curve, securitisers in Egypt and Turkey have managed to stretch the operability of ‘urgency‘ 
to quite extended periods. Political securitisation (the security state) raises the barrier to 
desecuritising discourse even without the need for a discrete securitising event. Everything can 
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potentially be a security issue, but it is for the state to decide this. As Wilkinson notes (2007), 
such a situation makes it hard for social actors to make competing security speech acts. 
 
-   Securitised river: recognized threat (Maas, Rhine - Netherlands) 
In light of Buzan et al.‘s remark on the impact of ´saying dikes´, we would expect floods to be 
structurally securitised threats in the Netherlands, even if the governance context is not. The 
Netherlands lost many people and assets in past flood events, until 2002 had civic ‗dike armies‘ 
patrolling high water stages and only focused on preventing floods, eliminating residual risk.  
If the river threat is so institutionalised, a flood easily actualises ´sedimented´ security (danger) 
responses in speech and practice. When the high-water event eventually comes, it is easily and 
‗felicitously‘ declared a crisis, and most proponents and opponents are agreed on the need to 
protect lives and assets, although they may differ about the way it should be done. The balance 
predictably tilts towards quick-and-dirty engineering – emergency embankments, river bank 
repairs – and crisis measures suspending normal rights and freedoms, such as zoning and 
expropriation. A flood securitisation thus successfully mobilises unbounded resources and a 
support base for countering future flood events.  
 
-    Non-securitised context 
If the river is not normally seen as an enemy, as is the case in Britain and Bangladesh, the 
shock of a flood crisis could change this and impel emergency measures. Other security issues 
may strongly resonate, though, notably food. 
 
 
9.3 WHEN THE FLOOD CALLS … FLOODS GET SECURITISED? 
 
9.3.1 SIX RIVER SECURITY PROJECTS  
 
Let us briefly recapitulate the six cases, organized by the above categorization of context:  
 
Egypt and Turkey - River projects in securitized states 
While Egypt is the ‗gift of the Nile‘, there would not seem to be a particular reason for Egypt to 
securitise Toshka, let alone for upstream Ethiopia to protest it. Egypt has achieved full technical 
closure of the Nile by building the Aswan Dam with a giant storage reservoir, Lake Nasser. 
However, every now and then bumper floods at times exceed the lake‘s capacity and required the 
construction of a spillway into the desert. Prepared not to waste a drop, the Egyptian 
government planned a giant project development, the Southern Valley scheme, to ‗opportunitise‘ 
(Warner, 2004) the flood years, that is, capitalise on the windfall flood years at whatever cost. The 
scheme would not only expand the currently constrained irrigable area but also create space to 
resettle millions of Egyptians currently living in the densely packed metropolis. Ethiopia saw it as 
a prior claim which would constrain its own security of future development and protested. 
 
In Turkey, water is plentiful, and as an upstreamer, the country has no external river 
intervention to fear. The flood damage potential on the Tigris is mainly in the Iraqi delta, and has 
given rise to major infrastructural works there. The GAP dam project intended to bridge 
socioeconomic divides between the bustling Northwest and impoverished Southeast. Having 
realised planned projects on the Euphrates, the Turkish government resolved to exploit and 
regulate the river Tigris. However, the Turks set their sights on the river for development of the 
resources for hydropower and irrigation as part of the Greater Anatolia Project (GAP). To create 
a reservoir adjoining the Ilısu Hydro-electric Power Plant (HEPP, effectively started in 2006, 
dozens of Kurdish villages including the historically significant town of Hasankeyf need to be 
‗manually flooded‘ and their inhabitants resettled. 
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Turkey sees the (induced) flooding of houses and heritage as a necessary stage in reviving the 
civilisation of Southeast Anatolia. But the citizens of Hasankeyf and other flooded villages saw it 
as the destruction of their home and heritage, while Kurdish rebels moreover saw it as a symbol 
of Turkish domination and made the river works a target for attack. As a consequence, Turkey‘s 
Southeast Anatolia region has remained under a state of exception since 1984. The re-ignited 
Kurdish uprising has ensured Turkish army presence in the Southeast region and critics can 
expect detention for contempt of the Turkish state. 
 
In Egypt and Turkey, full control of the rivers has not led to their demilitarization and 
desecuritisation. On the one hand, drought imperilling energy and food security is still an issue, 
but also control of people, the strategic value of regional development and economic interests 
underpin a military role in the water sector. The river management projects are treated as national 
security because they are development projects set in the very regions that are subject to 
perceived originators of threats to national security – Upper Egypt and Southeast Anatolia. As we 
saw in Chapter 4, the Nubians face ‗soft repression‗ (the ignorance of their identity frame and 
demands) while Kurds face repression, making political demands difficult to voice. 
It has been observed (Aydın, 2003 and others) that Turkey is existentially insecure due to a 
history of recurring wars and internal challenges. This has promoted coup d‟états, declarations of 
the state of emergency and a strong role for the army. The securitized status of both project and 
political decision-making has foreclosed the scrutiny of project alternatives outside a select group. 
President Mubarak assures his subjects that multiple alternatives have been considered, and 
Turkey‘s State Hydraulic Works, DSÍ, studied ten alternative locations for the Ilısu Dam, several 
of which would have saved much or all of the historic city of Hasankeyf. As the Turkish project 
became a more integrated project, it gradually accommodated more complexity. In both cases, it 
is clear that they were not held up to public scrutiny before they eventually became politicised. 
 
Netherlands - Securitised rivers in a desecuritised state 
While security concerns in the Netherlands had diminished in a largely flood-free epoch, two 
high-water events in 1993 and 1995 put flood risk back on the policy agenda. On the Maas, 
several locations flooded in both events. While no one died, the flood damage and shock of not 
being safe brought a sense of disaster which can be said to have rescued the Grensmaas project, 
an initiative by the Province of Limburg. This plan for the Maas, developed in the 1980s, sought 
to combine nature development and flood protection by widening the river and creating natural 
embankments, funding the project with gravel extracted from the river (green for gravel).  
While the Rhine did not flood, the consecutive water events nevertheless triggered ‗panic 
politics‘: a preventive mass evacuation effort and emergency legislation in 1995. All of a sudden, 
security from flooding was the number one priority. The Netherlands took just two weeks to 
develop a Delta Plan for the Great Rivers and rush it through the Houses of Parliament and 
Council of State. This plan authorised special powers to carry emergency measures on the Maas 
and Rhine for a two-year period, including the suspension of strict rules of accountability, 
participation and environmental regulation. The government put in emergency river dikes and a 
ten-year moratorium on construction in the floodplain. Significant informal influence on security 
decision-making was noticeable between 1995 and 1997.  
An essential part of subsequent debate revolved around the question whether the flood issue 
was also a security issue in Limburg. When the Public Works department, Rijkswaterstaat, offered 
to take the lead in the project, Limburg had expected the river works to be adopted as a security 
issue, furnishing the balance  needed for the project. However, RWS argued that Limburg is well 
above sea level with considerable space for a flood peak to disperse. In the end, the pro-security 
initiator, Limburg´s provincial authority, won a Pyrrhic victory: the legal security norm (a 1 in 250 
year flood) was extended to undiked Limburg and the project went ahead, but without the 
hoped-for funds. This stripped the project of its more innovative and legitimating (or sweetening) 
features such as nature regeneration.  
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Fear of extreme events was also the rationale for the plan for controlled flood storage in the 
Ooij polder and two other polders launched in 2000. The idea was to inundate thinly populated 
areas to save more densely packed areas. The Vice-Minister initially decided not to securitise the 
decision-making, but to throw it out into the open. After provincial protest in Gelderland, central 
government attempted to depoliticise the issue by instating an advisory committee. A wider range 
of civil society institutions were indeed involved in the commission‘s work. The security rationale 
convinced the committee members early on, but could not command the same felicity with local 
polder dwellers, who complained they were not consulted. 
 
Bangladesh - Securitised event in a desecuritised /  desecuritising context 
As if devastating coastal cyclones in 1970, 1991 and 2007 are not enough, Bangladesh‘s rivers 
have not been kind on the country, either. The fatal coincidence of high water on the 
Brahmaputra-Jamuna and Ganges created two consecutive major floods in 1987 and 1988. The 
August and September 1988 flood claimed 2000 fatalities and left millions homeless. President 
Ershad, took emergency measures to protect the capital and to restore order. The mass human 
suffering incited French President Francois Mitterrand‘s resolve to stop the floods forever. The 
French rallied the G7 industrial countries around a Flood Action Plan for Bangladesh and 
proposed a US$5bn mega-plan to embank all the three major rivers that besiege the country‘s flat 
territory (technical closure). The French discourse of delivering Bangladesh from floods justified 
dramatic structural solutions, to honour an implicit duty to protect Bangladesh rather than leave 
it to its fate. This securitising plan however lost out to the concept of polder 
compartmentalisation combined with flood proofing measures, in keeping with the positive, life-
giving aspect of flood risk; a partial desecuritisation of the river. 
A flood risk assessment led to the de-selection of two project areas, while the project‘s 
implementation stage was saved from discontinuation by a smaller flooding event. The Jamuna 
Multipurpose Bridge project started nearby had led to a blocked inlet feeding the FAP-20 area 
with water. An apparently spontaneous river breakthrough unblocked the inlet but also destroyed 
hundreds of dwellings. Yet when in 1998 another ‗century flood‘ hit Bangladesh, FAP-20 showed 
its merits as a safe haven not just for Tangail but also attracting many refugees from outside the 
area.  
Bangladesh‘s Flood Action Plan started under a dictatorship (political closure). The President 
had already declared a state of emergency for political reasons, providing little scope for 
dissent429. This cleared many initial hurdles, as it obviated the need for democratic control. Thus 
when a leading research NGO issued a critical report on flood management, this led to repressive 
measures against its directors. In 1990 Bangladesh reverted to a shaky multi-party democracy. 
Technical as well as political setbacks repeatedly forced the initiators to change the project 
definition. A crucial factor was contested legitimacy. Local protest, coupled with a strong 
international NGO thrust, alerted donors to defects in the participatory structure and effects on 
the local socio-economic structure, based on communal land use. After local and international 
protests, the Bangladesh Water Development Board came round to dialoguing with the intended 
beneficiaries in 1995. 
 
Britain - Flood shock event in non-securitised context 
Despite suffering its own 1953 sea flood event, in which hundreds died, the UK has no 
institutionalized securitisation of hazard: the government has no formal responsibility to 
safeguard citizens from floods, instead people are obliged to take out insurance to buy or build 
property. Flood security is not ‗politicised‘ in Buzan et al‘s sense. Yet, the Thames Conservancy 
and its successors have unsuccessfully sought to securitise the floodplain by imposing 
development controls (keeping people away from the river). Local authorities, but also central 
governments facilitating a housing boom in the Southeast, showed weak opposition to the 
initiatives of floodplain developers. 
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The Agency also faced an uphill battle convincing public and civil-society stakeholders of the 
need for flood defence. It sought a role in providing security and protection (‗Protecting your 
homes‘), but wished to forsake hard defences in favour of environmental engineering: a flood 
bypass on the Thames with ‗soft‘ river banks. This would promote a more integrated approach to 
river management and increase the natural values of what it pictured as an ‗ecologically 
uninteresting‘ area. A truly integrated approach for the Thames moreover would require a second 
channel downstream from the first one. After a lengthy consultation process, a public enquiry 
and a revision of the project, the channel to protect Maidenhead, Eton and Windsor was built 
and opened in 2002. 
By that time, pressure from insurers and public shock over repeated river floods had started to 
boost the legitimacy of public protection works. Unlike in the Netherlands, a minor flood event 
had come and gone in 1990 without greatly affecting the project. But three-year flood cycles 
(1998, 2000, 2003) ensured the issue remained on the political agenda. As the water rose in 
January 2003, the Jubilee River‘s natural embankment broke down and, among other factors was 
locally believed to have contributed to flooding Datchet. In response, the Environment Agency 
put in emergency engineering works, denied any responsibility and dismissed calls for a public 
inquiry430. The aftermath of the flood dented confidence in soft engineering, but not in flood 
channels, and led to the decision to put the previously rejected channel extension back onto the 
agenda. 
 
 
9.3.2 WINDOWS FOR SECURITISATION: SOLUTIONS IN SEARCH OF A PROBLEM? 
 
‗Dominant advocacy coalitions attempt to define the problem and the solution together in one 
package..a  solution [is] chosen first and the problem definition ... fit into that. (Wolsink 2003: 715) 
 
The question starting this study off was whether flood events, or the projects to contain them, 
changed the policy scene (regime) through securitisation. The present study operationalised the 
actualisation of securitisation by considering what happens in a post-crisis mode of decision-
making, a (natural or induced) high-water event. A crisis event reveals the social arrangements, 
the hegemonic discourses. A crisis simplifies the decision-making system as it copes with a 
potentially overwhelming challenge. This reconstituted crisis arena can ‗punctuate‘ the reigning 
balance of power and its modus operandi, but also reinforce existing relationships.  
On closer inspection the flood events rarely turned out to trigger new flood projects. It 
appears the projects were already there, looking for a niche to blossom. The FAP-20, Jubilee 
Channel, Maaswerken and Toshka case studies were all prepared before rather than after a major 
event. Although it was not possible for me to have inside information on decision-making on all 
the schemes, the available evidence suggests that in most cases under scrutiny, the plan preceded 
the flood. In each of the projects, in addition to demand for security, there appear to be at least 
some ‗supply‘ considerations at work beyond direct flood response when selecting them. 
FAP-20 was already defined before 1987/88 floods and, according to interviewees, would very 
probably have gone ahead without the Flood Action Plan. Compartmentalisation gained 
prominence after the flood, though. as a workable compromise between the two competing 
paradigms of flood management: total control (hard structures), and living-with-the-flood 
(flexible response). While FAP-20 was the flagship, compartmentalisation was also a defining 
element in other FAP subprojects (such as FAP 3.1 in Jamalpur and FAP-4 in Khulna-Jessore). 
The floods however created a context in which the local Bangladeshi request for support could 
be articulated with security discourse on the global scene. From my interviews it was very notable 
that neither ‗security‘ nor ‗vulnerability‘ have much resonance in Bangladesh in relation to floods. 
But floods as threat resonated with donors used to speaking ‗security‘ from floods and its lexical 
isotopes (defence, threat, fight against water): France, the Netherlands, now the Asian 
Development Bank. This provided an opportunity to develop an extensive programme of flood 
projects. 
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While the Jubilee Channel was of course built before the 2003 flood came along, the flood 
brought the second channel back for the downstream river section on the agenda which had been 
defeated on cost-benefit considerations in 1992. After another flood, in 2007, the second channel 
in some form appears to be still on. 
The Egyptian government needed several years of abundance to give the enormous Southern 
Valley project, lying in waiting since the late 1950s, a big push. Egypt‘s legitimisation, need for 
space and food security may be questioned by international scholars, Mitchell and Allan 
respectively, but continues to be echoed in donor discourse.  
In the Netherlands, the Border Maas (Grensmaas) nature restoration project languished until 
the flood came along. The floods provided a unique opportunity to save a nature development by 
hitching a ride with a ‗dry feet‘ project; the gravel industry, who faced a ban on further quarrying, 
has strengthened its hand because its participation provides the economic rationale for the 
project. 
Linking nature development with flood protection, gravel extraction and navigation together 
legitimised the hefty size of the intervention. The plan combined several interests and objectives, 
but without the flood protection aspect, it is doubtful that the project would have gone ahead in 
this form. 
The story for the Ooij polder is slightly different: flood storage was a practice that had fallen 
into disuse since the 1950s in the Netherlands. When in the 1995 high-water event Gelderland 
was on the verge of an emergency inundation of the Ooij polder to save downstream polders, the 
plan to revive this practice emerged in 2000.  
As for the Ilısu dam, there is no such clear event, although the energy crisis of the 1970s can 
be said to have been a significant help in legitimising an expensive hydro-electric plant. 
 
Non-security innovations found a niche in the design of new projects when presented as flood 
control projects. From one perspective, greening the projects and ‗making space‘ for the river 
was hoped to appease project-affected population worried about the quality of their landscape or 
their access to monsoon water in each of the three ‗wet‘ countries: river widening (NL), ‗green‘ 
bypass (UK) and compartmentalisation (Bangladesh).  On the other hand, the project itself saved 
or promoted non-security concerns: such as environment and agricultural self-sufficiency and 
export, technology, the future of the gravel industry and the beautification of ‗uninteresting‘ 
landscape. The power of flood defence can help something else to play hopscotch.  This 
‗something else‘ can be seen as development frame – whether a ‗civilising mission‘ of regional 
human development as in Turkey and a new civilisation on the Nile or nature development in 
England and the Netherlands where, project initiators sought to gentrify an ‗impoverished‘ or 
‗visually uninteresting‘ landscape.  
This finding is supported by a strand in the public administration literature that reveals that 
problems and solutions are not sequentially put on the agenda. Solutions may be waiting in the 
wings, spying the arena for an opportunity to make their way into the debate. The 'garbage can' 
(e.g. Cohen, March & Olsen 1972) theory of decision-making predicts this - it visualises problems 
and solutions to be thrown into a garbage can where they can quite fortuitously meet. Kingdon 
(1984) sees windows of opportunity where problems, politics and policies are understood as three 
separate ‗streams‘ which may come together when a particular ‗window of opportunity‘ opens. 
But the meeting of streams in Kingdon´s ‗primeval soup‘ does not have to be accidental - the 
factors facilitating the window of opportunity can be helped along by key individuals (‗policy 
entrepreneurs‘), key events or crises. It may then well be that a solution (an alternative for flood 
management) has been waiting for a ‗felicitous‘ problem to latch itself on to. All this would 
suggest that, rather than a problem in search of solution, flood protection schemes may have 
been solutions in search of a problem. Unprompted, several interviewees voiced this assumption as 
well. 
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9.3.3 „TIME IS ON MY SIDE‟? THE SHADOW OF THE FUTURE 
 
Time is perhaps the worst enemy of flood securitisation. No matter how ‗structural‘ the state of 
emergency, there is inevitably an end to the sense of urgency that legitimises exceptionalism. 
While actual floods bring existential fears, these are often easily forgotten by those who were not 
badly affected. The post-flood drive and momentum quickly runs out (Huber, 2004 gives it two 
years) if floods do not return and disrupt society. As attention shifts to other concerns, flood 
plain regulation is relaxed again and funding and handling of the project comes under scrutiny. 
Popular acceptance of river regulation schemes thus cannot be taken for granted. As it not easy 
to put flood management at the top of the agenda except just after a flood event, project 
initiators may feel that a carte blanche is needed to cut the red tape and get things done.  
When the momentum for a river project starts to flag, it may be attempted to invoke a crisis, 
or adduce and invoke additional threats. As engineers who pray for a flood may not get it, other 
threats can be adduce to make the case for flood interventions. We saw terrorism as an additional 
security reason in Turkey and Egypt. In the Netherlands and the U.K., climate change was said to 
cause greater rainfall variability. But Dutch and English river projects were legitimized by climate 
change-induced extreme flood scenarios. In the Netherlands, the possibility that floods might have 
caused great damage set in train measures like evacuation in 1995 and subsequent construction 
and regulation leading to the controlled flooding policy. When the emergency measures had run 
out, a programme of river widening interventions was started (Space for the River). Worsening 
climate change predictions led to the upward revision of scenarios on the rivers Maas and, 
especially, Rhine. Water professionals started to worry: What if a never-experienced 18,000 m3/s 
flood wave hits the Netherlands? This fear led policymakers to designate several polders for 
emergency flood storage with a view to saving more densely built-up polders in 2000. In its 
promotional material for the Jubilee Channel, Britain‘s Environment Agency invoked the 1947 
flood, but also dramatised the issue by invoking the horrors of the greenhouse effect, playing on 
latent fears in the project communication strategy. Thus the shadow of the past and the shadow 
of the future reinforced each other. 
In Bangladesh, climate change did two things: it created a new ‗culprit‘ outside the region, as it 
is Western CO2 emissions that are believed to contribute most to climate change (Huq and Reid, 
2004). But it focused on sea level rise rather than rainfall variability, shifting the focus from river 
flooding to coastal flooding and cyclones, focusing the discourse on sea level rise rather than on 
higher river flood stages. 
 
It appears project initiators have three options to reduce the ‘shadow of the future‘  
- to seek to extend or renew the security window through extra securitization to keep up the 
momentum;  
- to secure as many ‗early wins‘ as possible while the emergency window is still open, or 
- to take anticipatory action to accommodate the inevitable shadow of the desecuritised future.  
 
This latter option might compromise the support base for securitised decision-making of the 
home audience. A solution may be a two-faced discursive strategy: a ‗securitised‘ image of threat 
control is projected to the home audience, while the initiator in fact designs or implements the 
water management project with ‗desecuritised‘, peacetime logic in mind - ‗just in case‘, to prevent 
problems after the flood window closes. 
Clearly, almost all the major problems the Maaswerken encountered since 1997 stem from 
decisions taken during the ‗securitised‘ time window, without such anticipation. National and 
European accountability rules such as anti-trust and environmental directives quashed regional 
security-induced consortium deals and exemptions from environmental controls after the floods. 
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9.4 COMPLIANCE WITH SECURITISATION: FELICITY AND INFELICITY OF 
 SAYING SECURITY 
 
‗When a state actor makes a securitising move, it demands special powers to restore order, a 
temporary derogation from rules.‘  
‗Responses can range from endorsement, passive acceptance and bargaining to non-compliance, 
resistance and conflict. Acceptance makes the difference between the effort (securitising move) and 
the success‘ (Stahl, 2007).  
 
 
9.4.1 THE AUDIENCE FOR SECURITISATION 
 
Policy problems do not present themselves, they are framed. The framing already point at its 
solution. At the start of this chapter, the key security frame elements were defined as the risk 
itself (naming, labelling), imputed cause of risk (blaming and shaming) and preferred solution 
(remedy)431. All schemes were framed by at least one key actor as a defence or national security 
issue. The present Section examines who needs to be convinced to make a successful securitising 
move.  
 
The securitisation requires a felicitous convergence of enunciator, referent, object and audience 
bringing closure to a debate, to the policy agenda, or even to what can and cannot be talked 
about in society. Securitisation, as noted, is a call and response. While most of the projects in 
some way benefited from the flood window, all of the schemes got into trouble somewhere down 
the line. As large infrastructural project can take decades to be realised, the consonance of the call 
and response needs to be sustained. A positive initial response from an audience (‗let‗s do 
something about this!‘) does not guarantee successful legislation and implementation of the 
proposed remedy. 
To assess the felicity of these moves we cannot measure the impact, but only note ex-post that 
they did or did not generate public debate and resistance. A sure sign of successful securitisation 
is that critical voices are silenced or dismissed as irrelevant, that information remains classified, 
assumptions untested, blank cheques handed out, alternatives ignored. If it is untested, this can 
be seen as testimony to the strength of the securitisation. 
Securitised projects never command a total consensus and can in principle be challenged. 
While flood protection is a powerful securitiser, the rationale leaves space for it to be discredited, 
its motives questioned, its implementation thwarted, and the procedure of selecting alternatives 
criticised by other stakeholders or non-compliance and civil disobedience. Especially when the 
immediacy is not overwhelming, stakeholders can find niches for advancing their doubts with 
relative ease: they locate, test and latch on a sore spot and secure it to question the need for 
securitised decision-making. Securitizing agents will have to convince their audience they are 
acting in the latter‘s best interests, identifying with their feelings and needs (Balzacq, 2005). 
 
Hilhorst identifies the following domains:  
a)  The domain of disaster governance. In a securitised state, the state has great discretion over 
private rights and freedoms. The relevant audience may only appear to consist of a closed circle 
within the state apparatus, expected to control society and ensure its compliance. However, the 
case studies show even this isolated arena is not enough to control either the local or 
international levels. Where the local level is controlled, the superior level of decision-making may 
not co-operate, and where the national and international levels are aligned, the locals may revolt. 
Within the governance domain, the pivotal role of donors should be highlighted, whose support 
needs to be ‗enrolled‘ indefinitely. 
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b)  The ‗epistemic community‘ of science and technology experts concretises the project with models, 
designs and evaluation studies. It may differ with the initiator on the need for securitisation and 
the assumptions underlying the flood (de)securitisation, but also with stakeholders on their ´real´ 
risk. Experts are internationally mobile. Politicians who are experts in the water field (Christie 
and Hanlon, 2001) are exposed to their international peers. In democracies, they bridge the 
public, private (consultancy) and NGO sectors and may be mobile between the sectors. Scientific 
debate may support but also disagree with the securitising logic. 
 
c) The audience for securitisation involves the whole population, including those expected to 
accept the whole package of restrictions and sacrifices resulting from security decisions. Faced 
with a disaster, it is the local domain that bears the brunt of immediate coping and relief efforts 
(Kirschenbaum, 2004). Faced with acute insecurity, stakeholders (in both Hobbesian and non-
Hobbesian state contexts) are prepared to throw their lot in with an external security provider 
and willingly give up their autonomy. The modality in which order or safety is restored after a 
disaster event however may leave people feeling threatened in terms of their rights or identity. It 
may not accept the required sacrifices for the greater good if the project fails Balzacq‘s condition 
that the securitiser convinces the audience of acting in their best interests, feelings and needs. 
 
 
Three key ‗audience‘ groups relevant to the present study are those identified in Hilhorst‘s 
(2003) three domains of knowledge and action. Each of these has a specific capacity to address 
hazard, and would ideally coordinate with each other to the hazard at hand. Yet, such co-
ordination in flood response is not the norm, given the spectacular tales of ill-coordinated 
disaster response such as detailed by Christie and Hanlon (2001)432. Established practices (people 
speaking ‗the same language‘ and working by similar protocols) within and between the domains, 
may obscure a clash between multiple perspectives of reality and interests. The alignment of the 
three (for accepting a securitization or desecuritised network coordination) can be highly 
problematic, as they need to co-ordinate well to ensure disasters are adequately addressed. 
Successful securitisation would align these domains in a consensus at one stroke. It appears 
from the Dutch case, the crash programme to build hard structures in Limburg encountered little 
controversy, even if it involved some hurried expropriation measures, and people enjoyed the 
informal access to security providers. Several Dutch interviewees were nostalgic about the post-
flood period, 1995-1997 when everyone – flood managers, politicians, experts, local people - 
joined hands and could fast-track decisions. But even this apparently successful securitisation got 
into trouble after 1997. 
The Table below lists five reasons why a securitising move might be resisted (from Gromes 
and Bonacker, 2007).433 In all cases (including Limburg post 1997) part of the ‗audience‘ did not 
condone the case for river securitisation. It appears that each of the three domains indeed played 
a leading role in the non-securitisation of one or project. After each point, it is indicated how this 
resonated in the case studies and which actor category contested. The case studies suggest some 
additions, captured in the ´other reasons´ category of reasons in the Table (Table 9.2). 
 
 
9.5  RESISTANCE: NON-COMPLIANCE, POLITICISATION AND CONFLICT 
 
In a European (liberal) context, any intrusion in freedoms needs to be legitimised to assure 
compliance. In liberal democracies citizens are imputed to comply with state rule because the law 
guarantees them protection. If they do not feel it protects them well enough, they do not feel 
bound by it (Boutellier, 2002). Coercion is the least effective way of durable compliance (Held, 
1980).  
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TABLE 9.2 Non-securitisation applied to flood management in the six cases  
 Non/securitising move (Gromes and 
Bonacker, 2007) 
Applied to the water sector Argument advanced by 
1 The asserted existential threat 
never existed. 
- The river is not dangerous 
- The river is not that dangerous.  
- The extreme flood scenario is doubtful 
 
- Ooij: epistemic 
community  
- Maas: donor 
(RWS) 
2 The existential threat does not 
exist anymore.  
 
- Food security is not an issue, as there is no 
water scarcity thanks to virtual water  
 
- Egypt: 
(International) 
Epistemic 
community 
3 Ordinary measures suffice in 
order to respond to the 
existential threat.  
- The river is a nuisance rather than a security 
issue.  
- Special measures are not necessary 
- Maas: river 
manager/donor 
- Thames: donor 
4 Panic politics are not effective 
in addressing the threat. 
- The strategy or project is not good enough  
- The intended plan will not do the trick. The 
river can‘t be tamed. There are limits to 
defence. 
- It‘s better to adapt to the river than control it. 
Bangladesh, 
Netherlands: local 
NGOs and (some) 
flood experts 
5 The extraordinary measures 
avoid the existential threat but 
their side-costs are too high.  
 
- Personal or social costs outpace benefits: 
project is the greater danger  
- Project costs are unsustainable  
- Technocratic approach 
- Project makes stakeholders more rather than 
less insecure (Collateral damage of fighting the 
flood too high). 
- Unwillingness to carry costs or sacrifice 
Sacrifice: Local 
NGOs, Epistemic 
community  
Costs: donors, 
epistemic 
community 
(all cases) 
 Other reasons for resistance to 
securitization 
 
- Other issues are more pressing 
- Distrust in motive or authority of initiator 
(‗hero‘) or securitiser  
UK, Bangladesh: 
Locals 
 
 
 
In the event of a flood threat, emergency measures were accepted in the Netherlands. Despite 
the flood not happening on the Rhine, a majority of stakeholders claimed in a survey that they 
still felt mass evacuation was justified (de Gelderlander, 2005). On the Maas, Compulsory 
Purchasing Orders (CPO) were accepted and the emergency structures, in the first two years after 
the high-water event, mostly uncontroversial. This makes for an interesting difference from 
Britain, where Eton resisted the CPO up to High Court, feeling there was no urgency for land 
take, however temporary.  The Maas interviewees expressed satisfaction at the informal fine-
tuning of the emergency kaden and did not complain that they were built without tendering. 
 
 
9.5.1 NON-COMPLIANCE AND „OPPORTUNITISATION‟ 
 
Actors who reject controls may resist directly, but also in subtle ways. The controls can spark 
‗deviant behaviour‘ (Bakker et al., 1999), that is, non-compliance with state laws and directives, 
undercutting institutional surveillance and control. 
Spatial zoning reflects the behaviourist (institutionalist) approach to disasters, zoning measures 
and incentives ‗teach‘ people to behave responsibly and anticipate disaster. It can consist of total 
ban on development or the identification of risk contours linked to compensation coverage. This 
appears to be a losing proposition in flood plain, where enforcement is a particular weakness of 
flood policy and what is logical from a project perspective is not logical from a user perspective. 
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In floodplains the pressure for river encroachment is relentless. Whether because of the 
amenity value of living by the water, fertile soil, easy access to waterways, low rent, or because 
other livelihoods are unavailable, the pressure to occupy the floodplain is relentless.  
While Bangladeshi politicians have blamed people for irresponsible settlement, there simply are 
no settlement controls that influence their settlement decisions. As FAP-20 was an experimental 
programme, it put in several more dikes than strictly needed, failing to anticipate the 
overwhelming need for space to live and till the land like before. Flood embankments claimed 
land used for dwellings, arable farming and cattle raising, which in Bangladesh is mainly done by 
women. The need for space was most clearly expressed in individual and collective erosion and 
‗public cuts‘ of dikes and clogging of drainage channels with new constructions.  
While in Bangladesh people enjoy very few degrees of freedom in terms of location and 
livelihood, the Europeans in our case studies mostly accept risk because they can afford it 
(Loucks, 2006). Unlike Bangladesh, environmental ‗bads‘ are not badly distributed in the 
Netherlands, that is, socio-economic groups are equally exposed to risk. But by contrast, 
environmental ‗goods‘ are: If you can afford it, you can procure amenities not open to others, 
such as living on a scenic location by the water (interview Bressers, October, 2007). Those who 
wish to settle in the flood plain in the Netherlands are not vulnerable, but privileged. 
  
Just like a smokestack used to be a source of progress in ‘60s Europe, an embankment in front 
of your house can be a source of social prestige in Bangladesh. In the European cases however 
nobody wanted an embankment in sight. The designation of the Ooij for controlled flooding was 
opposed, among other reasons, because it would make the region unsuitable for investment and 
cause property prices to fall. This meant that while demand for flood management intervention is 
voiced by property owners, opposition also comes from other property owners.  
The phrase ‗opportunitisation‘ (Warner, 2004a) may denote that, just like threats to survival, a 
development opportunity that seems too good to be true can bring actors to break away from 
normal rules and disregard rights. The pressure to develop the flood plain (or in Egypt the desert) 
is great and government-supported with a view to the overriding need for space for housing. 
Social and economic interest can override environmental and safety concerns. This can be done 
by state actors, but also by actors in society. In the Netherlands, the first step in de-constraining 
the river was a ban on flood plain development in 1995. But in Limburg I heard at least one story 
of emergency structures planners colluding with developers, moving a dike back further than 
planned to save more land for development   
In Britain, since 1947 river managers have been pressing for planning guidelines to ´make 
people behave‘ better. Each flood has spawned a call from the river manager for planning 
controls, but has been overruled by housing pressures (and economic opportunities) on the flood 
plain, accommodated by a persistently permissive flood plain development regime resented by 
the Environment Agency. 
In Britain, this is different in metropolitans and London and between regions, but in 
Maidenhead the most flood-affected people court risk because they can afford to (interview, 
Winchester, 1999). This means risk accepting behaviour and opposition to flood schemes. In 
Southeast England, local authorities and developers find ways to ignore or outwit planning 
regulations. There, and in Limburg local authorities have thus deliberately, if selectively, opened 
up the flood plain and allow building in low-lying polders, requiring citizens, civil society and 
local authorities to arrange security for the new dwellers. 
 
 
9.5.2 POLITICISATION  IN A SECURITISED CONTEXT? 
 
Political closure is achieved through invoking threats to national security and declaring a state of 
emergency, which has been in place since 1981 in Egypt and 1984 in Turkey. This makes every 
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aspect of life a possible security issue. Since water is a strategic good for both countries, both 
Ilısu and Toshka river management projects were proclaimed ‗national projects‘. This makes 
opposition potentially considered treasonous and basin conflict potentially violent. 
In Buzan et al.‘s understanding of politicisation, an issue becomes subject to public debate and 
government takes responsibility for it (1998: 28). Domestically, political debate, even protest, is 
difficult to stage in a context where not only the project but all of society is securitised. Under the 
state of exception, rulers rely on the military and external protectors. But even authoritarian 
(totalitarian) states need to legitimise the state of exception they have imposed. Mega-projects 
may seek to procure this legitimacy. Wilkinson (2007) has noted that it is hard to ‗speak security‘ 
in securitised environments. To start a debate in a securitised context, one has to make sure not 
to set oneself apart from the state‘s values. Does this hold for the two Middle East countries, 
Egypt and Turkey? 
  
Egypt and Turkey are multi-party democracies, but organised orthodox Islamic opposition is 
outlawed, and identity based political action faces soft (Egypt) or hard (Turkey) repression.  
Domestically, out of the six cases, Egypt seems the most ‗closed‘ on the political and technical 
continuum. The Egyptian press is infrastructurally controlled and public protest is not allowed. 
But even in the heavily securitised Egyptian environment, opposition Members of Parliament 
could seize on the downside of the river projects (corruption, favouritism, mismanagement). In 
Egypt, the expensive capture of excess floodwater gave critics a symbol to lambast another state 
projects as ‗white elephants‘. Despite the ruling National Democratic Party‘s firm grip on political 
life, it proved possible for opposition parties and scientists to expose what they see as a chimera, 
and despite the control of the press, the debate was reported in Egypt‘s biggest newspaper. 
While domestic opposition could not make a strong stand in Turkey, an international coalition 
effectively politicised the issue. An oppositional international NGO coalition instigated a 
redefinition of hitherto ill-considered aspects of the project, notably the fate of adversely affected 
groups. The flooding of Hasankeyf gave opponents a dramatic image to latch on to and sharpen 
conditionality for bilateral loans. Export credit guarantees for the foreign contractors depended 
on donor state approval, so the INGO coalition targeted Export Credit Agencies (ECAs). When 
guarantors withdrew one by one, the Ilısu dam looked doomed. 
 
 
9.5.3 COUNTERSECURITISING MOVES – COUNTERSECURITISED VALUES 
 
The way flood risk is managed can bring (unwanted) changes and create new risks. If a local 
community or NGO sees projects as threats to existential values, they may defend themselves 
against the project. Like states, they claim ‗a right to use whatever means are necessary to block a 
threatening development‘ (Buzan et al. 1998: 21). This brings a different form of the ‗defence (or 
security) dilemma‘ we encountered in Chapter 4: the presumably well-intentioned flood defence 
efforts is framed by particular stakeholders as a vital threat, leading to mutual antagonism and, 
potentially, escalation, especially if they do not keep communication channels open.  
In a securitised state, water projects are almost automatically securitised, but it is clear from 
interviews and project literature that flood managers in all non-securitised context also presumed 
that their intervention would be welcomed as a common interest. The national security interest was 
considered good enough reason not to discuss flood policy with local citizens in Ilısu and 
Toshka, but also, initially, the Ooij polder and Tangail. Initiators were happy to advertise the 
project, but not to open discussion that might call the project into question. In each case, 
however, the ‗selling‘ approach opted for was not as successful as hoped for and in the Dutch, 
Turkish and Bangladeshi cases ran up against a successful counter-information campaign. 
The Bangladesh project triggered unease with their region being used as a guinea pig area for 
an untested technology developed by Westerners fanned protests against the project. Several 
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NGOs feared for local livelihoods being threatened by Green Revolution technologies 
introduced through FAP. An apparent BWDB indifference to the outcome of the consultation 
exercise failed to induce trust in the project or its initiators in an already antagonistic setting. This 
made the flood scheme a human rights issue in the non-European schemes while in Europe, 
cultural and landscape/natural values were securitised as at risk and untouchable. 
All projects were pictured as at threat to the environment. (Note that in Britain, ‗the 
environment‘ is also taken to include people‘s properties.) The river engineering projects in the 
Netherlands and England were a response to earlier environmental protest, claiming hard 
defences destroyed natural and landscape values, such as tree lines. ‗Nature development‗ was 
presented as an economic compromise between security and environmentally sustainable 
engineering, with more natural banks, wetlands and Scottish cattle. But local protesters resisted 
developed nature, as they liked their more manicured cultural landscape just fine. Moreover the 
modality to keep the project economic, gravelling, would bring nuisance and ugly pit holes and 
disturb peace and quiet. In Britain cultural heritage included the untouchability of Windsor and 
Eton and Agar‘s Plough (an archaeological site). 
 
In Britain, the Jubilee channel was framed within an overarching city vs. countryside 
antagonism. Before the 2003 flood arrived, neighbouring parishes felt their peace and quiet, 
landscape and safety was sacrificed for Maidenhead, pictured as a commuter town for media 
types. The ‗uninteresting‘ label the Environment Agency put on the Maidenhead area to 
legitimise its environmental enhancement in planning the channel was challenged by cultural 
heritage and landscape values defended by local stakeholders. They perceived the intervention as 
an (urban, centralizing) intrusion of their territory and heritage values that do not need improving 
or sacrificing. 
In each case, a peripheral area felt the need to defend its cultural integrity to an intervention. 
(I)NGOs and citizen platforms presented themselves as the defenders of this integrity. Citizens 
rejected their government‘s developmental ambitions with local water and space – feeling that 
neither their landscape nor their culture needed developing. 
Health featured in both European and non-European cases. Stagnant water attracts parasites 
that bring diseases. Water storage projects in Bangladesh, Egypt and Turkey were feared to 
promote the spread of kala-azar, malaria and bilharzia. Even in the temperate zone, on the Maas, 
a citizen worried about malaria but could be assured. But this was not what rallied opponents 
into a discourse coalition opening up a conflict frame. 
 
 
TABLE 9.3 Countersecuritised values overlap sectors  
 Environmental Economic  values Socio-cultural rights Human rights  Political/military 
security 
Threat Degradation of 
landscape and 
natural values 
Destruction of 
ecosystems 
Resettlement Safety War 
Threat to livelihoods Cultural assimilation threat to identity 
Housing prices  Health  
 
 
The countersecuritised values are summarised in Table 9.3. Like securitisation, 
countersecuritisation has to resonate with its intended audience. It does not have to be followed 
up by extreme measures: threats and mobilisation can be enough to make the project initiator 
think twice, or to convince one‘s constituency that one has the eye on the ball.  
Intense public debate (politicisation) is enough to signal the crumbling of a once successful 
securitising move. Politicisation in the sense of deliberation was expressed in Parliamentary 
questions and political lobbying. Non-politicised negotiation won local stakeholders many 
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placating concessions from project management. However, instead of debate, several conflicts 
escalated with minimum communication between the warring sides. 
In all politicised cases, the discourse of crisis and catastrophe, survival and destruction 
resonated in the opponents´ discourse. We may call this ´countersecuritisation´ on behalf of civil 
society or other states. 
Countersecuritising moves counter discursive closure with counter-closure, defending non-
negotiable values against intervention. This polarisation triggers a threat-defence sequence quite 
similar to (attempted) securitisation, legitimising conflict, disobedience and, in the case of Turkey, 
violence. 
 
Undercutting assumptions: Alliances with the epistemic community  
While fighting the values, protesters also sought to cast doubt on the knowledge supporting 
the projects. They co-opted or hired consultants in the expert community that doubted flood 
scenarios, showed up uncertainties, or provided alternatives. This had the additional strategic 
advantage of enlisting peers of initiating experts being able to speak the discourse of the initiators 
(x or non-x) rather than bringing local knowledge to bear (y-language).  
‗Blue engineering‘ initiatives were confronted by ‗green engineers‘ while in Europe green 
engineering initiatives rather than intimate local knowledge of the flood (rat counts, bird flights). 
In Bangladesh however the indigenous modes of land use and vulnerability reduction received 
increasing attention in the academic community in the course of FAP-20. In Turkey and Egypt, 
cultural heritage conservation issues rather than indigenous modes of water management 
attracted national and international academic interest. 
Countervailing arguments were staged in settings for ‗speaking truth to power‘ familiar to 
project leaders and policy-makers: technical seminars, journal articles, Letters to the Editor in 
respected newspapers while at the same time, much more antagonistic civil protest grew in the 
streets and town halls. The next Section will analyse how the conflicts over river interventions 
escalated. 
 
 
9.5.4 CONFLICTS AND COALITIONS 
 
It is well known that an external enemy welds together a ‗community of friends‘ inside the fences. 
A common enemy created a sense of community where there was none before, or where it was 
fragmented (see in this context also Harries and Borrows, 2006).  
People may see the flood or the project as a threat to their way of life, but the fear of a flood 
threat or outrage over its realisation can also create a ‗defining Other‘ (Ignatieff, 1993) where no 
clear community identity was visible before. a striking common element emerging in the case 
studies is an aversion to the river management project as a ‗foreign body‘. The reinforcement and 
escalation of antagonism over flood protection can be for reasons largely unrelated to the project 
as such. 
The transition to democracy at the turn of the 1990s exposed the Bangladesh project to 
successful politicisation from a coalition of Bangladeshi and international NGOs. The way radical 
NGO campaigns are organised may bear a surprising resemblance to military mobilisation 
(Szerszynski, 2002: 55). In the desecuritised policy context of Bangladesh, England and the 
Netherlands, opponents took the form of local public protest and a sophisticated information and 
lobbying campaign.  
In each of those cases, opponents successfully mobilised the press and/or the political sector, 
and found a receptive constituency for their protests. 
 
It takes two to turn a clash of interests into an open conflict. In Turkey and Bangladesh the 
government and donors pictured the opposition to projects as a threat (anti-development, against 
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national security). A (piecemeal) ‗logic of equivalence‘ built a common ground, a discourse 
coalition between actors that would not normally find themselves on the same side.  
The anti-globalists enlisted a World Bank consultant to write a critical dam resettlement report, 
the Kurdish Human Rights Project worked with archaeologists over cultural heritage, while the 
threats of Iraq and Syria against dam funders underscored the anti-Ilısu NGO coalition‘s point 
that the project would lead to war rather than peace. In Britain, Turkey and the Netherlands, 
local authorities acted in tandem, if not always in perfect harmony, with the citizen platforms. 
Bangladeshi NGOs had rarely taken an interest in water issues before, but found a common 
cause to tackle not just state but international interventionism, focusing especially on the Green 
Revolution technology introduced in the region through FAP. As a result the project started with 
a standoff between ´ignorant sociologists´ and ´corrupt engineers who don‘t listen´. Male 
engineers were confronted by angry women in street protests in Tangail and Dhaka. The images 
were sent over to the Netherlands just in time to influence the parliamentary debate over FAP in 
the Netherlands. The World Bank in turn labelled the opposition ´anti-development´. 
 
In Limburg, a logic of equivalence supported the conflict frame equating the Maaswerken with 
the greed of gravellers, the insensitivity of Delft engineers, the colonisation of Limburg by 
Holland, the wasteful project management and environmental pollution, the unfairness of 
´desecuritising the Maas´ and the ‗purple‗ provincial and national authorities against a Catholic 
(Christian-democratic) political identity of civil society in the South Netherlands.434 From the 
point of view of the Westerners, Limburg remained tainted with the brush of corruption and 
opportunism. 
The citizen platform on the Maas, BOM, made alliances with Belgian gravellers to invoke 
European antitrust and environmental legislation to challenge the handling of aggregates, crucial 
to the financial viability of the project. This held back the project for a year. 
 
Such antagonism is not evident from the Ooij case, which however did have a history of 
resistance to intervention, both expansionism from neighbouring Nijmegen and dike 
reinforcement works initiated by the water board backed by the Public Works Department. 
When the Ooij platform failed to get a hearing, it declared war on the Vice Minister and her 
department. The feeling of acute distrust was apparently mutual: in the Ooij issue, an internal 
memo we retrieved suggests the Public Works department similarly divided the stakeholder 
community on controlled flood storage into friends and enemies. 
In both cases (if at very different scales and intensities) both protests were framed in terms of 
‗war‘ and ‗struggle‘. 
 
 
9.5.5 THE CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE OF FELICITY WITH FUNDERS 
 
So far, I have discussed the role of civil society and co-opted experts to trip a project up  One 
actor has been underexposed: the project funder. It appears that the role of the funder is crucial.  
Apart from a regimented organisation and information campaign, the success of opposition 
can be ascribed to their targeting of the project funder. Donor compliance can make or break the 
project, and impose conditionalities. There are limits to anyone‘s blank cheque - the initiator of 
the case studies was never able to completely self-fund the flood project, it depended on the 
donor‘s values and assessment of the merits of the proposal.  
The elasticity of budgets can be said to be a measure of the felicity of securitising the flood. 
Once the money runs out, funding becomes a test of the resolve of the government to continue 
spending whatever it takes to protect the country. When successfully legitimised (securitised), 
they may be pursued even at crippling cost - ‗money is no object‘.  
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It would not be immediately obvious that funding so often was to prove an Achilles heel for the 
project. A new, experimental megaproject is unlikely to have a good cost-benefit ratio. Large 
infrastructural development projects are seldom economic and invariably turn out to be far more 
expensive than budgeted for. A Maaswerken project leader only half-jokingly assessed normal 
budget overruns at a factor π (= 3.1415..) (Interview, 2000). This should not be fatal to successful 
‗opportunitisation‘, as repetition of the technology is expected to reap economies of scale and 
indirect benefits, including political prestige and technical reputation. In both the Thames and 
Brahmaputra projects, the idea was to select a relatively ´safe´ project in terms of acceptable cost-
benefit ratio and low risk of failure, with a view to replication elsewhere on the river. Both 
technical setbacks and protests put paid to that expectation, so that the logic of a series of 
channels (Thames) and compartmentalised polders (Brahmaputra) did not materialise and 
adjoining areas remained unprotected. 
 
The Netherlands securitized rivers and Egypt‘s securitized political sector might be expected to 
have saved such projects despite the cost. When the Dutch Delta Works sea defences were 
planned in the Netherlands, the decision was made first – the cost-benefit analysis could come 
later (Smits et al., 2005). The Netherlands currently spends about 1% of its state budget on flood 
defence, so that budget overruns would not put the Treasury under stress the way it did in Egypt 
and Turkey. Still cost turned out to be an insurmountable financial constraint in the Maaswerken 
negotiations. The cost issue was deferred until the end of negotiations. This procrastination 
however may have been a strategic mistake, as with the passing of time and no repetition of the 
event, the momentum provided by the flood window was faltering while the cost spiralled, cost 
recovery was a self-imposed inviolable bottom line. Peripheral Limburg relied on core ‗Holland‘ 
for its funding. The Maaskaden (emergency flood defences) episode aligned with national 
emergency legislation. After 1997 the two sides, despite being project partners, did not see eye to 
eye over the ‗security-ness‘ of river management on the Maas. When the local authorities of 
Limburg presented the Maaswerken as a security initiative, they ran up against a veto from the 
Public Works department, who refused to disburse emergency money in 1997. Five years later, 
the Maas director had to leave, in part over the excessive administrative costs he was running. 
 
In Britain river schemes had never been very large, and the overall cost of the Maidenhead 
project (GBP110 million and counting) has been much criticized by local stakeholders. MAFF 
had the power to decide the fate of the EA by insisting on cost-benefit criteria and eligibility 
criteria, especially a positive cost-benefit ratio, for the crucial 15% grant in aid. 
 
In two cases the financial aspect appears to have been an ex-post legitimation so as not to fund 
or continue the project. 
In the Ooij, the securitiser had seemingly allocated the money to carry out the plan. The 
chairman of the platform did not win by questioning the morality, how the government who is 
supposed to protect its citizens could propose to take a 1 in 1250 risk of drowning them, even if 
to save others. They won the battle when they located a report saying the project was not viable 
in cost/benefit terms, a point specifically singled out by the Vice-Minister when she announced 
shelving controlled flood storage. 
Unlike the Netherlands, there was a serious national (rather than project-level) rather than self-
imposed cash crisis to contemplate in Turkey and Egypt. This financial pinch opened a window 
for an ad hoc discourse coalition of co-riparians, NGOs and eventually parliamentarians in Turkey 
and national political parties and press in Egypt to target the project‘s lifeline: money. 
To sustain disproportional outlay, a powerful donor is required who will keep furnishing 
money without strings attached. There appears to be heavy overlay between different layers of 
the ‗cake‘, between donors and recipients, core and periphery. A complicating factor for 
successful securitisation in both the Dutch, Bangladeshi and Turkish case studies, then, is that the 
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decision to securitise water is embedded in regimes at other scales, in which different rules may 
apply. The links brought in powerful ‗audiences‘ that do not necessarily respond as hoped for, 
reducing the felicity of security mode for the river management project. 
When these are aligned, it can help the states in legitimising their choices: an internationally 
hegemonic securitisation, the ‗war on terror‘, justified local anti-terrorism measures (Turkey vs. 
PKK), international outrage over flooding justified large investments in the Flood Action Plan. 
But when the two spheres are moving out of sync, things look differently. 
If the international context is not securitised non-emergency rules of competition and 
accountability apply on the international scene. But they proved rather elastic, given the need for 
donors to boast successful projects, and can use them to improve their position.. 
 
The Turkey and Bangladesh projects had to parry the overlay of donors, who support the 
flood management effort but attached ability conditions to their support.  
In the Bangladeshi projects, global outrage with the human toll of destructive floods 
legitimised an all-out effort to control the flood. The French proposed a control approach 
despite NGOs pointing out that both Dutch and local engineers had concluded the river will not 
be tamed. But flood control proposals were not accepted by the key donors, the USAID and 
UNDP. The US Corps of Engineers had discarded the control option decades ago. They opted 
instead for controlled flooding and flood proofing. Donors also attached ‗good governance‘ 
strings such as participation and a decent Internal Rate of Return. The economic rate of return 
(EIRR) however only appeared as a criterion in the evaluation after the project was closed. The 
Dutch Minister for Development Cooperation had allocated EUR 7 million extra in 1994 despite 
a negative report from his inspection on economic merits. It appears that other donors had 
stronger concerns about financial viability than the Dutch, whose prestige as water experts was 
also at stake. 
In the Turkish case, donors made export guarantees conditional on environmental and social 
conditions, such as an improved resettlement plan. International overlay splits the country in two 
(after Jacoby, 2005): there continues to be a schizophrenic tension between a securitised, 
peripheral Southeast concerned with military and economic control and the Kurds in Northern 
Iraq as closest concern, and a desecuritised, semi-democratised westernised centre (West Turkey) 
with European aspirations as an attractor435, which enables it to impose principles of ‗good 
governance‘ such as human rights and a de-emphasis of the Turkish army (Diez, 2000) 436. 
In Egypt, the national funding crisis can be expected to reduce the size of the frankly illusory 
Toshka project. But the Egyptians were in a better position to isolate themselves from the 
international overlay. They have indefinitely delayed the next phases of project rather than 
depend on the outside world for the project‘s projected $90 billion budget. As there is no 
dramatic media-friendly focus of environmental or cultural damage either. This keeps the debate 
largely outside the scope of NGO and international critics. 
 
 
9.5.6 OUTCOME OF SECURITISATION, NONSECURITISATION AND 
 COUNTERSECURITISATION 
 
All schemes under scrutiny here became subject to some securitising moves, but closure due to the 
flood itself was only pronounced in the Netherlands. All schemes also became subject to 
politicisation, despite three projects starting in a securitised political context, and attempts to 
include a degree of participation in the remaining projects. It was to be expected that the 
‗induced‘ inundation of Ilısu would elicit contest. But when I started the research project in 1998-
9, I did not expect all schemes to get into trouble. By repoliticising flood policy, these claims also 
reopened the ´flood gates‘, i.e. undoing the closure to alternatives, compromises or even 
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discontinuation of the project. The outcome in each case (except that the ‗jury is still out‘ on 
Egypt) was for initiators to change, delay, shelve or prevent follow-up of the project or policy. 
The security claims against the projects had an impact that may have surprised even its 
enunciators. The controversy over Ilısu hit the international press at a time when Turkish 
relations with both Syria, Iraq and the Kurdish population were improving. The claim that FAP-
20 would create a dust bowl, has not been borne out in practice.437  
In Bangladesh, the Netherlands and UK, the confrontation with opponents at national and 
international level meant the reformulations of the project and placating concessions, making the 
project more in line with ‗living with the flood‘ concepts. The success the antagonists of the 
project managed to reap ranged from the shelving of the policy (Ooij), to the abortion of plans 
for replication (Bangladesh). Moreover, it secured the opponents a place at the table in future 
planning (co-optation). 
Yet, despite the success of both nonsecuritising moves and countersecuritising protests, the 
projects did not disappear. The modalities of handling cultural and social concerns due to the 
Ilısu dam, may have been modified, but the dam and its reservoir are under construction as 
intended. Political and scientific misgivings have not changed Egypt‘s determination on 
colonising the Western Desert. Compartmentalisation was not immediately replicated, but found 
its way into later Asian Development bank projects in Bangladesh. Controlled flood storage was 
shelved for the Ooij polder but its necessity appears in several recent reports from national 
planning councils (Pols et al., 2007, VROM-raad, 2007) on the future of Dutch water 
management. The Maaswerken got new management and started work in 2005 and the Jubilee 
River has been repaired. While it is fair to conclude on the basis of the six cases that politicisation 
is inevitable, it is equally valid to note that once started, projects are unstoppable, whether 
securitised or not. The dogs barked, some bit, but the caravan moved on. 
 
 
TABLE 9.4  Outcome of politicisation for project  
Case 
study 
Hege-
monic 
actor 
Project 
initiator 
Artefact Securitised 
context 
Project 
legitimisation 
Opposition 
(discursive 
alliance) 
Effect 
on 
project 
Egypt President President Channel, 
irrigations 
scheme, new 
city, airport 
etc. 
State of 
emergency 
Development, 
population 
pressure 
Experts, 
domestic 
political parties 
(Silence) 
Turkey DSI DSI HEPP dam State of 
emergency 
Development, 
terrorism 
International & 
domestic NGOs 
Delay, 
restart 
Bangla-
desh 
BWDB Donor FCD/I 
scheme 
Dictatorship, 
flood 
aftermath 
Safety, food 
security 
International & 
domestic NGOs 
No 
follow-
up after 
project 
end 
UK MAFF EA Channel, 
part natural 
banks, part 
concreted 
- Safety, nature Parish councils, 
county council 
Second 
channel 
NL-Maas RWS Province of 
Limburg 
kaden, 
widening, 
deepening 
Flood 
aftermath 
Safety, nature, 
shipping 
Citizen platform, 
NGO 
Delay, 
restart  
NL-Ooij RWS RWS structures 
and 
sluicegates 
Flood 
scenarios 
Safety downstream Citizen platform, 
experts 
Shelved 
 
 
The hypothesis proposed in Chapter 1 assumed securitisation to be the norm. This turned out 
to be false: it appears from the analysis that the securitised and desecuritised ‗spheres‘ are 
connected by spatial and temporal links, influence each other and to a degree depend on each 
other. This brings in a contextual understanding of how projects relate with the felicity of moves 
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for closure: while a flood helps a project, protest hurts when it finds the funders‘ ear. The overlay 
of hegemonic de-securitisation, emphasising choice and rights, appears to defeat local 
securitisation necessity and exception. These links between the securitised locality/episode and 
desecuritised overlay invite the question what ‗peacetime‘ decision-making on security issues 
looks like. As this is not a well-theorised area in security studies, we will recall the precepts of 
´peace logic´ and draw parallels with security when making ‗peace with the river‘. After 
elaborating on this logic, we shall look into the politicisation of the ‗peace logic‘. 
 
 
9.6 PEACE WITH THE RIVER: THE CHALLENGES OF RIVER 
DESECURITISATION 
 
European water management has recently been witnessing a notable discursive shift from 
structural flood defence to a ´risk approach´ and ´Room for the River´ initiatives. The river is not 
frightening, it is now promoted as ´fun´ in European projects such as Freude am Fluss. Since the 
above has shown that even in securitised contexts attempted securitisations were compromised, it 
is all the more relevant to take a closer look at the constitution of desecuritised water 
management. Chapter 4 we encountered a parallel shift from ´water wars‘ (securitised) to ‗water 
peace‘ (desecuritised water management. That chapter considered what it means if water is not 
expected to lead to war. Below it is assumed that the same obtains for the desecuritisation (‗de-
disasterisation‘) of high-water events. 
If water is no longer considered an emergency issue by the key players, we would expect a 
situation where ‗closures‘ are opened up: the state is no longer automatically the lead security 
actor, rights and freedoms cannot be shored up for the common good, acceptance of sacrifices is 
not self-evident. I will discuss each of those in the context of the case studies. It will appear that 
not only Bangladesh, Turkey and Egypt had trouble integrating these principles but also the 
Netherlands and Britain. 
 
 
1. Reflexive desecuritisation of the river 
The current state of the art in disaster studies recognises that the way society is organised 
produces hazard in a complex interplay of natural and social forces (Parker, 2000, Hilhorst, 
2003). This emerging ‗holistic‘ paradigm (Green and Warner 1999) sees hazard as mutuality, 
arising ‗as a result of the social, economic and political order, which is transmitted through 
natural and semi-natural processes‘. They are a function of the 'normal workings of society' 
(Parker, 2000). The way we control nature to handle water thus adds to our own vulnerability to 
floods. Unwise land use impedes runoff while dikes displace risk, increasing rather than 
decreasing vulnerability by raising dikes (Disco, 2002).   
This ‗internalises‘ agency in risks that were previously attributed to external agents ‗Reflexive 
modernisation‘ (Beck, 1992) suggests a smooth, anonymous process of ‗adaptation‘ and 
‗adjustment‘. It appears however that it was the politicisation of a closed security frame that 
brought different risk (security) conceptions to the table. In the 1970s and 1980s it became 
evident over the loss of cultural and environmental values due to flood defence led to the 
politicisation of sea and river defences, which in turn led to a national consultative commission 
proposing lower risk standards, green diking and alternatives to diking. Treating water as a friend, 
giving it space, and using ‗green‘ technology for natural embankments as practiced in the UK and 
the Netherlands, means to accept certain self-organising, ‗chaotic‘ aspects of the river. 
 
The newly acceptable freedom for the river is relative: it allows a greater degree of uncertainty, 
but within discrete limits. This became clear when the environmentalists initially advocated the 
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‗ecological flooding‘ of polders in the Rhine basin. A flood is a great opportunity for 
environmental restoration.   
When the Ooij polder was slated for flood storage, Gelderland‘s provincial environmentalist 
umbrella advocated un-controlled flooding. But the local chapter changed their minds about this ‗let 
it flood‘ alternative when protests to uncontrolled flooding in the Ooij grew louder and their own 
houses would be affected. Total liberation of the river can rejuvenate natural systems, but also 
has the potential to necessitate destructive social adaptation. Even advocates of ‗living with the 
flood‘ will accept the flood only up to a point.  
More flexibility does not detract from the fact claims that Dutch engineers are still unprepared 
to accommodate a river‘s inherent instability and spontaneous vegetation (roughness). We do not 
like the river to take any space it likes. Man remains in control of the river (van Hemert, 1999). 
 
Another limit to river management is the realisation that a rule or artefact that promises 
collective safety can invite unsafe behaviour. The safest dikes attract investment and settlement 
behind that dike, in spite of the residual risk of a breach which will then wreak more havoc in 
areas lulled into a false sense of security. The sea dikes protecting the West of the Netherlands 
are an extreme of this: it continues to predominant in terms of lives, assets and vital 
infrastructure, but has no evacuation plan. Both in Limburg and Maidenhead, building defence 
structures legitimised and protected further construction in areas that previously had been set 
aside. This leads to the ´control paradox´: a lock-in situation, where you seek to improve the 
safety of a system but end up more vulnerable people as people feel safe and take more risks 
(Immink, 2007). 
In the Dutch river areas the tendency has been to restore a liberal settlement policy on the 
river subject to public-private provision of safety measures. The already tolerated municipal 
leniency toward floodplain development in Limburg was sustained and vindicated when, after a 
10-year moratorium, the Dutch lifted the ban on flood plain development in 2005 allowing 
innovative building in floodplains. Freeing up 15 locations – institutionalizing risk acceptance – 
the Netherlands has replaced a ban on developing the flood plain by a bet on ‗spatial quality‘. 
Riverside land traditionally was a neglected area, a kind of wasteland. Making the riverside prettier 
by improving natural values could also attract investment to pay for beautification interventions. 
 
Positive shocks and adaptation to stress? 
The ‗water peace‘ narrative also evidences a belief in the salutary effect of (impending) crisis, 
which forces reflexivity and adaptivity to ‗resource stress‘ and climate change. The theory of 
punctuated equilibrium in ecology, on which Baumgartner and Jones (1991) draw, points at the 
positive role of systemic shocks in changing the status quo (Gould and Eldredge, 1977). In the 
‗water peace‘ discourse, a system as a whole adapts – the whole transforms to a new ‗steady state‘, 
more diversified, more scarcity conscious.  
 
As we shall see in the third and fourth subsections, the reflexive turn involves participatory 
´feedback´ mechanisms that might democratise decisions impacting on security, with the 
potential to compensating and sharing the sacrifice. The fifth, on the other hand, introduces a 
´vulnerability´ approach, alerting us to structural causes of risk differentiation and resulting limits 
to freedom for river and people,  
 
2. Reframing security as risk 
The realisation that the river cannot always be controlled is hard to take for control-oriented 
engineers. Yet, the Mississippi flood of 1994 in the USA, the failure of the Brahmaputra right 
bank embankment in Bangladesh and the high-water events of 1993 and 1995 in the Netherlands 
made it clear that there is always a possibility that the unthinkable flood can still happen despite 
the defences. The reflexive turn alluded to in Ch. 4 drove home the insight that human 
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interventions may precipitate rather than reduce risk. A sense of ‗ungovernability‘ and 
‗governance failures‘ became a focus of attention for a while in the late 1990s (e.g. Stoker, 1998). 
To overcome the defeatism, a re-labelling of problems has been notable in the environmental 
sector. Security is now known as risk (Giddens, 1999). A focus on risk means conceding defeat 
every now and then, but if well-prepared, risk does not have to have overwhelming 
consequences. In the past decade, the Netherlands has seen a clear shift from security, defined as 
the strength of the dikes, to the management of ‗residual risk‘, which focuses on the impact of 
flood event on the territory behind the dikes as well as undiked floodplain.  
Research into uncertainty has been going on since 1995 within the Public Works department‘s 
research institute RIZA. But uncertainty proves politically unpalatable, it makes politicians and 
citizens feel insecure and engineers look incompetent (RIZA researcher interview, 2005). This 
appears to be no different in the UK, if we recall the Taplow parish councillor‘s outrage to 
discover that the flood would not be fully and indefinitely contained by the Jubilee Channel. 
In the Netherlands, a redefinition of uncertainty in protection as ‗failure factors‘ sounds like 
certain knowledge, and is thus acceptable (interview, Silva, 2005). Currently the European 
Interreg programme funds the Freude am Fluss project (enjoyment of, or by, the river): living with 
the river rather than being afraid of the river. While the environmental trend was continued with 
the Space for the River approach, it was attempted to also make ‘Space for people‘. The below 
will discuss the consequences of this philosophy in more detail. 
 
3. Regime space for people? New actors in river governance:  [ Security co-production - Co-optation or 
cooperation ] 
While the river is constrained by dikes and channels, many can afford to ignore the challenge 
and leave it to the experts. Development controls reduce freedoms, but bring no responsibilities. 
A risk approach however requires the co-operation of many interdependent stakeholders. The 
switch to the risk approach seen in the European countries and for all practical purposes, 
Bangladesh, necessarily calls on civil-society compliance and co-operation more than a hazard 
approach, whether enforced through coercion or spontaneous coordination. 
A challenge for water managers is to get the same things done under the peace logic of 
desecuritisation as you can do under securitisation. Being unafraid of the river is not necessarily 
reflected in the state being unafraid of people and people being unafraid of the state. To provide 
security river managers now have to clear a host of hurdles like cost-benefit analysis, openness, 
accountability, deliberation and development pressures.  
 
A desecuritised approach to perceived dangers either means toleration of the threat or 
managing securitised issues in a non-securitised ways, resisting them without violating normal 
rights and rules (Roe, 2004: 285). Non-state actors are expected to take direct responsibility for 
security provision, by (increasing coping capacity) or required to avoid aggravating the problem 
(reducing challenge).  
The transformation from securitised to desecuritised decision-making brings a new political 
arrangement or arena (Huysmans, 2002) with particular governance challenges. This arena 
transformation could, in principle, mean the emancipation of marginalised actors (Aradau, 2001) 
and democratisation of process.438 
 
The trend under liberal Dutch Water Ministers not to treat the river as an enemy anymore has 
important consequences for the division of responsibilities. In the Netherlands, for example, 
protests against dike reinforcement had not only involved protest against vertical flood defence 
structures in the horizontal landscape, they also sided against technocratic, authoritarian 
interventions (van Hemert, 1999). Collaborative planning (Healry 1997) promises better checks 
and balances, a balance of power that can act as a brake on ill-conceived projects and stimulate 
creativity (Wolsink 2003). 
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Since 2003 the Public Works department, together with the water boards, officially does not 
guarantee 100% security. But who will take care of security now? As we saw, other actors in 
spatial planning are not necessarily willing to prioritise water security in their dealing and to 
relieve the Ministry of some responsibility. To avoid further free-riding on its protection services, 
the Dutch water department was willing to lift its 10-year ban on floodplain development for 
occupation on condition that a wider range of governance actors would take responsibilities in an 
Integrated Security Chain approach, from pro-action to rehabilitation. This means a horizontal 
(between national Ministries) as well as a vertical shift in sharing responsibilities (between national 
and local level). 
 
Allowing multiple actors to participate in risk management as well as dialogue on planning, 
without the project getting mired, is a major challenge of river desecuritisation for a river 
manager. If dikes can break, one needs non-structural measures to cushion the impact. This 
requires co-operation on the part of those behind the dikes. Minimising damages can involve the 
co-operation of businesses and residents, who may have to move or adapt their mansions and be 
prepared to act when the flood comes (dike teams), accept occasional nuisance, and offer and 
take insurance against unreasonable loss. Initiators in each of the case studies organised different 
forms of participation consulted them at markedly different steps of Arnstein‘s ladder, and co-
opting private and civil-society actors in implementation. 
Thus, realisation of the Maas works was conceived by the provincial government as a 
consortium formed with private (gravel industry) as well as NGO parties (Natuurmonumenten) to 
ensure a balance of social, environmental and economic sustainability. The course the 
negotiations took between 1998 and 2001 indicate that these criteria clearly did not carry the 
same weight, especially when cost-benefit analysis became a key criterion due to the non-
securitisation of the Maas. 
The trend towards desecuritisation of the river in the Netherlands increasingly confronts the 
water regime with a spatial planning regime in which water security is not the core concern but 
has to compete with other interests (Immink, 2007). Spatial planning in the Netherlands has seen 
a tendency from social engineering to multi-actor social learning and network co-ordination. In 
the expert community this created legitimacy for the involvement of social scientists next to 
natural scientists (Immink, 2007). Not everyone starts on an equal footing: since natural values 
rarely bring in the economic gain that real estate does, developers begin with a head start. Space 
for the River easily translates as space for developers (de Boer, interview). Thus, a desecuritised 
regime creates the very situation for the Netherlands that has marred the EA‘s ambition of 
effective flood defence in England. In Limburg, the insistence on budget neutrality meant that 
environmental concerns increasingly gave way to gravelling proceeds to make the project 
economically viable. Both gravellers and environmentalists at various points threatened to leave 
the consortium. But the gravel industry could, and did, hold the project in a double bind as an 
economic survival issue: their non-cooperation would kill the project, while the failure of the 
project, so they claimed, would kill the aggregates sector and create unemployment. The 
environmentalists did not have the same veto power when they drew a line in the sand arguing 
natural values were put at risk. 
 
4. Stakeholder Participation: „politicisation‟ without the politics? 
How about involving the project-affected stakeholders in decision-making? We can look at this 
in terms of who can participate and to which extent, and if it had an effect on the range of 
alternatives considered. 
It appears that while participatory structures are now experimented with in Turkey and Egypt, 
stakeholders had little or no influence on either project election or implementation. The next few 
paragraphs therefore will only discuss participation in Bangladesh, England and the Netherlands. 
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In the UK and Bangladesh flood schemes, project democratisation through public 
participation was part of the innovation, unprecedented in flood projects. Stakeholders were 
consulted about their preferences beforehand, while several NGOs were co-opted into the 
project preparation.  
In Great Britain, the debate over the need for the project was curtailed with references to the 
1947 floods. The publicised number of alternatives (492 !) is impressive, but the selection subject 
to strong NRA influence. The NRA commissioned research into a notable alternative on smaller-
scale flood proofing of neighbourhoods, which would have relied on much greater community 
awareness and involvement (Penning-Rowsell et al, 1989). The report remained unpublished and 
beyond competition. Institutional stakeholders did have more informal influence at the early 
stage when archaeology and historic values necessitated changing the routing of the channel. The 
subsequent public consultation rounds and subsequent public hearings in the 1990s led to many 
placating concessions in project implementation. 
Opponents however developed and tabled alternative relief channel options, notably Taplow 
Parish Council and the County Council of Buckinghamshire. In contrast with the Dutch 
alternatives, these alternatives consisted of different, mostly smaller versions of the same channel. 
All these new alternatives were, on the whole, rejected by the NRA. 
 
In Bangladesh, the auspices for public consultation were initially bad.439 The selection between 
the eight FAP reports took place under a securitised political (dictatorship) context, outside the 
public view440. 
The later changes to the FAP-20 project were not a result of new alternatives being brought in, 
but of risk assessment as well as public upheaval. Two out of the three original project sites were 
dismissed after a cool assessment of natural risk - the structures being at high risk of being 
washed away. Out of the four options originally developed for public consultation, technical 
option ´C´ for the Tangail site appears to have been ‗steamrolled‘ by the BWDB, over the 
objections of the Dutch side and, NGOs claim, those of the local population. 
The participatory exercise on alternatives for flood control was rushed through and its results 
ignored by the Bangladesh Water Development Board. However, after this troubled start the 
most far-reaching forms of participation of all schemes were tried by instituting a multi-
stakeholder platform (MSP) structure for managing the sluice gates. The compartmentalisation 
project sought to democratise the distribution of the ´residual risk´ from monsoon floods 
between stakeholders. The participation structure for FAP-20 was refined after the donors 
threatened to withdraw their support. The ‗poldering‘ set-up however ran up against scepticism 
on the part of Bangladeshi project leaders. It can also be said to ignore and therefore 
institutionalise a social system marred by patriarchal, violent social relations (van Betuw 2004). 
Local involvement was extended to the participatory implementation (construction and 
Operation and Maintenance) phase, with local groups actively building embankments, hoping the 
project would be self-managed after the project‘s closure. This might have been given a warmer 
welcome if the local stakeholders had felt they had had a say in it and a budget to secure 
continued Operation and maintenance after project end. 
On the Rhine, a range of intermediary organisations were involved in the selection process of 
areas suitable for controlled flooding. Organised regional civil society and private sector umbrella 
organisations were consulted in focus-group settings but not locally affected social and economic 
interests. While similar to the Bangladeshi projects, it was not deemed opportune to consult 
affected stakeholders in the Ooij polder. Despite several platform participants having been 
involved in earlier protest against dike reinforcement pre-1993, Ooij dwellers considered dike 
raising as a preferable alternative to controlled flooding. This was dismissed by the Public Works 
department as too expensive. Currently compartmentalisation is again considered as an option 
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By the time the decision on alternatives on the Maaswerken was to be made, the momentum 
of flood securitisation had likewise run out. The Maas project thus had to comply with a legal 
(EU-induced) obligation to provide and consult the public on several alternatives. The public was 
duly consulted for the Environmental Impact Analysis on the Maas on their preferred options. 
The Environment Impact Analysis was dismissed by the Dutch EIA evaluation commission for 
not considering some alternatives well enough. Time is money; and spiralling cost and economic 
strictures in the end forced a deviation from any of the previously proposed alternatives. This in 
turn led to the temporary departure of the environmentalist project partner from the project 
consortium and a severe dent in public confidence. After tough negotiations on project 
realisation, a variant outside these options was selected. When the project threatened to 
disintegrate, a range of stakeholders were consulted behind closed doors. Informal relations 
between stakeholders and provincial project initiators which had chilled after the Public Works 
department took over 1997, were revived in March 2001 to break the project impasse. When a 
local action group successfully invoked European antitrust regulation, the project was again 
delayed. The provincial government initiators recognised the need to communicate much better 
and established productive relation with BOM, the regional citizen platform. 
 
If we see public-initiated participation as an attempt to share control in process and outcome 
with stakeholders, all projects, then, prove definitely flawed. In each project, the initiators did not 
treat their project as a ‗wicked problem‘, but as a technical challenge that needed to be ‗sold‘ on 
stakeholders. In each case, however, the initiators framed the participatory process in a way that 
gave them a great deal of control, including the option of ignoring the outcome. The modality of 
public consultation chosen in each case presupposes a form of (participatory) negotiation that 
stripped participation of potential political edges. Both Bangladeshi and UK project initiators 
freely volunteered in interviews and writing (Gardiner, 1996) that theirs was a ‗selling‘ approach, 
while the Dutch project approach in practice displayed the same strategy. This type of 
participation assumes that sensible people will respond to reason and agree with each other when 
confronted with ‗the evidence‘. The role of sociologists in FAP-20 appeared to prepare the 
ground for the right message. 
In all flood management cases, the formal mode of participation offered was found wanting 
and too late in the process by some stakeholder groups. Directly affected stakeholder groups 
(local citizens in Hasankeyf and the Ooij polder) did not get a hearing: or chose to drop out of 
the (organised) participatory processes (Federatief Verband tegen Ontgrondingen in Limburg). Those 
can be expected to have brought in a rather different problem definition. The limited leverage the 
participants had made it attractive for stakeholder groups to opt out of the process, lobby 
influential decision-makers or attempt to cause a commotion in the press or donor community. 
Excluded actors and perspectives (reasoned they) could only find their way into the process 
through unplanned types of participation. ‘Participation‘ can also be understood in its ‗Longian‘ 
interpretation (Long, 2001): ‗participation‘ does not only capture social compliance with 
externally organised processes with invited participants, but also spontaneous social engagement 
with a view to influencing its outcomes: protest, contest, obstruction, deviance. 
But interestingly, various actors chose to co-operate and resist at the same time. This was 
encountered both in the international arena, on the Nile and Euphrates, where basin co-riparians 
were not consulted on the decision to build a mega-project on the river and predictably exerted 
pressure and threats at the political level. At the same time those same co-riparians participated in 
technical exchange and co-ordination meetings. In the other three projects, local groups likewise 
talked, formally or informally, with the project initiators while at the same time ‗participating‘ by 
engaging in protest or political and legal contest, often breaching the vow of confidentiality. The 
issue of openness of information and communication is elaborated in the next section. 
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Information and communication 
While securitised decision-making invites secrecy and manipulation, desecuritised decision-
making would be expected to be more transparent and accountable. An open exchange of 
information requires availability of project information in the audience‘s language with little 
trouble, in accessible language. In the cases under review, the degree of openness ranged from 
suppression of an EIA in Egypt and its delay in Bangladesh and Turkey, to a surfeit of 
information in the Maas and Thames projects. 
Information itself may be withheld or even classified (securitised) invoking national security. A 
plethora of reasons can lie beneath non-sharing of information, from a desire to monopolise 
strategic knowledge, a sense of vulnerability down to sheer embarrassment because the 
information is incomplete, ill understood, disorganised, or inaccessible (observations by Van der 
Schans and Verhallen, pers. comm., 2003) which can breed distrust and hostility. In Bangladesh, 
researchers and consultants complained that important findings were whitewashed or suppressed. 
This meant alternative perspectives were suppressed or massaged.   
Community platforms may be important as information brokers. Desecuritisation exposes a 
project to Right-to-know legislation (the Aarhus Convention: UN/ECE 1998, see Verhallen, 
2007, Blaikie et al., 1994), which gives affected parties information that helps them position 
themselves, if not always with an eye on the common good. The itinerary of the transparency of 
the Flood Action Plan for Bangladesh is especially intriguing: a progressive information 
desecuritisation/dis-closure process started out with no information in Bangladesh on FAP; then 
public reports of meetings with ever widening groups, followed by a plethora of English-language 
studies that however according to the interviewees were heavily edited. In the Ooij, the Platform 
managed to unearth a critical study underlying the advisory report on emergency flood storage, 
while in the Maas, the absence of the minutes of the closed-door meetings with stakeholders 
during 6 hectic months in 2001 to salvage the Maaswerken plan, meant culpability before the 
Council of State for unlawful secrecy – or more precisely negligence for lack of process 
documentation. 
When negotiations have to take place in a ‗glass house‘, this makes it harder to reach tentative 
agreements. Early divulgence of plans for a river planning project that will involve a change in 
land use, exposes project initiators to serious risks: it invites speculators to buy up land likely to 
be needed for the project, while early publication of ‗search areas‘ also has invariably given rise to 
vocal protests especially from farmers whose land may be project-affected. 
 
 
5. Norm differentiation 
The shift from hazard to risk in the Netherlands means that different standards can be applied 
to areas with different population and asset densities. The calculation of required safety per area 
now explicitly introduces cost-benefit considerations in risk management, which can lead to is so-
called ‗norm differentiation´. Economic calculus means that areas with the same probability bring 
a higher impact in an area with many economic assets. 
In the Netherlands, there always was an institutionalised difference between the level of 
protection between coast (1 in 10,000 year events), main river area (1 in 1250) and diked Limburg 
(1 in 250). The best protected areas are those where most economic assets are hoarded. Within 
these three zones, however the protection standards were supposed to be equal, although 
engineers knew better than that.441 The eventual successful extension of the safety standard to all 
of Limburg fixed this, but by then the government had declared the government was not going 
to guarantee it. 
In Britain, the Association of British Insurers, ABI, warned in 2000 that from then on, 
premiums would be differentiated according to exposure and entire areas excluded from cover. 
This would shift responsibility wholly towards home owners (Huber, 2004: 13). Insurers also 
tried to make the complicit government behave: The Association blamed government for more 
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generally neglecting flood defence, that is, for not making the rivers behave442. But it also called 
for a stronger stance on floodplain occupation, that is: making people behave. To avoid paying 
higher premiums, citizens adapt their behaviour. This way, people‘s freedoms are still 
compromised – not by public policy, but by private risk management. 
The (re)construction of risk has its winners and losers. In parallel with the ‗hydro-hegemony‘ 
school in security studies introduced in Chapter 4, the next section will bring in the vulnerability 
approach which attracted much attention in disaster studies in the 1980s and 1990s. The 
vulnerability approach notices that risk has its winners and losers, and that its causes may be 
systemic and institutionalised. This constitutes a consistent critique of the five tenets of ‗water 
peace‘ just discussed. 
In sum, the appreciation of the negative consequences of intervention and of the positive 
aspects of water for its amenity, landscape and natural values may lead to a ‗greener‘ engineering 
approach and enable reframing of the hazard approach to a risk approach - from foreclosing any 
flood risk to resilient response. This opens up space for the consideration of alternative problem 
frames, alternative solutions and the involvement of alternative actors. Security is a co-
production: local authorities, the market (private insurance, consultants) and civil society 
(watchdog NGOs, CBOs) take responsibilities, while international regimes also impinge on 
lower-level decisions. Economic criteria (favourable cost-benefit ratio, cost recovery), protection 
of property rights and transactions in a deliberative planning process between initiators and 
stakeholders. Security standards can be debated and negotiated, which can lead to norm 
differentiation in risk. 
In practice, participation is limited, as decisions remain controlled by experts. These however 
rarely tend to be pleasant surprises to local stakeholders.  
River management projects bring risk redistribution. A desecuritised approach relies on the co-
ordinated coping capacities of the different stakeholder groups. While current writing on 
adaptivity and resilience tends to be concerned with the resilience of the system as a whole (e.g. a 
river basin), political ecologists would zoom in on how such adaptation affects different people in 
different ways. Below, I will zoom in on conflicts that are specifically related with the distribution 
of risk and vulnerability, alleged to result from desecuritised governance practice such as cost-
benefit criteria. A ´vulnerability´ or political ecology approach does not see these problems as 
incidental. Political ecologists see vulnerability to floods as conditioned by their systemic 
contexts, the workings of the political economy (Bryant and Bailey, 1997). The following Section 
delves further into this. 
 
 
9.7 CONFLICT OVER RISK DISTRIBUTION IN ‘DESECURITISED’ PROJECTS 
 
9.7.1 COUNTER-BLAMING AND FRAMING: NOT ENOUGH PROTECTION 
 
So far, we have encountered protests against flood schemes, claiming other values are more 
important than flood security.  But much conflict on security projects were not directed against 
flood protection, but concerned the perceived sacrifices to protect others - selectivity in protection. 
As upstream flood works often increase downstream risk (Bakker, 2007), protest from 
downstreamers in Britain could be expected443. But upstreamers (Ooij) made it clear they were 
not prepared to suffer nuisance and increased flood risk to guarantee the safety of lower-lying 
areas. The Ooij, an economically less developed but well-to-do area has to make space to save 
more developed areas downstream. The Ooij polder dwellers did not see why their protection 
should be less important than that of the neighbouring Overbetuwe and Alblasserwaard polders. 
For the citizens of Hasankeyf, where planned flooding of houses and heritage is a certainty rather 
than a 1 in 1250 contingency, there seems no local security benefit at all. 
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Projects in their ´desecuritised´ phase, or those that never were securitised in the first place, are 
also exposed to criticism that the project does not protect people well enough. If anyone is 
imputed to have caused, precipitated or failed to prevent the flood, they are held to account for 
placing others at risk.444 As Delft engineer Frans Klijn observes445, if science and engineering do 
not release us from risk, it means floods are not considered natural disasters, but engineering 
failures. Thus, like securitising moves on the part of project initiators, a security threat was named 
and framed, attributions of cause and effect are made, blame placed446 and responsibility for the 
remedy identified in the local domain.  
The Jubilee Channel was never really securitised, the project had to be realised without special 
pleading. The Environment Agency, moreover, could not boast the same credibility as its Dutch 
or Bangladeshi counterparts, while a source of blame was readily available. The Thames channel 
project got into real trouble when the project failed to withstand the flood. Residents in the 
downstream of Maidenhead saw hundreds of houses flooded in January 2003 and blamed the 
channel project itself rather than the weather event. They took the EA to task on this for 
imputed breaking of the safety promises to Datchet citizens made during at the 1992 Public 
Inquiry. A strenuous denial of responsibility on the part of the river manager increased the 
antagonism between downstreamers and agency. A parish councillor blamed the ´value 
engineering´, cost-reducing exercise, for compromising the security standard. When several 
consultant reports confirmed structural faults in the EA‘s ‗green engineering‘ design, the Agency 
passed the blame on, litigating against its main subcontractors. 
The blame discourse in these stories does not evidence a rejection of the initiator‘s security 
frame, but rather a call on the river manager to provide more protection. The implication of the 
way the complaints were framed was that if the collapsed ‗green‘ banks of the Thames bypass had 
been constructed with good old-fashioned engineering, they would certainly have held. If the 
Ooij could be protected with compartmentalised dikes rather than flooded, people would feel a 
lot safer. On the Maas residents of isolated properties outside the parishes to be embanked 
refused to be abandoned to make economies. The same sentiment is expressed in the non-
acceptance of local residual risk (Taplow, Lomm): was the project not supposed to prevent all 
flood events?  
These civil-society voices are joined by Dutch experts who argue for old fashioned dikes 
instead of investing in a ´medieval´ (Boorsma, 1999) system of detention and calamity polders, 
and in Britain by structural engineers finding fault with the green embankments of the 
Maidenhead channel after the 2003 floods. 
Conspiracy stories buttress insecurity stories: in interviews both Ooij and char dwellers outside 
Tangail claimed they heard explosions (Tangail) or saw army engineers preparing to explode a 
dike (Ooij) to provoke a breach in 1995. Such stories were never proved nor disproved, but 
evidenced the distrust in the state as protector.  
 
 
9.7.2 DIFFERENTIAL VULNERABILITY  
 
What we call man‘s power over nature turns out to be a power exercised by some men over other 
men with nature as its instrument.   
(C.S. Lewis, 1947) 
 
The above has raised issues that may be tackled within a liberal ‗water peace‘ paradigm. In this 
perspective, people have the choice to go and live in less hazardous locations and can mobilise 
the means and ‗voice‘ to protest and negotiate compensation  But from a political ecology 
perspective, not everyone is in that position. Despite well-known hazard potential, many have no 
other choice but to settle in flood-prone areas. In western countries, low-cost housing is more 
likely to be in floodplains. In Bangladesh, for example, simply lacks the space to house people 
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elsewhere, and the vulnerability school in disaster studies (spearheaded by Blaikie et al., 1994) 
reminds us, many marginalized people do not have a choice.  
Environmental change, whether natural catastrophe or human-induced, affects lives and 
livelihoods differentially. A vulnerability assessment predicts what may happen to a particular 
group exposed to a particular hazard (Cannon et al., n.d.). But for the most vulnerable in society, 
everyday subsistence is a hazard (see e.g. Allen, 2003). The flood itself may not make all that 
much difference in light of the myriad challenges, and the flood relief may not be much help. In 
fact, it may turn out to be another hazard. 
Whether made under securitised or desecuritised circumstances, both floods and flood policies 
can significantly change the various different stakeholders´ security positions, making some more 
secure and others less. Consequently it can appear to stakeholders that not everyone‘s security is 
equally important. When flood defence structure (the cure) is seen as more damaging than the 
flood risk (the ailment), people feel more rather than less insecure. Not everyone has the same 
opportunity or desire to adapt. For them, security turns out to be scarce and seemingly zero-sum: 
more security for some means less security for others. Some settings are more likely to create risk 
and/or maximise impacts on exposed groups, instilling an acute sense of vulnerability and 
iniquity. The differentiation of benefits and costs seems to be built into their design with 
seemingly scant consideration for redressing the balance. A political ecology perspective can help 
us foreground the broader political struggles that the project is embedded in. Such a perspective 
does not see these disparities as accidental, but rather as the outcome of structural biases: the 
political economy of flood protection.  A vulnerability approach focuses on local security and 
tends to script the affected stakeholders as victims. The analyst would therefore expect flood 
protection projects not to target the safety of the poor, except when the rich have also been hit. 
Above, we discussed security dilemmas and threats coming from an insecure state. Under non-
security or desecuritised conditions, the state may withdraw to make more space for non-state 
actors and bring economic (cost-benefit) and social (participation) criteria.  
In light of the constructivist approach taken in this study, the research has not expressly set 
out to investigate and assess the ‗objective‘ distributive effects of flood protection schemes 
themselves but relied on the interpretations of actors and observers. As we have seen, the 
securitized projects were ultimately subject to ´desecuritised´ governance criteria. For example, all 
desecuritised flood security projects were therefore ultimately expected to be legitimised in terms 
of cost-benefit calculations. This economic rationale promotes protection where the assets are, rather 
than a view that every life saved counts no matter at what costs, and excavation where the most 
valuable aggregates can be found, to balance the books for the project.  
In Limburg (but also in part in Maidenhead) the amount of and proceeds (and VAT) on gravel 
that can be sold remained a crucial factor for the project‘s viability, which became acute when the 
initiators failed to have the project labelled a security project. The Grensmaas project‘s 
opponents argued they should not sacrifice the integrity of landscape for the profits of the 
gravelling and construction industry. The considerable  concessions made to the gravel sector 
could be (and were) construed as another indignity inflicted on Limburg by the powers in The 
Hague. 
Without such concessions, the river projects do not bring an acceptable Benefit-Cost ratio are (or 
may feel) left to their own devices. In Britain, where floods were never securitised at all and cost-
benefit criteria appear unassailable, the government has reiterated people‘s ‗own responsibility‘ in 
risk management. The points system underlying MAFF (now DEFRA) grant aid ensures the non-
funding of trouble spots.447 Cost-benefit considerations precipitated the selection of Maidenhead 
over, for example, equally exposed and flood-prone areas on the Thames in Wales. To 
interviewed local critics, this made the Jubilee River scheme a project for the rich working in the 
media sector, the elite children educated at Eton and the royals at Windsor, while poorer areas 
are left behind. 
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The vulnerability perspective is especially poignant in Bangladesh. Bangladeshi critics had been 
quick to note in 1988 that General Ershad and the international community only sprang into 
action when the presidential palace and foreign embassies in uptown Gulshan New Town were 
hit and the helicopter pad in Tangail prevented Madame Mitterrand from landing there. 
The donor‘s risk assessment involved in the selection of the Tangail scheme brought another 
perverse rationale: compartmentalisation might not work in a more flood-prone area, as the 
infrastructure washes away. Thus FAP-20 protected people who were already comfortably safe 
compared to the underprivileged char dwellers nearby. (In fairness other Flood Action projects, 
notably FAP-3.1, have targeted the security of the char people.)  
Food security, a strong legitimator of FAP-20, was predicated on green-revolution HYV rice 
varieties, reducing production risk for farmers. Project initiators kept an eye on the project‘s 
Internal Rate of Return. Boosting agricultural production (high yielding rice varieties) was so 
crucial, that landed farmers were privileged over landless fishermen and women. It strengthened 
private property which Lockeians seek to protect against state domination. The downside is that 
those without (registered) property or water rights are not (well) protected, as their assets do not 
feature in the calculations. The Tangailis of Central Bangladesh are used to working the khas 
(common land) and communal fishing. Fishermen and peasants saw the commons enclosed and 
saw no alternative livelihood opportunities. It legitimised the project enabling private enclosure 
of the commons (beels) driving Hindu fishermen, who are often already barred from landholding, 
away from their already very limited livelihood, increasing their overall vulnerability. While 
farmers were privileged over fishermen, townspeople benefited more than the countryside, even 
though it is in the rural area that the distribution effects of flood risks has the more immediate 
impact on livelihoods. Livelihoods, now seen as essential to human security (UNDP 1994), are 
thus not safe from either the securitised or desecuritised risk management practice.  
In their official formulations, the Turkish and Egyptian projects specifically sought to bridge 
socio-economic gaps between centre and periphery, which would also stave off terrorism  
Analysts such as McDowell (1996) however show the welfare benefits of the Turkish GAP 
accrue to the country‘s industrialised West rather than its impoverished southeast and perpetuates 
rather than redistributes feudal land tenure relations. Poor Kurdish town dwellers in dozens of 
villages have to make way for development projects. 
The colonization (enclosure) of the Egyptian desert throws up a sharp contrast between the 
poverty of the resettled Nubians and Prince Talal‘s 100,000 ha plot. In response to criticism, the 
government has also promised smaller plots will be set aside for university graduates and small 
farmers. The question how many fellahin might be persuaded to start again in such an inhospitable 
area, is at least partly solved with a view to agricultural reform in Egypt, which asserted the 
property rights of (absentee) landlords. The state apparatus helped owners drive tenants off their 
lands, with the slums of Cairo or the ´greened desert´ at Toshka as their only place of refuge to 
start again. 
Societal and academic commentators have thus made pointed observations on the socio-
economic effects that played a role in disputes over flood regulation projects, and the winners 
and losers emerging as a result.  
However, the protests to differential security rarely came from underprivileged areas. The 
protest against the Jubilee River did not come from poor Welshmen, but from neighbouring 
middle-class Taplow and Datchet. The Tangail protest movement had strong ‗guidance‘ from 
national and international NGOs. In Limburg and the Ooij, organised protest came from well-
educated town dwellers united in citizen platforms. These groups have the political access and 
resources to make a difference. Welshmen and Tangaili landless meanwhile fend for themselves. 
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TABLE 9.5 Acceptance of securitised and non-securitised interventions 
Country Political sector River management 
 Securitisation: 
Political closure 
Securitised; 
Technical. Institutional closure 
Non-securitised: 
 
Egypt Enduring SoE since 
1981 
Nile diversion 
- politicised 
Horizontal extension Demand 
management 
- politicisation  
Turkey Enduring SoE since 
1979 
War with PKK 
Dam regulation 
Resettlement 
 – conflictive 
Regional development, 
Integrated Water Management 
- conflictive 
Bangladesh SoE until 1990, and 
after 2006 
River training 
French plan 1989 – 
rejected 
Controlled drainage 
Compartmentalisation 
- conflictive 
NL-Ooij Special River Law  
DGR 
1995-1997  
 
Mass evacuation 
- accepted 
Emergency flood storage 
- conflictive 
NL-Maas Emergency structures 
- accepted 
Retention 
River widening 
- conflictive 
UK None CPO - failed ´Green´ channel  
- conflictive 
 
 
TABLE 9.6 Type of conflict over river management projects: too much control, too little protection 
 Conflict over 
Protection 
Conflict over intervention/ 
Control 
Egypt   
 
 
Turkey  Capture of commons 
 
 
Bangladesh Distribution: Inside vs. Outside 
project area;  
Residual risk  
Capture of commons 
NL-Ooij Kaden 
Residual risk  
 
Economic risk (investment ban) 
NL-Maas Embanking towns 
Residual risk 
Distribution Upstream vs. 
Downstream 
Despoliation of countryside 
UK Upstream vs. Downstream  
Residual risk 
Insurers reduce coverage 
Despoliation of countryside 
 
 
State retreat ?  
The above approach has cast doubt on the benefits of public, let alone private, primacy in 
providing security to local actors. While ‗desecuritisation‘ implies that ‗securitisation‘ is always a 
possibility, the state may disengage from security, either because the danger is no longer an 
urgent worry (a-security: war has become unthinkable) or because society has found ways to 
tackle the issue without the national defence apparatus and national political involvement 
(‗depoliticisation‘). In Buzan et al.‘s sense, floods do not have to be ‗political‘ in that they are not a 
state concern: local communities and local or regional authorities may take care of their 
protection. Before 1798 in the Netherlands, 1958 in Bangladesh (East Pakistan) and 1995 in 
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Britain, there was no central river manager bringing in flood protection structures. The trend (if 
less the practice) in the Netherlands discourse for about a decade has been to decentralise flood 
management. 
The ‗post-providential‘ (Ophir 2004) state makes people more responsible for their own 
security. The idea is that by devolving power, taking their voice and capacities seriously and 
entering into partnerships, devolution can empower people. Making physical space for both the 
river as well as people requires the flexible, multifunctional use of space, such as amphibious 
housing, resilience and preparedness. This has opened a new phase in flood management, ‗living 
with the flood‘, with a less prominent role of national flood managers. 
Living with the flood is, of course, what Bangladeshi and other Asian communities have been 
doing all along. The ‗vulnerability approach‘ finds that people have little to expect from the state 
and international organisations, and argue that rather than giving people relief and making them 
dependent on the international aid (economic protection) system, they should be given help in 
increasing coping capacities for coping with environmental hazard: reduction, preparedness. A 
‗sustainable livelihoods‘ (DFID 1999) approach argues that people have social, environmental, 
political, financial capital at their disposal. Bangladeshis have learned not to depend on the state 
and rely on sometimes violent self-help in flood management. A World Bank funded 
management devolution programme leaves them with the Operation and Maintenance of often 
substandard flood infrastructure. Still, in Tangail too, some residents called for physical 
protection by FAP-20 and appreciated hard structures in front of their houses, while thousands 
of outsiders migrated or fled into the polder in 1998. Bangladeshis are excellently attuned to the 
normal flood (barshas) but few are well equipped to stand the bad, century flood (bannas).  
Self-management may be the highest form of participation on Arnstein´s ´Ladder of 
participation (1967), but Cuillier (quoted in Collins and Ison, 2006) notes that self-management 
can also be a form of abandonment if the government simply retracts its support with no 
compensating provisions and people do not feel safe on their own. Exclusion from national or 
international solidarity leaves the powerless to their own devices without consulting if non-
securitisation resonates with their ‗feelings, needs and interests‘. Henri Giroux (2006) has called 
attention to the politics of ‗disposability‘, a concept that appears to capture  Egypt‘s ‗politics of 
indifference‘ to the fate of the fellahin quite well. In the European countries, norm differentiation, 
liberalised floodplain management and selective insurance coverage releases constraints on 
freedoms, but can also mean those who can afford it could lead to ‗gated safety communities‘, 
protected enclaves on private mounds or behind private embankments. 
Harries and Borrows (2006), associated with the UK‘s Environment Agency, argue that 
expecting people to help themselves in coping with the flood brings anxiety because people do 
not always have a clue how they are supposed to act. The ‗risk management‘ approach 
underestimates how people deal with fear (Harries and Borrows, 2006). When people feel 
challenged by a risk they cannot control, one anxiety-managing strategy is denial. Risk 
communication and other risk management measures, other than issuing sandbags, raise anxiety 
without increasing a sense of protection. They advocate two-way communication between flood 
manager and residents about what people can do might help in case of a flood, in terms of the 
present study, empowering (bringing alternatives) rather than leaving them to self-help. In the 
West Netherlands the perspective is much more limited so that people quite rightly depend on 
the sea dikes (Warner, Meijerink and Needham 2007). People cannot be expected to fend for 
themselves like that. 
In a conceptual essay invited by the African Water Issues Research Unit (Warner, 2000) I 
maintained that integrated water management requires an integrated society. In the current 
context I would maintain that an integrated water security also requires an integrated society. A 
fragmented society in which certain groups are excluded cannot easily reach coherent flood risk 
management.448 Selective protection means the violent closure of the sphere of security and may 
bring us back to the ‗pre-providential states‘ when elites instated containment zones to protect 
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themselves or their clients and ward off sources of hazard (pestilence, pollution, deviance) 
meaning the abandonment of others exposed to hazard (Ophir, 2007). When this separation is no 
more functional and hazards affect the chosen few, environmental protective measures are taken. 
 
 
9.8 DID FLOOD EVENTS OPEN A WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY FOR 
 GOVERNANCE REGIME CHANGES? 
 
As introduced in Chapter 1.2.3, the so-called Punctuated Equilibrium approach predicts Focusing 
Events to break through established regime patterns. That approach is inspired by ecology, which 
teaches that ecosystems go through four phases of pioneering, colonization, climax and decay 
(De Groot, 2000). The last stage is marked by creative destruction. A favourite paleontological 
example is the creative destruction of a meteorite wiping out the dinosaurs. 
Punctuated equilibrium theory suggests, flood events or projects can change the policy context. 
Did the floods wipe out the dinosaurs or did they adapt? In each of the ´hydro security regimes´ 
under review, a national ‗hydro-hegemon‘ could be identified. Rijkswaterstaat (RWS) in the 
Netherlands, the Bangladesh Water Development Board in Bangladesh, the Ministry of 
Agriculture (now DEFRA) in Britain, DSI in Turkey, Presidency and army in Egypt. These 
leading agencies in their own way were in the process of downsizing and under pressure to 
redefine their roles as the project was mooted, giving other actors a possible look-in. How did the 
flood and conflict over projects affect the regime? Did they affect the role of the hegemon and 
the rules of the game, as Lowry (1998) maintains? 
While an overall impact assessment is not possible on the basis of the data, I will make 
preliminary inferences below with regard to openness and closure of the regime in terms of 
actors, roles/procedures and knowledge. 
 
An emblematic event such as a declared flood crisis can indeed proved a short-lived window of 
opportunity for the river manager to have projects plans and policies fast-tracked and hegemonic 
position of the self-appointed national ‗water defence force‘ strengthened. Such an event can 
generate the consensus that enables a cooperative regime to address common problems. Floods 
on the Rhine and Maas and elsewhere precipitated closer European co-operation on floods and 
the adoption of the European High Water Directive (European Parliament and Council, 2007). 
This however did not hold for Bangladesh, India and Nepal, a hydro-security system linked by 
three rivers and multiple disputes over borders and migration. On the Nile and Euphrates-Tigris 
basins, two cases of nearly averted war in 1998 may have improved relations between the 
riparians, allowing non-hegemons to make demands. But the more meaningful change may well 
be the influence of non-state actors on donors, including the international interaction of experts 
filtering down ‗desecuritised‘  thinking. 
At the domestic level, Bangladesh‘s President Ershad‘s flood security activism after the 1988 
flood did not silence his political opponents, who managed to have him deposed in 1990. The 
Toshka project enabled by the ‗good flood‘ in Egypt brought parliamentary questions and even a 
fatwa, but mainly appears to generate indifference at home and abroad. Local government had 
been weak ever since Bangladesh became independent, but got a new lease on life as FAP 
progressed, such that the role of local government service, LGED, role in water management 
increased dramatically. Public participation became enshrined in several national guidelines. 
In the Netherlands, ‗calling a crisis‘ after 1993 and especially 1995 enabled Rijkswaterstaat and 
waterschappen to take the reins – the evacuation plan for 200,000 on the Rhine, a Delta plan for the 
Great Rivers – despite the dubious evidence for such a ‗crisis‘. Nationally, authorities, experts and 
locals appear to have worked in concerto enable the quick construction of emergency dikes in 
Limburg until 1997. On the Maas, the (national) Public Works Department was seen as taking 
over of the Grensmaas project and faced resistance from the provincial political parties, with a 
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telling standoff between provincial and national government in 1999 over a trial trench. The 
environmentalists dropped out when austerity measures impelled stepping up the economically 
more interesting aggregate excavation at the cost of environmental amenities.  
The flood may also have precipitated the acceptance of an already initiated move from vertical 
to horizontal flood response, necessitating Rijkswaterstaat to take a different, more modest role 
in a ‗polder governance‘ model of negotiation. This provided inroads for non-state and foreign 
agencies. On the Rhine, for example, regional actors accepted the initiative to take the lead in 
Making Space for the River, while the province of Gelderland‘s initiative, with the neighbouring 
German Land as partner, contested the 18,000 m3/sec scenario as hegemonic wisdom. 
On the Rhine, the plan for controlled flooding had been hoped to boost the profile of the 
Water Vice-Minister and her Public Works Department, but was defeated in part by the 
department‘s own handling of the plan. Since then, ministerial restructuring and water policy 
decentralisation has continued. 
The Province of Limburg was the lead actor in the Grensmaas project. Post-flooding defence 
efforts first boosted the role of the waterschappen and the province, and co-opted both private-
sector companies and major environmental NGO in the Maaswerken consortium in 1997. Yet 
when the traditional security provider, Rijkswaterstaat, reassumed their lead role by taking the 
reins in the Maaswerken project, it refused contributing a ‗security premium‘. The province of 
Limburg challenged the definition of security maintained by the public works department, but 
lost. In 2001 when the project itself reached crisis point, Limburg regained the initiative and 
normalised consortium and stakeholder relations. 
In Britain, the Maidenhead project was started by what was to become the Environment 
Agency, which launched its project proposal without a legitimising flood crisis. The Agency 
started from a weak position because of externally imposed change within the regime; NRA‘s 
transmogrification into the Environment Agency, and the privatisation of the water supply 
branch of Thames, weakened rather than strengthened its role in the policy arena. The Agency 
sought to strengthen its position as a lead actor in flood policy and change the system of cost-
benefit calculation. The analysis argues that a strategy predicated on environmental values was 
part and parcel of an ultimately fairly unsuccessful niche strategy to change the regime. 
Environmental and culture al heritage NGOs act as statutory consultees, but with limited interest 
in flood schemes. The EA challenged established regime rules, seeking to extend the accepted 
calculation of benefits in the cost-benefit analysis beyond lives and assets protected to include 
environmental and health damage forgone. In both cases, the challenger lost, and so far, nothing 
appears to have changed fundamentally (Huber, 2004, Scrase and Sheate, 2005). Two years after a 
flood, the Maidenhead flood alleviation scheme face a public enquiry.  
Yet, after repeated floods, the issue is now definitely on the agenda, making the EA‘s drive for 
more integrated flood management plans a policy reality. The agency‘s mandate grew after the 
police abandoned its flood warning service, and after the insurance association threatened to 
withdraw cover after two costly floods if government did not pull its weight. The state appears to 
be taking a larger role., but EA‘s role in flood policy remains clearly subordinated to that of the 
Ministry of Agriculture, as reiterated in flood policy documents (Ingen-Housz 2007). 
 
The above are all pressures for change from within the policy regime. Was the regime 
challenged from the outside?449  
A window of opportunity for the opposition in Bangladesh was the gradual recognition within 
the technical community that the major rivers in this country cannot realistically be tamed 
dramatically. This realisation switched the focus of FAP discourse from saving the country from 
floods to integrated water resource management to meet multiple demands. Rather than relying 
on local knowledge (Jansen, 1998), opponents co-opted expert knowledge. This was possible as 
experts were not a united community.  
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Similarly the Ooij platform, seeking to change the securitised mode and challenged the 
assumption, enlisted a retired Delft professor and was supported by dissenters in the epistemic 
community who did not necessarily share their scepticism of the 18,000 m3/s discharge scenarios, 
but were keen to discuss uncertainties. 
To get a hearing, protestors in each case did not rely on their local knowledge only but enlisted 
water professionals and local and district authorities, while in Bangladesh and Turkey, they 
benefited from the political skills of international NGOs. As the opposition reaped success, the 
ruling security coalition offered NGOs a place within the decision-making regime, which 
protesters then can accept or reject. Controversies over river infrastructure thus opened a 
window for opposition actors to become part of the governance regime. 
In a political culture dominated by the politics of mutual delegitimation, Bangladesh, NGOs 
and engineers started out at loggerheads. NGO opponents of FAP(-20) had a tough battle on 
their hands to prove their mettle as flood management actors. As a result of their successful 
engagement, Bangladeshi NGOs found a mode of coexistence after the controversy over the 
Flood Action Plan (in which FAP-20 was a flashpoint that gave NGOs a look-in in the river 
management regime.  
In Britain, Flood Risk Action Groups were established after the 2003 flood to involve citizens 
and local authorities more in flood preparedness. In the Netherlands, the BOM (Bewoners 
Overleg Maaswerken) and HWP (Hoogwaterplatform) gained inroads in the decision-making 
regime structure by joining regular talks with the Maaswerken project organization and 
Gelderland respectively (Waalweelde project). 
While NGOs were co-opted, not everyone agreed to be drawn into the regime. The anti-
gravelling federation (Federatief Verband tegen Ontgrondingen) on the Maas, for example, took a ‗non-
participatory‘ (non-co-opted, from the perspective of the activists) stance. The role of an 
‗outsider‘ ensures the group not to compromise their principles, and legitimacy to continue to file 
administrative lawsuits and target the regional press. 
 
Hegemonic Control? 
In terms of Hilhorst‘s (2003) domains of knowledge and action, some opportunities have been 
created for better co-ordination between decision-makers, experts and local stakeholders. NGOs 
and local authorities thus found their way into the decision-making regime, widening the range of 
actors with the potential of improving feedback between state and society. However, it was noted 
the regime does not alter a structural selectivity in protection between actors and does not 
account structurally for the security of project affected people. Taking a critical regime 
perspective we can analyse what makes everything remain largely the same in terms of security 
control, despite obvious conflicts. 
We have seen that in Turkey and Egypt, the hegemonic actor is faced with the challenge how 
to maintain hegemonic control (régie) of political decision-making. Moving from one-party to 
multi-party rule without losing control of people. In a flood context, flood scheme initiators 
appear to have hoped they found ways of widening the range of actors in security provision and 
deliberation without needlessly endangering their control of the river. Project initiators in 
Bangladesh, Britain and the Netherlands must have believed the flood defence case was cut and 
dried, as they were invariably taken aback by the furore over the projects they started. They had 
assumed that the flood risk itself, expected benefits and a form of public consultation would be 
enough to legitimise the project. Protest thus brought defensive and placating responses. While a 
(semi)-caged river still instils fear, so apparently do non-state actors inspire fear in state agencies. 
Therefore, it is not only structurally securitised political environments in the Middle East that 
find it hard to communicate with local flood- and project-affected people about their security 
concerns, but also liberal democracies in Europe. 
The present study yields that river management largely remains in the hands of technical 
experts, outside the political sphere. As Aradau (2001) notes, an increasingly practiced way for 
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governments is to treat risk and calamity management not like a war but like a normal, routine 
situation we can handle rationally. This ‗managerialisation‗ treats risk like a technical problem, 
without great uncertainties. A ‗risk‘ approach implies control and predictability enabling a rational 
calculation of means and ends (Fox, 1999). Popular participation then is required to incentivise 
stakeholders such that they do not increase risk (Aradau, 2001)450. Floyd (2007) therefore rightly 
dismisses Buzan et al.´s (1998) claim that desecuritisation leads to politicization. Unease with 
more unobtrusive ‗desecuritised‘ social controls as risk maps and risk profiling is rarely giving rise 
to political protest. This, critical security scholars argue, gives the security establishment relatively 
free range.  
If this reasoning is correct, a transformation of the political arena and emancipation of actors 
under desecuritised river management would seem to be wishful thinking.  
 
 
9.9 CONCLUSION: HOW DOES THE THEORY ILLUMINATE EMPIRICAL 
 FINDINGS?  
 
The analysis shows that a window of opportunity for securitisation never lasts very long in 
practice: no matter how structurally securitised the context. The window for securitisarion proves 
to be an undependable instrument of ‗closure‘. The window of opportunity for swift action closes 
and river schemes will eventually encounter either a serious challenge (polarisation and 
politicisation) or have to contend with the slow motion of ‗routinised‘, everyday decision-making. 
Even in a political economy that routinely spends its way out of crises by investing in 
infrastructure, or in a permanently securitised context, initiators cannot count on unlimited 
budgets, legitimacy and compliance. All studied flood-related projects saw resistance and 
dramatic protest (rallies, parliamentary questions, high-profile lawsuits, walk-outs) suggesting 
local citizens felt their ´feelings, needs and interests´ had been ill-served. Securitisation and 
desecuritisation have multiple audiences: experts and non-experts, decision-makers and decision-
affected people. While we might concentrate on local stakeholders, flood managers, donors and 
experts are crucial to the successful completion or rejection of a flood defence scheme. The 
‗natural risk‘ of a flood and its distribution effects, cannot be judged in isolation from the 
technical and administrative/governmental setup, which bring their own risks parsed as threats 
or, as we have seen, opportunities.  
 
While securitisation brought non-compliance and resistance, desecuritisation does not mean 
´living with the river´ is universally appreciated. It was noted in Ch. 5 (Bangladesh) that a 
pendulum swing can be observed between risk-acceptance and risk-aversion, which drive „wet‟ and „dry‟ 
phases. Yet it was found above that aspects of water securitisation and desecuritisation, as it were 
‗conflict and cooperation with the river‘, can influence each other or even happen at the same time 
(see also Brouma, 2003, Davidsen, 2006, Mirumachi, pers. comm..). The above has thus 
described a practical dialectics between securitisation and desecuritisation with respect to floods, 
a standoff between the special and normal politics. ‗War with water´ and ´peace with water´ 
neatly echo the ´water war´ and ´water peace´ narratives pictured in Chapter 4. A ‗water as 
politics‘ (political ecology) view of disasters challenging the two takes similar view of the world as 
the hydro-hegemonic view of ´water wars´. This perspective, among other things, highlights that 
projects and protest can be symbolic: just like securitisation may be about something else than 
the professed threat, controversy over a flood project, then, is likely to be a focus for 
controversies about something else ( territorial control, identity, historic grievances etc.). To key 
actors, the Focusing Events may well be moments in a larger story of security and control, and 
opposition against its manifestations. The next and final Chapter goes into this, and draws 
conclusions from the above findings for the body of constructivist security theory. 
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Chapter 10: The securitisation of flood events: 
implications for security analysis 
 
 
 
‗The argument is not about the reality of (…) dangers, but about how they are politicized (…) 
Starvation, blight and famine are perennial threats. It is a bad joke to take this analysis as hinting that 
the dangers are imaginary‘ (Douglas, 1994: 29). 
 
‗Emergencies demand rapid action… Presidents and prime ministers have to take action first and 
submit to questions later. But too much prerogative can be bad for democracy itself‘ (Ignatieff, 2004: 
2). 
 
‗When there‘s a man overboard, you are not going to worry if it‘s a federal responsibility or a state 
responsibility‘ (New Orleans flood victim in When the levees broke, part 3, Dir.: Spike Lee) 
  
 
10.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The preceding chapter by and large applied the conceptual framework of constructivist security 
studies, as developed by the ‗Copenhagen School‘, to six empirical river management studies. The 
study set out to investigate the roles 'security' and 'risk' discourse plays in (de)legitimising flood management 
projects, and how this affects the political and river management regime context. It confirmed Buzan et al.‘s 
prediction that environmental securitisation is rarely successful, except when the threat resonates 
with earlier threats. While security speech can change the arena it did not found much evidence 
for ‗punctuating the equilibrium‘: regimes remained in place, new directions and actors in river 
governance manifesting themselves before the crisis returned when the crisis window closed. 
However, the outcomes of the present study suggest that certain modifications and elaboration 
of the Copenhagen approach may be in order.  
The present chapter will raise five issues: 
- We should not only attention to threats but also to the opportunity side of crises (10.2) 
- Research on security speech and practices should not only focus on elites, but also on societal 
actors (10.3)  
- Security speech and protest has a tendency to ‗hijack‘ audience, which gives a false sense of 
consensus (10.4). 
- Neither securitisation nor politicisation is ‗the problem‘  (10.5) and 
- An integrated security approach may offer possibilities to impose conditions and 
accountability on security action (10.6). 
 
 
10.2 INSTRUMENTALITY OF SECURITY SPEECH: CRISIS AS OPPORTUNITY 
 
In ‗The rise and fall of the Soviet threat‘, Alan Wolfe (1979) shows how the construction of such 
Cold War threats as the Missile Gap and other icons of the ‗Red Scare‘ depended on domestic 
American political expediency. The analysis suggests that political and military elements benefited 
from the occasional dramatic representation of a threat, independent of its actual manifestation. 
In terms of the present research, the fear of Soviet power generated a demand for security in the 
United States that was met by a government willing to supply. Like any sensible supplier, they 
advertised (marketed) their wares by playing on the intended audience‘s needs and promises of 
effectively meeting them. 
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Demand for security in the face of hydrological hazard likewise appears to have a political 
seasonality on response to supply and demand. The awareness of risk and demand to be 
protected from harm is ever on the rise (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1983). While extreme floods are 
becoming more of a challenge due to a growing number of people settled in at-risk areas but 
demand for structural measures is also whipped up by climate change scenarios predicting intense 
floods and droughts. Whether in the case of the missiles or climate change, a degree of 
uncertainty about the future facilitates the invocation of vital threats. 
The political response to risk is not always the search for a Teflon coating and/or diplomatic 
immunity (Hood, 2002, see also Leiss and Chociolko, 1994), but a willing supply side. Security 
provision can also be a livelihood or a political career In its most opportunistic sense, as Naomi 
Klein asserts, hazards are a business opportunity (Klein, 2007). But whether driven by greed, a 
concern for the safety of others or a sense of professional responsibility, the point remains that 
security services, civil engineers, insurers, mayors and humanitarian aid agencies are only too 
happy to promise prevention, protection and rehabilitation. As some will happily admit, they 
‗need‘ the occasional flood to keep up awareness and pressure on decision-makers. 
A crisis is thus a contradictory animal, as shown most clearly in the Chinese character for 
'crisis', which is a composite of two characters, ‗threat‘ and ‗opportunity‘ (see below). A crisis 
represents danger, but it can also be a lucky break for some. Not only do floods bring 
fertilisation, ecological restoration or social capital, they bring a window of political opportunity– 
both for incumbents and challengers - to assert their legitimacy as providers of protection 
services.  
 
 
    
   Threat (Danger) 
  / 
Crisis      => window for (regime) change 
  \ 
   Opportunity  
 
FIG. 10.1 Chinese character for „crisis‟ shows the two faces of crisis 
 
 
For state actors, security can be instrumental in attaining ulterior goals – legitimacy, 
compliance, control over freedoms, resources, political standing within the bureaucracy. 
Huysmans (1998) even sees securitisation as 
 
... a technique of government which retrieves the ordering force of the fear of violent death by a 
mythical replay of the variations of the Hobbesian state of nature. It manufactures a sudden rupture 
in the routinized, everyday life by fabricating an existential threat which provokes experiences of the 
real possibility of violent death (Huysmans, 1992, quoted in Aradau, 2001). 
 
Yet, the case studies have indicated security is not just the business of security professionals at 
central level. Regional and local authorities, experts, NGOs and community-based organisations 
take initiatives to protect their communities against floods, or as the case may be, against flood 
defence projects and policies. Decision-making theory suggests a linear process of agenda setting 
for solving a problem (Easton, 1965). But decision-makers and experts are not normally 
confronted by well-defined environmental problems; they frame them out of the complex mass 
of problem and solution elements, in so doing naming (attributing) culprits and remedies. The 
emerging dominant problem frame delimits the solution alternatives considered or excluded. 
Sometimes the problem itself is redefined (reframed) several times over until it gets ‗solved‘ or 
otherwise disappears from the agenda.  
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A flood can be a window to promote existing security ´solutions´, river plans that were already 
lying in waiting451. Securitisation and desecuritisation influence and reinforce each other through 
spatial and temporal linkages. The two appear to feed on each other, not just conceptually 
(Behnke, 2005) but also in the practice of flood governance. 
Examples in the case studies abound. The need to divert overflow in Lake Nasser into the 
desert provided a window for Toshka. Compartmentalisation was already on the agenda when 
major floods ravaged Bangladesh in two consecutive years. A high-water event saved the 
province of Limburg‘s Grensmaas plan for river restoration. All researched flood schemes are 
more than just security infrastructure. Rather than quick technological fixes, they introduced 
more subtle ways of dealing with floodwater drainage (compartmentalization, green river 
engineering) as well as extending the mandate by putting in measures to facilitate shipping 
(Maas), nature development and aquatic recreation (Maas, Thames), a vision for regional 
development (Turkey) or create a whole new civilisation (Toshka). The threat of security allowed 
other, developmental, transformational policy preferences to play hopscotch on the back of 
security: they were ‗security-plus‘ projects. 
 
 
10.3 CAN THE SUBALTERN ‘DO SECURITY’?  
 
Are political or academic ‗authorities‘ the only actors who can do this trick? Buzan et al. (1998) 
state that securitisation has to come from a position of ‗authority‘ –  politicians, NGOs, experts, 
media. This disadvantages those who cannot speak, for example illegal aliens (Hansen, 2000 q. in 
Diez, 2000). This view however is contested: Litfin (1997), Aradau (2004) and others claim 
everyone can ‗do security‘, even from an ‗abject position‘, the security-have-nots outside the 
national can re-appropriate it for other purposes, for doing what they ´freely choose to do‘ 
(security as emancipation) (Aradau, 2004). 
 
First, local actors mostly quietly look after their own security with or without projects, as they 
bear the brunt of hazards anyway (Kirschenbaum, 2004). Second, they can make intervening 
security actors lives difficult. Project implementation brings an interface (Long, 2001) between 
engineers and local citizens in which the latter may express a refusal to play and gave rise to 
protests and active resistance from outside the elite. Vocal protests against project 
implementation in Tangail, Hasankeyf, Ubbergen and Taplow were such an embarrassment to 
project initiators that, given external support, they could not so easily be repressed. 
Second, they can ‗countersecuritise‘, that is, promote a security counter-frame that protects a 
non-negotiable value, legitimises extraordinary forms of protest and protection. For this they can 
enlist more powerful actors, joining an existing discourse coalition or simply find themselves on 
the same side as others siding against the project. In the current study we saw the unlikeliest of 
bedfellows seeking to stop a project - Friends of the Earth, Trinity College, the World Bank and 
the state of Iraq all opposing the Turkish Ilısu Dam, anti-gravelling groups in Limburg siding 
with gravel companies from across the border and the European Union against the Maaswerken 
consortium. 
This indicates that the support of certain ‗members of the audience‘ is crucial to the success or 
defeat of security speech. The research project has identified crucial groups in that audience, as 
explained in more detail in the following Section. 
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10.4 SELLING THE SECURITY STORY 
 
10.4.1 ALIGNING DISPERSED AUDIENCES 
 
Discourse is co-production: nobody can control discourse alone. A successful security discourse 
coalition, whether for or against a project, depends on the context and the audience. It takes a 
receptive audience to validate and ´instantiate´ a securitising move. It was found that even in a 
authoritarian political system, the audience reaches far wider than the immediate junta 
membership. In each of the case studies the audience consisted of a mostly international network 
of disparate, occasionally overlapping groups that were not usually well-coordinated among 
themselves. As will be argued below, the audience can be ‗hijacked‘ and taken for granted, but 
also has knowledge and agency. The present research identified (after Hilhorst, 2003) three core 
audiences who need to be aligned to counter a security challenge, and thus need to respond to 
the labelling of a situation as ‗insecure‘ and in need of extra-ordinary measures: other decision-
makers, notably  
- governance sector    (decision-makers, funders, bureaucrats 
- security experts    (scientists and managers) 
- local response    (the flood- and project-affected population).  
 
Governance    Other actors in the risk governance sector also need to co-operate. Regional 
authorities need to give planning permission. Supranational directives contain norms that force 
accountability. Funding proved a particular Achilles hill for river management projects. Security 
discourse may well successfully command a ´blank cheque´ for security measures in the regional 
or national arena, but requires others (donors) to stand surety for continued funding. As these 
operate in non-securitised contexts (or choose to invoke non-security norms), as they did in all 
my case studies except Egypt, they bring conditionalities that impair the sustainability of security 
measures. 
Experts   Security logic has customarily extended to the scientific community, where 
uncertainty only complicates the narrative and therefore is reasoned away into ‗safety margins‘ 
(waakhoogte), ‗failure factors‘. Securitisation does not allow ambiguity or uncertainty. In flood 
management, scientific uncertainty is ‗tamed‘ by imposing safety margins, using stochastic tables 
based on historic flood data and extrapolation. But in each case, critics in the scientific 
community could be co-opted by protesters, willing to challenge the assumptions of rivers 
schemes. While in the case of Bangladesh, academics championed local knowledge, opponents 
more frequently mobilised technical counter-expertise challenging river experts on their own 
terrain. 
Local response    Finally, a project intervenes in local lives. A project promises to protect local 
stakeholders, catering to a demand for security. If they had a traumatic flood or evacuation 
experience, they may well be willing to sacrifice a lot to ensure safety in the next event. In the 
Maaskaden episode, there were direct informal feedback mechanisms between project planners, 
implementers and affected population. In the other case studies however such intensive co-
ordination has been very rare. The project-affected population is not coterminous with the 
intended beneficiaries. They tend to be background as an audience. So, where are they in the 
story? Are they  (seen as) participants or silent witnesses?  
 
Below, I will return to Slocum and van Langenhove‘s (Constructivist) positioning approach 
and van Eeten‘s policy stories to see how different actors position not only themselves but also 
others (and the flood) in the arena. 
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10.4.2 POSITIONING, BLAMING AND HIJACKING THE FLOOD SECURITY ARENA 
 
A great measure of policy uncertainty permits jumps (leaps of faith) in the security story, to make 
linear attributions that construct a neat security claim. These claims enable ´conflict 
entrepreneurs‘ (Friis 2000) to bring together coalitions around a narrative that help forge an 
audience for a successful security speech act. By transforming the policy issue into a security 
arena with threat-defence sequence, this creates certainty and an action perspective. As a 
consequence, fence-sitters (‗liminars‘) by their very existence are a threat to things, and are forced 
to become either ‗us‘ or ‗them‘. 
What kind of story does a securitising agent tell the audience? Flood securitisation is a story of 
a threat (the river) affecting a referent (lives and assets) and a remedy (infrastructure, zoning etc.). 
The hero slays the dragon threatening the princess and as a thank-you gets to marry her. 
The successful securitisation of the river however introduces another actor: it is also a direct 
(or indirect, Ohana, 2007) way of condemning Others. It is to discredit the opposition to security 
policy as the ‗dragon‘s helper‘ – environmentalists, the deviance of greedy developers, lax local 
authorities, upstream interventions, climate change-inducing industries, whose behaviour 
presumably causes the danger to core values. ‗Dissidents can be silenced most effectively when 
they are portrayed as aiding the enemy‘ (Dalby, 2000: 13). A contested security project in turn 
presents its opponents with an opportunity to position themselves as alternative heroes in the 
tale, with the project initiator as ‗dragon‘s helper‘ (or ‗lion unleasher‘)  The present study not only 
found such stories for the Netherlands (after van Eeten, 1997) but also Bangladesh, Turkey and 
Britain. The initial antagonism of the ‗blue‘ and ‗green‘ coalitions, ‗engineers‘ and ‗sociologists‘, 
‗intruders‘ and ‗rebels‘  concerned a clash of two mirroring security stories delegitimising the 
opponent‘s values and narrative. The conflicting protagonists have reduced uncertainty by ‗filling 
out the blanks‘ with a security story that creates certainty about, or unimportance, of the facts of 
the matter - and by not communicating with each other. 
How about the ´princess´, supposed to be protected? Labelling a group or the environment as 
threatened reconstructs the identity of this group as vulnerable victims. It was noted in Chapter 8 
that local actors rarely feature in participatory designs for security schemes. It is not usual to 
interact with flood-prone citizens to learn if and how they would like to be protected. We found 
water departments find it very hard to consult rather than sell. Citizens are now included in some 
operational security activities such as neighbourhood or dike watch but are largely absent from 
hazard management arrangements which at best remain at the inter-institutional, corporatist level. 
States, but also NGOs have a tendency to present groups as vulnerable without consulting 
them on this (Allan, 2002). Bangladeshi NGOs have patron-client relations with the local poor, 
and in turn enjoy patronage from international donors. This makes it hard to assess the 
spontaneity of protests against projects. In Europe initiators and NGOs defended environmental 
values that were not uniformly shared by local citizens, so that their ‗green‘ moves were not 
felicitous with the local audience. There may be a very real cry for help (real demand for security), 
a voluntary offer to be another actor‘s protégé, but if this is assumed rather than expressed, there 
is question of instrumentalisation (‗hijacking‘) of intended beneficiaries. Like fairytales, we thus 
find neither the security nor the countersecurity coalitions are necessarily democratic. Positioning 
oneself as protector attributes agency to the (originator of the) threat, and passivity to the at-risk 
protégé, even if this passivity is not necessarily warranted.  
 
Invoking history and the politics of unease 
A positioning approach allows us to account for change. Due to interaction and learning, the 
former antagonists locked in defence dilemmas are now co-operating in consultative bodies, so 
that the neglected ‗princess‘ now has a voice. Yet, other cases show that learning can also mean 
learning to reproduce, intensify and develop variations of essentially the same conflict story – 
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with the flood or flood plans as recurring threats. This points us at the importance of a time 
element. 
Buzan et al. (1998: 29) expected environmental security speech to be mostly non-felicitous – at 
most, it results in politicization. The authors however concede that resonance with historic 
threats can make all the difference. In the Netherlands, the securitization of a high-water event 
that many do not consider a crisis proper triggered crisis legislation if the threat resonates with 
earlier traumatic events the (´saying dikes´), while in Britain, which does not have this historic 
resonance, floods that killed five residents in Middle England in 1998 did not. 
Now that the Dutch are contemplating a risk (adaptivity) rather than a hazard (dikes) 
approach, proponents of ‗dikes‘ frequently invoke a new threat: climate change. After Bigo (1998) 
this can be seen as essentially the same narrative. Rather than concentrating on unique (repeated) 
speech events, Bigo argues we should look for connections that weave them into a more 
coherent security narrative. He notices a ‗politics of unease‘, in which all manner and threat 
(migration, terrorism) are collated to ‗sell‘ technologies of surveillance and identification as the 
remedy (governmentality). The ´politics of unease´ thus legitimise all kinds of security measures 
that bring increased control of individual behaviour. 
Conceivably, though to my knowledge not contemplated by Bigo, counter-securitising 
coalitions may well be doing the same thing in their counter-hegemonic strategy. Action-oriented 
NGOs find (or declare) ‗crises‘ to operate their social or environmental advocacy role. NGOs 
have broader agendas for social change or environmental conservation, and are constantly on the 
look-out for any ‗mistakes‘, that create opportunities to delegitimise an adversary and make 
donors feel uneasy. This, it appears, is easy to do: mega-projects rarely are totally successful and 
often display glaring weak spots - environmental costs, resettlement, financial irregularities – 
which would easily be forgiven immediately after an actual crisis context, but not when that 
context is lacking. Successful protest against large infrastructural water projects in 1990 made 
international donors nervous – they could not afford to make mistakes.  
Incidental conflicts over dikes and zones resonate with other conflict legacies .- historic (often 
centre vs. periphery) grievances and underlying conflicts. Protest against controlled flooding in 
the Ooij built on earlier mobilisation against dike reinforcement, Limburg protesters were 
steeped in protest against gravelling. At the international level, protest against FAP-20, Ilısu and 
resonated earlier successes of locally focused international INGO protest (International Rivers 
Network, Friends of the Earth) against infrastructural works, such as Narmada, Arun and Pergau. 
This ‗jet stream‘ may well have provided a window for the countersecuritisation, and hence 
politicisation, of the flood protection schemes in Bangladesh and Turkey  The careful selection of 
multiple venues in the political system (forum shopping) enabled the anti-Ilısu and anti FAP 
coalitions to find an international hearing for their protests, breaking through the established 
local ‗equilibrium‘. Whether within or above the law, they opened the floor to contest the 
initiator‘s project frames – as bringing war not peace, destruction not development -  that not 
only delays or halts a project but promotes other agendas. 
The strategies used by national NGOs and local platforms in Europe and Asia Tangail and the 
Ooij polder (lawsuits, dramatic public protests, parliamentary lobbying) were successful in 
stopping a policy or its follow-up. All projects were seriously compromised or discredited by the 
opposition. Moreover, as noted some NGOs and CBOs gained a place at the table in the regime 
and influencing donor or hegemonic conditionalities imposed on river management schemes. 
This allowed some actors to have it both ways: to fight the project, but also benefit from it, both 
in terms of physical protection and of enhanced status resulting from protesting and negotiating 
enhancements.  
While un-securitisation (disarming securitising moves) and desecuritisation (undoing previously 
successful securitisations) strategies were mounted to take power away from an actor framed as 
enemy, to delay crucial decisions to prevent action, to take power away from an (institutional) 
actor, with a view not to getting certain things done. Alternatives were proposed, but none of the 
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options for protection worked out by consultants and retired civil engineers were actually tested 
and adopted. Calling off the project has not eliminated the risk for the flood-prone regions, and 
has not introduced an alternative technological frame.452 Since the flood risk is not ‗solved‘, 
‗solutions‘ can be resuscitated. Indeed, the modality for riverine flood management may have 
become controversial everywhere, all proposed technologies have reappeared in some form. 
Conflicts, therefore, can be expected to revived, too. 
 
With some irony, the above argument can be summarised as the ten-step Table 10.1 below:  
 
TABLE 10.1 Securitisation and countersecuritisation in ten easy steps  
How to securitise in ten easy steps 
 
How to countersecuritise in ten easy steps 
1. Select an issue that is sufficiently complex and 
uncertain 
1. Select an issue that is sufficiently complex and 
uncertain 
2. Identify or invent a crisis (injustice) to be 
overcome 
2. Identify or invent a crisis (injustice) to be 
overcome 
3. Present the particular view as the general 
interest 
 
3. Present the particular view as the general interest  
4. Attribute the problem to an 'other'  
 
4. Attribute the problem to an 'other'  
5. Present the issue as urgent and solvable 
 
5. Present the issue as urgent and dangerous 
6. Present yourself or a favoured actor as the 
hero of the story  
6. Present yourself or a favoured actor as the hero of 
the story 
7. Present yourself or a favoured actor as the 
victim of the story (e.g. in need of saving) 
7. Present yourself or a favoured actor as the victim 
of the story   
8. Mobilise the support of key audiences, 
including the help of a powerful donor 
8. Mobilise the support of key audiences, including 
the help of a powerful donor 
9. Turn word into action, if necessary placing 
yourself above the law 
9. Turn word into action, if necessarily placing 
yourself above the law 
10. If attention flags, bring in a new threat that 
warrants the same solution 
10. If attention flags, bring in a new threat that 
warrants the same protest 
 
 
10.5 STATE OVERBOARD? 
 
We have seen that both taming the flood and making peace with the river has easily translated 
into ‗war with stakeholders‘. The terms of security provision made sense at systems level, but 
rarely at local level. This invites the question if the systems level, privileged by ‗integrated water 
resource management‗ is necessarily the appropriate level. A critical perspective questions the 
state as key referent of security, arguing the individual or the planet should be privileged. State 
involvement may reduce but also create and promote risk and vulnerabilities for people and 
planet. Throwing the state overboard means relying on social solidarities and/or market forces.  
It is legitimate to ask what total non-securitisation of flood risk would mean: a reliance on 
societal self-help. The effective flood warning and country boat system in Bangladesh shows that 
emergency can overcome social constraints to include a wide range of actors in flood 
preparedness and response. The frequent recurrence of floods obviously maintains flood 
awareness, which is not available in floods that take more than a generation to recur. 
The vulnerability school in disaster studies echoes the concern of critical schools in society 
studies  about individual or group security, but distrusts the state or private sector to provide this 
for different reasons. For both the ‗Welsh school‘ in Aberystwyth (Booth, Wyn Jones, 
Linklater…) and the ‗Paris School‘ (Huysmans, Bigo…), governance does not bring the security 
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co-production and alignment envisaged by ‗water peace‘ narrative, but increased control (Table 
10.2 below). Vulnerability analysts, meanwhile, have noted that social resilience to all kinds of 
hazards is underestimated, and promoted investing in local resilience and preparedness. Disasters 
are opportunities at local level too, as they enact social networks and resources (Hilhorst, 2003). 
However, we have argued above that resistance to certain project does not mean local 
stakeholders do not make use of protection structures and have no demand for protection. 
10,000 Tangaili women protested against FAP-20, but others requested physical protection and 
those outside the embankments found refuge there in the 1998 flood. The protest against 
schemes such as Narmada or Maaswerken is not normally oriented against the very idea of 
development or flood protection, but against its modality and distribution effects. 
 
It is a fine line between control and self-governance: the former can be suffocating, the latter 
can become synonymous to abandonment, when no one looks out for Others any more in their 
hour of need. This invites a closer look at the challenge of countering disaster in the ‗logic of 
peace‘ of networked governance arrangement – one may visualise a ‗bazaar‘ of spontaneously 
organised social security interaction co-existing with the more customary ‗cathedral‘ of top-down 
management (Lankford and Hepworth, 2006). 
 
 
TABLE 10.2 Three approaches to security studies 
School 
 
Security is  Referent Theoretical background Regimes bring 
American  Stability of 
expectations 
State  Realism Stability: strong 
hegemon 
Copenhagen Peace, Cooperation State/ 
other 
Liberal Constructivism with 
realist roots 
Coordination: 
norms, values, 
procedures 
Welsh/Paris 
(Critical security 
studies) 
Emancipation Individual Radical (Political ecology) Control 
mechanisms 
 
 
A case for conditional securitisation 
In responding to contingencies, perhaps you cannot always privilege ‗choice‗ over ‗necessity‘, 
´deliberation´ over ´decision´. With our current state of knowledge, an earthquake cannot be 
deterred. The attraction of disaster securitisation, instead of the politics of neglect, is that it 
legitimises the human and capital investment in mechanisms to get things done, quick, on a large 
scale when the ‗opponent‘ does not play by your rules. When a tsunami is coming in your 
direction, both the certainty and values are clear. With a house is on fire, you will be unlikely to 
deliberate over liability and compensation with your neighbours over collateral damage, but call 
the fire brigade. The collateral damage to others as a result of dousing the flames can be dealt 
with later. When someone is an immediate danger to themselves or to others, police and aid 
workers are allowed to intervene without consultation (outreach – in Dutch bemoeizorg: unrequited 
care). 
To avoid being insecure at a crucial time, stakeholders are willing to abandon their sovereignty 
and delegate their political say to security suppliers. But legitimate intervention need not go 
completely unchecked. Liberal security analysts, including as the Copenhagen School, see the 
security mode is an undesirable that should at most be transitional. Is it possible to regulate the 
unregulated period of exception so that are rescuers and protectors are accountable for their 
actions?  
The treatment of flood victims, as much as other people temporary ´placed outside society´, 
requires a discussion on protocols, on rescue ethics – a Geneva Convention for crisis response. 
In this we can take a cue from Michael Ignatieff (2004), the Canadian social commentator-turned 
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politician who insists the state of exception is the ‗lesser evil‘ when your adversaries‘ actions are 
not as ethical as your own standards, and advocates putting security under democratic control 
and with a clear time delimitation – thus mixing wartime and peacetime modes of security 
governance.  
In the projects under review, there turned out to be structural links between the securitised and 
non-securitised ´spheres´ that acted as brakes on the suspension of choice and accountability. 
External actors imposed environmental, financial, socio-economic and political rights and 
obligations on project initiators - though it merits mentioning that economic conditionalities not 
only helped but also hurt stakeholder groups. These links however have also proved levers for 
donors to pay more attention to local stakeholder interests. It will be argued below that the 
currently prominent ‗integrated security chain‘ offers opportunities to institutionalise the links 
between securitised and non-securitised worlds. 
 
Security chain and networked security governance 
This is especially apposite the context of disaster preparedness, where the crisis is not imminent, 
so that there is time for deliberation as humanitarian crises bring immediate security needs. But 
water projects are not so much about disaster response as about disaster preparedness. The 
urgency involved in developing and instating flood protection schemes and policies, rarely 
warrants full securitization. The research noted that other (social and environmental) agendas 
were co-opted and adopted in these schemes, and different alternatives possible for which there 
was no urgent reason to overlook. Flood preparedness provides an opportunity to arrange this 
institutionally, to guarantee democratic accountability in the aftermath of the next crisis. 
An integrated security chain management has the potential of mixing security and non-security 
modes of risk governance. In the integrated security chain, repression (disaster response) is the 
fourth phase out of five: prevention, pro-action, preparation, repression and aftercare. While the initial 
disaster repression phase is probably best tackled by actors with coercive powers, the other 
phases are not restricted by urgency. These desecuritised phases widen the range of actors and 
bring in diversity of likely candidates, whose roles and identities may differ between the stages. 
Moreover, the stages are likely to overlap and the different links in the chain to be associated with 
different actors.  
A ‗water peace‘ logic fights complexity with complexity but may also suffer from the problems 
of the water peace logic. First, one need to be aware of a functionalist assumption in the water 
community that ‗good governance‘ can make actors work well with each other. Friesendorf 
(2007) notes that 
 
‗(n)etworks are (..) needed among actors with a similar outlook and between actors with a different 
outlook.‘ (…)  In addition to more balanced security governance, there is a need for better networked 
governance (Friesendorf, 2007, emphases in original). 
 
Currie Alder (2007) however has warned that participatory resource management can be a foil 
for resource capture, if it ignores underlying power divergence.  In the same vein, Warner, 
Hilhorst and Waalewijn (2002) qualify their recommendation for a multi-stakeholder approach to 
disaster preparedness by emphasising the need to understand why such platforms are promoted, 
and how the interests of less powerful groups are safeguarded. The functional co-ordination 
mechanisms in network governance can easily overlook the hegemony element and thus exclude 
important actor identities, needs, interests. 
The research however also found that the vulnerable, whether in- or excluded from the regime, 
do not face a solid ‗hegemonic bloc‘. One cannot assume the governance system to be 
consistently cooperative, the epistemic community consensual and the community united. 
Opposition in one domain can resist the call for consensus co-opting/enrolling dissidents in 
another domain who can say things that local groups or politicians cannot. Thus we saw alliances 
between community-based platforms and dissenting experts or regional governments.  
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Such mechanisms however require a level of structural awareness and engagement more likely 
to be raised in a conflict situation. In ‗peacetime‘, local actors are rarely well-organised and the 
tendency for all actors not to spend time on the first three phases before the event happens. This 
privileges the professional state and NGO actors indicated above at the table – until someone re-
securitises the issue. 
 
 
10.6 SECURITY MODES: A TYPOLOGY 
 
Finally, it is possible to re-systematise the three-mode approach to security decision-making 
(Table 10.3 after Buzan et al 1998: 28) 
 
 
TABLE 10.3 Three modes in which policy problems are treated (after Buzan et al. 1998).  
 
Mode 
 
Security 
perspective 
Politicised? Securitised? Legitimacy Instruments 
 
      
Security 
 
 
Emergency depoliticisation securitisation Mandate for 
fast-tracking 
martial law, 
special laws 
Politics 
 
 
Contestation politicisation desecuritisation To be won 
contested 
public debate, 
Supreme Court 
Action 
Normal 
 
 
non-urgent depoliticisation ‗undersecuri- 
tisation‘ 
Evident 
non-contested 
(Forsyth, 2003) 
competition 
self-regulation 
 
 
TABLE 10.4 Types of (security) policy problems (after Hisschemöller and Hoppe, 1996). Given their constructed 
nature, the agreement on values and facts cannot be taken for granted. The cells indicate which analytical approach focuses 
most on each cell. 
 High value convergence 
Depoliticisation  
Low value convergence 
(Re)politicisation 
High urgency 
Low uncertainty 
Securitised decision-making (emergency)    
HOBBESIANS 
 
 
Closure (by speech act) 
 
Politicisation     
MOUFFEIANS 
 
 
Open conflict, internalising 
antagonisms 
(by power of argument) 
 
Low urgency 
High uncertainty 
Managerial approach    
FOUCAULTIANS 
 
Routinisation 
(backgrounding the risk based on 
technical rationality) 
 
 
Technical control 
Joint learning   
HABERMASIANS 
 
Dialogue/Deliberative democracy (by 
power of the better argument) 
 
 
Mix of ‗fighting‘ and ‗learning‘ – no 
alternative for politics 
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Different strands in security studies have highlighted different alternatives to securitisation; 
(Mouffeian politicisation, Foucaultian managerialisation and Habermasian social learning) but to 
my surprise, these strands have not been brought together into a single framework. The research 
and its analysis permits me to expand and recast the way security problems can be handled in the 
below diagram, linked to problem types identified by Table 10.3 below (explained in Chapter 8). 
Of course the value convergence and urgency remain constructed rather than certain and 
therefore contestable. 
Such a table also enables us to trace the dynamics through time in different contexts. The case 
material on the six flood schemes shows all modalities to be in evidence, if with varying success. 
Context is of crucial import in the possible modalities of dealing with security policy problems. 
The securitised political context of the ‗dry basins‘ investigated obviously makes it easier to 
foreclose contest, although politicisation and deliberation is not impossible. Strong structural 
donor and NGO links enabled ‗amplification‘ of local protest. Countersecuritisation successfully 
compromised the projects and in places exacted reforms, but the managerial frame remained 
dominant, so that a meaningful dialogue never ensued. 
 
 
10.7 CONCLUSION  
 
Securitisers and countersecuritisers (politicisers) see opportunity in floods and conflicts over 
flood project to promote certain agendas. They use the same tricks of discursive persuasion and 
enrolling others for certain goals. Security speech action does not have to be from a position of 
authority, or even be about speech but promotes agendas that are otherwise less easily attained. 
As both initiators and opponents use the language of fear to convince key audiences, flood 
projects can be expected to lead to securitisation but also countersecuritisation, politicisation and 
conflict  
Pictured in very broad strokes, securitisers will seek to avoid the political process to get things 
done and are annoyed when the window of opportunity finally closes, while non- and counter-
securitisers will try to avoid securitisers getting certain things done. It is argued that rejecting or 
relativising security as a construction ignores express demand for protection in overwhelming 
disaster events, and politics expresses express concerns about the way this demand is met, so that 
both modalities should be taken seriously. Both securitisation and 
countersecuritisation/politicisation are facts of political life and both have their relative merits in 
relation to different types of policy problems. 
While extraordinary powers accruing to state actors can easily have worrying consequences in 
terms of control and constraints to rights and freedoms, it was proposed not to throw 
Securitisation out with the liberal bath water. It was noted in the introductory chapter that in a 
constructivist view, states are not only seen to play power games but also to puzzle (Checkel 
1999). In this puzzling process, not all state actors avoid blame, nor do they always they take 
credit without taking action, and their supply offer appears to be readily met by a demand. A 
disaster studies approach shows up the pluses of securitisation – swift action, a window for 
reconstruction breaking through entrenched contexts, but also the minuses. 
While the choice between ‗going with or without normal political rights‘ would appear to be 
easy, both may carry a high price for some actors. Integrated security chain brings a mix of 
traditional and non-traditional security actors in the different disaster domains, who will need to 
find a modus (co-)operandi in disaster pro-action, prevention and preparedness. The merits of 
conditional securitisation would need further exploration in future research. 
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Chapter 1 
 
1 Like the Realist conviction that states have always existed, this liberal narrative is not necessarily borne 
out by history. It appears an instance of another ‗invented past‘. Western European countries, including 
Britain have not been top-down but shared power with the middle class and a rich array of local rulers. 
Trottier (2004) points out that the state in Europe never exercised such a control over resources as it did 
in ‗oriental despotisms‘. Water only became a state concern in the 19th and 20th in most European 
countries (Blokland et al. 1999). 
2 One of the most well-known early authors on the Social Construction of Technology (SCOT), Langdon 
Winner (Winner 1980), has called attention to the viaducts by the American architect Moses as example of 
how technology can discriminate between, as private cars (owned by whites) could pass under them to go 
to beach while buses (blacks, dependent on public transport) could not. It is not proved that they were 
actually intended to have this segregating effect but it can easily (and has been) construed that way from a 
black-and-white ‗logic of equivalence‘. 
3 An emblematic (if not unproblematic) contrast is posed by two Chinese schools of river management: a 
closed  (‗Confucian‘) mode of flood regulation aimed at full control and discipline of the river coupled 
with social and self-discipline, while the Daoist teachings of Lao Tzu inspired an experimental approach in 
which the river is given more freedom to find its path :‗living with the river‘ (Li et al. 2004).  
4 Meijerink (2005) reviews four different theories of stability and change: He argues that the theories on 
advocacy coalitions (Sabatier), punctuated equilibrium (Baumgartner), multiple streams/window of 
opportunity (Cyert and March; Kingdon) and epistemic communities (Haas 1992) are quite 
complementary in explaining policy change. 
5 Young, Oran (1994). As Jägerskog (2003) notes, this is a close cousin to Hajer‘s (1995) ‗emblematic 
event‘ raising awareness on social vulnerability. 
6 Lees (2001) analyses how calling a ‗water crisis‘ in Israel in the 1990s marginalised farmers and as a 
consequence, changed the hydraulic mission. 
7 Because a ‗securitising move‘ (a move for closure) and ‗a securitisation‘ are sometimes conflated, I will at 
times use the stylistic contamination of ‗successful securitisation‘. 
8 Legitimacy combines the idea that there should be a difference between dominant and subordinate 
actors with an imputed common interest between the two (Beetham 1991: 72). This difference can be 
legitimised if the subaltern actor can be convinced that the more powerful actor‘s agenda represents the 
general interest Max Weber (1947) defined legitimate power as power that is regarded as legitimate - a 
constructivist viewpoint avant la lettre. For Weber, a power relationship is legitimate because it can be 
justified in terms of people's beliefs - there is congruence between power and beliefs, values and 
expectations that provide its justification. 
9 The Santiago School, supported by Stafford Beer and others, experimented with a socio-cybernetic 
system that would communicate feedbacks about people´s needs in under Salvador Allende‘s Chile. But 
the need for government to retain control can be an incentive to use the same complexity to assess risk 
and deviance. 
10 Frustratingly Laclau and Mouffe (1993) did not provide a complete methodology either. Lindahl and 
Sundset (2003) usefully developed the generative concepts proposed by Laclau and Mouffe and linked 
them with the work of the Copenhagen School in their research on the securitisation of HIV-AIDS. 
Davidsen (2006) has similarly applied this framework to the water sector in his discursive analysis of South 
African hydropolitics. 
11 A grand narrative or meta-narratives is a narrative about narrative that brings a comprehensive 
explanation of a historical experience or knowledge. A grand narrative is a ―global and totalising schema 
which orders and explains knowledge and experiences‖ (Stephens, 1998). 
12 In the tradition of Pierre Bourdieu‘s concepts of ‗field‘ and ‗habitus‘, Unlike the natural world, human 
behaviour, is not simply the effect of external forces acting upon it; human beings actively and 
purposefully act on in response to their environment. The ‗security field‗ to Bigo is a logic integrating 
heterogeneous practices into a specific concrete manifestation of the rules defining security practices (or 
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‗formation‘). Society organizes risks by providing an institutional environment which plays a central role in 
the production and regulation of particular risks. 
13 According to Mason et al. (citing Knoepfel) the ‗degree of participation of different actors group in the 
policy or project formulation, implementation and evaluation directly affects the acceptability and 
implementation of (...) national and international policies‗…[These are] ‗determined by the openness or 
closure of national and international regimes with regard onto the demands of interest groups‘ (Mason, et 
al., 2003: 9)  
14 Czarniawska for example (2001) contrasts how a local streetcar accident is reported in Swedish and 
Italian media respectively, contrasting Northern dry understatement with Southern European hyperbole 
and drama. 
15 There is considerable difference of opinion within the methodological literature about the proper 
terminology for the person who provided information used as research data: ‗subject‘, ‗respondent‘, 
‗informant‘ are in use. For the purposes of this thesis, the term ‗informant‘ refers to anyone who has 
provided information outside the context of a formal interview. Those asked to be interviewed are 
referred to here as ‗interviewees‘. Interviewees have been recorded semi-verbatim. 
16 In one memorable instance however I had to wrap up an interesting but interminable interview (it lasted 
a good three hours) for sheer attrition - I noticed my own level of attention started to drop to 
unacceptable levels, combined with a developing pain in my right (writing) hand. This interviewee 
graciously accepted to continue the talk at a later date without apparent difficulty. 
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participation… were either overlooked or totally absent in the original‘. GAP,-RDA  (2002),.Master Plan. 
Background of the Southeast Anatolia Project, www.gap.gov.tr/EnglishGgbilgi/gtarihce.html/ 
129 Ilisu Engineering Group (2001), Ilisu Dam and HEPP - Environmental Impact Assessment Report 
http://www.ecgd.gov.uk. 
130 Morvaridi, Behrooz (1999), Stakeholders Attitudes to Involuntary Resettlement in the Context of the 
Ilisu Dam Project Turkey, London: Foreign Office, Export Credits Guarantee Department 
http://www.ecgd.gov.uk/lrgtxt/Ilisusocialreviewreport240602.doc 
131 Reported in, e.g. http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2000/12/1201_turkey.html. 
132 The European Union‘s antitrust agency summoned Siemens to sell the hydro-electricity part of its 
daughter VA-Tech. The asking price is assessed at 300 million euros, including the Ilisu project (Brennsell 
2005). 
133 Laura Smith-Spark, Turkey dam project back to haunt Kurds, 5 August 2006, BBC News; Emíne 
Kart/Fulya Özerkan, Ilisu Dam: A gold necklace for Tigris or a rope around Hasankeyf‘s neck, Turkish 
Daily News, 13 August 2006. 
http://hasankeyfesadakat.kesfetmekicinbak.com/news/00140/ 
134 In Turkey itself, the press reports professional criticism a ‗mechanical way of dealing with history‘ 
Ethem Torunoğlu, the head of a honorary board of the Turkish Union of Engineers and Architects 
Chambers' (TMMOB) Chamber of Environmental Engineers. 
135 ´Turkije leent miljard voor bouw omstreden dam´, Engineering 360o, 15 Aug 2007 
www.engineering360.nl. 
136 http://www.livius.org/men-mh/mesopotamia/tigris.html. 
137  The below bizarre (and not very factual) 2003 quote from CIA´s Stephen Pelletier in the New York 
Times (q. in Selby 2005) seems to give an indication of how at least some overheated Americans in high 
places think:  
´We are constantly reminded that Iraq has perhaps the world‘s largest reserves of oil. But in a 
regional and perhaps even geopolitical sense, it may be more important that Iraq has the most 
extensive river system in the Middle East. In the 1990s there was much discussion over the 
construction of a so-called Peace Pipeline that would bring the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates 
south to the parched Gulf States and, by extension, Israel. No progress has been made on this, 
largely because of Iraqi intransigence. With Iraq in American hands, of course, all that could change. 
Thus America could alter the destiny of the Middle East in a way that probably could not be changed 
for decades—not solely by controlling Iraq‘s oil, but by controlling its water. 
 
 
Chapter 4 
 
138 Leo Lewis (2007), Water shortages are likely to be trigger for wars, says UN chief Ban Ki Moon, The 
Times Online, 4 December 2007. The World Wildlife Fund requests signatures for the UN Convention on 
the non-navigational uses of water with the slogan: ‗Add your face to our online petition to stop water 
wars‘ http://www.wdm.org.uk/campaigns/water/action/stopwaterwars/ 
139 or meta- narrative, a narrative about a narrative, a ―global and totalising schema which orders and 
explains knowledge and experiences‖ (Www.wikipedia.com) 
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140 The discipline of International Relations has never managed to rally around a single concept or theory 
of state, power and security. It is customary to identify three or four ‗debates‘ or ‗paradigms‘. Viotti and 
Kauppi (1999) - Paul Viotti and Mark Kauppi, ―International Relations Theory,‖ 3rd Edition (Boston: 
Allyn and Bacon, 1999) for example have identified Realism, Pluralism, Globalism as main schools for 
educational purposes. This multiplicity is echoed in the emerging discipline of international hydropolitics 
identified by Waever (1997) however has noted that the debates are far more dynamic than that, and the 
goalposts have changed. 
141 http://www.worldwatercouncil.org/index.php?id=25 web page accessed 27 Aug 2005 
142 www.salwenpr.com/files/regenesiswaterwarsrelease.pdf 
143 The phrase was coined in the 1950s by John Herz (1951) when fear of nuclear destruction persuaded 
people to pronounce they would prefer to be Red than dead. In global terms, to foreclose (or avenge) any 
infringement on their territory, the US feels legitimised to infringe on other countries´ sovereignty, 
eliciting resentment (Hassner‘s ‗empire of force‘). 
144 A river basin is the area of land from which all surface run-off flows through a sequence of streams, 
rivers and lakes into the sea at a single river mouth, estuary or delta. In: European Environmental Agency 
multilingual environmental glossary, http://glossary.eea.eu.int/EEAGlossary/R/river_basin, 2 February 
2003. 
145 Critical analysts have pointed out that the call for hegemonic order was matched by a ready supply. The 
end of the Cold War had put the purveyors of (American) statecraft into an existential crisis (Ó Tuathail 
1999). The US had come out as the victorious, reigning global power, but what, who was the enemy? The 
world found itself with an introspective hegemon, while the Pentagon found itself without a clear mission. 
A debate in academic and security policy circles ensued whether the concept of security‘ should be 
enlarged to include economic and environmental conflict. 
146 After Molle (2003) I will take Turton and Ohlsson as a ‗strawman example‘, mindful that there are 
several similar accounts, such as Gardiner, Molden and Newson, and indeed, as I have no rights to cast 
the first stone, Green and Warner (1999) and Warner and Turton (2000). 
147 http://www.lrcj.org/Studies/Strategies_Soil_Mediterranean/Strategies_Soil_Mediterranean.htm. 
Idisagree here with Turton who appears to see complexity as a threat to security. 
148 According to the Corner House, an activist NGO, Turkey refused the Commission to investigate Ilısu 
as a case. 
149 www.aber.ac.uk/media/Documents/S4B/sem02a.html 
150 Likewise, the water department as the principal resource manager has become institutionalised as if 
they have always been there but this state of affairs can be ‗de-‗ and ‗reconstructed‘. 
151 Kooiman, and currently Teisman at Rotterdam School of Management pioneered the application of   
complexity science in their studies of governance. 
152 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (1994), Human Development Report 1994, New 
York, United Nations. 
153 According to Brouma (2003), there are three narratives of the change from modernity to post-
modernity: shock, evolution and mutual engagement. I will not go into the non-shock alternatives here 
bujta acknowledge their validity 
154 some of whom are not even from or in Copenhagen (Buzan is British and de Wilde Dutch) 
155 and therefore is branded more ‗European‘. 
156 When facing stress or shock, there are two extremes of adaptive response responding. One is the hard 
surface, closely-coupled, the tit for-tat, all-out, one-size fits all, centralised, homogenised approach., 
containment, the show of force - the Hammer. At the other end of the scale, we find the loosely-coupled, 
modular system: the Sponge. Complexity studies advocates modularity, redundancy, to cushion and spread 
shock impact 
157 Jyrki Käkonen (1988), Natural Resource Conflicts and Changes in the International System. Three 
Studies on Imperialism, Avebury. 
158 In Barcelona 80,000 families reused to pay their water bills in protest of low quality and high rates. 
159 This dual focus interestingly links the two attractors of psychological security, ‗eros‘ and ‗thanatos‘, or 
the bottom and the top of Maslow‘s pyramid of needs (Warner 2004). 
160 We have seen that the ´Lockeian´ water peace narrative protects property rights  For Locke, like for the 
ancient Greeks, the definition citizenship only pertains to those who have possessions, that is, something 
to lose. ´Enclosure´ refers to the development of agricultural capitalism in Britain, in which the commons 
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were enclosed for mass agricultural production (‗sheep ate men‘) creating a class of landless, disenfranchised 
citizens. This ‗social closure‘ thus excludes the poor and landless who till the commons. In the case of 
Cochabamba, as in other countries where water was privatized (e.g. Chile), traditional rights were negated. 
161 Based on the work of the anthropologist Eric Wolf, Johnson and Donahue (1998: 346) identify three 
types of water management, based on three different values of water: political, economic and social 
(cultural). The third narrative stresses the social value of water. 
162 The water hegemony narrative depicted here should not be equated with the current developments on 
hydro-hegemony in the London Water Issues Group. While sharing many concerns of equity and power 
asymmetry with critical scholarship, the London group is more heterogeneous in outlook and seeks to 
engage in active dialogue with policymakers and water practitioners. For an introduction to the hydro-
hegemony ‗school‘, see Zeitoun and Warner 2006.     
163 Overlay occurs when ‗one or more external powers move directly into the local complex with the effect 
of suppressing the indigenous security dynamic‘. Barry Buzan (1991) 
164 Davidsen (2006) arrives at the same conclusion on Southern Africa. 
165 As Waever has noted (1997),  a ´neo-neo-consensus´ appears to have emerged in the discipline of 
International Relations, with ‗neo-liberals‘ roughly agreeing with ‗neo-Realists‘.  
166 These authorsr however focus on the legal regime only; see also Mbaziira et al, n.d., on the upstream 
regime. 
167 Wendt (1999) calls these states Hobbesian, Lockeian and Kantian states respectively. Kantians (or 
Gtrotians, after Grotius´ De bello ac Pace) believe politics can be  overcome  as we inexorably move 
towards a peaceful world society. I did not encounter instances of Kantianism in the present study. 
168 Dore (2007) shows there is still an abundance of regional water conflict factors at several levels. 
169 From a political ecology perspective, meshing very well with the approach taken in the present study, 
Waller (1994) defines regimes as 
 
‗...society‘s management and use of a natural resource, both the means used to extract a resource like 
water from the natural environment to the ends towards which its exploitation is directed, is (…) 
structured under a set of legal statutes, social norms, cultural practices and political institutions. Given 
the ability of modern technology to control nature, these rules, values, habits, laws, regulations, public 
policies, authorities and bureaucratic agencies, now largely determine our relationship with a natural 
resource. A water management regime, then, includes the knowledge, organizations and human choices 
which determine who gets water and when, from where and for what purpose and price, and how it can 
and should be used‘ (Waller, 1994: 16). 
 
170 "Either the text can effect closure of a problem via a meconnaissance which denies the Other, or it can 
give new meaning to a problem via recognition of a problematic which denies not the Other but the 
Other's already known conditions of existence" (Burton & Carlen, 1979: 33). In official discourse a 
situation or a problem is "closed" by the displacement of one paradigm by another. It is no accident that 
discourse analysis has been characterized as deconstruction in order to point out that the goal of analysis 
is disclosing something that was consciously or unconsciously "closed". 
171 http://www.svf.uib.no/sfu/oestigaard/ArtiklerWeb/Australia/Oestigaard_Water.pdf 
 
 
Chapter 5 
 
172 In 1995, FAP-20 was rechristened the Compartmentalization Pilot Project, which confusingly shares its 
acronym (CPP) with a subsequent Bangladeshi scheme, the Coastal Protection Project. For that reason, 
the present document will generally refer to FAP-20 despite the name change. 
173 Sharmeen Murshid, ‗Water Discourse. Where Have All the Women Gone?‘; The Daily Star; no. 322, 15 
July 1998 and 17 November 1999. 
174 In practice the World Bank approach was quite hands-off, especially after 1991-2 when the Narmada 
Dam controversy erupted in neighbouring India. As a result, respondents are equally split between those 
who feel the Bank did a fair job, and those who feel they made a shambles of it. 
175 Germany also invested 39 Million Deutschmark in the Jamuna protection and stabilisation project FAP 
21/22.  
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176 http://www.sed.manchester.ac.uk/research/ippg/PDF/IPPGCountryStudyNo2.pdf 
177 Thus BRAC moved from Relief Assistance to Rural Advancement.  
178 http://www.transparency.org/news_room/in_focus/2006/cpi_2006__1/cpi_table 
179 NGOs cannot escape the spiral of corruption. The NGO desk is under the Prime Minister's Office, 
which reportedly demands bribes for its services. The desk can decide whether an NGO is eligible for an 
internationally funded project. Due to the politicisation of aid policy, the desk may be tempted to give the 
go-ahead to projects that may be harmful to government policies (ints BNGO). The national security 
argument can be exercised, Ahmed (1999) quotes from a 1988 circular: 'The participation of NGOs in 
development will be encouraged if otherwise not found detrimental to government policy or national 
security'. 
180 ‗Hague wants to place FAP before JS", Daily Star, 4 June 1994. 
181 The endless political strikes have been so disruptive to economic life that the Chambers of Commerce 
have intervened in politics, though some claim that this serves the political ambitions of individuals rather 
than the sectoral interest (Kochanek 2000). 
182 e.g. Nizam Ahmed (2003), From Monopoly to Competition: Party Politics in the Bangladesh 
Parliament (1973 - 2001), Pacific Affairs, 76 (1) 1, pp.55-77, Owen Lippert (2005), ‗Overcoming 
Bangladesh's democratic deficit‘, Inroads, Summer 2005. 
183 A good example are the Association of Engineers of Bangladesh Water Development Board's 
'Comments on draft Bangladesh Water and Flood Management Strategy proposal by FPCO in March', 
1995). 
184 Apart from the issue whether they are equipped for this, it is the fundamental prerogative of the 
executive to set conditions and evaluation standards. 
185 The ‗basket case‘ label, carelessly applied to Bangladesh by Henry Kissinger worrying about that the 
country‘s poverty could tilt it towards communism, has stuck and reinforced the view of a country that 
cannot take care of itself. In addition to its admittedly weak economy, the aid community portrayed 
Bangladesh as having one of the most fragile, vulnerable environments in the world, threatened by 
uncontrollable dangers ranging from India‘s Farakka Dam to deforestation in the Himalayas and sea-level 
rise (Bradnock & Saunders 2000). Because of its booming population, land is in critically short supply, and 
forever threatened by uncontrollable waters. 
186 Japan is currently the biggest bilateral aid donor followed by the US (Kronstadt 2003). 
187 http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTWSS/Resources/337301-
1147283795581/FloodStrategyatWorldBank.pdf 
188 FAO, The State of Food and Agriculture (SOFA) 1997.. 
189 http://www.fao.org/ag/agL/swlwpnr/reports/y_sa/z_bd/bd.htm#hazards 
190 The resentment and frustration over this Indian move is echoed in the comments by the Bangladesh 
Association of Water and Power Engineers. A paragraph in the 1995 National water strategy (FPCO) 
predicting the drying up of the Ganges below Farakka was slammed by the Association as 'suicidal' rather 
than a realistic resignation to regional geopolitical realities. 
191 Troubled by the Farakka dam, Bangladesh raised the Ganges issue with the UN General Assembly in 
1976, leading to n agreement in 1977. India was however slow to renew the agreement. Bangladaesh 
mooted its own Ganges barrage in the 1970s, but has not yet built it. In 1996 a treaty to share water on 
shared rivers between India and Bangladesh. India‘s river linking plan however would transfer water out 
of the Brahmaputra into the Ganges. Reservoirs have been built in India on the southern Ganga branches, 
but not yet on the northern ones that affect Bangladesh.(ur-Rashid 2005. Harun ur-Rashid, ‗How can 
Bangladesh respond to Indian river-linking proposal?‘, 5 January 2005, Daily Star, Dhaka. 
192 'The arrogance! What he says is right and he won't listen to anyone else (…) He is a liar.' (pers comm.) 
193 The Surface Water Modelling Centre, Dhaka, has continued to model a sequence of compartments 
along the Jamuna despite the abandonment of compartmentalisation. 
194 http://www.kfw-entwicklungsbank.de/EN_Home/Evaluation/Further_Information/Ex-
posteva43/PDF-Dokumente/bangladesh_com.pdf 
195 FAP Monitor 4, 2(1), RAS, July 1996. 
196 Outraged, Van der Laan protested, but on his return, it was too late to stop it. Anyway, 'The Hague was 
okay with anything' (interview Dutch consultant). Euroconsult was unhappy too, and decided to build the 
sluices without the gates - these would have to await the participatory process (Jansen q. in Smit 1993). 
Piet Wit, who participated in the Dutch ministerial mission is quoted (in Smit 1993) as hinting that this 
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stance may well be about the rich pickings to be had from construction. Whichever the case may be, Dirk 
Frans, the sociologist who devised the alternatives, left the project in a huff over this, but came back 
several times to help out and is now again involved in the Asian Development Bank´s Southwest Area 
IWRM project. 
197 There is of course a predictable overlap in stakeholder identities – boatmen may double as farmers or 
fishermen, who in turn may be women. Also landowners tend to diversify between plots at different 
altitudes and had plots inside and outside the project area. 
198 It was open to manipulation by literate local leaders and project staff. A report by UST, another 
Dhaka-based NGO (Kalimullah et al 1995) claims chawk committees were selected ‗by hook and by crook‘ 
by lFAP authorities. NGOs report physical threats on the part of musclemen hired by contractors. 
199 For a critique of this report, see W. van Ellen, 'Om de toekomst van Bangladesh', Trouw, 13-6-1995. 
200 in ten meetings held between April and November 1992 (published March 1993), the tortuous genesis 
of which is detailed in Hanchett (1997), who was involved in them. 
201 A fatalist mindset; for an analysis within a cultural-theory framework, see Warner, 2006b. 
202 To be fair on the French, FAP projects that were eventually adopted by Franch did include 
experiments participation. 
203 For example, the Dutch Inspectorate‘s report on FAP 20 (IOV 1993) loosely mentions security 
without explaining it, while the UNDP (Faaland et al., 1995) speaks of 'security, productivity and other 
development objectives' which places security square in the middle of a modernisation drive. The fifth of 
the Eleven Guiding Principles requires the 'safe conveyance of the large scale cross border flows to the 
Bay of Bengal' without explaining how safe and for whom it should be safe. 
204 While the World Bank put the death toll in those two years at more than 3000, and the official number 
was put at 2379204, Saleemul Huq (BCAS) claimed that ‗(t)he floods claimed only few victims, about 2000‘ 
(Salm 1995), Wood (1999) puts the figure at 1800 while Proshika puts the number at ‗only 1500 - a lot 
fewer than are killed in traffic each year‘ (Salm 1994). FPCO‘s Kamal Siddiqi quotes the same number. 
According to Pieter Smit, a critical Dutch political scientist, even that number is strongly exaggerated 
(Smit, 1993). 
205 'Govt urged to suspend FAP activities', Daily Star, 26 November 1995. 
206 Although the UNDP report seems to advocate a critical engagement even with this assumption, noting 
the urban bias does not bode well for the urban poor (Faaland et al., 1995). 
207 We should not be too idealistic about the beel as a 'common pool resource', though. While open-access 
de jure, there are unofficial de facto (nested) property rights. These informal rights may take precedence 
over formal rights. 
208 The implication of controlled flooding is to sacrifice less valuable land for the benefit of more valuable 
land. Parker (1992) for example predicted that the embanking programme would increase the number of 
homeless as their land would be acquired to accommodate embankments and for sources of earth. This 
was not communicated 
209 However conflicts are not always so clear-cut as people who own land on one side of the embankment 
may live on the other side. 
210 While the FAP case was not selected for the main event, its case generated considerable publicity when 
it was brought forward at the 2nd International Water Tribunal in Amsterdam in 1992. 
211 It may be countered that NGOs had aligned themselves quite early on in two umbrella organisations, 
ADAB and CEN, and that they were very well informed "through the grapevine" about each other's work. 
212 Which, for the poor, is almost synonymous to saving lives. 
213 To be eligible for services, some interviewees argue, the poor need to sign up to NGO membership, 
which lands them into a patron-client relationship with the NGO, which as a quid pro quo may require 
their loyal participation in protest activ 
214 Beckers, Verspaget, Tommel, Terpstra.  
215 A Dutch consultant notes that Tangail however is a rather different setting - Dakatia is a tidal, undiked 
area, Tangail was part-embanked and has no influence from tidal motion (int Dcon 1). 
216 FAP 3.1 (Jamalpur), built on a compartmentalisation concept similar to FAP-20, became controversial 
as the 1.5 million char dwellers living in and in the strech of theJamuna immediately adjacent to the project 
area demanded protection and other protests over impeded fish migration and compensation. It was 
claimed that in total, FAP 3.1 would displace 6 million people. The original terms were radically revised to 
provide for flood proofing (UNDP 1995). When first the European Parliament called for a moratorium 
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on construction (Bangladesh Environmental Newsletter 6(2), April-June 1995), and later on the Dutch and 
German donor balked (See below), pushed by persistent NGO protest, the participation aspect was 
eventually significantly upgraded. 
217 When there is resistance to a project, the Asian Development Bank, the World Bank‘s regional sister, 
'gets the highest managers in and forms a very heavy evaluatory commission. NGOs play on that, it's an 
instrument of political power.' (interview, Dutch consultant con3) 
218 In the 1994 BELA case, FAP-20 was also claimed to endanger two archaeological sites listed under the 
Antiquities Act, 1968:  the Attia Mosque and the Kadim Mamdani Mosque. Mohiuddin Farooque and 
Sekandar Ali Mondol vs. Bangladesh (in Writ Petition No. 998 of 1994), in UNEP Partnership for the 
Development of Environmental Law and Institutions in Africa (PADELIA)  (2001), Compendium of 
Judicial Decisions on Matters Related to Environment, Vol. II National issues pp. 112-128, 
http://www.unep.org/padelia/publications/Compendium_Vol__II.pdf 
219 Bangladesh Observer, 6 September 1996. 
220 The Court however ruled in 1997 the Minister should draft new bye-laws to regulate compensation. 
221 This fifty-fifty partition is for the dry season (March-June). In case the flow below Farakka is 70,000 
cubic feet per second (cusecs) or less –  if the amount is between 70 and 75,000, Bangladesh receives 
35,000 and India the balance; if over 80,000 cusecs Bangladesh gets 40,000 and India again gets the 
balance (Sands 1997). 
222 ‗India zal water Ganges delen met Bangladesh‘, De Volkskrant 14-12-1996. 
223 Natural causes were claimed by officials. Alternative stories quickly emerged: some Bangladeshi 
interviewees claim to have heard explosions  reinforcing a local feeling their area was the site of a real-life 
experiment. Others (mainly Dutch) say one bank may have been strategically eroded so that it would 
collapse at the next major wave action in due course, while the then Team Leader claims it was unclogged 
by hand paid for by the World Food Programme. 
224 Bangladesh Ministry of Water Resources, ‗Report on the Flood Action Plan‘, 1994 
225 The Indian Farakka Dam was built on the Ganges without prior consultation with Bangladesh in 1975, 
to conserve water from the river Hooghly for the winter season. Even bigger projects to solve 
Bangladesh‘s flood problems include international schemes, notably upstream dams in Nepal and Assam. 
A problem however is that these will have a marginal effect on the water level (Berne University 1995). 
226  This aspect was indeed firm in the minds of the local population: the FAP-20 recipients identified 
'flood control' as the project's number one objective, rather than 'water management' (Shamunnay 1996). 
227 As the Bank-Netherlands Partnership programme puts it:  
‗The donor community criticizes [sic] the BWDB for a long period of time. The focus of the critiques 
is the incapability of the BWDB to incorporate integrated and participatory approaches in project 
development, to transfer projects to local stakeholders and to work in a transparent and accountable 
manner. Therefore the BWDB has become a less attractive partner for international financiers and 
donors.‘  
(www-esd.worldbank.org/bnwpp/index.cfm?display=display_activity&AID=64&Item=4 
228 A Diploma Engineer does not have a university education, which according to a BDWB interviewee is 
symptomatic of the low status accorded to FAP 20. 
229 The ‗epistemic community‘ approach to regimes developed by P. Haas (1992) sees regimes as a way of 
reducing ‗noise‘ in providing a clearing house for information, enabling the participating actors to learn. 
New functional knowledge may lead to evolutionary change, changing rules and procedures as the regime 
‗learns‘, or revolutionary change, generating new principles and norms. ‗Epistemic communities‘ converge 
on a body of accepted scientific procedure and evidence. 
230 When in the end, a proper hydrological model was drawn up, which by a stroke of luck turned out to 
have unexpected benefit in flood prediction (Bcon3). 
231  This fulfilled the catastrophic potential of rivers predicted by the Bengali professor Mahalanobis in 
1927 and later in 1964, by the Dutch Professor Thijsse. This cast new doubt on the control paradigm that 
was already sown when the Mississippi flood showed the impossibility of taming some floods - a message 
that was carried over into the Hughes report on Bangladesh, on which Shapan Adnan co-authored 
(Hughes et al. 1994). 
232 Such symbolism may be galling for the project‘s initiators, but by no means unheard-of (cf. the Jangali 
Canal in Sudan which became the focus of the civil war there, Gap for the Kurdish uprising and 
Maaswerken for East/West relations. 
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233 for powerful pumps to support the drainage of polders - in this respect the experiences are not very 
different from the mixed results of poldering in Bangladesh. 
234 http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/19701.pdf  
235 Water security is now defined to mean that all people, including the world‘s poor,  
 have access to water services to meet their basic needs  
 are able to take advantage of the opportunities that water resources provide  
 are protected from water-related hazards  
 have recourse where conflicts over water arise. 
 
 
Chapter 6 
 
236 The Maas has 30 tributaries, some of which cross country borders, so that catchment in fact includes 
Luxembourg and a minor part of Germany. 
237 See Dossier Cllr G. Meerten (Unie 55plus), http://www.sdnl.nl/meerten8.htm 
238 It should be noted that in Dutch, 'flood' translates as overstroming (flood, inundation) as well as 
hoogwateroverlast (inconvenience/nuisance caused by high water'). The semantic difference came crucial in 
1995, when there was no flood crisis, though the water did cause nuisance on the Maas in Limburg. In the 
chapter, Dutch hoogwater will be represented by the admittedly inelegant literal translation ‗high water 
(event)‘ to differentiate it from a flood (crisis) event. 
239 Alternative 2b involves: ‗(1) combined gravel and sand mining and nature development in the 
Grensmaas, (2) combined floodplain lowering and sand sand mining in the Maas between tussen 
Roermond and Mook, (3) constructing 60 km of kade in locations where the water level does not drop 
enough as a result of part(1) and (2), (4) administrative spatial planning measures (e.g. zoning, JW) to 
prevent future damage and (5) modifications in sewerage and other small-scale measures at municipale 
scale.' (Teisman 1995, my translation) 
240 This story was related to me resolutely off the record by a Delft-based consultant, then confirmed by a 
local interviewee. 
241 Examples are the Royal Dutch Societ of Geographers (KNAG) e-conference, 1 April 1999; De 
Volkskrant, 13 March 2000. 
242  VPRO De Ochtenden, Radio 1, 12 and 15 June 2001. 
243 ‗De Maas zou nóg meer ruimte moeten krijgen‘, De Volkskrant. 26 February 2002. 
244 Van der Ven is quoted approvingly by a Mook spokesman in De Gelderlander, 2 June 1999. 
245 Still, one interviewee was disappointed that Van der Ven‘s challenges did not generate a more lively 
exchange of views. ‘It is telling how his criticism was not picked up in the press and the debate died down. 
In a way that is unfortunate'. 
246 'Irritatie, ergernis en zorg over te lage Maasdijken', De Gelderlander, 15 June 1999. 
247 'Van Voorst tot Voorst: Maas had hoger gemogen', de Limburger, ed. Zuid, 21 January 2000. 
248 'Geen magere alternatieven voor de Maas, De Gelderlander, 10 June 1999. 
249  Adapting the channel, bridges and harbour facilities facilitating four-layer cargo, enabled shipping 
capacity to go up from 40 to 60 tonnes of cargo. The arrival of a new, shipping-oriented Minister for 
Transport in 1998 boosted the Maas route element of the project, in so doing promoting the project as a 
whole. While the Maas route did not bring about as much controversy, it did lead to a (sustained) appeal 
to the Council of State over houses being torn down and natural values to be sacrificed for improved 
navigation in the Juliana Channel, which runs alongside the Common Maas. This forced the Maaswerken 
to go back to the drawing board for alternatives. ‗De Maaswerken: verbreding Julianakanaal zonder 
ingrijpende afgravingen‘, De Limburger, 14 December 2004. 
250 On KNAG Discussieforum, response to article by G.P. van der Ven. 
251 Peet Adams, ‗Een brave straatvechter‘, De Limburger, 5 June 2002. 
252 Math Vestjens was one of the most fervent defenders against deprioritisation of the project ever since 
taking office in the Provincial Council in 1995 and the Provincial authority in 1998.  
253 The ‗risk equation‘ (supply and demand) can be said to be unbalanced when the threats or risks are not 
balanced by pledges to take responsibility for them. This was the case for Maaswerken project. 
254 The dredging industry has complained that ‗(p)otentially more cost-effective measures are not even 
considered‘ VBKO (Vereniging van Waterbouwers en Bagger-, kust- en oeverwerken), Hoofdzaken in 1997.  
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To my knowledge the dredgers have not come up with a new alternative however. 
255 De Limburger, 29 November 1997 and 1 December 1997. 
256 Twan Mientjens, ‗Niet tornen aan budget Zandmaas‘, De Limburger, 15 June 2001. 
257 Peet Adams, ‗Lobby-offensief voor Grensmaas‘, De Limburger, 3 July 2003. 
258 ‗Geen zin in grind Grensmaas‘, De Limburger, 27 April 2001; ‘Provincie Limburg wil Maasplassen 
terugkopen‘, De Volkskrant, 27 september 1999. Unie 55+, one of two minor political parties representing 
the elderly at the time, also took up the issue of Aqua Terra and published its letters to the Minister and 
Provincial authorities on-line; the documents are available from http://www.sdnl.nl. 
259 Councillor G. Koopman, who made this observation, soon was to move on to the House of 
Commons, where, in 2004, he demanded an investigation on the part of the State Comptroller into the 
financial management of the Maaswerken project organisation. 
260 'Vestjens voelt geen pressie bij koop van Maasplassen', De Limburger, 19 June 1999. 
261 Equivalent to the Department of Trade and Industry in the UK. 
262 K. Wu, Rijkswaterstaat communication officer, quoted in J. Dohmen and J. van der Sande, ‗Tegenslag 
voor ‗krankzinnig plan‗, NRC, 20 March 1999. 
263 Despite the policy guideline RWS was negotiating with municipalities to allow only very limited 
construction in the floodplain, the Minister for Transport granted Oolder Veste, a new residential area, 
'pipeline status' which means dispensation from the moratorium on building in the floodplain (Wolsink 
2006). T de Haan, then Chief Inspector for Limburg, is unhappy about it from a river management 
perspective. 'But once the Minister has decided, this is a 'hard fact' for us we cannot contravene' 
('"Slaapverwekkend of rond-Hollands" betogen over Oolder Veste', De Limburger, 23 December 1999. 
264 Social organisations can have academic research carried out at a reduced or waived fee at a 
Wetenschapswinkel. It published 10 volumes of research on the Grensmaas in 1997 and 1998. 
265 The front page shows a severely flooded pedestrian crossing; only the post stick peers out from the 
water to underscore the message on page 2, that the 'damage and consequences of the high waters in 1993 
and 1995 are still etched in everyone's memories'. 
266 http://www.rijkswaterstaat.nl/wateroverzicht/maaswerken/, accessed March 2006. 
267 Nieuwsnet Limburg, 27 May 1999. 
268 De Gelderlander, 10 June 1999. 
269 De Limburger, 12 March 1999. 
270 ‗Maaswerken van start. ik durf nu hier te blijven', De Limburger, 18 June 2005. The municipality of 
Haelen contracted of its own accord Kupers, a private company, to provide big inflatable bags, which can 
be in place within 36 hours in case of emergency (De Limburger, 1 February 2002). Meanwhile, Roermond 
now has a mobile water dam, shaped like an ‗inflatable sausage‘ (De Limburger, 25 October 2001). 
http://www.snlm.nl/archief/zm251001.htm 
271 ‗Bewindsvrouw vals voorgelicht over plan hoogwatergeul‘, De Limburger, 3 July 1999  
272 The works themselves temporarily increase flood risk while they are under construction. A former 
Maaswerken official (interview, August 1999) said it is not clear to him how this residual risk is accounted 
for. 
273 ‗Weigeren grindwinning terecht‘, De Limburger, 17 January 2002. 
274 http://www.archis.nl/content/nieuwe-content/P_Maaswerk-01.xml.asp 
275 ‗Arcen en Velden voert overleg over strategie Zandmaas‘, De Limburger , 28 November 1998. 
276 Kamervragen Maaswerken, answers 11 dated April 2000 to questions 30 March 2000 posed by 
Stroeken and Biesheuvel, 
www.verkeerenwaterstaat.nl%20cend%20bsg%20brieven%20data%20955455440_tcm195-142280.pdf 
277 ‗Limburg trekt zich terug uit Zandmaas‘, De Limburger, 5 October 2000. 
278 De Gelderlander, 13 August 1999. 
279 HKW/AK/3552/992, 2 April 1999. 
280 De Gelderlander, 13 August 1998. 
281 De Limburger, 8 June 1999. 
282 ‗Rijkswaterstaat betaalt mee aan 'blauwe knoop' bij Den Bosch‘, WaterForum Online, 20 oktober 2005 
283 Geo-Control B.V., Exploitatiemaatschappij L‘Ortye Stein B.V., Vereniging tot behoud van 
Natuurmonumenten in Nederland, Boskalis B.V., HAM-Van Oord-Werkendam B.V., Ballast Nedam 
Baggeren B.V. en Van den Biggelaar Aannemingsbedrijf B.V. 
284 ‗‖Idiote‖ nieuwe kade dwars door centrum Blerick‘, De Limburger, 13 April 2001. 
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285 ‗Limburg staat toch extra grind uit Gresnsmaas toe‘, Financieele Dagblad, 10 July 2000. 
286 Peet Adams, ‗Nauwelijks extra natuur bij Zandmaas‘, De Limburger, 31 January 2001. 
287 ‗Groeiend verzet tegen Maasplan en grindwinning‘, NRC Handelsblad, 6 Febuary 2001; Peet Adams, 
‗Milieufederatie stapt naar rechter tegen Grensmaas‘, De Limburger, 17 February 2001. 
288 Annelies Derkx, „Hoog Water in het Haelens Broek en Horn‘, De Streekbode, 20-2-2002, 
http://home.hetnet.nl/~milieustichting/drie.htm 
289 ‗Toename verzet tegen ontgrinding bij Bunde/Geulle aan de Maas, Limburgs Dagblad 2 May 2001. 
290 Arthur Sassen, ‗Geulle zegt ‗NEE‘ tegen ontgrinding‘, 
http://www.geulle.com/geulle/nieuws/250401nieuws.html 
 291 Borgharen, Itteren, Bunde/Voulwames, Geulle, Meers, Schipperskerk, Illikhoven, Vissersweert, 
Roosteren, Stevensweert, Horn, Haelen, Buggenum, Nunhem, Velden, Lomm and Arcen. 
292 Limburgs Dagblad 31-1-2002; Paul Seelen, ‗WML vreest gevolgen werk aan Grensmaas‘, Limburger, 16 
May 2002. 
293 http://home.hetnet.nl/~milieustichting/achttien.htm Limburger 10-7-2002 
294 I owe this point to the Maaswerken‘s current stakeholder communication manager, Victor Coenen. 
295 Peet Adams, ‗Een brave straatvechter‘, De Limburger, 5 June 2002. 
296 Bosscherveld – Geulle aan de Maas - Meers – Maasband – Urmond; - Nattenhoven – Roosteren 
297 Inspraak door de heer N. Naus, Progressief Born en Federatief Verband tegen Ontgrondingen, verslag 
van de extra vergadering van de vaste Commissie voor Verkeer en Waterstaat, Provinciale Staten, 
Limburg, 16 February 2001 (www.limburg.nl). 
298 http://www.geulle.com/leefbaar/leefbaar_bericht5b.html, 4 November 2001. 
299 ‗CDA wil natuur schrappen in Zandmaas‘, De Limburger, 18 January 2003. 
300 ‗Provincie wil Grensmaas niet openbaar‘, De Limburger, 15 November 2001. 
301 The  brochure ‗De verkorte tracéprocedure en insprasak‘ published by Verkeer en Waterstaat 
Inspraakpunt, explains the procedure, a bemusing mix of openness (participation) and closure (shortened 
decision-making trajectory) 
http://www.rijkswaterstaat.nl/images/Verkorte%20Tracewet%20brochure_tcm174-127824.pdf 
302 Committee minutes: Verslag Commissie Vergadering Grondgebied, Arcen en Velden, 6 January 2003, 
www.arcenenvelden.nl/servlet/nl.gx.webdam.client.http.GetFile?id=348793 
303 ‗Lomm Actief vraagt Kamer uitstel voor Zandmaas‘, De Limburger 23 October 2000; ‗Klachten bij 
Europese Commissie tegen gunning Grensmaas‘, De Limburger, 18 December 2001. 
304 http://www.nma-org.nl/archief1998/besluiten/bbb/bbb0095-9810.htm 
305 ‗Under Dutch law, expropriation is not an option if the land-owner is able to carry out the 
desired work, and gravel extraction companies can arguably carry out river widening measures. 
306 The Consortium Grensmaas bv, consisting of the Panheelgroep, de Combinatie Regenboog VOF and 
Natuurmonumenten. 
307 ‗Ook aanbesteding Zandmaas stuit op verzet van Brussel‘, De Limburger, 20-12-2003. 
308 Delfstoffen Combinatie Zandmaas. Peet Adams, ‗Europa keurt Grensmaas nog steeds af‘, De 
Limburger, 17 November 2003. 
309 This offered a choice between five options ('Lansink‘s Ladder'): 
1. topsoil continues to be used as topsoil 
2. soil as construction material, eg for dikes and kaden, 
3. reuse of topsoil after processing (e.g. ripening or immobilisation), 
4. storage in lakes, clay screens or depots   
5. transport to well known dump sites (such as Slufter and Hollands Diep). 
Beleidsnotitie Actief Bodembeheeer Maas, 
http://www.rijkswaterstaat.nl/rws/riza/actiefbodembeheer/documenten/ABM-beleidsnotitie2003.pdf 
310 The so-called Pikmeerarrest established public servants and eagencies cannot be prosecuted for carrying 
out legally prescribed administrative tasks. When the ruling was reviewed in 1998, the Supreme Court 
decided only national authorities enjoyed this immunity,  
311 Peet Adams and Bjorn Oostra, ‗Topberaad over stort Maaswerken‘, De Limburger, 2 Febuary 2002. Also 
see Van der Meulen et al. (2006: 166). 
312 ‗Ondanks druk zwijgt Vestjens over stort Maaswerken‘, De Limburger, 18 August 2001. 
Peet Adams, ‗Zuiveringschap komt al in actie tegen Maaswerken‘, De Limburger, 29 November 2001. 
313 Peet Adams, ‗Volledige top van De Maaswerken weg‘, De Limburger, 25 January 2002. 
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314 According to D66, project implementation funds for the Eindplan had been transferred to policy 
preparation funds, thus explaining the remarkably high sum. 
315 ‗Maaswerken slorpte al 150 miljoen euro op‘, De Limburger, 5 June 2002. 
316 ‗Spreekverbod voor topman Huurman van Maaswerken‘, De Limburger, 5 June 2002. 
317 ‗De Maas zou nóg meer ruimte moeten krijgen‘, De Volkskrant, 26 February 2002. 
318 http://www.bodemnieuws.nl/nieuwsbrief/2004-13/nieuwsbrief.html 
319 ‗Rijk dreigt Grensmaas af te blazen‘, Bodemnieuws Nieuwsbrief, March 2005. 
http://www.bodemnieuws.nl/nieuwsbrief/2005-07/nieuwsbrief.html 
320 Peet Adams, ‗Akkoord beveiliging Maas in M-Limburg‘, De Limburger 2-7-2004. 
321 http://rijksbegroting.minfin.nl/ 
322 De Gelderlander, 2 June 1999. 
323
 These non-urban areas include an area between Roosteren and Linne, where a horticultural zone and 
isolated agrarian businesses would remain unprotected, and be affected by upstream interventions as well. 
Also, Haelens Broek and De Kemp were not embanked when RWS decided on second thoughts not to 
construct a dike there. 
324 As marl excavation on the Belgian side has given rise to a 7 m drop very close to the river, this is not 
always feasible. Interview, stakeholder manager, Maaswerken, 2006. 
325 ‗Plan voor verwerken Maasslib‘ , De Limburger, 8 November 1999. 
326 ‗Alweer nieuw plan voor beveiliging Maas in‘, De Limburger, 19 December 2001. 
327 Notably, the deepening of the binational Westerschelde channel and the reinstatememt of the IJzeren 
Rijn railway line crossing Dutch territory, in an area of scenic beauty see for ezample: ‗Alterra: ―IJzeren 
Rijn ramp voor Meinweg‖', De Limburger, 23 November 2000. 
328 De Water, No. 108, July 2005. 
329 http://www.geulle.com/leefbaar/leefbaar_bericht12.html, Infobrief No. 14, September 2005. Also: 
Wido Smeets, ‗Handen af van het Limburgse landschap‘, De Limburger, 10 July 2002. 
330 Sometimes conflated: Landscape is ‗securitised‘ by one stakeholder as part of the cultural heritage 
331 Paul Bots, ‗Gaten in kaden dichten gaat niet zomaar‘, De Limburger/Limburgs Dagblad, 6 November 
2007. 
332 In response to those protests, the Province of Limburg commissioned the national technical research 
bureau TNO to research the effects of the dredging mills. ‗Machines Grensmaas onder de loep‘, De 
Gentenaar, 13-8-2002, http://www.gentenaar.be/Article/Detail.aspx?articleID=nbra14082002_045 
 
 
Chapter 7 
 
333 It is acknowledged with thanks that the study was sponsored by Wageningen University´s ´Boundaries 
of Space´ programme. A slightly shorter version of the present chapter appears in the International Journal of 
Water Resources Development in March 2008. 
334 e.g. ‗... participatory approaches generating consensus and enthusiasm within the community for 
adoption of IFM; autonomous management; and mechanisms for equitable distribution of benefits.‘ 
(www.nisp.org). 
335  The Dutch Disaster Act of 1985 defines a disaster as ‗an event that endangers the life and health of a 
large number of people, or causes severe harm to material interests, and requires coordinated efforts from 
various fields of expertise‘ (Rosenthal and ‘t Hart 1998: 113). 
336 When a concerned Prince William Alexander inquired what the flood had been like, people responded; 
‗what flood?‘ (http://www.wrlent.nl/downloads/achtergrond26april.pdf). The Prince also appeared to 
believe that controlled flood storage would save Rotterdam, but this does not make much hydrological 
sense (interviews). 
337 Note that the respondent does not talk about conferring with stakeholders. 
338 It was a variety of the legal concept of a ‗calamitous polder‘, a polder that so often has to cope with 
flooding that polder inhabitants cannot raise the cost of damage and recovery themselves (Klijn and van 
der Most 2001: 2-6). 
339 Publicising an indicative map is an ‗assault strategy‘ the later Commission‘s communication experts 
would rather have avoided (int. ten Brinke 2005). The top-level public officers on the other side of the 
‗clay screen‘ would not normally have opted for an indicative map of the areas for controlled flooding but 
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shared the Vice-Minister‘s have an interest in a higher public profile for water policy. But the key officer 
of that team, ir Van der Hoek, saw a strategic need to come up with a map despite the undecided state of 
play. The timing was hurried as the window of opportunity might be limited. The Minister of Spatial 
Planning, Pronk, and the Vice-Minister of Water got on well personally. Pronk had a vision of 
environmental contours in spatial planning – red for built-up areas, green for nature, blue for water. To 
make sure they could claim space in their negotiations with VROM for water storage in the Fifth Spatial 
Planning document, the Public Works Department had to make a  ‘reservation‘ – without being too 
specific on which areas would be selected in the event (ints. former top RWS policy officer A. Van der 
Hoek, 2005, 2006). ‗We didn‘t want to leave it with them – we wanted to keep control [de regie erop houden]. 
So we had to come up with a map ourselves‘. 
340 ‗Commissie kiest drie ‗calamiteitenpolders‘‖‘, NRC 29 May 2002). 
341 Experts like Wim Silva (RIZA), and Matthijs Kok (HKV Lijn in Water, formerly WL | Delft) and 
Richard Jorissen (DWW) were among the key people involved in this. 
342 The pathway would be through the Nears valley near Goch and the Oude Ijsseldal on the east side of 
the Rhine, after which the water would drain onto the Waal (Silva 2001; Klijn en van der Most 2001). The 
Germans fear a similar back door effect via Holland (NRW Environment Minister B. Höhn quoted in 
Werkgroep Hoogwater, Hoogwatermagazin/Hochwassermagazin 4, May 2002). Canalisation between 1955 and 
1977 has meant the loss of 130 km3 of space for the Upper Rhine, so that flood water reaches Holland 
faster in a steeper wave. Retention basins are put in place on the Upper Rhine for some years and in 
Nordrhein-Westphalia four locations have been organised as retention polder. In 1992 a ‗Gesamtkonzept‘ 
was set up of eight repositioned dikes and three retention areas, Bylerward near Rees, Ilvericherbruch near 
Krefeld and Wortingerbruch near Monheim/Leverkusen, which would lower the river level at Lobith by 
10 cm. (Ministerium für Umwelt und Naturschütz, Landwirtschaft und Verbraucherschütz des Landes Nordrhein-
Westfalen, the Province of Gelderland, Public Works Department (ed..), 2002)  In Germany, where the 
designated areas are populated rather more thinly than in Holland, and complete buy-out of citizens was 
envisaged, the Minister was reportedly unyielding: if people didn‘t like the areas she had selected, people 
could indicate which areas would be suitable for controlled flooding – the plan would go ahead. However 
the new CDU government of NRW is expected to return to hard structures (dikes) for flood protection. 
343 ‗Laat de polder niet verzuipen‘, De Volkskrant, Wetenschap, 27 December 2003 
344 Presentation at ‗Ruimtelijke bijdrage aan gevolgenbeperking‗, an expert meeting on flood impact 
mitigation, NIROV/Spatial Planning Department, The Hague, 10 October 2007. The consultants were 
not alone in their critical stance. When a controlled flood storage policy was proposed, there were worries 
within the Dienst Weg- en Waterbouw (civil engineering service), a technical branch of Rijkswaterstaat 
about the social acceptability of the new policy. They hired Enne de Boer, a sociologist consultant, to 
draft a report on the social impact of such a policy (De Boer 2003). 
345 Technische Adviescommissie Waterkeringen, draft advice to the Luteijn Commission, 13 September 
2002 and eventual advice, 8 october 2002. 
346 Geert Willems, 'Querdamm en Kapitteldijk hoger', De Gelderlander, 15 November 2007. 
 
 
Chapter 8 
 
347 RPS Landscape Management and Planning Consultants, Clouston, Didcot. 
348 Participants in the debate may have a quite different self-understanding – they may insist they aim for 
consensus rather than confict or hegemony. In analysing discourse, the analyst does not pass judgment on 
the possible motives of participants (Tennekes 2005). 
349 http://www.landaspirations.com/ 
350 The discourse of flood management is one couched in military metaphors of ‗defence‘ (likewise the 
Flood Defence Committees). I will follow British custom throughout the text. 
351 Appalling pollution in the Thames gave rise to the first European water policy (Newson) culminating in 
the 1951 Report of the Peppard Committee to improve water quality sufficiently for the salmon to return. 
352 http://www7.caret.cam.ac.uk/windsor_maid_intro.htm 
353 The pattern of main or non-main rivers follows no set rule. ‗Enmaining‘ (legally reclassifying ‗critical 
ordinary watercourses‘ as ‗main river‘) must be accepted by the Regional Flood Defence Committee, and 
‗committees have sometimes refused applications for rivers whose flood defences are in poor condition or 
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absent‘ (Oxera/MAFF 2001: 14) 2001]. The upshot is that the (minor) Clapper Stream, another source of 
occcasional local flooding in the project area, cannot be handled by the Environment Agency, since the 
institution has no authority over it, it being non-main water (Venables 2000). 
354 ‗The local authority appointees who sit on the RFDCs are bound to act as members of an EA 
committee, not as representatives of local authorities, although it is not clear that this distinction is always 
made in practice, and if it were, an element of local accountability that appears to exist de facto from 
current practice might be lost‘. [2nd interim report 2001] The Drainage Boards, established in 1930 have 
permissive powers to ‗enter land‘ and carry out works on non-main channels (Scrase and Sheate 2005). 
While flood-defence work on non-main rivers outside the areas covered by Internal Drainage Districts are 
the realm of Local Authority. National grant-aid supplemented the levies raised by catchment 
organisations, IDBs and local authorities until 2003. The Committees are formally part of the EA but have 
a larger mandate beyond that of either of its constituents. 
355 The Land Drainage Act of 1991 lays down the IDB‘s drainage mandate, while the Water Resources Act 
1991 relates to the functions and powers of the EA and the flood-defence committees. 
356 Interviewees noted that the same held true for Railtrack, with whom the EA worked together to enable 
the jacking of an underpass under the railway embankment.  
357 Memorandum submitted by The Environment Agency (F21) to Select Agricultural Committee, House 
of Commons, Minutes of Evidence, 1998. 
358 ‗many proposals (...) allowed residential densities as high as those proposals refused on density grounds 
(...) Limiting flood hazard potential, if at all important, was an unmentioned secondary concern‘ 
359 On the basis of Thames Water Authority‘s Section 24 (5) stipulating surveys to identify major land 
drainage and flooding problems in the region. 
360 ‗...a series of flood walls and embankments protecting these areas from overland flood flows. The 
Cookham floodwalls incorporate moveable flood gates with a drainage system that allows seepage to be 
pumped from sumps.‘ (MWEFAS Operating Procedures Public Document 2005, Environment Agency, 
South East Area, Thames Region, found on jubileeriver.com) 
361 New properties in Maidenhead, England therefore are raised to where the level of the door is above the 
1947 flood limit. 
362 Maidenhead Civic Society, January 2006, 
www.maidenheadcivicsoc.org.uk/projects/York%20Stream.pdf 
363.‘...as rivers keep on rising‘, The Independent, 9 February 1990. 
364 Cost estimates rose from £51mn (NRA 1989) and £83.5mn or £14,000 per protected house including 
to £43.75m for implementation and O&M for 65 years (EA, 1998), to £110 million. This was largely 
covered by an increase in the council tax (community charge) levy by 6.3% for the fiscal year 1999-2000, 
which brings in £62.5 mn. 'Danger alert along river as levels rise' (Maidenhead Advertiser, 22 January 1999. 
365 Middlesex University‘s submission to the 1998 Agricultural Select Committee notes that MAFF‘s 
scoring system had become even harder for new projects than the existing Project Appraisal Guidance 
Note (PAGN, 1995), requiring a cost-benefit ratio of 4 to 1 – to achieve a high priority in funding 
(Memorandum 22, Agricultural Select Committee 1998), or as Crichton (2005) has it: ‗Benefits have to 
exceed costs by at least a factor of three, with a national target of a factor of five‘. 
366 Maidenhead, Windsor and Eton Flood Alleviation Scheme - Environmental Statement Part I.  National 
Rivers Authority, Thames Region).  
367 http://www.spelthorne.gov.uk/contrast/pdf_floodreportjan2003.pdf. 
368 in terms of e.g. Zygmunt Bauman 1999, the transgression of boundaries between the self and its 
extension, such as family and home. 
369 
www.geraldeve.co.uk/Asp/templateManager/render/sections/13/render.aspx?siteID=1&subSID=&sID
=13&documentID=14 
370 Although others claimed a shortfall on the market is expected. Locally, Berkshire can meet its targets 
but Buckinghamshire cannot. 
371 The CBA yields a ratio, rather than a difference, so it can make a difference whether an item appears as 
a negative cost or a positive benefit in the equation even though the value is the same (C.Green, pers 
comm 2001) 
372 Though still ‗relatively slow‘ compared to some upland rivers (Johnson 2005). 
373 www.ecu.ox.ac.uk/sirch/casestud.htm. 
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374 Larcombe (2005) notes that ‗today the EA have a duty to dredge for navigational purposes, and the 
power to dredge for flood defence purposes.‘ 
375 ‗With the high ground of Windsor Castle on one side and the M4 Motorway on the other it is difficult 
to see any other realistic alternative solutions.‘ (RPS 1993). 
376 ―While risk reduction is central to the DEFRA/NAW policy and implicit in current decision-making 
practice, explicit assessment of risks has in the past tended to be limited to the appraisal of major 
decisions to invest in flood defense infrastructure (...) The contribution that a wide range of interventions, 
including land-use planning, control of runoff, flood storage, flood warning, insurance, improving flood 
resistance of property, and operation and maintenance of flood defenses, makes to flood risk management 
has only recently begun to be analyzed in a systematic way‘ (Hall et al. 2003: 226). 
377 According to Gardiner (1996), the ‘executive Regional flood Defence Committees regard the 1-in-50-
year standard of protection as a minimum‘. Even the implementation of the 1: 65 standard leaves some 
questions. Should one protect for the highest or most frequent flood? While Lewin & Fryer started from a 
‗correct level‘ of flooding of 5 cm – which would mean only wet toes - Penning-Rowsell, Winchester and 
Bossman-Aggrey (1987) adopted a 40 cm standard. 
378 The Datchet, Wraysbury, Staines and Chertsey Floodplain Plan Study. 
379 Matthew Gorman, EA admits at-risk flood areas need more protection, Windsor Reporter, 21 April 2005. 
380 In their landmark book on planning Cullingworth and Nadin have noted that there are not many 
detailed cases of decision-making in Britain, because it is not a very transparent process, as opposed to 
many available US case studies. This seems to reflect the cultural differences in the openness of government 
(Cullingworth & Nadin 1997). 
381  ‗Problems‘ S. 13, Memorandum 22 (F34), Select Agricultural Committee, 1998. 
382 I contacted the National Heritage in 2000, but their spokesman hardly remembers the incident. 
383 Eton College cited loss of land value because of land ‗held with‗. In this context, the NRA /EA 
formally had a strong hand in the light of the strong land drainage tradition in the UK. The 
institutionalisation of drainage boards in the Land Drainage Act of 1930 facilitates compulsory land 
purchase for flood schemes such as MWEFAS. The relevant Environmental Authority has powers to 
acquire the freehold of land for the purpose of enhancing land drainage schemes383 As a consequence,  
 
‗We had a CPO [Compulsory Purchasing Order] under our land drainage powers, confirmed by MAFF. 
Eton issued a direct challenge. We didn‘t want to use the freehold so we offered an easement. The 
inspector‘s representative looked at it in April. In June the solicitors looked at it for legal challenge. The 
Minister sat on it until March 1995 – approval, CPO confirmed. On the last day of the inquiry, Eton filed a 
formal legal objection saying that the document was flawed. The EA said the easement was sufficient as it 
gives EA all the problems. A CPO extinguishes all third-party land rights. You don‘t know they‘re there ‗till 
someone remembers. Our barrister said Eton couldn‘t do it, their barrister said they could. Because of this 
the rest of the CPOs were also on hold on all other land. The 3rd counsel said it was too complex, it 
wouldn‘t stand up in law; basically unworkable. In April 1996 Eton agreed to buy the land by CPO then we 
would resell the land.‘ (Interview EA, Reading). 
384 Note of Conference with Counsel, 19 September 1988. 
385 Another formal objector to a Compulsory Planning Order was the Department of Transport, which at the 
time was still separate from Agriculture and the Environment. The MWEFAS needed a diversion on the 
M4 motorway, which got in the way of its Transport Ministry‘s own M4 motorway widening project. This 
and other complaints from landowners and agencies led to intense consultations between the DETR, 
Berkshire and Buckinghamshire. 
386 Dorney Lake was the site for the BearingPoint Rowing World Cup 2005, the World Rowing 
Championships 2006 and has been selected for rowing and sprint canoeing in the Olympic Games 2012. 
387 ‗Flooded with relief‘, Quarrying Today, Spring 2004, Issue 13. http://www.qpa.org/pdf/qtoday13.pdf 
388 Quoted in ‗Trench threat to common ends‘, Windsor, Slough and Eton Express (WSEE), 31 March 1989. 
389 ‗Given that run-off which contributes to floods could be described as pollution and is caused by the 
activities of individuals other than those that are at risk of flooding, the Human Rights Act may place a 
duty on government to protect the rights of those in the flood plain against the run-off from the property 
of those higher in the catchment.‘ [OXERA/MAFF 2001] 
390 ‗Villagers are told: Keep up the fight‘, Maidenhead Advertiser, 5 May 1995. 
391 In 1999 Berkshire County was split into an Eastern and a Western authority. This has little impact on 
the implementation of the scheme, though. 
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392 It appears from the interviews that the Agency gained a reputation with some stakeholders for shoddy 
project management during the construction of the channel. Both Eton College (interview with the 
author) and local town dwellers complained about signs fallen down and not replaced and untidy handling 
of the site. 
393 Maidenhead Advertiser, 9/6/1995.  
394 ‗Flood channel will still go with the flow‘, Maidenhead Advertiser, 12 February 1999. 
395 ‗Outline designs and budget costings were put together over the next few weeks and at the second 
meeting decisions were made  to run with those alternatives which were viable both from an engineering 
point of view, and an expectation that a worthwhile saving in cost would be forthcoming. The precise 
number is difficult to define because some items overlapped with others and  with the alternative designs 
upon which the tender was based, so we had to sort out the evaluation and costing of the Value 
Engineering proposals and separate it from the alternative tender. (...) The detailed designs were on-going 
during the run-up to the start of construction work on site in early August 1998 and continued thereafter. 
We had to be careful that the time involved in the design and approval of the larger changes did not 
compromise the start on site of those activities. Mike Campbell / George Pargeter, ´The Maidenhead, 
Windsor and Eton Flood Alleviation Scheme Contract 6 - River Thames To Mainline Railway. The 
Contractor's View´, Balfour Beatty Construction Linited, Civil Engineering Division. 
396 House of Commons, Select Committee on Agriculture, Sixth Report. 
397 British policy discourse makes an interesting distinction between statutory rules, institutionalising 
protection from threats and permissive, discretionary measures. While spending on flood protection is 
permissive, Local Authorities and the Environment Agency may choose to do it - protecting the birds is 
statutory (Venables 2000). The upshot is a lack of EA mandate for flood protection works. 
398 Given infinite resources, my EA spokesman would buy people out, not evict them from the floodplain. 
He held up the Three Gorges project (China) as a bad example of social engineering. 
399 It was officially opened by HRH Prince Andrew in July 2002, in honour of Queen Elizabeth‘s golden 
Jubilee. Among others, the project protects her Windsor castle and deer parks. 
400 ‗Merit award swells Jubilee River trophies‘, New Civil Engineer, 19 September 2002, p. 39. 
401 ‗Groups in flood role‘, River views, Environment Agency newsletter, September/October 2003. Huxley 
to Wraybsury, Wraysbury to Teddington and one dealing with Chertsey Bourne, which meets the Thames 
in the MWEFAS project area. 
402 www.frags.org website. 
403 There are two Thames FRAGs: Hurley to Wraysbury and Wraysbury to Teddington and one dealing 
with Chertsey Bourne, which meets the Thames in the Jubilee River‘s project area. 
404 ‗Mechanisms of Flooding‘, Flood Risk Action Groups, Volume 1, 11.3.25,  
http://www.frags.org.uk/mech_vol1.htm 
Subcontractor Arup also took flak for changing specifications of their role in the project in its work for 
MEWEFAS in 1997-1998, dropping claims of ‗cost savings‘. This had been observed by local residents 
and the Community Support Group South (CSGS), formed to coordinate residents' views to local Flood 
Risk Action Groups. claim claims flood levels downstream were increased ‘by up to 125mm‘ as reported 
on thamesweb and later admitted by the Environment Agency,  Channel Closure  stokes Jubilee River 
row‘, New Civil Engineer, 6 May 2004, p. 12. 
405 The burough comprises Ashford, Charlton, Halliford, Laleham, Littleton, Shepperton, Staines, 
Stanwell, Stanwell Moor and Sunbury. 
406 The Times, 30 August 2004 
407 Francis Batt, ‗Fears over flood showdown‘, ICBerkshire, 3 June 2004. 
408 Francis Batt, ‗Flood, sweat and jeers‘, 13 August 2004, icBerkshire; Mark Hansford, ‗Arup denies 
downplaying its role on Jubilee river‘, New Civil Engineer International, 30 September 2004. 
409 JMP Consultants Ltd., Flood Analysis Report, Final 10-5032-B, 10-5042-A, 10-5047-A R.001 V3, 
Flood Analysis Report ww2.runnymede.gov.uk/home/latest/Flood_Analysis_Final%20V3.pdf 
410 ‗Two-year-old flood relief channel already needs major repairs‘, Ground Engineering, 01 August 2004.  
411 ‗Soft Engineering Comes up short‘, New Civil Engineer International, 1 October 2004. 
412 ´Repaired Jubilee river flood defence still 10% under capacity‘, New Civil Engineer +, 21 September 
2006. 
413 Windsor, Ascot and Maidenhead Observer, 22 April 2005. 
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414 This progressive insight is reflected in the rather different answers to questions in the Commons asked 
in 2003 and 2006. When Parliamentary questions were posed by various regional Members on 15 January 
2003 and 4 February 2003, Mr Morley (Minister of State for Climate Change and Environment) stated 
there were ‗no effect on Medmenham and Marlow‘ and that a rerun of an updated hydrological model had 
been done which showed no significant effect.  
When on 6 June 2006, Adam Afriyie MP for Windsor asked again about Jubilee River and MWEFAS as a 
whole 
(http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmhansrd/cm060626/text/60626w1189.htm) Ian 
Pearson admitted the channel was functioning below standard. 
415 ‗EA sues designers of failed Jubilee River flood defence‘, New Civil Engineer+, 15 June 2006.   
416 Michael Horsnell, ‗Anger swells overthat flood river shifts damage‘, The Times, 30 August 2004 
417 http://www.environment-
agency.gov.uk/commondata/acrobat/lowerthames_strategy_948936.pdf#search=%22MWEFAS%20trea
sury%20cost%20benefit%22 
418 Mark Hansford, ‗Flooding fears push Agency to seek Jubilee River extension‘, New Civil Engineer,  
13 May 2004, p. 5. 
419 ‗Repaired Jubilee river flood defence still 10% under capacity‘, New Civil Engineer +, 21 September 2006. 
420 ‗Locals may pay GBP200 flood scheme‘, BBC News, 7 December 2006. 
421 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmhansrd/cm070724/debtext/70724-
0008.htm 
422 Maidenhead Advertiser, 5-5-1995. 
423 Downstream Flooding - Residents remain angry, thamesweb, 16 January 2004. Parliamentary questions 
on 4 Feb 2003 also give examples of constituency correspondents frequently mentioning the word 
‗sacrifice‘. 
424 This can be seen as a new step in a more inclusive trajectory. After the 2000 floods, a ‗Flooding. You 
can‘t prevent it. You can prepare for it‘ campaign was launched  The year 2001 saw the publication of the 
Civil Engineers report, ‗Learning to Live With Rivers‘, and in 2004 DEFRA issued a consultation 
document Making Space for Rivers424 which explicitly advocates stakeholder involvement, where. 
‗stakeholder‘ is defined as ‗all those individuals and groups affected by flood and coastal erosion risks 
and/or able to influence the development of approaches to flood or coastal erosion risk management 
decision making‘ (Defra, 2004b: 2). It claims ‗members of the community should have input both of their 
knowledge of the local characteristics of flooding and the community in terms of their preferences and 
priorities for flood‘ (Speller, 2005). 
425 Apart from technical and policy documents and Flood Hazard Research Centre publications, to my 
knowledge so far only a Durham student wrote his Bachelor‘s thesis about it (Norton, 1994). 
426 ‗The town at greatest risk of flooding, The Times, 3 December 2007. 
427 For reasons of scope I will not discuss Actor Network Theory (Callon, Latour) which ascribes agency 
to inanimate objects such as rivers, ‗actants‘. 
 
 
Chapter 9 
 
428 A garrison state is ‗a state organized to serve primarily its own need for military security‘ (Merriam 
Webster dictionary) http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/garrison%20state 
429 Bangladesh is currently again under emergency rule and relations with India still shaky. 
430 This is not a necessary course of action. The US Corps of Engineers made a public apology for the 
New Orleans flood and admitted error of judgment and construction faults. 
431 Not all frames are phrased as securitising moves, and not all are successful securitisations. 
432 Christie, Frances and Hanlon, Joseph  (2001), Mozambique and the Great Flood of 2000. James Currey  
Ltd. 
433 http://www.luiss.it/shur/wp-content/uploads/2007/05/shurwp05-07.pdf 
434 I owe this point to Luuk Knippenberg (Knippenberg, pers comm. 2005). 
435 in part demilitarising its political sector, creating a ‗protected democracy‘. 
436 In light of the (now more subdued) army presence Cizre (2000) calls Turkey a ‗protected democracy‘.  
437 Also, the campaign to save the wild hamster (creticus creticus, korenwolf) for the Netherlands came at a 
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time neighbouring Germany experienced a wild hamster plague. 
438 http://www.sgir.org/archive/turin/uploads/Cebeci-cebeci-turin_paper.pdf 
439 As noted, the FAP project started out under securitised conditions (dictatorship) then after transition 
to multi-party democracy the project came to be discussed with ever widening groups of stakeholders. 
440 The final responsibility however was with the World Bank, which could in principle be held to account. 
441 But revealing this appears to have been a public taboo. The project Security Map for the Netherlands 
(VKN) would mercilessly reveal the actual levels, i.e. the differences in protection. Only after in 2004 a 
government-commissioned report (Bannink et al. 2004) decried the lack of knowledge and poor state of 
many dikes, the Vice Minister allowed the publication (declassification) of the Security map. 
442 Graeme Wearden (2007), Insurers say authorities partly to blame for flood damage, Guardian, August 
20. 
443 Syria and Iraq worry about possible flooding or drought induced by upstream Turkish dams. In Britain, 
downstreamers blamed their suffering in 2003 on the protection of Windsor and Maidenhead. Limburg‘s 
downstream villagers likewise protested when they feared the increased risk effects of upstream flood 
works. 
 
445 quoted in Rob Berends, ‗De illusie van zekerheid‘ , De Gelderlander, 29 January 2005. 
446 Douglas seeks to explain why society selects some risks over others as important, in spite of quite 
different expert assessments: ‗understanding risk and danger is part of a way of making sense of the world, 
and keeping things in their proper place‘. They help determine in- and outside, trusted and foreign 
elements. Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) maintain that in Western societies, belief in witchcraft may have 
died out, but blaming and claiming mechanisms are ever on the rise – we always look for a culprit and 
redress, so that there are few hazards left that are not politicised.  
While the work of Beck and Giddens focuses on individual vulnerability and responsibility and Caplan 
(2000) sees a (neo)conservative school re-emphasising individual responsibility, Douglas sees people as 
socially embedded (they discuss with neighbours, families, etc) and, as Harries notes, protesting a 
collective threats against gives them opportunity for collective action. It may be ountereed that a 
community is not a coherent entity, speaking with one voice. It may therefore be questioned if, as Douglas 
claims, ‗communities‘  seek blame and redress when something goes wrong. But the identification of a 
common enemy can enlist a winning coalition creating a (temporary) community identity for collective 
action (Harries and Burrows 2006). A counter-securitizing move can allow a local alliance to present a 
united front against the securitising move of a state actor. 
447 For example, Tewskesbury flooded in 2007 but is unlikely to be protected in future as a result of the 
points system. 
448 Lijphart (1967) and Lustick (1993) argue that even in divided societies, consociationalism can work: 
while societal groups ignore each other at day-to-day- level, their elites cooperate and coordinate at the 
top. 
449 According to John Scott (2000), pressure defies the hegemon from within the decision-making circles, 
while protest can only engage from outside. 
450 See also the ‗Changing Landscape of European Liberty and Security (CHALLENGE)‘ project.  
451 This is not true for the Turkish and Ooij cases, but applies to the four other researched schemes. 
452 Just like the water in Cochabamba is still undrinkable and its supply frequently interrupted seven years 
after the successful resistance of water privatisation referred to in Ch. 4. 
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Summary 
 
 
Floods bring life and death, fertilisation and destruction. The destructive side instils primordial 
fears of chaos and destitution. Therefore, flood politics are not like normal politics – they are 
security issues. In turn, flood disasters are crises for society. The public outcry after flood events 
challenges a governmental body‘s legitimacy, which may be blamed for its unsatisfactory warning 
or flood protection system. A flood event legitimises extraordinary measures in which normal 
rules do not apply. A broad consensus on what is to be done and a broad mandate for doing it 
fast, whatever the price, can be expected. 
River regulation infrastructure and flood response are supposed to prevent disastrous floods. 
Engineers create often innovative infrastructural designs and increasingly devise participatory 
processes to discuss their plans with affected stakeholders. Such projects always seem to get 
politicised. The present study argued that unease over security distribution is a recurring factor.  
Analytical starting point for the study is the work of Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1988), the 
‘Copenhagen School‘, which has given a strong impulse to the security debate. They have shown 
that threats to security are not a reality ‗out there‘; a threat is what you make it. One issue can 
become elevated to security status (‗securitised‘), legitimising extraordinary measures,  while 
another remains unaddressed. Generally, it is state governments who can declare war and 
emergency and mobilise the army, police and emergency services. But a solitary focus on the state 
underestimates other actors‘ capacity to securitise or counter-securitise issues. 
A move for ‗securitisation‘ is a move for closure, excluding certain actors, alternatives, debates 
for the sake of emergency action. As the post-flood time window for devising new projects run 
out, normal rules, criteria and accountability structures apply. Flood projects bring contest over 
the distribution of risk, who should be protected by whom at what cost. Security and risk are 
strategically used constructs, used for political gain. The study seeks to bring a coherent 
theorisation and conceptualisation of (the construction of) security and risk in water 
management. 
The study focuses on flood security. Far from dodging responsibility for risk management, 
flood managers appear quite keen to take on the responsibility, using the language of fear and 
threat to generate demand for their protection services, while citizens are willing to forgo their 
political rights and place their fate in the hands of these suppliers. The current vogue for ‗risk 
management‘ only intensifies control of people through risk profiles, statistics and subtle 
incentives. To several liberal observers this opens up vistas of ‗surveillance states‘ with worrying 
effects for civil liberties. The study will however argue that you should not throw the baby called 
Security out with the bathwater. Especially in the disaster sector, a ‗desecuritised‘ mode of 
governance is hard to imagine. 
The study thus analyses and organises how states oscillate between security logic (‗logic of 
war‘) and non-security logic (‗logic of peace‘) in flood security governance. The way floods are 
managed and politicised are a reflection of how society is organised. Therefore, one should look 
at flood protection schemes within their social, political, economic context. The study looks at six 
planned river interventions in five countries, analyses the role of security and risk discourse in 
conflict and politicisation over river interventions. It finds it is not only state representatives, but 
also opponents who can effectively ‗speak security‘ and play the ‗politics of unease‘. 
 
The introductory chapter presents the analytical and methodological building blocks. After the 
Copenhagen School, the study takes a constructivist perspective of security and crisis. It sees 
security as a way of framing a problem. Its perspective of regimes is inspired by Hilhorst‘s (2003) 
domains of knowledge and action in disaster response, which identifies three domains of 
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governance, expertise and local response. An adequate flood response would require these 
domains to be well—coordinated among themselves. A securitising move seeks to forge a 
consensus, but this cannot be relied on to work.  
 
The first empirical part of the dissertation consists of two case Middle East studies of river 
development. While the hydro-politics in the Nile and Euphrates-Tigris have often been 
described, the role of their current projects has not. 
Chapter 2 introduces Egypt‘s Toshka Project. Now that it has closed off the Nile with the 
Aswan dam, Egypt treats floods as an opportunity to create a ‗new civilisation‘ in the Southern 
Desert to create living space for millions of Egyptians and increase food security by ‗greening the 
desert‘. As Egypt is a highly controlling state and hardly anyone lives in the area to be colonised, 
one would not expect conflict to arise. However a national cash crisis triggered questions in 
Egyptian Parliament over the good sense of the mammoth undertaking. 
The chapter ponders the role of Toshka in hegemonic basin politics. Ethiopia fears that 
Toshka creates facts on the ground that will be advantageous in the inevitable renegotiation of 
Nile agreements between the river‘s riparians. Other Nile states seek a better allocation deal but 
run up against Egypt appears willing to reconsider the status quo, but makes sure its power 
position is maintained. 
Chapter 3 sketches the conflict over the Ilısu Dam. Turkey, a former empire that has learned 
to be a republic, has embarked on a series of dams and irrigation systems known since 1977 as 
the GAP project. After a series of dams on the Euphrates, the large Ilısu hydro-electric dam was 
the first major scheme on the Tigris. Downstream protests, fearing Turkish control of the river, 
did not change Turkey‘s mind, but an international NGO coalition successfully halted the dam. 
Their main complaint: the dam would flood dozens of Kurdish villages including the culturally 
important town of Hasankeyf. The campaign soon escalated into ‘water wars‘ language. In 2006 
the dam project was restarted, but the struggle continues. 
Chapter 4 compares the cases of upstream Turkey and downstream Egypt in light of three 
global water narratives: water wars, water peace and hegemonic struggle. The two states have 
controlled the floods but are struggling to control the countryside. Both are hegemonic actors in 
their basin, both states have absolute command within their territory, but neither can afford to 
ignore the international community. This induces both states to liberalise their water sectors and 
carry through social reforms and entering into co-operative regimes with their riparian 
neighbours. The analysis questions the currently hegemonic ‗water peace‘ analysis which suggests 
the water issue has become ‗desecuritised‘ in both basins. It concludes that security mode lives 
side by side with non-security tendencies, while the negative effects of both securitised and 
desecuritised modes continue to be fought in another type of ‗water war‘: the struggle against the 
‗enclosure‘ of global resources. An Appendix applies the three narratives to basin regime 
formation, which brings a more multifaceted story of conflict and co-operation. 
 
The second part of the study looks at four flood protection schemes in ‗wet‘ river basins. 
Chapter 5 traces the rise and fall of the Flood Action Plan-20 in Tangail, Bangladesh. After the 
destructive floods of 1987 and 1988, the international community decided to fund a Flood 
Action Plan, of which the Dutch- and German-funded compartmentalisation project was to 
become the flagship. The project intended to introduce a system for subdividing polders into 
compartments, each with its own water management committee on the east bank of the Jamuna 
river. The project team was soon confronted by angry masses. This raised questions in the 
donors‘ parliaments, review missions and a review of the project. The analysis shows that the 
project was not as bad as it has been depicted by the NGO coalition, and how its mission was 
adapted several times. It was discontinued in 2000 when sea-level rise appeared the more pressing 
problem, but the compartmentalisation concept appears to get a second life in the Southeast of 
the country. 
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Chapters 6 and 7 look at two river management interventions in the Netherlands. Famous for 
its ‗fight against the water‘, the country‘s security preparedness was flagging in the 1980s after 
protesters decried the loss of natural and cultural values due to dike raising. The Maaswerken, in 
the southern province of Limburg, sought to combine the regeneration of the river Meuse with 
flood protection (Chapter 6). Because the Border Meuse is a gravel river, the sale of aggregates 
was expected to pay for the river restoration works. Initiated in the mid-eighties, the project 
languished for years but resurfaced when in 1993 and 1995 two high-water events shook the 
country. Post-flood, under ‗securitised‘ rules, everything was possible, but when the security 
window closed a few years later, the project ran into different kinds of trouble because decisions 
taken in securitised mode were not acceptable in non-securitised mode. Especially anti-trust 
regulation and conflict over polluted aggregates led to lawsuits and parliamentary questions. 
Hoped-for ‗security‘ funding did not materialise, while unease with aggregate excavation, even for 
a ‗green security‘ project, persisted. 
Meanwhile on the Rhine, a project called Space for the River was initiated to widen the river to 
better accommodate high river discharges (Chapter 7). However worrying climate change 
scenarios impelled the Public Works department to consider an emergency plan for flood storage 
in ‗calamity polders‘. The Vice-Minister for Water Management in 2000 decided she badly needed 
this plan to boost her political profile. The designated areas responded badly to the news and 
commissioned counter-expertise. In response, the department instated an advisory Commission 
to develop a convincing rationale for ‗controlled flooding‘. Its report however failed to convince 
polder dwellers, who mounted an all-out attack, leveraging counter-expertise and successfully 
targeting parliamentary parties. The Vice-Minister had to concede defeat and shelved the plan.  
Chapter 8 focuses on Britain, where flood control has not been a government concern, so that 
people have had to rely on self-help and market mechanisms (insurance). But in the 1980s the 
National Rivers Authority (now the Environment Agency) looked to protect the town of 
Maidenhead on the Thames and devised a pilot project – a ‗green‘ flood relief channel - for an 
integrated river management approach on the Thames. The Agency‘s application for planning 
permission generated much protest from villagers, counties and Eton College, and the project 
was ‗called‘ in by the Environment Minister in the early 1990s. However, the Agency was willing 
to accommodate many objections and launched an information campaign. Moreover, the floods 
of 1998 and 2000 increased the support base for river engineering works. In 2002 the channel 
was inaugurated and won many prizes, but in 2003 the channel‘s banks failed and downstreamers 
accused the EA of flooding them so as to save others.  
 
Chapter 9 pulls together the lessons from all six case studies. It engages with those strands in 
decision-making literature, such as Punctuated Equilibrium Theory, that predict crises like floods 
and flood projects to open windows of opportunities to change the status quo in the ‗policy 
regime‘. Only in the Netherlands, where floods are historically securitized, a near-flood event 
opened a window for securitization. Project initiators indeed make ‗securitising moves‘ to 
legitimise their project, because the ‗window of opportunity‘ for action is very short, but as the 
memory of the flood fades, so does the support base for engineering works. The flood issue may 
even disappear from the agenda as other concerns overtake it. Flood projects also bring 
opportunities to promote transformative projects that would otherwise not be politically feasible. 
But they are also foci for opponents against unwanted control. 
The Chapter again relies on three narratives, ‗war with water‘, ‗peace with water‘ and the local 
(anti-hegemony) view. Again, both securitized and desecuritised projects create conflicts with 
stakeholders who feel disadvantaged, put at risk or even abandoned as a result of the 
intervention. These however are not necessarily the most vulnerable groups, but those with good 
organizational and political skills. This should not detract from the need to protect marginalized 
groups instead of abandoning them to self-help.  
THE POLITICS OF FLOOD INSECURITY 
 
314 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
In closing, Chapter 10 feeds these findings from the case studies back to the security studies 
literature, arguing that it is not only authorities who can ‗speak security‘ but also affected citizens, 
NGOs and enterprises. Despite co-opting opponents into the decision-making regime, states will 
continue to find themselves confronted by countersecuritising moves and stories, polarising the 
debate. While the analysis perceives a welcome trend towards ‗desecuritisation‘ of flood policies, 
it argues that calling for desecuritisation alone does not do justice to people‘s fears and states 
have a role in attending to those. Rather, a judicious mix of security and non-security elements in 
the ‗integrated security chain‘ approach may indicate the way forward. 
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Samenvatting: Hoog spel om hoog water 
 
 
Overstromingen brengen vruchtbaarheid maar ook vernietiging met zich mee. De destructieve 
kant  van hoog water brengt vrees teweeg voor chaos en armoede. Overstromingspolitiek is 
daarom geen gewone politiek – het is veiligheidspolitiek. Overstromingen zijn ook 
crisismomenten voor het maatschappelijk bestel. Publieke verontwaardiging na een overstroming 
plaatst vraagtekens bij de legitimiteit van een overheidinstantie, die de schuld kan krijgen van 
ineffectieve waarschuwing of hoogwaterbescherming. Een overstroming legitimeert 
buitengewone maatregelen waarin normale regels niet opgaan. Er zal brede overeenstemming zijn 
over wat gedaan moet worden en een mandaat om dat snel te realiseren, ongeacht de kosten. 
Rivierwerken en overstromingsbeleid beogen overstromingsrampen te voorkomen. Civiel 
ingenieus ontwerpen vaak innovatieve kunstwerken en in toenemende mate ook 
participatieprocessen om hun plan met de betrokkenen te bespreken. Niettemin lijkt het 
onvermijdelijk dat zulke projecten gepolitiseerd raken. In deze studie stel ik dat de verdeling van 
veiligheid daarbij steeds van belang is.  
Het startpunt voor analyse in deze studie is het werk van Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1988), 
exponenten van de zogeheten ‘Kopenhagen School‘, die een stevige impuls heeft gegeven aan het 
veiligheidsdebat. Zij laten zien dat een bedreiging geen reële fenomenen is maar geconstrueerd 
zijn. Het ene thema kan onderwerp van veiligheidspolitiek worden (ge-securitised, „verveiligd‟), en 
daarmee buitengewone maatregelen legitimeren, terwijl het ander geen passeert zonder discussie. 
Omdat het doorgaans overheden zijn die de oorlog kunnen verklaren en noodtoestand uitroepen 
en politie, hulpdiensten leger kunnen inzetten. Maar als je de blik alleen richt op het vermogen 
van de staat om te verveiligen onderschat je het vermogen tot tegen-securitisation van andere actoren. 
Een poging tot verveiliging beoogt het debat kort te sluiten, waardoor bepaalde actoren en opties 
om de noodsituatie het hoofd te bieden. Hoogwaterprojecten brengen echter meer veiligheid 
voor sommigen dan voor anderen. Naarmate de tijd om nieuwe projecten op te tuigen begint af 
te lopen, gelden weer gewone regels, voorwaarden en verantwoordingsstructuren. 
Hoogwaterprojecten brengen dan politieke strijd over de verdeling van risico‘s, over wie door wie 
en tegen welke kosten moeten worden beschermd. Veiligheid en risico zijn strategisch gebruikte 
concepten die voor politiek gewin kunnen worden ingezet. Dit onderzoek probeert tot een 
samenhangende theorie en conceptualisering te komen van veiligheid en risico(-constructies) in 
het waterbeheer. 
De studie gaat over de politiek van hoogwaterveiligheid. Riviermanagers gaan niet (zoals 
sommigen voorspellen) de verantwoordelijkheid voor risicobeheer uit de weg, maar blijken er 
juist op gebrand de verantwoording op zich te nemen, waarbij ze de taal van angst en bedreiging 
spreken om de vraag voor hun beschermingsdiensten aan te zwengelen, terwijl burgers bereid 
blijken hun politieke rechten op te schorten en hun lot in handen te leggen van 
veiligheidsaanbieders. Het momenteel zo populaire ‗risicomanagement‘ verstevigt de greep op 
mensen met risicoprofielen, statistieken en subtiele prikkels. Verschillende liberale 
commentatoren zien hierin de voorbode van een Big Brother-staat met verontrustende 
consequenties voor burgerlijke vrijheden. Ondanks deze zorg beargumenteer ik in deze studie dat 
je het kind niet met het badwater moet weggooien. Met name in de rampensector is een ontveiligde 
vorm van governance moeilijk te realiseren. 
In deze dissertatie analyseer en conceptualiseer dus de manier waarop staten tussen 
crisisdenken (staat van beleg, noodbeleid) en kust-veiligdenkrn (normaal beleid)  in reactie op  
hoogwaterdreigingen. De manier waarop overstromingen worden beheerst is een weerslag van de 
manier waarop de maatschappij in elkaar zit. Daarom dient hoogwaterinfrastructuur  in een 
sociale, politieke en, economische context te worden beschouwd. De studie beschouwt zes 
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gelande interventies in de rivier in vijf landen, analyseert de rol van veiligheids- en risicodiscours 
in conflict and politisering van rivierprojecten. Niet alleen overheidsvertegenwoordiger maar ook 
tegenstanders die doeltreffend de taal van veiligheid kunnen spreken en politiek van de angst te 
bedrijven. 
 
Het inleidende hoofdstuk presenteert de conceptuele en methodologische bouwstenen. In 
navolging van de Kopenhagen School, gaat mijn onderzoek uit van een constructivistische 
benadering van veiligheid en crisis. Het beschouwt veiligheid als een manier om een probleem in 
te kaderen (framen). De opvatting van ‗regimes‘ is hier geïnspireerd door Hilhorst‘s (2003) drie 
domeinen van kennis en actie bij rampenbeleid: bestuur, expertise en locale respons. Om 
adequaat op een ramp in te springen dienen deze domeinen onderling goed gecoördineerd te zijn. 
Een verveiligingsinitiatief (securitising move) beoogt consensus te smeden, maar de initieftiefnemer 
kan er niet vanuit gaan die poging ook succesvol zal zijn.  
Het eerste empirische gedeelte van de dissertatie betreft twee gevalsstudies van 
rivierontwikkeling in het Midden-Oosten. Terwijl de waterpolitiek in de Nijl en Eufraat-Tigris al 
vaak zijn beschreven, geldt dit niet voor de huidige projecten. 
Hoofdstuk twee geeft een inleiding op het Toshka-project in Egypte. Nu de hoge Aswandam 
de Nijl heeft afgesloten, beschouwt Egypte hoog water als kans om een ‗nieuwe beschaving‘ in de 
Zuidwestelijke Woestijn. Om daarmee voor miljoenen Egyptenaren leefruimte te creëren voor 
miljoenen Egyptenaren en voedselzekerheid de ‗woestijn groen te maken‘. Aangezien de 
Egyptische staat de politiek in zijn greep heeft en nauwelijks iemand in het te koloniseren gebied 
woont, is conflict veel minder waarschijnlijk. Toen de bodem van de Egyptische schatkist echter 
in zicht kwam stelden Egyptische Parlementsleden vragen over de wijsheid van een dergelijke 
mammoetonderneming. 
Dit hoofdstuk beschouwt de rol van Toshka in hegemoniale stroomgebiedpolitiek. Ethiopië 
vreest dat Egypte het land voor voldongen feiten stelt die goed van pas zullen komen bij 
toekomstige onderhandelingen tussen de oeverburen vaan de Nijl. Andere Nijlstaten wensen een 
betere verdeelsleutel. Egypte lijkt bereid de status quo opnieuw te bezien zolang haar machtspositie 
behouden blijft.  
Hoofdstuk drie beschrijft het conflict over de Ilısudam. Turkije, voorheen een keizerrijk, heft 
moeten leren zich al een republiek te gedragen. Het is een reeks dammen en irrigatiesystemen, 
sinds 1977 onder de gezamenlijke noemer GAP. Nu de dammen aan de Eufraat er staan, is de 
waterkrachtcentrale bij Ilısu, het eerste grote project aan de Tigris. De benedenstroomse Irakezen 
vrezen dat Turkije zijn greep op de rivier wil vergroten. Hun protest liet de Turken koud, maar de 
een internationale coalitie van ngo‘s wist de dam wel met succes tegen te houden. Hun 
belangrijkste bezwaar gold de overstroming van tientallen Koerdische nederzettingen, waaronder 
het historisch belangrijke stadje Hasankeyf. De campagne liep uit op ongegronde 
waarschuwingen tegen een dreigende wateroorlog. In 2006 werd het damproject opnieuw gestart, 
maar de tegenstand blijft. 
Het vierde hoofdstuk vergelijkt het waterveiligheidsbeleid van het bovenstrooms Turkije met 
die van het benedenstroomse Egypte, tegen het licht van drie mondiale watervertogen: 
wateroorlog, watervrede en hegemoniale strijd. De twee staten hebben de rivier onder controle 
maar hebben meer moeite het platteland in bedwang te houden. Beide mogendheden zijn 
hegemoniale actoren in hun stroomgebied, beide hebben de absolute zeggenschap binnen hun 
territorium, maar geen van beiden kunnen het veroorloven zich doof te houden voor de 
internationale gemeenschap. Dit brengt beide staten ertoe hun watersector te liberaliseren en 
sociale hervormingen door te voeren en samenwerkingsregimes te initiëren met hun oeverburen. 
De analyse leidt tot vraagtekens bij het momenteel heersende vertoog van ‗watervrede‘, dat de 
indruk wekt dat in beide stroomgebieden het waterthema ontveiligd is, dat wil zeggen, geen thema 
van conflict. Eerder kan gesteld worden dat crisis- en normale modus gelijk optrekken, terwijl de 
negatieve effecten van ontveiliging een ander soort wateroorlog doen ontbranden: een wereldwijde 
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strijd van mensenrechten- en milieuorganisaties tegen de toe-eigening van waterbronnen, hetzij 
door de staat, hetzij door de markt. Een aanhangsel past deze verhaallijnen toe op regimevorming 
op stroomgebiedniveau, hetgeen een rijker geschakeerd begrip van samenwerking en conflict 
oplevert. 
 
Het tweede deel van deze studie bekijkt vier hoogwaterplannen in ‗natte‘ stroomgebieden. 
Hoofdstuk vijf gaat de opkomst en ondergang van Flood Action Plan-20 in Tangail (Bangladesh). 
Na de verwoestende overstromingen van 1987 en 1988 besloot de internationale gemeenschap 
tot een veelomvattend Flood Action Plan, waarvan het door de Nederlanders en Duitsers 
gefinancierde compartimenteringproject de vaandeldrager zou worden. Dit project beoogde een 
systeem waarbij polders worden onderverdeeld in compartimenten net elk hun eigen ‗waterschap‘ 
aan de oostoever van de Jamunarivier. Het projectteam zag zich spoedig gesteld tegen boze, 
veelal vrouwlijke demonstranten. Dit leidde tot debat onder parlementsleden in de donorlanden 
en zond evaluatiemissies. 
Hoofdstukken zes en zeven beschouwen twee ingrepen in Nederlandse rivieren. Nederland is 
weliswaar beroemd om de ‗strijd tegen het water‘, maar had de paraatheid voor 
overstromingsgevaar in de jaren tachtig minder aandacht gegeven als gevolg van milieuactivisme. 
De Maaswerken in Limburg beoogden de Grensmaas een nieuwe natuurimpuls te geven in 
combinatie met bescherming tegen hoogwater (hoofdstuk zes). Omdat de Grensmaas een 
grindrivier is, werd aangenomen dat het project kostenneutraal kon worden uitgevoerd, 
gefinancierd uit opbrengst van grondstoffenverkoop. Het plan dateert al van medio jaren tachtig, 
maar bleef jarenlang op de plank liggen tot de hoogwaters van 1993 en 1995 het land deden 
opschrikken. Meteen na het hoogwater leek alles mogelijk, maar toen een paar jaar later het 
momentum verslapte, raakte het project in de moeilijkheden: beslissingen die vlak na een 
noodsituatie gelegitimeerd leken, stuitten op weerstand onder ‗normale‘ omstandigheden. Met 
name de aanbesteding en de verwekring van vervuild rivierslib leidde tot rechtszaken en 
Kamervragen. De overheid weigerde de noodfondsen toe te kennen waar op de provincie 
Limburg op rekende. Tenslotte bleef onder de burgerij de onvrede met grootschalige 
ontgrondingen voortduren. 
Intussen werd aan de Rijn het project Ruimte voor de River opgestart om hoogwater beter te 
kunnen accommoderen (hoofdstuk zeven). Zorgelijke klimaatscenario‘s brachten Rijkswaterstaat 
er echter toe noodoverloopgebieden aan te wijzen. De staatssecretaris besloot in 2000 dat ze dit 
plan dringend nodig had om imago van haar beleidsveld, het hoogwaterbeheer, op te krikken. De 
aangewezen gebieden reageerden negatief op het nieuws en lieten tegenonderzoek doen. Het 
ministerie reageerde daarop met de instelling van een adviescommissie om een overtuigende 
onderbouwing voor noodoverloop en keuze van de meest geschikte calamiteitenpolders‘. De 
Commissie-Luteijn wist de polderbewoners niet te overtuigen. Zij gingen frontaal in de aanval, 
zette tegenonderzoek in en richtte zijn pijlen op de Kamerfracties. De staatssecretaris zag zich 
genoopt de strijd op te geven en legde het noodoverloopplan in de ijskast. 
Hoofdstuk acht richt zich op Engeland, waar hoogwaterbeleid lang geen overheidstaak is 
geweest; burgers moesten maar roeien met de riemen die ze hadden, dan wel op de markt 
(verzekeringen) vertrouwen. In de jaren tachtig probeerde de National Rivers Authority (de 
huidige Environment Agency) het stadje Maidenhead aan the Theems te beschermen en bedacht 
een proefproject – een ‗groene‘ nevengeul om vandaaruit tot een integraal waterbeheersplan voor 
de Theems te komen. Voor dit project diende de Agency zelf toestemming voor een ingreep in 
het ‗Groene Hart‘ te krijgen, en werd daarmee mikpunt van tegenstand van graafschappen, 
gemeenten en het befaamde Eton College. Dit leidde uiteindelijk begin jaren ‘90 tot 
hoorzittingen. De Agency bleek bereid vele bezwaren te accommoderen en startte een 
voorlichtingscampagne. Dankzij de overstromingen van 1998 en 2000 nam het draagvlak voor 
ingrepen toe. De nevengeul werd in 2002 ingehuldigd als het Jubilee Channel en won vele prijzen, 
maar toen in 2003 de natuurlijke oevers afbrokkelden en benedenstrooms huizen waterschade 
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ondervonden, beschuldigden de benedenstroomse bewoners de EA onder water te hebben gezet 
om anderen te beschermen.  
 
Hoofdstuk negen trekt lering uit de zes gevalsstudies. Het hoofdstuk past stromingen uit de 
besluitvormingsliteratuur toe, met name Punctuated Equilibrium Theory, die voorspelt dat zowel 
overstromingen als hoogwaterprojecten kansen bieden om het ‗beleidsregime‘ te veranderen. 
Alleen in Nederland, waar overstromingen van oudsher zijn verveiligd, schiep een bijna-
overstroming een kans om noodbeleid te voeren. Maar in alle gevallen probeerden voorstanders 
van rivierinterventies hun project met verveiligingsdiscours te legitimeren, omdat de ruimte om actie 
te ondernemen erg kort is. Naarmate de herinnering aan de overstroming vervaagt, neemt ook de 
steun voor technische ingrepen af. Het hele hoogwaterthema kan van de agenda verdwijnen 
naarmate andere problemen belangrijker worden geacht. Hoogwaterprojecten bieden tevens de 
mogelijkheid economische of natuurontwikkelingsprojecten aan te zwengelen die anders politiek 
niet haalbaar zouden zijn. Naar zulke projecten zijn tevens mikpunt van verzet tegen ongewenste 
controle. 
Dit hoofdstuk mikt wederom op deze  vertogen ‗oorlog met water‘, ‗vrede met water‘ en ‗strijd 
over risico‘. Wederom gesecuritisede en gedesecuritisede projecten conflicten met 
belanghebbenden die zich benadeeld voelen, in gevaar gebracht of zelfs verlaten door de ingreep.  
 
Dit zijn niet per se de meest kwetsbare groepen, maar goed georganiseerde groepen die weten 
hoe je de politiek moet benaderen om je zin te krijgen. Dat doet niet af aan de noodzaak 
zwakkere groepen te beschermen tegen extreme rampen in plaats van ze aan hun lot over te 
laten. 
Hoofdstuk tien tenslotte verbindt de bevindingen uit de gevalsstudies met de literatuur over 
veiligheidsstudies. Het stelt dat niet alleen autoriteiten veiligheidsdiscours bezigen maar ook 
betroffen burgers, ngo‘s en bedrijven. Ook al proberen ze nogal eens tegenstanders in het 
besluitvormingsregime in te lijven blijven staten zich tegenover countersecuritising moves gesteld 
zien waardoor het debat op scherp wordt gesteld. Hoewel ik een welkome tendens tot 
‗desecuritisation‘ (‗ontveiliging‘) van hoogwaterbeleid signaleer, stel ik dat desecuritisation zowel geen 
recht doet aan de angst van mensen voor bedreigingen die hun incasseringsvermogens te boven 
gaan en dat zij er op rekenen dat de staat een rol speelt bij de respons daarop. Een afgewogen 
combinatie van veiligheidsbeleid en normale elementen van besluitvorming in de ‗integrale 
veiligheidsketen‘-benadering lijkt daarbij perspectief te bieden. 
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